2022 QCCA 133, 2022 QCCA 133

Succession de N.M. 2022 QCCA 133 COURT OF APPEAL CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC REGISTRY OF MONTREAL No.: 500-09-029774-213 ( 500-17-117281-215 ) MINUTES OF THE HEARING DATE: January 28, 2022 THE HONOURABLE LUCIE FOURNIER, J.A. IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF N. M. No.: 500-09-029774-213 APPLICANT COUNSEL S. M., in his capacity as liquidator of the estate of N. M. Mtre Simon Grant ( Gilbert Séguin Guilbault ) Absent RESPONDENTS COUNSEL Public Curator of Québec THE Canada trust company Mtre Antonio Iacovelli ( Miller Thomson ) Absent Sc. K. Mtre Ilan Gabizon ( Paquette & associés avocats ) Absent td waterhouse canada inc. Mtre Maude St-Georges ( McCarthy Tétrault ) Absent

R. K. Fashion togs investments ltd ABSENT AND UNREPRESENTED 500-09-029774-213 Amended application for leave to appeal from a judgment rendered in the course of a proceeding on October 14, 2021 by the Honourable Madam Justice Marie-Christine Hivon of the Superior Court, District of Montreal (art. 31 C.C.P.). Clerk at the hearing : René Gutknecht Courtroom: RC-18 HEARING Continuation of the hearing of January 25, 2022. The parties were excused from appearing in Court. BY THE JUDGE: Judgment – see page 4.

René Gutknecht, Clerk at the hearing JUDGMENT [ 1 ] The applicant seeks leave to appeal from a judgment granting the provisional application for the replacement of the applicant and the defendant, Sc. K., as liquidators of the estate of the late N. M. [1] [ 2 ] The applicant is the son of the late N. M., and the defendant, Sc. K., is his grandson. Their father and grandfather, N. M., died in 2013. In addition to appointing them as liquidators, N. M.’s will provided for the creation of a testamentary trust in favour of Ru. Kr., his wife. The income of this testamentary trust was to be paid to Mrs. Ru.

Kr. once a year, and failing sufficient income, a minimum annual amount of $50,000 was to be paid to her. [ 3 ] Given Mrs. Ru. Kr.’s incapacity, the respondents—the Public Curator of Quebec and The Canada Trust Company—were appointed, respectively, curator to her person and curator to her property. [ 4 ] The trial judge was seized of the respondents’ provisional application for the replacement of the applicant and Mr. Sc. K. as liquidators based on a number of allegations, including their failure to fulfil their obligations towards Mrs. Ru. Kr. and pay her the income to which she is entitled. * * *

[ 5 ] The trial judge granted the respondents’ provisional application and ordered that the applicant and Mr. Sc. K. be replaced as liquidators. She was of the view that Mrs. Ru. Kr., who is 95 years old, had been deprived of minimum income of $50,000 per year since 2013 and that the applicant and Mr. Sc. K., by not paying that income to her, were not fulfilling their duty as liquidators. She added that they were administering the estate in their own interests and were in a conflict of interest situation, particularly because they had entered into an agreement with Roseanne Mager-Sc.

K. [2] which would have the effect of modifying the testator’s intentions by transferring assets of the estate without taking Mrs. Ru. Kr.’ interests into account. [3] [ 6 ] The judge also concluded that the criteria applicable to a provisional application for the replacement of liquidators are the criteria for a safeguard order and that, in the case at bar, they had been met. In that regard, she found that the respondents had shown an appearance of right with respect to the relief sought, because the applicant and Mr. Sc. K. were not performing their obligations. Furthermore, she found that Mrs. Ru.

Kr., in whose favour the respondents are acting, was suffering a serious injury by having been deprived, for several years now, of the assets or income to which she is entitled under the terms of her deceased husband’s will. The judge was also of the view that the balance of convenience weighed in favour of granting the provisional order, given Mrs. Ru. Kr.’ age and given that the status quo was not an option in these circumstances.

Lastly, she considered it urgent that the order be issued. * * * [ 7 ] Since this is an application for leave to appeal a judgment rendered in the course of the proceeding, it is governed by the criteria set out in art. 31 para. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure . Leave will be granted only if the judgment determines part of the dispute or causes irremediable injury to the applicant and if the following conditions, which Bich, J.A. reviewed, [4] have been met: [8] La Cour s’est abondamment prononcée sur le sens de l’art. 31 C.p.c. et, en particulier, sur celui de son second alinéa.

Il ressort de la jurisprudence que, aux fins d’obtenir une permission d’appeler en vertu de cette disposition, la

partie requérante doit établir que le jugement de première instance décide en

partie du litige ou lui cause un préjudice irrémédiable, ce qui est une condition de recevabilité de sa demande, sans laquelle, même erroné, le jugement ne peut faire l’objet d’un appel. Mais cette démonstration ne suffit pas : la

partie requérante doit également montrer ce en quoi le jugement est affligé, du moins en apparence, d’une erreur de nature, potentiellement, à entraîner une intervention de la Cour. Mais cela encore ne suffit pas : elle doit également démontrer que l’appel projeté sert le « meilleur intérêt de la justice » ainsi que la saine administration de celle-ci (art. 9 et 18 C.p.c.) et qu’il concorde avec le principe de proportionnalité (art. 18 C.p.c.).

Afin d’évaluer ces deux dernières conditions, le juge autorisateur se demandera notamment si l’affaire soulève une question méritant l’attention de la Cour et tentera aussi d’apprécier les chances de succès de l’appel envisagé puisque, bien sûr, il sera rarement dans l’intérêt de la justice d’autoriser un appel voué à l’échec.

Il tiendra compte aussi du contexte général de l’affaire, du degré d’avancement de l’instance pendante devant le tribunal de première instance, de la manière dont les parties conduisent le dossier, etc. [Reference omitted] [ 8 ] Moreover, leave to appeal a provisional order which, by its very nature, is limited in time, will be granted only in exceptional circumstances. [5] * * * [ 9 ] In the present case, the applicant has not met any of the criteria for leave to be granted. [ 10 ] Firstly, I reject the applicant’s contention that the respondents do not have the required legal interest to act.

Indeed, not only do they have the legal interest to act, but, as curator to Mrs. Ru. Kr.’ person and curator to her property, respectively, they have the duty to protect her interests. [ 11 ] Furthermore, the judgment does not determine the dispute, as highlighted by the judge’s statement, with respect to the evidence, that “À première vue, et sans se prononcer sur cette question au fond, il appert que les termes de l’Entente mettent les intérêts des liquidateurs et fiduciaires avant ceux de madame Ru...

Kr... et apparaissent différents, voire contraires à ce qui est prévu au Testament ”. [6] [ 12 ] Lastly, the interests of justice and the rules of proportionality argue in favour of refusing leave to appeal so that the file can be readied for trial and be heard on the merits as quickly as possible. FOR THESE REASONS , THE UNDERSIGNED : [ 13 ] DISMISSES the application for leave to appeal, with legal costs. LUCIE FOURNIER, J.A.