R. v. C.V.S. Date:, 2010 BCPC 71

Citation: R. v. C.V.S. Date: 20100430 2010 BCPC 0071 File No: 8123 Registry: Kamloops IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Youth Criminal Justice Act REGINA v. CVS REASONS FOR SENTENCE OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE S. D. FRAME Counsel for the Crown: Alexandra Janse Counsel for the Defendant: Aaron Sam Place of Hearing: Kamloops, B.C. Date of Hearing: April 6, 2010 Date of Judgment: April 30, 2010 [ 1 ] CVS appears before me for sentencing on guilty pleas he entered very early on in these proceedings relating to the repeated sexual assaults of his very young cousin, C.

CVS has agreed the offending included repeated oral sex, touching and one instance of attempted anal penetration. [ 2 ] The Crown has asked for a designation of serious violent offence and seeks six months in custody together with a two year probation period.

The defence seeks a non-custodial sentence and maintains that this is not a serious violent offence. [ 3 ] Considering the very unpleasant task his young victim would have had to appear and testify, it is a strong mitigating factor that CVS has entered this guilty plea particularly given the family connection. [ 4 ] That being said, the offence is an appalling one. Although no Victim Impact Statement is available, the offending was discovered when the young victim himself attempted a similar act upon another child.

The facts revealed that CVS was using bribery and threats in a very predatory manner to groom his young victim. [ 5 ] I must determine if this is a violent offence given that such a finding would make jail an option on sentencing. I must also determine whether this is a serious violent offence, such that a deferred custody and supervision order is not available. [ 6 ] It is clear this is a violent offence. The psychological impact and the obvious by-product in C.’s behaviour make it clear that the requisite harm has been done.

This is obvious not only from his own victim’s conduct, but by the obvious results of CVS’s own too- early sexualisation. [ 7 ] The question of whether it is a serious violent offence is much more difficult. Neither “serious violent offence” nor “violent offence” are defined in the Youth Criminal Justice Act or the Criminal Code . [ 8 ] The Supreme Court of Canada, in R. v. C.D., 2005 SCC 78 (CanLII) , [2005] 3SCR 668 , defined the term “violent offence” found in Section 39(1)(

a) of the YCJA . A violent offence must be defined as an offence in the commission of which a young person causes,

attempts to cause or threatens to cause bodily harm. Bodily harm is not limited to physical injury but can include psychological harm as well. [ 9 ] I was provided with a decision from the Northwest Territories R. v. T.F. 2008 NWTTC 11 (CanLII) , [2008] NWTJ No. 66 , where the court summarized C.D . as follows: 9. The term “bodily harm” used by the Supreme Court of Canada in C.D. includes both physical and psychological harm. In C.D . , the majority, in defining the related term “serious violent offence”, referred to its previous judgment R. v. McCraw , 1991 CanLII 29 (SCC) , [1991] 3 SCR 72 , in which the term “serious bodily harm”, previously used in s. 264.1(1)(

a) of the Code, was considered. At para. 20, the majority in C.D. noted: ... Although the concept of “bodily harm” is not defined in the YCJA , s. 2(2) of this Act states that “[u]nless otherwise provided, words and expressions used in this Act have the same meaning as in the Criminal Code .”

Section 2 of the Criminal Code defines “bodily harm” as “any hurt or injury to a person that interferes with the health or comfort of the person and that is more than merely transient or trifling in nature”. In R. v. McCraw , 1991 CanLII 29 (SCC) , [1991] 3 SCR 72 , Cory J., writing for a unanimous Court, relied on this definition of “bodily harm”, as well as the dictionary definition of “serious”, to interpret the meaning of “serious bodily harm” for purposes of s. 264.1(1) (

a) of the Criminal Code as it was worded before February 15, 1995. Specifically, Cory J. held that “serious bodily harm” is “any hurt or injury, whether physical or psychological, that interferes in a substantial way with the physical or psychological integrity, health or well-being of the complainant” ... [emphasis added] [ 10 ] I am grateful to counsel for providing me a number of decisions following the hearing which address the “serious” aspect of this violent offence. Unfortunately, those cases are extremely difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile with the language in McCraw .

In the decision of my brother Judge Gove, R. v. R.A.A., 2003 BCPC 212 , the Crown asked the court to make a finding of serious violent offence. Judge Gove referred to R. v. C.(D.L.) 2003 CanLII 32877 (NL PC) , [2003] N.J. No. 94 (Nfl. Prov. Ct.) and to Professor Nicholas Bala’s text, Youth Criminal Justice Law , as follows: 18 I am not aware of any judicial determination as to “serious violent offence” or “violent offence” decided under the Youth Criminal Justice Act , except for the recent decision of R v. C.(DL), a decision in the Newfoundland Provincial Court of Gorman, PCJ.

Judge Gorman does a thorough analysis of the law, and says at paragraph 61: It is not necessary for the court, in this case, to provide a definitive definition of what will and what will not constitute a violent offence. 19 Then the meaning of subsection 39(1)a of the Act: It is suffice to say that it does not require that the offence involve the application or attempted application of physical force. Such a definition would be overly narrow.

For instance, uttering a threat to rape someone could constitute a violent offence. 20 Professor Nicholas Bala, in his text Youth Criminal Justice Law , Irwin Law, says at page 492: A “serious violent offence” usually involves significant physical injury to the complainant, or an attempt to cause injury. A sexual assault involving significant psychological injury will also be a “serious violent offence”. The definition of “serious violent offence” relies on the concept of “serious bodily harm”, which is not defined in either the YCJA or the Criminal Code . In R. v.

McGraw 1991 CanLII 29 (SCC), [1991] 3 SCR 72 , The Supreme Court of Canada held that the phrase refers to “any hurt or injury that interferes in a grave or substantial way with the physical integrity or well-being of the complainant,” and includes a rape even if there is no physical injury. 21 Bala goes on at page 493: Section 42(9) of the YCJA is discretionary: the youth justice court is empowered to determine the offence is a serious violent offence, but need not do so. [ 11 ] In that case, Judge Gove did not conclude that there was a violent offence and therefore did not designate it to be a serious violent offence. [ 12 ] In R. v.

R.(C.I.) 2004 CarswellBC 577 , 2004 BCPC 53 , [2004] BCWLD 592 , my brother Judge Davis was also asked to designate a sexual offence as a serious violent offence. Judge Davis had before him allegations of vile sexual assaults and victim impact statements showing that the young victim was left with significant fearful and even terrified reactions to older children. At paragraph 20 of Judge Davis’ decision, he includes a citation from other cases, particularly the passage from Justice Abella’s decision in R. v. Stuckless : 28 The learned justice goes on to quote from Justice Abella’s decision in R. v.

Stuckless (1998), 1998 CanLII 7143 (ON CA) , 17 CR (5 th ) 330 (Ont CA) at page 344-45 as follows: Sexual abuse is

an act of violence. When committed against children, the violence is both physical and profoundly psychological. It is coercive and exploitative conduct, and represents the use of compulsion against someone who is defenceless . [emphasis added] 29 I should note, however, that with respect to the present charge, the agreed upon facts do not allege a breach of trust as being a relevant factor for this Court to consider. 30 With respect, therefore, I reject defence counsel’s argument that I must have evidence on the record that a victim has suffered psychological harm before I may conclude that an offence is violent. In my opinion, the cases dealing with

section 150, 151 and 271 charges make it clear that with respect to sexual touching and assaults, they are by their very nature inherently violent even where a breach of trust is not present . [emphasis added]

[ 13 ] In my view Justice Abella’s reasons are couched in the very scope of the language in McCraw , which I must consider in determining whether an offence is a serious violent offence. [ 14 ] At paragraph 21, Judge Davis cites from Judge Dhillon’s decision in R. v. T.B.W as follows: 21. ... The Honourable Judge Dhillon in R. v. T.B.W . ( 2003 BCPC 256 BCPC) explains the seriousness of such a designation and says as follows: 17. It is my respectful view that a section 42(9) SVO determination is analogous to determining an aggravating fact or circumstance for sentencing purposes.

The SVO finding will have the potential for an adverse impact on the young person should there be further convictions in future. Under

section 2 of the YCJA , a “presumptive offence” for the purposes of adult sentencing includes a “serious violent offence” in addition to murder, attempted murder, manslaughter and aggravated sexual assault. And furthermore, at paragraph 27 the Honourable Judge Dhillon says: I note that many Criminal Code offences against the person have violence or the potential for violence as an underlying basis. In my respectful view, something more than conviction of an offence of violence is required before a judicial determination can be made that the offence is an SVO.

The underlying facts must support a finding of significant or serious harm. In this regard, I note that my colleague the Honourable Judge Gove cites Professor Nicholas Bala at paragraph 20 of his recent reasons in R. v. RAA , 2003 BCPC 212 that a “serious violent offence” usually involves significant physical injury to the complainant or an attempt to cause such injury. [ 15 ] Judge Davis concluded that he needed something more than what was before him to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the information ought to be endorsed with the designation of a serious violent offence. [ 16 ] R. v.

H.(P.) 2004 CarswellOnt 5645 , is a decision of Clark J. of the Ontario Court of Justice which considers the impact of designating a matter as a serious violent offence: 13. Given the objectives of the Act, one could argue that a finding of serious violent offence must be reasonably narrow in its application. It should be directed to those youths who pose the greatest threat to the physical and psychological integrity of members of society. Such a finding can be onerous. The serious violent offence designation continues to exist as long as the young person’s record exists.

It marks or stigmatizes the young person with a unique negative characteristic. It is intended to alert and thereby deter the young person from similar activity. It also creates a potential for more punitive sanctions for future offences by removing the young person’s prima facie right to be sentenced as a youth rather than as an adult. [ 17 ] In other words the considerations go beyond the offence itself and the victim in particular, to the accused and whether he poses the greatest threat to the physical and psychological integrity of members of society.

The designation is punitive and therefore these considerations must be addressed. [ 18 ] Justice Clark considered the same passages from Nicholas Bala’s text, R. v. McCraw , (1991) 1991 CanLII 29 (SCC) , 7 CR (4th) 314 , 128 NR 299 , 66 CCC (3d) 517 , R. v. Stuckless , and R. v. K.(T.) About the latter decision, he said this: 22. In the case of R. v. K.(T.), [2003 CarswellOnt 2768 (Ont.

C.J.) ], unreported, dated May 26 th , 2003, (see Youth Criminal Justice manual, Justice Harris at number 42.190030), the court determined that forced intercourse on a 12 year old complainant with ensuing psychological effects was a serious violence offence although the court declined to make a formal designation as the offence occurred under the previous Young Offenders Act prior to the proclamation in force of the The Youth Criminal Justice Act . Therefore section 11(1) of The Charter applied in any event to preclude such a designation being made.

This case appears to more clearly identify what constitutes a serious violent offence, at least to the extent that forced intercourse, (i.e. penetration) would likely be considered as a significant and profound and therefore serious physical violation. Moreover, it could be argued that the psychological trauma to the complainant would also be serious. [ 19 ] He then went on to consider Judge Davis’s decision in R. v. R.(C.I.) , supra and said this: 24. The finding in this case is arguably unusual or even perverse since the facts would appear to meet the definition of serious violent offence.

One might have thought therefore, that in addition to significant physical harm from the anal intercourse that it would be reasonable to conclude that the complainant would have suffered significant psychological or emotional harm. It would also appear therefore, that although evidence need not be called to establish a violent offence of a sexual nature as psychological harm is deemed to have been occasioned to a complainant, it is a condition precedent to a serious violent offence designation. [ 20 ] In reconciling the cases, Judge Clark said this: 26.

The present state of the case law therefore dealing with sexual assaults, sexual touching and sexual interference suggests that these are all inherently violent acts which at best trigger consideration for a custodial disposition under section 39(1)(a). Moreover, direct evidence of psychological trauma to the complainant is not required as these inherently violent acts are deemed to spawn ensuing psychological harm to the complainant as per Stuckless and A.(E.S.). 27. To make a finding of a serious violent offence in sexual matters would seem to require more. R. v.

K.(T.) seems to suggest that forced intercourse is in and of itself serious bodily harm, and that this must have spawned equivalent psychological effects to the complainant sufficient to meet the threshold for a serious violent offence designation. However the R.(C.I.) case decided more than one year later would appear to require establishing beyond a reasonable doubt not only significant and serious physical bodily harm but also an equivalent measure of psychological harm to also constitute serious bodily harm.

This must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt with first person evidence or hearsay evidence from reliable sources, that is, parents of a minor child and medical or psychological evidence where appropriate or necessary. Although McCraw seems to suggest that either significant physical or psychological hurt is sufficient to establish serious bodily harm and thereby a violent offence, R.(C.I.) seems to suggest that both significant physical and psychological hurt are required to establish a serious violent offence designation.

[ 21 ] I reject that part of Clark, J.’s decision as it simply does not accord with McCraw or R. v. R.(C.I.) which appear to be the genesis of his comment. [ 22 ] In 2004, in a decision of the Alberta Provincial Court in R. v. G.(M.G.), the court made these observations while considering an attempt to cause serious bodily harm: 16.

With regard to the matter of “attempt to cause serious bodily harm”, it seems to me that when no serious bodily injury actually occurs, the Court may only find an attempt at such, if it is satisfied beyond doubt that the accused intended to cause serious injury and took a step or steps to that end.

For example, in a case where the accused shoots at someone with a firearm capable of causing death or significant bodily injury, but misses, it would be open to the Court to conclude that by shooting at the individual with such a weapon, he intended to cause serious bodily harm, given the capability of the weapon he was using. Clearly an offence that does not cause serious bodily harm, or where an attempt to cause harm would likely only cause “bodily harm” as opposed to “serious bodily harm”, no SVO designation can be made. 20.

Justice Cory concluded that a threat of rape in the context of the circumstances of the McCraw case, to the reasonable person, would constitute a threat to cause “serious bodily harm” to the recipient of that threat. He described the seriousness of a threat of rape as follows: Violence and the threat of serious bodily harm are indeed the hallmarks of rape. While the bruises and physical results of the violent act will often disappear over time, the devastating psychological affects may last a lifetime. It seems to me that grave psychological harm could certainly result from

an act of rape. 21. With respect to the psychological impact of a rape, he further noted: ...To ignore the fact that rape frequently results in serious psychological harm to the victim would be a retrograde step, contrary to any concept of sensitivity to the application of the law. In my view, there can be no conclusion other than that rape can cause serious bodily harm. It follows that the threat to rape may well, depending on the context and circumstances, constitute a threat to commit serious bodily harm contrary to the provision of s. 264.1(1) (

a) of the Criminal Code . ... 32. It is certainly possible to infer serious bodily harm (serious psychological harm), to a victim, without direct evidence, in circumstances where the unlawful sexual invasion was accomplished by threats of death or physical injury or actual acts of violence used to induce the victim’s co-operation... 33. Having regard to the restrictive definition of “serious violent offence” and its intended narrow application, (see comment of Ritter J.A. in R. v.

D.(C.), at para . 40) in the absence of direct evidence of serious psychological harm, although recognizing that an inference of psychological harm, as that term is broadly understood, may be inferred in cases of sexual interference and intrusion, no inference of psychological or emotional harm such as to constitute serious bodily harm and thereby justify an SVO designation, should be made except when the circumstances surrounding the intrusion and the degree of intrusion in combination, lead the Court to conclude beyond doubt that such harm is the only reasonable, rational conclusion. [ 23 ] Clearly physical harm does not have to be present in order to find serious psychological harm. [ 24 ] In R. v.

T.C. [2006] N.W.T.J. No. 21 , a decision of the Northwest Territories Youth Court, Judge Schuler made this observation: 16. Any sexual assault on a child is serious and is a significant threat to the child’s well-being. Although there is no victim impact statement from the victim on count 1, the information in the pre-sentence report makes it clear that the victim has encountered problems not just in dealing with what happened to her, but also because of the negative reaction of some family members towards her. There is no question that forcing a little girl to do what Mr.

C. made her do would have a long-term, traumatic effect on her. [ 25 ] Conversely, in R. v. T.F. , 2008 NWTTC 11 (CanLII) , [2008] NWTJ No. 66 , Judge R. D. Gorin of the Northwest Territories Youth Court, made this observation at paragraph 14: The Crown suggests that s. 39(1)(

a) of the YCJA applies in all cases of sexual assault. Alternatively it suggests that the subsection applies in all cases of sexual assault on a child. I reject both suggestions. Sexual assault is the intentional application of force of a sexual nature on another person without that person’s consent. Consequently, s. 271 of the Criminal Code prohibits a broad range of misconduct. Both the seriousness and the impact of sexual assaults on victims can vary greatly. Based on the wide ambit of s. 271 as well as the case law I have previously referred to, I conclude that in order for s. 39(1)(

a) of the YCJA to apply, the Crown must specifically prove that “bodily harm”, within the meaning of s. 2 of the Criminal Code was caused, attempted or threatened. Proving that a sexual assault on an adult or child has occurred does not by itself relieve the Crown of this obligation. [ 26 ] Something more, then, than the presumption of psychological harm is required to establish that this is a serious violent offence. [ 27 ] What then is the evidence of a hurt or injury, physical or psychological, that has interfered in a substantial way with the physical or psychological integrity, health or well-being of C.?

There is no Victim Impact Statement provided. Although attempts were made to obtain one, none was forthcoming. There is certainly some evidence of physical harm arising from the pain felt on the attempted anal penetration. In the Psycho-Social Assessment, CVS disclosed to the psychiatric social worker that he began sexually abusing C. when he himself was around the age of thirteen. He had sexual contact with C. at least twenty times over a period of eighteen months. He disclosed that he stopped whenever C. protested or was uncooperative.

Applying the test set out in the cases, this is clearly evidence of psychological harm such that this must be designated a violent offence. The question is whether I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the psychological harm is such that I must designate this a serious violent offence. [ 28 ] The Pre-Sentence Report prepared by the Youth Probation Officer reveals that CVS disclosed his cousin used to like to play his

video game. CVS would tell his cousin he had to submit to CVS’s demands if he wanted to keep playing the game and he cautioned the victim not to tell or they would both get into trouble. [ 29 ] In the Psychiatric Assessment, CVS admitted he would take down C.’s huggies and rub against him – sometimes naked and sometimes not. On one or two occasions he ejaculated in C.’s mouth. He attempted anal penetration once but C. said it hurt so CVS stopped.

Acknowledging the effect this must have on his young cousin, C., CVS disclosed that he would try to normalize his behaviour and reward his cousin by letting him play with his game or his Xbox. He also disclosed that if his cousin said he did not want to do it, “I just asked for one more time”.

CVS recognised “that the victim might be affected emotionally because Charles believes that he was affected ‘a lot’; ‘I don’t like to get touched a lot or tickled’.” CVS recognized in the Psychiatric Assessment that his cousin would mostly be affected mentally and also feels that the situation between them has become strained because they are not able to talk. [ 30 ] Throughout the reports, CVS recognized the impact on his young cousin because of the impact upon himself as a result of abuse he said he was subjected to.

He recognized his own fear and shame during both his assaults upon his cousin and during the sexual relations he had with his cousin’s older sister. The very great tragedy is that this is not the limit of the sexual abuse and over- sexualisation of members of his family. His own mother, his sister and his cousin have all fallen to the same fate.

It is clear that there is serious psychological harm done, that it is pervasive and that C. is another casualty. [ 31 ] Perhaps, though, the most significant indication of the very serious psychological harm CVS’s actions had on C. is C.’s own conduct, which led to the discovery of CVS’s offending. Six year old C. was playing with a three year old relative in a park when he took the child behind a nearby building. C. was discovered trying to take the young relative’s pants off and making sexual movements toward the three year old by pushing his body into him.

He clearly knew that what he was doing was wrong because when he was asked what he was doing, he ran away. The serious psychological harm imposed by CVS on C. has therefore extended beyond that psychological harm recognized by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Stuckless , into further victimization of even younger children. [ 32 ] I accept that a sexual assault on a child is a serious and significant threat to the child’s well-being. Even absent a victim impact statement, I am satisfied that there is a clear indication of a long-term, traumatic effect on C.

I accept Justice Abella’s assessment that sexual abuse committed against a child is profoundly, psychologically violent, coercive and exploitative. It is evident not only in the predatory nature in which CVS groomed his victim, but in the outcome represented by C.’s own conduct. This is a serious violent offence. [ 33 ] It is still within my discretion to determine whether it is appropriate to make the designation in this case based upon the youth before me. It is reflected in various reports I have referred to that CVS is deeply remorseful and ashamed of his actions.

He was himself sexualized as early as age four by a female cousin only two years older than him. He comes from a family deeply affected by sexual abuse, poverty, isolation and inappropriate parenting in his early years. Although his mother is attempting to cope with the insidious effects of the sexual abuse in her family, she is overwhelmed and unequipped to do so. The support CVS receives from his mother and step-father, though, bode well for his rehabilitation. [ 34 ] The degree of guilt and remorse CVS feels for his sexual offending are promising indicators for his rehabilitation.

However, his suicidal ideation from time to time indicates that a broad plan for therapy must incorporate not only the sexual offending but the mental health issues at play. [ 35 ] CVS is presently attending Four Directions School with good attendance and respectable grades. He appears to be enthusiastic and is responding well to the environment. This is in contrast to his prior inconsistent and fluctuating performance at his former schools. He has not resisted the counselling he has been sent to at school and was also cooperative and forthcoming in the preparation of the various reports.

He has demonstrated a desire to control his sexual impulses but has “many depressive indicators and a strong sense of inadequacy and his progress over the past year has been a fragile adjustment with an ongoing sense of impending breakdown” (taken from page 13 of the Psycho-Social Assessment). He has expressed that he hopes to be punished and seems to have a strong sense of disappointing his mother, family and community. [ 36 ] The programme manager of the Leadership Resiliency Programme at Four Directions Storefront School wrote a letter applauding the positive impact CVS has had at the school.

He is considered a role model, treats students and staff with respect and is positive. Joyce Shannon, the Youth Support Worker with Secwepemc Cultural and Education Society has known CVS for about eighteen months. She described him as polite, respectful and helpful. [ 37 ] With respect to CVS specifically, I have set out a number of factors governing me in this decision.

Additionally, I note that the psychiatric assessment, while it finds him to be at risk to reoffend given the extensive nature of his sexualisation, low self-esteem and inability to see himself as accepted in the community, also found that: Personality testing results indicate that Charles appears to be a good candidate for individual, insight oriented, psychotherapy, as well as guidance in acquiring skills for coping more effectively with his life.

His test responses also suggest that family therapy may be a critical component of treatment to address historical problems and ensure adequate emotional support in the future. [ 38 ] I accept the analysis set out by Justice Clark in R. v. H.P. that given the stigma and potential for punitive sanctions for future offences, a serious violent offence designation ought to be narrow in its application to those youths who pose the greatest risk to the physical and psychological integrity of members of society. CVS has left an indelible mark of that nature upon C.

There is no way to predict whether CVS will offend again in the future although the reports suggest he is at risk to reoffend. On the other hand, he has expressed significant insight, remorse, desire for punishment and rehabilitation, and has conducted himself in a manner which indicates that he is not, despite the offence, a youth who poses “the greatest threat”.

Therefore, although this offence has all the hallmarks of a serious violent offence, I decline to designate it as such in this case. [ 39 ] I must now determine what is the appropriate disposition given the offence, the background of the accused, the appropriate deterrence and the rehabilitative prospects for CVS. I must consider that the sentence must be proportionate to the seriousness of the offence. This offence was grave and the sentence imposed must reflect that.

However, I must also impose the least restrictive sentence capable of achieving the purposes of sentencing set out in Sections 3 and 38 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act , being the one most likely

to rehabilitate CVS and reintegrate him into society and to promote a sense of responsibility in CVS, as well as an acknowledgement of the harm he has done to his cousin and to his community. [ 40 ] In balancing the heinous nature of the crime, particularly its predatory nature, against the positive efforts, genuine remorse and very strong indicators that appropriate counselling for the rehabilitation of CVS is available, I am satisfied that an alternative to custody is available in the circumstances. [ 41 ] I therefore impose a period of probation for three years.

The terms of the probation are as follows: You shall keep the peace and be of good behaviour.

You shall appear before the Youth Justice Court when required to do so by the Court; You shall immediately report in person to the Youth Worker at the Youth Probation Office located at Kamloops, B.C. and after that you shall report as and when directed by the Youth Worker; You shall reside at a residence approved by the Youth Worker and you shall not change your residence or telephone number at any time without first obtaining the written consent of the Youth Worker; You shall obey the rules and regulations of your residence; You shall remain in the Province of British Columbia at all times, unless you have first obtained the written consent of the Youth Worker to go elsewhere; You shall have no contact or communication, directly or indirectly, with C.

Schooner, except with the advance written consent of the Youth Worker; You shall not possess or consume any alcohol or drugs, except as prescribed for you by a physician; You shall have no contact or communication, directly or indirectly, with nor be alone in the presence of any person you know to be, or who reasonably appears to be, of the age of 12 years or less, except as follows: (

a) unless accompanied and supervised by an adult approved of in writing in advance by the Youth Worker, or (

b) except you may have contact with your immediate family members provided that if they are under the age of 12 there is adult supervision approved in writing in advance by the Youth Worker; You shall not attend at any public park, school ground, daycare centre, swimming pool, playground, skating rink, community centre or recreational centre where persons of the age of 12 years or less are present or might reasonably be expected to be present, except in the presence of an adult third party, approved in writing in advance by the Youth Worker, or with a prior written authorization of your Youth Worker; You shall not possess any pornographic materials or have any pornographic materials in your home in any form including but not limited to magazines, photographs, videos, internet sites or downloads, or television programmes; You shall attend school regularly and not be absent except in accordance with either a medical certificate or the advance written consent of the Youth Worker; You shall attend, participate in and successfully complete any assessment, counselling or program as directed by the Youth Worker.

Without limiting the general nature of this condition, such assessment, counselling or program may relate to: (

a) A sexual offence prevention; (

b) A full-time attendance program for sex offenders; (

c) Psychological counselling through Youth Forensic Services or Child and Youth Mental Health Services; and You shall comply with all rules and regulations of any such assessment, counselling or programme; You shall attend at the RCM Police detachment at Kamloops, B.C. at 10:00 a.m. on May 6 in order for a sample or samples of your bodily substances to be taken for purposes of registration in the national DNA databank in accordance with the provisions of

Part XV of the Criminal Code . ____________________ S. D. Frame Provincial Court Judge