r v. Daher WANNA, 2021 QCCQ 520

R. c. Wanna 2021 QCCQ 520 COURT OF QUEBEC CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC DISTRICT OF MONTREAL «Criminal and Penal division » No: 500-01-141575-164 DATE: February 8, 2021 ______________________________________________________________________ BY THE HONOURABLE MYLÈNE GRÉGOIRE, JCQ ______________________________________________________________________ HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN Prosecutor v. Daher WANNA Accused ______________________________________________________________________ REASONS FOR SENTENCE ______________________________________________________________________ I.

OVERVIEW [ 1 ] In an oral judgment rendered on December 17, 2019, Daher Wanna (the accused) was found guilty of stealing from “FORTUS GROUP”, a Volvo truck and trailer of a value exceeding $5000, and extortion against his former employer, Mr. Ion Ioxa. [ 2 ] A full account of the evidence can be found in the judgment on the verdict. [ 3 ] For the purposes of sentencing, the following

summary will suffice. [ 4 ] In October 2015, the accused started working as a driver for the company FORTUS GROUP, property of Mr. Ion Ioxa, also acting as his employer. The accused was mainly doing Canada-USA shipments. [ 5 ] After a few weeks, the accused expressed to Mr. Ioxa that he was in need of more money and wanted to work additional hours. He was not satisfied with the work load, the loss of revenue incurred when returning with an empty load truck as well as the long lay over periods.

All of these reasons were making the accused lose money. [ 6 ] He indicated to his employer that if the situation remained the same, he would look for a new job. Mr. Ioxa offered him an alternative. [ 7 ] On January 4 th , 2016, through his company ANTO TRANSPORT, the accused signed with FORTUS GROUP a 23 months lease with option to purchase the 2013 VOLVO truck and trailer he was using for work (Exhibit P-1 and P-2). [ 8 ] Compliance with the terms of the agreement made it possible for the accused to eventually become the owner of the truck.

The contract also provided for the rental of the trailer #2212 under specific conditions of payment (Exhibit P-6). [ 9 ] Following a major disagreement with Mr. Ioxa in early February 2016, the accused refused to return the equipment (truck and

trailer) until his employer paid him what he considered his due, committing thereby the crimes of theft and extortion. [ 10 ] The truck and trailer were never recovered by the owner nor even found. II. EVIDENCE ON SENTENCING HEARING [ 11 ] Mr. Ion Ioxa did not wish to address the court on sentencing; he apparently did not deliver a “victim impact statement” in accordance with

section 722 of the Criminal code either. [ 12 ] The accused is 58 years old and has no criminal record. [ 13 ] He is a truck driver since 1999. [ 14 ] At the sentencing hearing, the accused took the stand and explained his current personal situation. [ 15 ] Since 2016, he acts as his father’s caregiver. He produced a letter to that effect [1] . [ 16 ] He has been on welfare since May 2018 and receives $814 per month. His expenses amount to $600 for his rent and car insurance. [ 17 ] According to the letter written by his family doctor, Dr.

Dolly Nahri, the accused suffers from rheumatologic issues preventing him from working [2] . However, the accused testified that he was waiting the present proceedings to end before he could return to work. [ 18 ] Upon presentation of an undated document [3] , the accused would be afflicted with other health issues subject to investigation [4] such as rheumatism, diabetes and cholesterol.

Attached to that document is a list of his medication. [ 19 ] The accused expressed remorse for what he did, stating he never thought he would go this far. [ 20 ] In response to his lawyer’s questioning, the accused established the financial loss of Mr. Ion Ioxa at approximately $65 000. [ 21 ] In cross-examination, he acknowledged that the value of the truck and trailer was equivalent to $75 000 ($60 000 for the truck and $15 000 for the trailer). [ 22 ] In his remarks, the accused’s lawyer referred the Court to the contract (Exhibit P-1) and argued that an amount of $68 999.87 was more accurate.

That amount represents the monthly payments ($2 608.69 x 23 payments) combined with the down payment of $9000 to be made at the end of the contract. [ 23 ] These calculations fail to take into account the value of the trailer which from the evidence retained, is established at $15 000. [ 24 ] I therefore conclude that there is evidence of a loss, beyond a reasonable doubt, for an amount of $75 000, which is also the most advantageous finding for the accused.

III. POSITION OF THE PARTIES [ 25 ] The prosecution recommends that a 12 months jail term should be imposed upon the accused along with a one-year probation with the specific condition to abstain from communicating in any manner with the victim, Mr.

Ion Ioxa. [ 26 ] With respect to the admissions of the accused regarding the loss incurred by FORTUS GROUP, the prosecution also requests the imposition of a “fine in lieu of forfeiture” ( s. 462.37 (3) of the Criminal Code ) for an amount of $75 000. [ 27 ] As for the defence, it recommends a sentence of 90 days of imprisonment to be served intermittently during weekends, as well as a probation order for a period of three years during which the accused would have to complete 240 hours of community services within a delay of 18 months. [ 28 ] Also, the defence opposes to the fine in lieu of forfeiture and proposes instead a restitution order of $6000 to be paid over a period of five years at a rate of $100 per month ( s. 738 of the Criminal Code ). [ 29 ] In support of their respective positions, Crown and defence counsels carried out a case law review on the matter [5] .

IV. SENTENCING PRINCIPLES [ 30 ] As set forth in s. 718 of the Criminal Code , the purpose of sentencing is to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions on the offender. The stated objectives of any sentencing decision includes denunciation, deterrence, rehabilitation, reparation for harm done, promotion of offender responsibility and acknowledgement of harm done. [ 31 ] Sentencing is not an exact science.

The emphasis to be given to each of these objectives will vary according to the offence for which the offender is being sentenced, the circumstances of the offence and the circumstances of the offender. [ 32 ] During the sentencing process, the Court’s function is to impose a sentence that is fit.

A fit sentence is one that does not exceed what is just and appropriate, given the moral blameworthiness of the offender and the gravity of the offence. [ 33 ] In this regard, the Court must evaluate the aggravating and mitigating circumstances as they relate to the commission of the offences or the situation of the accused. Furthermore, the sentence should be similar to what has been imposed on offenders dealing with analogous offences that were committed in comparable circumstances. V.

APPLICATION TO THE FACTS [ 34 ] The offender found guilty of theft over $5000, is liable to a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years. The offence of extortion provides for a maximum penalty of imprisonment for life. [ 35 ] These sentences reveal the intention of the legislator to see these offences at the top of the scale in regards of their objective seriousness.

Furthermore, the conditional sentence is no longer available for those who commit these crimes. [ 36 ] During sentencing hearing, there was an exchange between defence counsel and the Court as to whether the accused had committed a “breach of trust” likely to constitute an aggravating circumstance as the case law provides.

[ 37 ] The main argument of the defence relied on the fact that because the parties signed an agreement, there was no subordination link between them. Therefore, the accused was not the employee of Mr. Ion Ioxa but more of a partner. [ 38 ] At the end of my analysis on that aspect, I conclude the contrary. To illustrate my point, here are some remarks about the evidence withheld: ➢ In October 2015, the accused started to work as a driver “for” FORTUS GROUP, company owned by Mr.

Ion Ioxa. ➢ In January 2016, they signed an “internal lease contract” in order for the accused, in compliance of all terms and conditions of the agreement, to eventually become the owner of the truck and trailer. In the meantime, as the agreement stipulates, the accused is the “holder” of the truck. ➢ Both parties qualified the position held by the accused as being an “owner-operator”. ➢ Meanwhile, FORTUS GROUP remains the one giving the work to the accused, finding loads to transport. FORTUS GROUP is also providing the fuel cards (credit cards) and is in charge of the maintenance of the trailer.

Basically, the agreement foresaw several terms to accommodate the accused and render it possible for him to comply with the payments but most importantly, allow him to work. ➢ The accused is paid every two weeks by FORTUS GROUP; he is paid per mile, empty or loaded. The accused is also paid during layover days [6] . ➢ The motive invoked by the accused to retain the truck and trailer was based on the fact that Mr.

Ioxa owed him money. [ 39 ] Until the accused becomes the full owner of the truck and trailer and does business on his own, the Court judges that the money he received from FORTUS GROUP constitutes a “salary” for the work done. [ 40 ] The concept of “position of trust” must be defined, case by case, using the factual context.

We must not confuse that concept with the one dealing with the “position of authority” which could have a different meaning, like in sexual or physical abuse cases for example. [ 41 ] In the present matter, while not the typical employer-employee theft situation, the accused was, without a shadow of a doubt, in a position of trust in relation with FORTUS GROUP and Mr. Ion Ioxa. [ 42 ] In Sentencing , 9 th ed., Clayton Ruby distinguishes, for sentencing purposes, between two types of theft over $5000: theft committed by persons occupying a position of trust , and “other” theft over cases.

He notes that: [t]heft by persons occupying a position of trust are considered as a special category for sentencing purposes. Most convicted in such circumstances have no prior record and many come from a “good” background, replete with family, education, and community ties.

Factors most often taken into consideration are the value of the theft , the amount (if any) repaid, whether the offender profited directly from the enterprise, the length of time over which the operation took place and the nature of the theft (i.e., degree of planning and sophistication) [7] . [ 43 ] The sentencing principal dominating consideration in these cases is general deterrence. Absent exceptional circumstances, the period of incarceration is almost invariably given.

The range of sentence generally appears to be one to seven years [8] . [ 44 ] The circumstances of the offence of extortion can vary greatly, and so can the range of sentences. [ 45 ] The case law presents a range of sentence of 90 days to several years of imprisonment. In most cases, we find among the facts the use of verbal and/or physical violence to coerce the victim to comply with the demand. [ 46 ] Our file distinguished itself with the absence of violence. [ 47 ] On the other hand, the duration of the crime over several weeks, during which the accused kept threatening Mr.

Ioxa that he would never retrieve his equipment unless he got paid, appear as an aggravating factor.

[ 48 ] As for the theft, the fact that the offence of extortion was committed in a context of “breach of trust” is also aggravating. [ 49 ] Nevertheless, extortion is a crime of greed (at least in this case) which involves planning and some degree of sophistication, notwithstanding that the accused essentially took advantage of a target of opportunity to do justice to himself.

Individual and general deterrence is called for in relation to this offence and jail terms are commonly imposed. [ 50 ] Both parties presented their position in suggesting the same sanction on each count, being of opinion that we should see the events as being part of a continuum. VI. RESTITUTION ORDER, FORFEITURE ORDER, FINE IN LIEU OF FORFEITURE [ 51 ] The victim made no request for a restitution order under

section 738 of the Criminal code . It is the accused himself who offered a marginal reimbursement for a total amount of $6000 with instalment of $100 a month for the next five years. [ 52 ] On sentencing hearing, the prosecution provided the Court with a copy of a judgment of the Ontario Superior Court of justice rendered on November 25, 2016, in regards of a civil action taken by FORTUS GROUP against DAHER WANNA [9] . The Defendant was therefore ordered to pay to the Plaintiff a total sum of $172 505.84.

The Court also ordered that the Plaintiff “shall have interim possession and permanent recovery” of the truck and trailer. [ 53 ] The first page of Exhibit S-1(Form 31 “Proof of Claim”) tends to show that the Defendant (the accused) filed for bankruptcy somewhere around March 31, 2017. No additional information has been transmitted on this subject. [ 54 ] In Zelesky [10] , the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada expressed himself in these words: “ The Court's power to make a concurrent order for compensa​tion as part of the sentencing process is discretion​ary.

I am of the view that in exercising that discretion the Court should have regard to whether the aggrieved person is invoking s. 653 to empha​size the sanctions against the offender as well as to benefit himself. A relevant consideration would be whether civil proceedings have been taken and, if so, whether they are being pursued.

There are other factors that enter into the exercise of the discretion, such as the means of the offender, and whether the criminal court will be involved in a long process of assessment of the loss”. [ 55 ] Later in Fitzgibbon [11] , our highest Court explained the following in regards of a restitution order: It can be an effective means of rehabilitating the accused because this order quickly makes him directly responsible for making restitution to the victim. Indeed it will often be counsel for the accused who will suggest that a compensation order be made.

The order also benefits the victim by providing a speedy and inexpensive manner of recovering the debt. It requires no more of the victim than a request for the order. Society as a whole benefits from the order since its imposition may reduce the term of imprisonment and provides for the reintegration of the convicted person as a useful and responsible member of the community at the earliest possible date [12] . […] The net effect of the compensation order is simply to prove that the victims have a valid claim as unsecured creditors in the bankrupt's estate.

It does not give the victims priority over the other unsecured creditors. The compensation order can be made pursuant to [s. 653(1)] without obtaining the consent of the bankruptcy court. It is not until such time as the beneficiaries of the compensation order seek to proceed pursuant to [s. 653(2)] and register the order with the Superior Court of a province that they must first obtain the consent of the bankruptcy court [13] .

[ 56 ] In our file, the evidence is silent as to whether the civil judgment was executed or not, even partially. [ 57 ] There was no real debate either on the financial situation of the accused [14] , which is essential for determining whether or not such an order is appropriate. [ 58 ] In these circumstances, I will use my discretion to prevent any contradictory decisions and prevent any incongruity in an eventual execution of judgments. [ 59 ] The situation is quite different as to the fine in lieu of forfeiture. [ 60 ] First of all, even if the defence objects to the imposition of such a fine, it admits that the truck and trailer are subject to the definition of “proceeds of the crime obtained through the commission of the designated offence” as provided by

section 462.3 of the Criminal code . [ 61 ] Secondly, it recognizes that a forfeiture order should be imposed following the prescriptions of

section 462.37(1) of the Criminal code . [ 62 ] I could not better summarize the applicable principles in the matter than recently did my colleague Justice Mascia in Chandroo [15] . [111] An offender may be happy to serve time knowing that his or her assets will be available upon release, or that his or her family may continue to enjoy the proceeds of crime. The purpose of restitution orders, forfeiture orders and fines in lieu of forfeiture, therefore, is to ensure that crime does not pay.

In other words, the profit motive for criminal offences is removed through the identification, seizure and forfeiture of the proceeds of crime. [112] In the leading case of R . v. Lavigne , supra, the Supreme Court explained how the forfeiture provisions of the Criminal Code are distinct from the objectives of punishment: [16] Parliament’s intention in enacting the forfeiture provisions was to give teeth to the general sentencing provisions.

While the purpose of the latter provisions is to punish the offender for committing a particular offence, the objective of forfeiture is rather to deprive the offender and the criminal organization of the proceeds of crime and deter them from committing crimes in the future.

The severity and broad scope of the provisions suggest that Parliament is seeking to avert crime by showing that the proceeds of crime themselves, or the equivalent thereof, may be forfeited. [113] However, there are instances where this objective cannot be met by forfeiture of the proceeds of crime, i.e. such as when the property or money cannot be found, has been squandered or has been transferred to others.

In these cases, the objectives of s. 462.37 (to deprive offenders of the proceeds of their crimes and to deter them from committing future crimes) may still be met by the imposition of a fine against the offender in lieu of forfeiture.

The said provision is provided for at s. 462.37 (3) , which reads as follows: If a court is satisfied that an order of forfeiture under subsection (1) or (2.01) should be made in respect of any property of an offender but that the property or any part of or interest in the property cannot be made subject to an order, the court may, instead of ordering the property or any part of or interest in the property to be forfeited, order the offender to pay a fine in an amount equal to the value of the property or the part of or interest in the property.

In particular, a court may order the offender to pay a fine if the property or any part of or interest in the property; (

a) cannot, on the exercise of due diligence, be located; (

b) has been transferred to a third party; (

c) is located outside Canada;

(

d) has been substantially diminished in value or rendered worthless; or (

e) has been commingled with other property that cannot be divided without difficulty. [ 63 ] While such an order is technically part of the sentence, it is nevertheless distinguished by the fact that its purpose is to replace the proceeds of crime. It is not regarded as punishment specifically for the designated offence [16] . [ 64 ] With regard to the application of these provisions, a court has a limited discretion. [ 65 ] How does the Court determine the amount of the fine? [ 66 ] As the Supreme Court reaffirmed in Lavigne [17] , [35] “The fine, as that provision says, is equal to the value of the property.

Further, equivalency between the value of the property and the amount of the fine is inherent in the words “instead of”. The fine takes the place of forfeiture. For the substitution to be genuine, the value must be equal. The court’s discretion applies both to the decision whether or not to impose a fine and to the determination of the value of the property.

It must be exercised in light of the evidence, and once this process has been completed, the court may not take the offender’s ability to pay into consideration as a basis for deciding either to impose no fine or to reduce the amount of the fine”. [ 67 ] Defence counsel sustains in his written arguments that the criteria of

section 462.37(3)

a) of the Criminal code has not been met; that the prosecution did not exercise due diligence to locate the equipment. [ 68 ] The Court does not agree as the whole evidence shows the opposite. [ 69 ] According to the claims of the accused, Mr. Ioxa immediately started to look for the truck, calling the truck stop in Grand Forks, North Dakota, the last known destination of the accused. Nobody was able to locate the truck with the plate number. [ 70 ] Mr. Ioxa also went to Ottawa and searched the area without more success.

He then presented himself to the Ontario police Department, but they referred him to Quebec police. [ 71 ] Mr. Ioxa kept trying to call the accused almost every day to convince him to meet and discuss, but the accused didn’t want to make any compromise. He kept threatening Mr.

Ioxa by saying: “send me the money in my account, then we’ll meet and you will see the equipment”; “If you don’t give me the money, you’re not going to see the equipment ever again”. [ 72 ] On top of the steps taken by the victim, on March 12, 2016, S/D Yvon communicated with the Canadian border services and received the information that the accused entered Canada with the truck and trailer on February 6, 2016 around 2:00 PM. (Exhibit P-7) [ 73 ] The whole evidence demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused has always been in possession and control of the equipment: • beginning at the signature of the lease contract; • and still on February 6, 2016 when he crossed the Canadian border at 2:00 P.M.; (Exhibit P-7) • and at least up until March 10, 2016, which correspond to his last contact with Detective Yvon before his arrest, still promising to return the truck and trailer within 48 hours of the payment by Mr.

Ioxa. [ 74 ] In my reasons on verdict, I conclude that given the evidence (direct and circumstantial) and the absence of evidence, assessed logically, and in light of human experience and common sense, the only reasonable inference was that the accused never ceased to be in possession and control of the equipment. He was still offering even late in March 2016, to bring back the truck and trailer within a short

delay. In fact, he is the only one to know what happened to it. [ 75 ] Since the accused lied on different occasions about the real location of the equipment (Grand Forks-North Dakota, USA or Mississauga, Ontario), it is unreasonable to expect from the authorities to search everywhere in the territory of two different countries. [ 76 ]

Section 462.37(4) of the Criminal code also requires that where payment of a fine is ordered, the Court shall impose a term of jail in default of payment consecutive to any other term of imprisonment imposed on the offender. The period of imprisonment depends on the value of the property. [ 77 ] As above mentioned, the Court determined the loss at $75 000. Consequently the fine will be for an amount of $75 000.

In default of payment of that fine, the Court shall impose a term of imprisonment not less than eighteen months and not exceeding two years. ( s. 462.37(4) (iv) of the Criminal code ) [ 78 ] It should be reminded that the incapacity to pay is only a consideration on the delay needed to pay the fine.

Also, before a court could issue a warrant for committal at the end of the delay, it can only do so if it is convinced that the accused has, without reasonable excuse, refused to pay the fine. [ 79 ] The Court must now determine the appropriate sentence especially in light of the fundamental principle that it must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES [ 80 ] The Court retains the following mitigating circumstances: ➢ The accused has no criminal record, but this factor has a relatively low weight here given the importance of the objectives of denunciation and deterrence. ➢ The absence of violence while committing the extortion. ➢ The accused collaborated with police by presenting himself to the police station when asked to do so. ➢ Although late, he expressed remorse for his actions.

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES [ 81 ] Several circumstances surrounding this case are aggravating: ➢ A planed and deliberate breach of trust; the accused had previously threatened Mr.

Ioxa not to bring back the truck. ➢ The nature of the loss; needless to say that the use of a truck and trailer is the basis equipment of the victim’s business. ➢ The extortion continued over several weeks during which the accused attempted to obtain the money from the victim. ➢ The accused continued to refuse to return the truck and trailer even after his arrest. ➢ The extent of the loss is $75 000. ➢ The underlying motivation: the accused simply did justice to himself. OTHER RELEVANT CIRCUMSTANCES

[82] Even if the accused offered to reimburse a marginal amount to the victim, this proposition was made at the last minute and in acontext of an intermittent sentence with probation he anticipates to obtain. [83] At the time of sentencing, the accused had owed the “value of the loss” resulting from his crimes for more than four years andhe has given no explanation as to why he has made no attempt at restitution. [84] Defence counsel also argues that the fact the accused does not suffer from any addiction or psychological distress, lowers therisk of recidivism.

The evaluation of that risk has not been established as no presentencial report has been prepared. [85] The current personal situation of the accused, most specifically in relation with his father’s health, appears to be the same as theone existing at the time of the events. Let us remember that the accused was asking the victim to find him a load to come back to Ottawabecause his father was sick. Nevertheless, the health situation of the accused’s father didn’t prevent him of committing the offences forwhich he was found guilty. [86] As for the accused’s own health, in Côté c.

R.[18], the Quebec Court of appeal mentioned the following: [20] S’il est vrai que la mauvaise santé d’un contrevenant peut constituer un facteur atténuant dans la détermination de la peine, elle neconstitue pas généralement un facteur d’allègement de la peine, sauf dans des situations exceptionnelles lorsque, par exemple, lecontrevenant souffre d’un cancer incurable et que son décès est imminent. [87] In R. v.

Potts[19], the British Columbia Court of appeal made similar comments in that regard: [85] It is relatively rare for the health of an offender to be taken into account in sentencing but there are cases in which an offender’shealth may be relevant.

Although an offender’s health status may be relevant at sentencing, in general these matters are best consideredas part of the overall circumstances of the offender, rather than as a basis for deducting time from an otherwise appropriate sentence.There are cases in which an otherwise fit sentence may be reduced on compassionate grounds, but such reduction must be based oncurrent, clear and convincing evidence: see R. v. Shah (1994), (BC CA), 94 C.C.C. (3d) 45 (B.C.C.A.); R. v.Shahnawaz (2000), (ON CA), 149 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (C.A.) at paras. 30-34; R. v.

Alcius, 2007 QCCA 213 atpara. 53. [88] We are not in presence of such evidence. [89] The accused was not coerced in any manner to sign the agreement with FORTUS GROUP. In fact, he testified it was a gooddeal. Mr. Ioxa never contested he owed money to the accused for the work done, but refused to comply under such threats. He was in hisfull right to have his property returned to him. [90] In light of all the circumstances of this case, the moral blameworthiness of the accused is very high and the sentence must senda strong and clear message of denunciation and deterrence.

At the end of the delicate exercise of weighting all the aggravating and mitigating factors as well as all of the relevant sentencingprinciples and FOR ALL THE ABOVE REASONS, THE COURT IMPOSES THE FOLLOWING SENTENCE:

On count 1: 9 months of incarceration; On count 3: 9 months of incarceration to be served concurrently to count 1. DIRECTS that the accused comply with the following conditions in a probation order of two years: ➢ Keep the peace and be of good behaviour; ➢ Appear before the Court when required to do so by the Court; ➢ Notify the Court or probation officer in advance of any change of name or address, and promptly notify the Court or probation officer of any change of employment or occupation; ➢ Abstain from communicating, directly or indirectly, with Mr. Ion Ioxa; ➢ Abstain from being in his physical presence.

IMPOSES a fine in lieu of forfeiture for the sum of $75 000. The said amount will be paid through the Clerk’s office at the Montreal court house in a delay of five years.

IMPOSES that in default of payment of that fine, the accused will have to serve a term of eighteen months of imprisonment (462.37 (4) (a)(iv)); DIRECTS that the eighteen months of imprisonment shall be served consecutively to any other term of imprisonment imposed on the offender or that the offender is then serving (462.37 (4)(b)); The fine in lieu of forfeiture shall be reduced, on proof of payment, by any amount given in restitution for the loss incurred by the victim or by a creditor who assumed the losses incurred by the victim . RENDERS, pursuant to

section 487.051 of the Criminal Code , an order authorizing the taking of the number of samples of bodily substances that is reasonably required for the purpose of forensic DNA analysis, from Mr Daher Wanna. PROHIBITS the accused, in virtue of

section 109 of the Criminal Code , from having in his possession:

a) any firearm, other than a prohibited firearm or restricted firearm, and any crossbow, restricted weapon, ammunition and explosive substance for a period of ten years;

b) any prohibited firearm, restricted firearm, prohibited weapon, prohibited device and prohibited ammunition for life. __________________________________ MYLÈNE GRÉGOIRE, JCQ M e Denis Trottier Attorney for the prosecution M e Guillaume Tremblay Attorney for the accused Date of hearing : September 17, 2020.

[10] The Queen v. Zelensky, (SCC), p. 961. [15] R. c. Chandroo, 2020 QCCQ 3571 , par. 111. On October 30, 2020, the motion for leave to appeal from the sentencerendered on September 15th, 2020, by the honorable Salvatore Mascia from the Court of Quebec, district of Montreal, was referred to thepanel of the Court hearing the appeal from the conviction. [16] R. v. Lavigne, 2006 SCC 10 , par. 25. [17] Id., par. 35.