2023 NBCA 60, 2023 NBCA 60

COURT OF APPEAL OF COUR D’APPEL DU NEW BRUNSWICK NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK 5-23-CA COMMISSIONER OF OFFICIAL LANGUAGES FOR NEW BRUNSWICK APPELLANT COMMISSAIRE AUX LANGUES OFFICIELLES DU NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK APPELANTE - and - - et - NURSES ASSOCIATION OF NEW BRUNSWICK RESPONDENT L’ASSOCIATION DES INFIRMIÈRES ET INFIRMIERS DU NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK INTIMÉE Commissioner of Official Languages for New Brunswick v. Nurses Association of New Brunswick, 2023 NBCA 60 CORAM: The Honourable Justice Drapeau The Honourable Justice Quigg The Honourable Justice LeBlond Commissaire aux langues officielles du Nouveau- Brunswick c.

L’Association des infirmières et infirmiers du Nouveau-Brunswick, 2023 NBCA 60 CORAM : l’honorable juge Drapeau l’honorable juge Quigg l’honorable juge LeBlond Appeal from a decision of the Court of King’s Bench: December 14, 2022 Appel d’une décision de la Cour du Banc du Roi : le 14 décembre 2022 History of Case: Historique de la cause : Decision under appeal: 2022 NBKB 242 Décision frappée d’appel : 2022 NBBR 242 Preliminary or incidental proceedings: None Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires : Aucune

Appeal heard: May 11, 2023 Appel entendu : le 11 mai 2023 Judgment rendered: July 13, 2023 Jugement rendu : le 13 juillet 2023 Reasons for judgment: The Honourable Justice LeBlond Concurred in by: The Honourable Justice Drapeau The Honourable Justice Quigg Counsel at hearing: For the appellant: Marion Sandilands and M. Alyssa Holland For the respondent: Josie H. Marks and Marie-Pier Cyr Motifs de jugement : l’honorable juge LeBlond Souscrivent aux motifs : l’honorable juge Drapeau l’honorable juge Quigg Avocats à l’audience : Pour l’appelante : Marion Sandilands et M. Alyssa Holland Pour l’intimée : Josie H.

Marks et Marie-Pier Cyr THE COURT The appeal is allowed. The decision of the application judge is set aside, and the matter is remitted to the Commissioner of Official Languages. The appellant is awarded costs throughout in the amount of $7,000. LA COUR L’appel est accueilli. La décision du juge saisi de la requête est annulée et l’affaire est renvoyée à la Commissaire aux langues officielles. L’appelante a droit aux dépens devant toutes les cours, lesquels sont fixés à 7 000 $. The judgment of the Court was delivered by LEBLOND, J.A. I.

Introduction [ 1 ] In July 2016, a complaint was filed with the Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages against the Nurses Association of New Brunswick relating to the latter’s adoption, in January 2015, of an entry-to-practice examination used to assess the competence and abilities of all nursing students wishing to enter the nursing profession in New Brunswick. The examination is known as the National Council Licensure Examination for Registered Nurses (the “NCLEX-RN”).

The complaint raised two main issues with the NCLEX-RN, namely (1) that francophone students were placed at a disadvantage compared to their anglophone colleagues because the exam was not properly translated from English into French and (2) that francophone students were put at an even greater

disadvantage because of the limited availability of French language study/ resource materials, when compared to the much greater availability of English language resources, designed to assist students in preparing for the exam. [ 2 ] An investigation of the 2016 complaint was conducted by then Commissioner Katherine d’Entremont. It culminated in a report released on May 9, 2018, in which she found the Association was in violation of the Official Languages Act , S.N.B. 2002, c. O-0.5 , on both counts raised in the complaint.

The Commissioner made several recommendations, which the Association was expected to act upon. One of these was that the Association report to the Commissioner no later than September 4, 2018, on measures taken to comply with the Act . [ 3 ] The Association filed an application for judicial review of the Commissioner’s findings, seeking to have them removed into court and quashed. Discussions ensued between the Association and a different Commissioner, who was appointed on an interim basis to replace Katherine d’Entremont following her retirement.

These discussions led to the withdrawal of the judicial review application on January 14, 2019, but the issue relating to the availability of the French language resource materials was left open and unresolved. [ 4 ] In July and August 2019, two additional complaints were filed with the interim Commissioner’s office by different complainants than those who had authored the first complaint.

Both new complaints raised the same issue as the first relating to the availability of French language resource materials but further alleged the Association had not taken any steps in response to the d’Entremont report recommendations. The interim Commissioner advised the complainants his office would not investigate these complaints on the basis that a private action, involving different parties, had been filed since the withdrawal of the judicial review application which made an issue of the lack of resource materials.

The interim Commissioner took the position that he could not investigate because the matter was before the courts. [ 5 ] In March 2020, following the appointment of the current Commissioner, Shirley MacLean, K.C., a further complaint was filed by the 2019 complainants, asking her to revisit her predecessor’s decision and to investigate the matter to see what the Association had done since the issuance of the d’Entremont report. The Commissioner advised the parties she would investigate.

The Association objected and filed another application for judicial review, seeking an order to prohibit the investigation from taking place, largely on the basis the matter had been settled by the withdrawal of the first judicial review application. The application judge agreed with the Association. He found the Commissioner’s office and the Association had concluded a settlement, which precluded the investigation contemplated by the new Commissioner.

He ordered a prohibition of the investigation and awarded costs against the Commissioner. [ 6 ] The Commissioner’s appeal of the application judge’s decision addresses the framework of her legislative mandate to investigate the complaints filed with her office under the Act and asserts the judge erred in prohibiting that investigation from occurring.

For the reasons which follow, I would allow the appeal, set aside the application judge’s decision, and remit the matter to the Commissioner to allow her to conduct her investigation. [ 7 ] Before proceeding, I would note, for the benefit of the reader, that although the vast majority of the materials in the record, including the Commissioner’s impugned decision, are in French, the parties made their written and oral submissions, both in the court below and before us, in English. II.

Context [ 8 ] It is important to set out in some detail the timeline of events leading up to this appeal as the parties take different views regarding the legal effect of some of them. One of the noteworthy features of the case is what, in fact and in law, occurred when the Association withdrew its application for judicial review in January 2019. As will become apparent, the application judge interpreted that withdrawal as a “settlement” between private parties. With respect, he erred in law in that

interpretation and, in order to understand the framework he ought to have applied in addressing that issue, a clear appreciation of the factual matrix is necessary. [ 9 ] In May 2018, Commissioner d’Entremont released her report in response to the first complaint.

She concluded the complaint was founded and the Association was in breach of the Act in that the two linguistic groups of nursing students were not operating on a level playing field in terms of the ability of francophone students to prepare for the NCLEX-RN given the significant disparity between available French and English preparatory resource materials. In addition, the Commissioner took issue, in some respects, with the quality of the French translation of the NCLEX-RN itself.

[ 10 ] The Association’s reaction to the report was swift. It firstly deplored the fact it was not consulted during the Commissioner’s investigation, although the report states that it was. It further declared the report contained many factual inaccuracies.

One of the salient features of the Association ’s position is that it has no control over the preparation of the NCLEX-RN, nor over the preparation, quality, and distribution of the French preparatory resource materials, which it does not endorse. [ 11 ] Shortly after the release of Commissioner d’Entremont’s report, on May 28, 2018, the Société de l’Acadie du Nouveau-Brunswick (SANB) and the Fédération des étudiants et étudiantes du Centre universitaire de Moncton (FÉÉCUM) filed an action against the Association (the “ SANB action”), which raised the same issues as those set out in the d’Entremont report.

The action asked the NCLEX-RN be declared invalid on the basis it infringed Charter rights and breached the Act . The Association challenged the plaintiffs’ standing to bring this action and, although standing was denied and the action dismissed by a judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench (see SANB and FÉÉCUM v. NANB , 2020 NBQB 19 , [2020] N.B.J. No. 28 (QL) ), on appeal of that decision, the Court ordered that it be set aside with leave to the plaintiffs to amend their pleadings to determine if their standing could be established (see La Société de l’Acadie du Nouveau-Brunswick Inc. et al. v.

Nurses Association of New Brunswick , 2021 NBCA 21 , [2021] N.B.J. No. 113 (QL) ) . The record before the Court shows that this action never proceeded. [ 12 ] Commissioner d’Entremont retired and, on June 20, 2018, an interim Commissioner, Michel Carrier, K.C., was appointed pending the appointment of Commissioner d’Entremont’s replacement. [ 13 ] On August 21, 2018, the Association filed a judicial review application seeking to have Commissioner d’Entremont’s report removed into court and quashed. It alleged procedural unfairness relating to its allegation it had not been consulted.

It also raised factual inaccuracies in the report. Discussions between interim Commissioner Carrier and the Association regarding how to deal with the application began in earnest. Most exchanges were by email. [ 14 ] On September 24, 2018, Commissioner Carrier communicated with counsel for the Association and advised that, if the Association were prepared to [TRANSLATION] “end the judicial review application,” he was prepared to publicly state the quality of the translation of the NCLEX-RN was adequate, thereby eliminating that issue.

The next day, the Association’s counsel agreed to postpone the scheduling of the application with the court and to pursue discussions. [ 15 ] On November 30, 2018, Commissioner Carrier advised the Association’s counsel that his office had retained counsel for the judicial review application but that he preferred to pursue discussions with him personally for the time being. Discussions continued. [ 16 ] On January 3, 2019, the Association’s counsel emailed Commissioner Carrier with a view to secure agreement on the “conclusions discussed.” The five “conclusions” germane to the appeal were that: 1.

The French version of the NCLEX-RN meets the requirements of s. 41.1 of the Act ; 2. The Office of the Commissioner acknowledges the Association has no control over the preparation and production of the French language resource materials; 3. The Office of the Commissioner acknowledges the Association’s efforts to make such materials available to francophone students; 4. The resource materials issue is before the courts in the SANB action, and the Office of the Commissioner agrees it will not comment on that issue while the case is pending; and 5.

The Office of the Commissioner considers its file closed. [ 17 ] On January 4, 2019, Commissioner Carrier replied by email, stating that he was prepared to agree the

translation of the NCLEX-RN was correct and that the d’Entremont report did not conclude the translation breached s. 41.1 of the Act . He also acknowledged the Association’s efforts in making French resource materials available. However, he left the issue of their availability, as found by the d’Entremont report, up to the courts [TRANSLATION] “out of respect for the litigation process.” With respect, as I discuss in the analysis below, the interim Commissioner erred in delegating to the courts his statutory duty to investigate this issue.

Nonetheless, the interim Commissioner’s position was arguably what triggered the second judicial review application, which now forms the basis of this appeal. [ 18 ] On January 7, 2019, the Association’s counsel emailed Commissioner Carrier to advise that his client [TRANSLATION] “accepts our settlement suggestions” and that if the matter could be finalized, there would be no need to further adjourn the scheduling of the judicial review application. [ 19 ] On January 10, 2019, Commissioner Carrier emailed counsel to remind him the issue of the availability of the French resource materials remained unresolved and the SANB action addressing that issue would continue.

However, with that caveat, he considered his file closed. [ 20 ] On January 14, 2019, the Association’s counsel advised the court clerk the judicial review application was withdrawn as the matter had been “settled.” [ 21 ] Several months later, in late July and early August 2019, two new complaints were filed with the Office of the Commissioner, both asking for a reinvestigation of the resource material issue. The first of these complaints was filed by the Association des a înés du Nouveau-Brunswick and the second, by a group of individuals represented by Lise Guérette-Daigle and Véronique Landry.

Later in August 2019, a meeting was held among Commissioner Carrier, the Association, and representatives of the complainants. Commissioner Carrier advised the resource material issue remained before the courts and his office would not investigate the new complaints. He made it clear that his decision not to investigate was because of the pending SANB action and that he did not preclude the possibility of a further investigation should the circumstances surrounding the court action change.

To be clear, he did not indicate the “settlement” would prevent a further investigation. [ 22 ] On November 22, 2019, Shirley MacLean, K.C., was appointed Commissioner. [ 23 ] In March 2020, one of the 2019 complainants asked Commissioner MacLean to revisit Commissioner Carrier’s refusal to investigate and to conduct an investigation. She opened two files, one for each of the two sets of complainants, and she wrote to the Association to advise her investigation would focus on the resource material issue to determine whether the Association was in breach of s. 41.1(3) of the Act , which provides: 41.1

(3) No person shall be placed at a disadvantage by reason of exercising his or her right to choose an official language in which to fulfil requirements imposed by a professional association. 41.1

(3) Nul ne peut être défavorisé du fait qu’il a exercé son droit de choisir la langue officielle dans laquelle il satisfait aux exigences qu’impose l’association professionnelle. [ 24 ] On November 13, 2020, counsel for the Association wrote to Commissioner MacLean to voice his client’s objection to this investigation, arguing the matter had been settled with her predecessor and the resource material issue was still before the courts. He considered the further investigation to be an abuse of process, particularly where he was not aware of any new evidence filed in support of the new complaints.

Moreover, the identity of the new complainants had not yet been disclosed to the Association and, as a result, the Association could not determine if it was dealing with the same individuals who had filed the original complaint or whether the new complainants might be the plaintiffs in the SANB action because the issue of their standing had still not been resolved. [ 25 ] On December 2, 2020, counsel to the Office of the Commissioner wrote to the Association’s counsel and took the position that Commissioner MacLean was not bound by her predecessor’s decision not to investigate and that, given her statutory obligation to investigate the new complaints, nothing he had said or done could bind her and prevent her from executing her duty.

The Commissioner’s counsel took the further position, on her behalf, there had been no “settlement” of the Association’s judicial review application in the manner the Association was interpreting it, that is to say that any future investigation of this issue was prohibited. Finally, the Commissioner’s counsel confirmed the authors of the new complaints were not the original complainants, nor the plaintiffs in the SANB action. This, however, did not deter the Association’s counsel, who maintained the new complaints were not based on new information.

[ 26 ] On April 15, 2021, counsel to the Commissioner wrote to the Association’s counsel to advise the investigation would take into account the findings of the d’Entremont investigation as well as the judicial review materials which followed. The Commissioner’s counsel confirmed the investigation was focused on the equality of access to the nursing profession and the Association’s process in controlling that access, in order to fully examine the issue of whether francophone students were at a disadvantage.

She further confirmed the Commissioner was mainly interested in the quality and availability of French language resource materials and the efforts made by the Association to address this issue. [ 27 ] On May 21, 2021, the Association’s counsel wrote to the Commission’s counsel to dispute the Commissioner’s authority to “reinvestigate” matters already dealt with by the Office of the Commissioner and argued, if the office of the Commissioner believed this further investigation was necessary, it ought to have consented to having the d’Entremont report removed into court and quashed in the original judicial review application, and agreed to a re-examination of the issue in a timely manner.

He advised he would file an application with the court to prevent the Commissioner from engaging in the reinvestigation but, before doing so, he asked if the Commissioner was prepared to explore another solution. [ 28 ] A without prejudice meeting of the parties took place, and the Commissioner confirmed she would proceed with her investigation, notwithstanding the substance of the current complaints was the same as the original complaint. [ 29 ] On September 10, 2021, counsel for the Association again confirmed his client’s position that, given the prior interim Commissioner had gone on record stating it would not be appropriate for his office to comment on the resource material issue while it was pending in the SANB action, the proposed reinvestigation was vexatious and an abuse of process. [ 30 ] On October 15, 2021, Commissioner MacLean released her decision confirming she would investigate.

This decision is at the heart of the current dispute. I address it in more detail below in the context of the reasonableness assessment which the judicial review judge was required to conduct and the Court now needs to undertake on a de novo basis. However, in the interest of completeness here, I note the Commissioner dismissed the Association’s objections to her investigation because of the broad duty vested in her by s. 43(2) of the Act .

She took the position the grounds for possible refusal to investigate, set out in s. 43(11), must be narrowly construed and she could not refuse to investigate based on an allegation of “abuse of process,” which is not referenced in s. 43(11). While she acknowledged she could refuse to investigate on the basis that the allegations in the current complaints were vexatious, since that is a ground for refusal referenced in s. 43(11), she found the complaints were neither vexatious nor an abuse of process.

In the end, it was her view that a refusal to investigate would be incompatible with the purpose and objects of the Act if the only reason to do so was that other parties had placed a similar issue before the courts. The new complainants were entitled, under the Act , to have their complaints investigated, and this did not amount to having a previously “resolved” issue reconsidered. The investigation was but a continuation of the earlier investigation of an issue which was still pending and had been left open and unresolved by the previous Commissioner.

I would note, at this juncture, that no court has ever ruled on the judicial review application relating to the d’Entremont report. [ 31 ] The judicial review application of Commissioner MacLean’s October 15, 2021 decision came before the application judge. More will be said about his analysis but, to conclude the factual matrix, it should be said he dealt with the “settlement” as a preliminary issue, rather than within the reasonableness framework he ought to have considered. His disposition was as follows: 1.

He declared a settlement was concluded with respect to the entire subject matter of the d’Entremont report; 2. Commissioner MacLean’s decision of October 15, 2021, was removed into the court and quashed; 3. The Commissioner was prohibited from conducting any further investigation in this matter; and 4. Costs were assessed against the Commissioner in the amount of $3,500 plus taxable disbursements. III. Grounds of Appeal [ 32 ] The Commissioner asserts the application judge erred:

1. In law and mixed fact and law by considering this case as a private law dispute and dealing with the “settlement” as a preliminary matter to be determined outside the scope of judicial review; 2. In law and mixed fact and law in not finding the judicial review application was premature and in failing to find exceptional circumstances which might allow it to proceed; 3. In law in carrying out a disguised correctness review of the Commissioner’s decision rather than one based on reasonableness in accordance with the principles set out in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v.

Vavilov , 2019 SCC 65 , [2019] 4 S.C.R. 653 ; and 4. In law and mixed fact and law in granting the remedy of prohibition. IV.

Standard of Review [ 33 ] To properly construe the Commissioner’s role and decision, the application judge was required to conduct his judicial review of all issues based on the standard of reasonableness as set out in Vavilov . [ 34 ] The Court’s role on appeal is to step into the application judge’s position and conduct its own de novo reasonableness assessment of the Commissioner’s decision to determine if the application judge selected the proper standard of review and then properly applied it. [ 35 ] While the Commissioner argued before us the second ground relating to the doctrine of prematurity should be reviewed on the standard of correctness, its application is a question of mixed fact and law, reviewable on the standard of reasonableness.

V. Analysis A. The Commissioner’s legislative framework [ 36 ] The analysis begins with a determination of whether the application judge properly construed the framework which governs the execution of the Commissioner’s duties, to then assess the reasonableness of her decision to investigate within that framework. [ 37 ] The Commissioner’s role and duties are set out in s. 43 of the Act , the relevant portions of which, for our purposes, are:

(9) In accordance with the authority provided to the Commissioner under this Act , it is the role of the Commissioner to investigate, report on and make recommendations with regard to compliance with this Act and to promote the advancement of both official languages in the Province. 43

(10) In order to fulfill the role under subsection (9), the Commissioner shall conduct and carry out investigations either pursuant to any complaint made to the Commissioner or on his or her own initiative and shall, as provided in this Act , report and make recommendations with respect to such investigations. 43

(9) Conformément aux pouvoirs qui lui sont conférés en vertu de la présente loi, le rôle du commissaire est d’enquêter, présenter des rapports et de faire des recommandations visant le respect de la présente loi et de promouvoir l’avancement des deux langues officielles dans la province. 43

(10) Pour remplir son rôle au sens du paragraphe (9), le commissaire procède à des enquêtes, soit à la suite des plaintes qu’il reçoit, soit de sa propre initiative, et présente les rapports et recommandations émanant de ces enquêtes conformément à la présente loi. [ 38 ] The Commissioner may refuse to investigate if one of the three criteria set out in s. 43(11) can be established: 43

(11) The Commissioner may refuse to investigate or cease to investigate any complaint if, in the opinion of the Commissioner, (

a) the subject-matter of the complaint is trivial, (

b) the complaint is frivolous or vexatious or is not made in good faith, or (

c) the subject-matter of the complaint does not involve a contravention or failure to comply with this Act or, for any other reason, does not come within the authority of the Commissioner under this Act . 43

(11) Le commissaire peut, à son appréciation, refuser ou cesser d’instruire une plainte dans l’un ou l’autre des cas suivants :

a) elle est sans importance;

b) elle est frivole ou vexatoire ou n’est pas faite de bonne foi;

c) son objet ne constitue pas une contravention à la présente loi ou, pour toute autre raison, ne relève pas de la compétence du commissaire en vertu de la présent loi. [ 39 ] The Commissioner determines her investigation process under s. 43(14): 43

(14) Subject to this Act , the Commissioner may determine the procedure to be followed in carrying out an investigation under this Act . 43

(14) Sous réserve des dispositions de la présente loi, le commissaire peut établir la procédure à suivre pour ses enquêtes en vertu de la présente loi. [ 40 ] A complainant dissatisfied with the Commissioner’s disposition of the complaint may apply for relief to the Court of King’s Bench under s. 43(18), which provides: 43

(18) If a complainant is not satisfied with the conclusions of the Commissioner received under subsection (16) or with the resolution of the complaint, the complainant may apply to The Court of Queen’s Bench of New Brunswick for a remedy. 43

(18) Le plaignant qui n’est pas satisfait des conclusions du commissaire reçues au terme de l’enquête en vertu du paragraphe (16) ou de la suite donnée à sa plainte, peut former un recours devant la Cour du Banc de la Reine du Nouveau-Brunswick.

[ 41 ] The final relevant piece of the framework is s. 41.1, which applies to a professional association such as the respondent. It sets out its obligations as follows: 41.1

(1) In this section, “professional association” means an organization of persons that, by

an Act of the Legislature, has the power to admit persons to or sus- pend or expel persons from the practice of a profession or occupation or impose requirements on persons with respect to the practice of a profession or occupation. 41.1

(2) When a professional association exercises a power referred to in subsection (1), the professional association (

a) shall provide services and communications related to the exercise of that power in both official languages, and (

b) with respect to its power to impose requirements, shall ensure that a person is able to fulfil those requirements in the official language of his or her choice. 41.1

(3) No person shall be placed at a disadvantage by reason of exercising his or her right to choose an official language in which to fulfil requirements imposed by a professional association. 41.1

(4) A professional association shall offer its services and communications to members of the public in both official languages. 41.1

(1) Dans le présent article, « association professionnelle » s’entend d’une organisation de personnes qui, par loi provinciale, est habilitée à admettre, à suspendre ou à expulser des personnes relativement à l’exercice d’une profession ou à leur imposer des exigences à l’égard de cet exercice. 41.1

(2) Lorsqu’elle exerce l’un quelconque des pouvoirs mentionnés au paragraphe (1), l’association professionnelle :

a) dispense dans les deux langues officielles les services et les communications liés à cet exercice;

b) s’agissant de son pouvoir d’imposer des exigences, s’assure que quiconque peut satisfaire à ces exigences dans la langue officielle de son choix. 41.1

(3) Nul ne peut être défavorisé du fait qu’il a exercé son droit de choisir la langue officielle dans laquelle il satisfait aux exigences qu’impose l’association professionnelle. 41.1

(4) L’association professionnelle offre au public ses services et ses communications dans les deux langues officielles. [ 42 ] This sets the legislative context in which any decision made by the Commissioner stands to be assessed for reasonableness. Because of the significance of the Act , which is unique to New Brunswick, the Court has previously stated it has a quasi- constitutional vocation and status (see Charlebois v. The City of Saint John , 2004 NBCA 49 , 275 N.B.R. (2d) 203 ; Charlebois v.

Saint John (City) , 2005 SCC 74 , [2005] 3 S.C.R. 563 ) and that status necessarily impacts the reasonableness assessment of a decision made pursuant to it. There is no dispute the rights protected by the Act are fundamental and, as a result, the Commissioner’s power to investigate is the critical tool to be used to monitor the protection and realization of those rights. The reasonableness of the Commissioner’s actions must be interpreted in this light.

(1) Ground 1: Was it appropriate for the application judge to deal with the “settlement” outside the scope of judicial review as a private law matter? [ 43 ] The application judge was clearly of the view the Commissioner could settle the subject matter of the complaint, through a private dispute resolution mechanism, and thereby preclude any future investigation of that issue. With respect, that was an error of law.

[44] The Commissioner is an independent officer of the Legislative Assembly, and her duties are clearly and strictlya matter of public law (s. 43(2.5)). As a result, any “settlement” between interim Commissioner Carrier and the Association was reachedentirely within the boundaries of the public law statutory framework and must therefore be assessed within the exercise of judicialreview for reasonableness.

In viewing the “settlement” as a preliminary matter outside judicial review, the judge not only misinterpretedits terms but also gave it undue weight, which unfortunately flawed the judicial review he then embarked upon. [45] The opening premise is that the Commissioner’s duties cannot be altered or indeed avoided by contract:Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190. Given the legislative framework in place, a Commissioner is unable tosettle a subject matter and any purported agreement may be understood only within that framework.

Quite apart from this constraint,there was never a final settlement of the resource material issue in any event. It was clearly left open. The Association agreed towithdraw its application for judicial review of the d’Entremont report knowing full well its withdrawal could not alter the statutory rightsof other parties and the Commissioner’s corresponding duty to see to their protection using her investigatory powers.

The “settlement”could not and did not remove that duty. [46] In the end, by treating the settlement issue as a preliminary matter, the application judge subjected itsdetermination to an entirely different legal framework and assessed it under a different standard of review. Regrettably, as noted, thatwas an error of law. Moreover, by ruling s. 43(10.1) of the Act gave the Commissioner “jurisdiction” to enter into the “settlement”agreement, the judge misconstrued the circumstances that can give rise to the application of that section.

It provides: 43(10.1) Despite subsection (10), when theCommissioner considers it appropriate, theCommissioner may attempt to resolve acomplaint without conducting aninvestigation. 43(10.1) Par dérogation au paragraphe (10),le commissaire peut, lorsqu’il l’estimeindiqué, tenter de régler une plainte avant deprocéder à une enquête. [47] Clearly, that subsection only applies to a Commissioner’s ability to resolve a complaint “without conducting aninvestigation.” That was clearly not the case here. The former Commissioner sought to avoid a judicial review challenging a reportfollowing a completed investigation.

(2) Ground 2: Was the judicial review premature and should it have been dismissed on that basis? [48] The doctrine of prematurity is grounded on the theory that, absent exceptional circumstances, parties cannotseek the court’s intervention in an administrative process until it has run its course: C.B. Powell Limited v. Canada (Border ServicesAgency), 2010 FCA 61, [2010] F.C.J. No. 274 (QL), reasons adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Halifax (RegionalMunicipality) v.

Nova Scotia (Human Rights Commission), 2012 SCC 10, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 364. [49] The Supreme Court in Halifax reasoned the restrained approach was to be preferred for sound practical andtheoretical reasons. The Court wrote: While such intervention may sometimes be appropriate, there are sound practical and theoretical reasons for restraint: D. J.Mullan, Administrative Law (3rd ed. 1996), at §540; P. Lemieux, Droit administratif: Doctrine et jurisprudence (5th ed. 2011), at pp.371-72.

Early judicial intervention risks depriving the reviewing court of a full record bearing on the issue; allows for judicial impositionof a “correctness” standard with respect to legal questions that, had they been decided by the tribunal, might be entitled to deference;encourages an inefficient multiplicity of proceedings in tribunals and courts; and may compromise carefully crafted, comprehensivelegislative regimes: see, e.g., Szczecka v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993), (FCA), 170N.R. 58 (F.C.A.), at paras. 3-4; Zündel (1999), at para. 45; Psychologist Y v.

Board of Examiners in Psychology, 2005 NSCA 116, 236N.S.R. (2d) 273, at paras. 23-25; Potter v. Nova Scotia Securities Commission, 2006 NSCA 45, 246 N.S.R. (2d) 1, at paras. 16 and 36-37; Vancouver (City) v. British Columbia (Assessment Appeal Board) (1996), (BC CA), 135 D.L.R. (4th) 48(B.C.C.A.), at paras. 26-27; Mondesir v. Manitoba Assn. of Optometrists (1998), (MB CA), 163 D.L.R. (4th) 703(Man. C.A.), at paras. 34-36; U.F.C.W., Local 1400 v. Wal-Mart Canada Corp., 2010 SKCA 89, 321 D.L.R. (4th) 397, at paras. 20-23;Mullan (2001), at p. 58; Brown and Evans, at paras. 1:2240, 3:4100 and 3:4400.

Thus, reviewing courts now show more restraint inshort-circuiting the decision-making role of the tribunal, particularly when asked to review a preliminary screening decision such as that

at issue in Bell (1971). [para. 36] [ 50 ] The Federal Court of Appeal took this a step further in Dugré v. Canada (Attorney General) , 2021 FCA 8 , [2021] F.C.J.

No. 50 (QL) , by asserting that the bar to intervening on an interim basis is “next to absolute.” This is particularly true in this case considering the broad legislative mandate given to the Commissioner to investigate. [ 51 ] This begs the question: what, precisely, is there about the Commissioner’s decision to investigate that makes it an “interim” decision and not a “final” decision on the narrow issue before the Court? [ 52 ] The application judge found that what distinguishes this case from the above authorities, cited by the Commissioner, is that there is nothing “preliminary” about the Commissioner’s decision to investigate (para. 140).

That decision was a final determination and the investigation to follow is a separate issue. The Association was not seeking to halt an investigation midstream because it had not yet commenced. The judge found the application was the only means for the Association to pursue enforcement of the settlement, with which I disagree for the reasons already stated and for those to follow. However, he also found the application was the appropriate vehicle to judicially review the Commissioner’s decision to investigate and that it was not premature for the Association to have so proceeded (para. 142).

I agree, but only insofar as the doctrine of prematurity has no application to the Commissioner’s decision. [ 53 ] In my view, the application judge’s decision with respect to the inapplicability of the doctrine of prematurity to the case before him does not run afoul of the tenets of the doctrine.

I would point out that, even if it did, the exceptional circumstance in this case that would circumvent the application of the doctrine in any event is that this matter has been without resolution for several years and there are many francophone nursing students whose future may depend on the outcome of the Commissioner’s investigation. It is high time she was permitted to undertake it.

(3) Ground 3: Did the application judge properly apply the reasonableness standard to the Commissioner’s decision to investigate? [ 54 ] As noted, the Court’s role in assessing whether the application judge properly applied the reasonableness standard is to step into his or her shoes and conduct a de novo assessment of the impugned administrative decision: Ayangma v. Université de Moncton, Moncton Campus et al ., 2019 NBCA 73 , [2019] N.B.J. No. 292 (QL) . Although the judge stated he would apply the reasonableness standard, we need to decide whether he did so (see Agraira v.

Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) , 2013 SCC 36 , [2013] 2 S.C.R. 559 ; Regional Health Authority B, doing business as Horizon Health Network v. Dr. deVries , 2022 NBCA 20 , [2022] N.B.J. No. 94 (QL) ). [ 55 ] On judicial review of an administrative decision, a judge must resist the temptation to decide the issue himself or herself. The task is not for the judge to determine first how the matter should have been decided and then whether the administrative decision-maker’s disposition measures up.

This approach is often referred to as conducting a disguised correctness review under the guise of a reasonableness review . Rather, the judge is to focus on the decision made, and the rationale for it, to see if it bears the hallmarks of transparency, justification, and intelligibility. If it does, it passes the test of reasonableness and is not to be disturbed, even when the judge completely disagrees with the decision.

Regrettably, that is not what the application judge did in this case. [ 56 ] The first indication the application judge’s analysis strayed is his finding the Commissioner lacked jurisdiction to investigate. That finding was largely based on his preliminary determination the “settlement” reached by interim Commissioner Carrier ousted Commissioner MacLean’s jurisdiction to proceed .

Rather than review her rationale relating to her legislative authority, the judge conducted his own analysis of the Act and concluded nothing in it could permit Commissioner MacLean to “reconsider and/or redecide a prior decision” (para. 165). However, that was not the basis for Commissioner MacLean’s decision. She provided an analysis of her authority under the Act to conduct her investigation, which had nothing to do with any prior decision by her predecessor. She considered that Commissioner Carrier’s refusal to investigate did not render the complaints with which she was seized vexatious or abusive.

The judge ignored this rationale. In fact, he wondered whether the Commissioner’s conclusion that Commissioner Carrier’s decision did not bind her was “correct.” He termed this a “threshold jurisdictional issue” which Commissioner MacLean ought to have addressed in her decision. This, again, bears the stamp of a correctness review (para. 164). An administrative decision-maker’s

interpretation of their powers under a home statute is subject to a reasonableness review and is owed deference ( Vavilov , at para. 25 ). [ 57 ] The second indication of a disguised correctness review is found in the de novo

interpretation the application judge made of s. 43(11) of the Act , which deals with the situations in which a commissioner may refuse to investigate. Vavilov is clear that the reviewing judge is not to undertake such an analysis (para. 116). Moreover, doing so completely undermines the expertise which rests with the Commissioner and her office in interpreting the language rights protection regime afforded by the Act . At the conclusion of his own analysis of s. 43(11), the judge found it was not “amenable to the narrow

interpretation given to it by the Commissioner” (para.

218). That is a finding which stacks the Commissioner’s

interpretation against his own. Again, that is disguised correctness review. What the judge needed to do was strictly consider the Commissioner’s decision, regardless of what

interpretation he might have favoured, and determine whether it met the hallmarks referenced above. If the decision exhibits these hallmarks, nothing more is needed to conclude it is reasonable. [ 58 ] The third and perhaps most obvious deviation from the reasonableness assessment which ought to have been conducted resides in the application judge’s undertaking of his own review of the record to address the issues of statutory

interpretation of the exceptions to investigate and the issue of the “settlement” agreement. Rather than focus on the Commissioner’s reasons with respect to these two issues, the judge’s focus on his own

interpretation led him to conclude the Commissioner had predetermined these issues before rendering her decision. Not only does the record not support any finding of predetermining issues, but the Commissioner had in fact invited the parties to make further submissions specifically on these and other issues before making her decision. [ 59 ] The Commissioner’s decision addresses the four objections raised by the Association. She considered each of the objections within her statutory framework and concluded her decision with a global analysis of the combined effect of the objections.

Her conclusion was that the complaints were neither vexatious nor abusive and that she was obligated to carry out her legislative mandate to investigate. I reproduce the salient portions of her decision of October 15, 2021, and begin with her

summary of the four objections raised by the Association: [TRANSLATION] [5] NANB formally objects to the investigation, claiming the complaints are vexatious and constitute an abuse of process.

NANB advances four arguments: 1) The complaints raise the same issues that were the subject of a previous investigation; 2) The Commissioner made the decision not to investigate these complaints when they were filed in 2019; 3) The complaints are not supported by any evidence, “much less new evidence that was not adduced or could not reasonably have been adduced” during the prior investigation; 4) The issue of the availability of preparatory resource materials is before the courts. [6] I will address each of these arguments in turn.

I will first review the general principles. [ 60 ] The Commissioner then sets out the legislative framework, as she interprets it, which establishes her mandate and limits her authority: [TRANSLATION] 2. General principles

a) Role of the Commissioner under the Official Languages Act [7] The Official Languages Act , S.N.B. 2002, c. O-0.5 (“the Act ”) establishes the Commissioner’s mandate and his role as a complaints investigator. The relevant sections are reproduced below:

43(9) Conformément aux pouvoirs qui lui sont conférés en vertu de la présente loi, le rôle du commissaire est d’enquêter, présenter des rapports et de faire des recommandations visant le respect de la présente loi et de promouvoir l’avancement des deux langues officielles dans la province. 43(10) Pour remplir son rôle au sens du paragraphe (9), le commissaire procède à des enquêtes, soit à la suite des plaintes qu’il reçoit, soit de sa propre initiative, et présente les rapports et recommandations émanant de ces enquêtes conformément à la présente loi. 43(10.1) Par dérogation au paragraphe (10), le commissaire peut, lorsqu’il l’estime indiqué, tenter de régler une plainte avant de procéder à une enquête. 43(11) Le commissaire peut, à son appréciation, refuser ou cesser d’instruire une plainte dans l’un ou l’autre des cas suivants :

a) elle est sans importance;

b) elle est frivole ou vexatoire ou n’est pas faite de bonne foi; 43(9) In accordance with the authority provided to the Commissioner under this Act , it is the role of the Commissioner to investigate, report on and make recommendations with regard to compliance with this Act and to promote the advancement of both official languages in the Province. 43(10) In order to fulfill the role under subsection (9), the Commissioner shall conduct and carry out investigations either pursuant to any complaint made to the Commissioner or on his or her own initiative and shall, as provided in this Act , report and make recommendations with respect to such investigations. 43(10.1) Despite subsection (10), when the Commissioner considers it appropriate, the Commissioner may attempt to resolve a complaint without conducting an investigation. 43(11) The Commissioner may refuse to investigate or cease to investigate any complaint if, in the opinion of the Commissioner, (

a) the subject-matter of the complaint is trivial, (

b) the complaint is frivolous or vexatious or is not made in good faith, or (

c) the subject-matter of the complaint does not involve a contravention or failure to comply with this Act or, for any other reason, does not come within the authority of the Commissioner under this Act .

c) son objet ne constitue pas une contravention à la présente loi ou, pour toute autre raison, ne relève pas de la compétence du commissaire en vertu de la présente loi. 43(12)

En cas de refus d’instruire une plainte ou de la poursuivre, le commissaire donne au plaignant un avis motivé. 43(12) If the Commissioner refuses to investigate or ceases to investigate any complaint, the Commissioner shall inform the complainant and provide reasons for the decision to do so. [8] Under subsection 43(9), the role of the Commissioner is “to investigate, report on and make recommendations with regard to compliance with this Act and to promote the advancement of both official languages in the Province.” [9] When complaints are received by the Office of the Commissioner, the Commissioner has a duty to investigate: under subsection 43(10), the Commissioner “shall conduct and carry out” investigations when he receives a complaint (“the Commissioner shall conduct and carry out investigations [...] pursuant to any complaint made to the Commissioner”).

In fact, the Act only provides four exceptions to this obligation (see subsections 43(10.1) and 43(11) of the Act ). The Commissioner may only refuse to investigate when one of these exceptions applies.

The decision to refuse to investigate is discretionary: if one of the grounds for refusal under subsections 43(10.1) or 43(11) applies, the Commissioner is not required to refuse to investigate, but he may refuse to investigate. [10] If the Commissioner refuses to investigate on one of these grounds, he shall inform the complainant and provide reasons for the decision to do so (s. 43(12)). [11] The role and authority of the Commissioner must be interpreted in light of the object and importance of the Official Languages Act . As recognized in the

Preamble to the Act and by the Supreme Court of Canada, the purpose of the Act is to implement the rights enshrined in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms ( Charlebois v. Saint John (City) , 2005 SCC 74 , at para. 13 ). Thus, the role of the Commissioner – including the role of investigating and making recommendations on compliance with the Act – is linked to the implementation of constitutional rights. As such, the Commissioner’s power to refuse to investigate a complaint should not be exercised lightly.

In light of these principles, I find that the duty to investigate under subsection 43(1) must be interpreted broadly and the grounds for refusal under subsection 43(11) must be interpreted narrowly. [12] In this perspective, I seriously doubt that I have the authority to refuse to investigate on the ground that a complaint constitutes an abuse of process. Paragraph 43(11) (

b) clearly empowers the Commissioner to refuse to investigate on the ground that a complaint is vexatious, but nowhere does it state that the Commissioner may refuse to investigate on the ground that a complaint constitutes an abuse of process.

In view of the principles set out above, I am reluctant to recognize abuse of process as a new ground distinct from the “vexatious” ground under paragraph 43(11) (b). [13] However, I do not need to decide this issue, as I do not consider that the complaints are vexatious or abusive. [ 61 ] Against this interpretive backdrop, the Commissioner then analyzed the general issue of whether the complaints she proposed to investigate were vexatious or constituted an abuse of process: [TRANSLATION]

b) Abuse of process and “vexatious” [14] The doctrine of abuse of process engages the inherent power of the court to prevent the misuse of its procedure ( Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E. , Local 79 , 2003 SCC 63 , at paras. 35-55 ). It is a flexible doctrine that focuses on the integrity of the process. When it applies in

the administrative context, it applies in the “clearest of cases,” when the proceedings are “unfair to the point that they are contrary to theinterests of justice” (Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), 2000 SCC 44, at para. 120). [15] The definition of a “vexatious” complaint is also somewhat flexible. In the context of civil litigation, a proceeding is vexatious ifit was “instituted maliciously and without probable cause” (Russell v. Northumberland Co-operative Limited, (NB CA), at para. 20, citing University of New Brunswick Student Union Incorporated et al. v.

Smith (S.) et al.; University ofNew Brunswick Student Union Incorporated et al. v. Vaillancourt et al. (1987), (NB CA), 84 N.B.R. (2d) 292(N.B.C.A.), at para. 3). A complaint may be vexatious if it is clearly repetitious of previous complaints that all share the same theme andhave already been determined (ST v. Edmonton (Police Commission), 2019 ABLERB 30, at para. 11). [16] NANB appears to treat the terms “vexatious” and “abuse of process” somewhat interchangeably.

As illustrated by the discussionabove, it is clear that the concepts of “vexatious” and “abuse of process” are flexible doctrines which sometimes overlap. For example,an attempt to have the same matter reconsidered would be vexatious as well as an abuse of process (see Olumide v. Police Commissionerand Human Rights Commission, 2021 PECA 4, at paras. 33-34). This is essentially the basis of NANB’s objection. [17] NANB has provided some examples of case law dealing with vexatious and abusive complaints.

While this case law providesexamples of these doctrines, there is nothing in these examples that binds me, as the factual and statutory contexts are distinguishable.Moreover, there is nothing in that case law establishing that abuse of process is an independent ground upon which a statutorycommissioner may refuse to investigate. 3. Analysis [18] Are the new complaints vexatious or an abuse of process? [19] It is undisputable that the complainants in these complaints are different from either (1) the complainants in the 2016-2018investigation (File 2016-3071), or (2) the plaintiffs in the court proceedings.

In its letter, NANB does not allege that the currentcomplainants are in any way connected to the other proceedings. Furthermore, NANB does not allege that the complainants in thesecomplaints have an improper motive or that they are acting in bad faith. [62] The Commissioner’s next step was to analyze each of the four formal objections raised by the Association inopposition to the investigation: [TRANSLATION] [20] I will address each of NANB’s arguments in turn:

a) Same subject matters as a previous investigation [21] NANB maintains that the complaints address the same matters that were the subject of a previous investigation. [22] The release of a prior report concerning similar issues is not identified in the Act as a ground for the Commissioner to refuse toinvestigate. On the other hand, at least two New Brunswick statutes and several federal statutes explicitly or implicitly provide for thistype of ground for refusal. The Official Languages Act of New Brunswick does not. [23] In any event, these complaints are distinct from the earlier complaints.

Firstly, the 2019 complaint explicitly relates to NANB’sfollow-up actions to the 2018 report; in other words, new facts that have (or have not) occurred since the 2018 report. Secondly, the newcomplaints relate to an issue that was explicitly left open in the 2018 report and in the 2019 letter from Interim Commissioner Carrier,namely the availability and quality of the preparatory resource materials. In his letter dated January 10, 2019, InterimCommissioner Carrier ruled [TRANSLATION] “that the issue of the gap in commercial examination preparatory resources in Englishand French remains unresolved.”

[24] Furthermore, the closure of the old file by Interim Commissioner Carrier in no way affects the current Commissioner’s duty to investigate a new complaint. [25] Moreover, unlike the cases NANB refers to, which deal with the calling into question of facts that occurred entirely at a fixed moment in the past, the present complaints deal with NANB’s ongoing compliance with the Act . There are specific allegations about facts that have occurred since the 2018 report.

Thus, although the complaints are based on issues related to the 2016-2018 investigation (file 2016-3071), they do not constitute a simple attempt to reopen that investigation. The investigation of the complaint does not require a reopening of the previous investigation or a further investigation.

b) Predecessor’s decision not to investigate [26] NANB emphasizes the fact that Interim Commissioner Carrier made the decision not to investigate these complaints when they were filed in 2019. [27] Overall, NANB argues that it is the complaints themselves, not the investigation, that would be vexatious or constitute an abuse of process. In itself, the decision of a previous commissioner not to investigate cannot render the complaints themselves vexatious or abusive.

However, at page 4 of its letter, NANB states that [TRANSLATION] “to consider such complaints would be doubly abusive, particularly in light of the OCOL having previously decided in October 2019 that it would not be appropriate to investigate them.” Thus, NANB states that the investigation itself may be abusive in light of the prior decision not to investigate. However, NANB does not develop this argument, nor does it provide any legal support for the argument that a previous Commissioner’s decision not to investigate renders the investigation an abuse of process.

On its own, this factor does not render either the complaint or the investigation abusive.

c) Supporting evidence [28] NANB argues that the complaints are vexatious because they are not supported by any evidence, [TRANSLATION] “much less new evidence which was not adduced or could not reasonably have been adduced” during the previous investigation. [29] This argument is without merit. NANB seems to impose a requirement of evidence where there is none. Generally, there is no requirement for complainants to provide evidence in support of their complaint. Rather, it is the Commissioner’s role to investigate complaints to determine whether they are founded.

It is impossible to say, without investigating, whether any of the evidence could reasonably have been adduced during the previous investigation.

d) Issue before the courts [30] NANB suggests the complaints are vexatious or abusive because the issue of availability of preparatory resource materials is currently before the courts. [31] NANB does not provide any case law in support of this argument. According to subsection 43(11) of the Act , the fact that a similar matter is before the courts does not constitute a ground for the Commissioner to refuse to investigate a complaint. [32] The complainants in this complaint are different from the plaintiffs in the legal proceeding and the complainants in the 2016 complaint.

In my view, it would be inconsistent with the purpose of the Official Languages Act to refuse to investigate this complaint on the ground that other parties have chosen to litigate similar issues before the Court of Queen’s Bench. [Footnote omitted] [ 63 ] Finally, the Commissioner provided her global analysis of all four objections considered together: [TRANSLATION]

e) Overall analysis [33] None of these factors, taken separately, establishes that the complaints are vexatious or constitute an abuse of process. What if we consider them together? [34] The second ground must be set aside entirely, as the decision of the previous Commissioner does not affect the nature of the complaints. Do the other grounds, taken together, prove that these complaints are vexatious or abusive? Do they constitute a misuse of the Commissioner’s resources or undermine the Commissioner’s role under the Official Languages Act ? In my view, they do not.

Given the multiplicity of complaints received, this is clearly an important issue for many people. While the various proceedings overlap, these complaints are not an attempt to reconsider issues that have already been determined: they are a continuation of the same subject matter as the 2016 complaints. Even if the issues addressed in these complaints are also the subject of ongoing legal proceedings, such legal proceedings have not been determined, and so, if anything, the investigation would be a concurrent proceeding rather than a relitigation of an issue that has already been determined.

While these complaints may inconvenience NANB due to the multiplicity of investigations, this is not the purpose of the prohibition against vexatious or abusive complaints. [35] Accordingly, I will not refuse to investigate the complaints on the ground that they are vexatious under paragraph 43(11) (

b) of the Official Languages Act , nor, assuming that I have the authority to do so, on the ground that they constitute an abuse of process. [Emphasis added; para. 25] B. Reasonableness assessment of the Commissioner’s decision

(1) Statutory authority [ 64 ] In interpreting her home statute, Commissioner MacLean cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Charlebois in support of her position that her role and authority had to be interpreted in light of the object and importance of the Act . This is what led her to broadly interpret her obligation to investigate under ss. 43(9) and (10) and to narrowly interpret the exceptions set out in s. 43(11). Her analysis bears the hallmarks of transparency, intelligibility and justification which makes it reasonable under the Vavilov guidelines.

(2) Vexatious complaint or abuse of process [ 65 ] Commissioner MacLean’s analysis of whether the new complaints were vexatious or an abuse of process dealt with the four objections raised by the Association.

The application judge did not take issue with the Commissioner’s position relating to the “lack of new evidence” objection, nor with the issue of “resource materials being before the courts.” However, he found her analysis of the other two grounds was unreasonable. [ 66 ] The first of these two grounds is the [TRANSLATION] “same subject-matter complaints.” The Commissioner found, as a fact, the new complaints were clearly distinct because they raised the question as to what had occurred since the release of the d’Entremont report, the very issue interim Commissioner Carrier left open and unresolved.

Commissioner MacLean’s analysis on this score is patently reasonable as it is grounded in facts which arose following the d’Entremont report. [ 67 ] The second of the two grounds with which the application judge disagreed relates to Commissioner Carrier’s decision not to investigate as binding Commissioner MacLean. As noted, the previous decision can have no bearing on ongoing compliance with the Act and the judge failed to appreciate this.

As a result, Commissioner MacLean’s decision to revisit Commissioner Carrier’s decision did not give rise to uncertainty or inconsistency and bears all the hallmarks of reasonableness.

(3) Reasonableness of the global analysis [ 68 ] In conducting her global analysis, Commissioner MacLean took a step back and asked herself, when viewing the Association’s objections together, whether an investigation would be an improper use of her resources, thereby undermining her role. She concluded it would not. She drew this conclusion in light of the legal framework which constrains her and, thus, conducted herself in a transparent, intelligible and justified manner.

(4) The Commissioner’s assessment of the “settlement” issue [ 69 ] Commissioner MacLean also addressed the “settlement” issue raised by the Association, although not as one of its four stated objections to the investigation. Again, she did not need to go beyond the fact the resource material issue had been left open and unresolved so that, no matter how one might characterize the “settlement,” it had no bearing on that issue, nor on the Commissioner’s obligation to investigate should the matter be the subject of a separate complaint.

The application judge failed to give deference to this analysis. [ 70 ] Moreover, it would have been unreasonable for the Commissioner to conclude to the contrary because, first, she cannot contract out of her statutory duties and, second, nothing in Commissioner Carrier’s communications to the Association precluded future investigations. [ 71 ] Commissioner MacLean’s decision therefore followed an “internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and […] is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain” her ( Vavilov , at para. 85 ). VI.

Prohibition as a Remedy [ 72 ] Before concluding, I wish to comment on the remedy given by the application judge. There is no discussion in his decision as to why he deemed it appropriate to order prohibition, particularly where courts have generally described this remedy as “drastic” (see Psychologist “Y” v. Nova Scotia Board of Examiners in Psychology , 2005 NSCA 116 , [2005] N.S.J. No. 350 (QL) , at para. 2 ), and to be avoided unless an unusual or exceptional circumstance warrants it.

The authorities cited by the judge in support of granting the remedy are distinguishable on the basis they dealt with matters which had been adjudicated, whereas the availability of resource materials in this case is an issue which has yet to be adjudicated. Moreover, the Commissioner had jurisdiction to decide to investigate, an element which would have been a prerequisite to consideration of the remedy. [ 73 ] The appellate jurisprudential trend in Canada has been to either overturn prohibition orders or uphold refusals to grant the remedy (see Holder v.

College of Physicians and Surgeons (Man.) , 2002 MBCA 135 , [2002] M.J. No. 405 (QL) ; Halifax ; Thielmann v. The Association of Professional Engineers and Geoscientists of the Province of Manitoba , 2020 MBCA 8 , [2020] M.J. No. 8 (QL) ; Dugré ). VII. Conclusion and Disposition [ 74 ] The Commissioner reasonably interpreted her statutory duties and her decision to investigate is owed deference.

She cannot be prevented from investigating as she must carry out her quasi-constitutional mandate to oversee the protection of language rights under the Act . [ 75 ] I would allow the appeal and set aside the decision of the application judge. I would remit the matter of the Commissioner’s investigation to her. I would award costs throughout in favour of the Commissioner in the amount of $7,000. Version française de la décision de la Cour rendue par LE JUGE LEBLOND

I. Introduction [1] En juillet 2016, une plainte a été déposée auprès du Commissariat aux langues officielles contre l’Association des infirmières et infirmiers du Nouveau-Brunswick concernant l’adoption par cette dernière, en janvier 2015, d’un examen d’admission à la profession servant à évaluer les compétences et les aptitudes des étudiants en sciences infirmières voulant adhérer à la profession infirmière au Nouveau-Brunswick. L’examen est appelé National Council Licensure Examination for Registered Nurses (le NCLEX- RN).

La plainte soulevait deux principales questions concernant le NCLEX-RN, notamment (1) que les étudiants francophones étaient défavorisés par rapport à leurs collègues anglophones du fait que l’examen n’était pas correctement traduit de l’anglais vers le français, et (2) que les étudiants francophones étaient encore plus défavorisés du fait qu’il y avait beaucoup moins de ressources d’étude et de ressources documentaires permettant aux étudiants de se préparer à l’examen disponibles en langue française qu’en langue anglaise. [2] La commissaire à ce moment-là, Katherine d’Entremont, a entrepris une instruction de la plainte de 2016.

À la suite de cette instruction, un rapport a été publié le 9 mai 2018 dans lequel elle a conclu que l’Association violait la

Loi sur les langues officielles , L.N.-B. 2002, ch. O-0.5 , relativement aux deux allégations soulevées dans la plainte. La Commissaire a formulé plusieurs recommandations que, s’attendait-on, l’Association devait mettre en application. Selon une de ces recommandations, l’Association devait faire rapport à la Commissaire des mesures prises pour respecter la Loi , et ce, au plus tard le 4 septembre 2018. [3] L’Association a déposé une requête en révision judiciaire des conclusions de la Commissaire afin qu’elles soient évoquées à la Cour et annulées.

Des discussions ont eu lieu entre l’Association et un différent commissaire, lequel avait été nommé par intérim afin de remplacer Katherine d’Entremont à la suite de son départ à la retraite.

Ces discussions ont conduit au retrait de la requête en révision judiciaire le 14 janvier 2019, mais la question portant sur la disponibilité des ressources documentaires en langue française a été laissée entière et non réglée. [4] En juillet et août 2019, deux nouvelles plaintes ont été déposées auprès du bureau du commissaire par intérim par des parties plaignantes différentes que celles qui avaient rédigé la première plainte.

Les deux nouvelles plaintes soulevaient la même question que celle soulevée dans la première plainte, à savoir la disponibilité des ressources documentaires en langue française, mais alléguaient en outre que l’Association n’avait pris aucune mesure pour mettre en œuvre les recommandations énoncées dans le rapport de la commissaire d’Entremont.

Le commissaire par intérim a informé les parties plaignantes que son bureau n’allait pas instruire ces plaintes puisqu’une action privée, qui engageait des parties différentes, avait été déposée depuis le retrait de la requête en révision judiciaire et soulevait la question de l’insuffisance des ressources documentaires.

Le commissaire par intérim estimait qu’il ne pouvait pas procéder à une enquête parce que les tribunaux étaient saisis de l’affaire. [5] En mars 2020, à la suite de la nomination de la commissaire actuelle, Shirley MacLean, c.r., une autre plainte a été déposée par les parties plaignantes qui étaient à l’origine de la plainte de 2019 dans laquelle on demandait à la Commissaire de revoir la décision de son prédécesseur et de mener une enquête afin de voir ce que l’Association avait fait depuis la publication du rapport de la commissaire d’Entremont.

La Commissaire a informé les parties qu’elle allait procéder à l’enquête. L’Association s’est opposée à l’instruction et a déposé une autre requête en révision judiciaire par laquelle elle sollicitait une ordonnance interdisant la tenue d’une enquête en s’appuyant principalement sur le fait que l’affaire avait été réglée par le retrait de la première requête en révision judiciaire. Le juge saisi de la requête a souscrit à la prétention de l’Association.

Il a conclu que le Commissariat et l’Association avaient conclu un règlement amiable, ce qui empêchait la tenue de l’enquête envisagée par la nouvelle commissaire. Il a rendu une ordonnance interdisant la tenue d’une enquête et a condamné la Commissaire aux dépens. [6] Dans son appel de la décision du juge saisi de la requête, la Commissaire aborde le cadre de son mandat législatif d’instruire les plaintes déposées auprès du Commissariat sous le régime de la Loi et soutient que le juge a commis une erreur en interdisant la tenue d’une enquête.

Pour les motifs qui suivent, j’accueillerais l’appel, j’annulerais la décision du juge saisi de la requête et je renverrais l’affaire à la Commissaire afin qu’elle puisse procéder à l’enquête. [7] Avant de continuer, je tiens à souligner, à l’intention du lecteur, que, bien que la grande majorité des documents versés au dossier, y compris la décision contestée de la Commissaire, sont en français, les parties ont présenté leurs observations écrites et orales en anglais tant devant le tribunal d’instance inférieure que devant notre Cour. II.

Contexte [8] Il est important de présenter de façon assez détaillée la chronologie des événements ayant conduit au présent appel puisque les parties ne sont pas du même avis en ce qui concerne les conséquences juridiques de certains de ces événements. Une des particularités importantes de l’affaire est ce qui s’est produit, en fait et en droit, lorsque l’Association a retiré sa requête en révision

judiciaire en janvier 2019. Comme nous le verrons, le juge saisi de la requête a interprété ce retrait comme un [TRADUCTION] « règlement amiable » entre parties privées. Avec égards, il a commis une erreur de droit dans cette interprétation et, afin de comprendre le cadre d’analyse qu’il aurait dû appliquer pour traiter de cette question, une juste appréciation des faits est nécessaire. [9] En mai 2018, la commissaire d’Entremont a publié son rapport en réponse à la première plainte.

Elle a conclu que la plainte était fondée et que l’Association avait violé la Loi du fait que les deux groupes linguistiques d’étudiants en sciences infirmières n’étaient pas sur un pied d’égalité en ce qui concerne la capacité des étudiants francophones à se préparer pour le NCLEX- RN compte tenu de la disparité importante entre les ressources documentaires préparatoires disponibles en langue française et celles disponibles en langue anglaise. En outre, la Commissaire a contesté, à certains égards, la qualité de la traduction française du NCLEX- RN en soi. [10] L’Association a réagi rapidement au rapport.

Elle a d’abord déploré le fait qu’elle n’avait pas été consultée dans le cadre de l’enquête de la Commissaire, même si le rapport indique qu’elle l’a été. Elle a en outre affirmé que le rapport contenait de nombreuses inexactitudes factuelles.

Un des aspects essentiels de la position de l’Association est qu’elle n’a aucun contrôle sur la préparation du NCLEX-RN ni sur la préparation, la qualité et la distribution des ressources documentaires préparatoires en langue française, ressources qu’elle ne sanctionne pas. [11] Peu de temps après la publication du rapport de la commissaire d’Entremont le 28 mai 2018, la Société de l’Acadie du Nouveau-Brunswick (SANB) et la Fédération des étudiants et étudiantes du Centre universitaire de Moncton (FÉÉCUM) ont déposé une action contre l’Association (l’ action de la SANB ) qui soulevait les mêmes questions que celles énoncées dans le rapport de la commissaire d’Entremont.

L’action visait à faire invalider le NCLEX-RN sur le fondement qu’il portait atteinte aux droits garantis par la Charte et violait la Loi . L’Association a contesté la qualité pour agir des demanderesses pour intenter cette action et, bien que la qualité pour agir n’ait pas été reconnue et que l’action ait été rejetée par le juge de la Cour du Banc de la Reine ( voir SANB et FÉÉCUM c.

AIINB , 2020 NBBR 19 , [2020] A.N.-B. n o 28 (QL) ), en appel de cette décision, la Cour a ordonné que la décision soit annulée et a accordé aux demanderesses l’autorisation de modifier leurs plaidoiries afin de déterminer si leur qualité pour agir pouvait être établie ( voir La Société de l’Acadie du Nouveau-Brunswick Inc. et autre c. Association des infirmières et infirmiers du Nouveau-Brunswick , 2021 NBCA 21 , [2021] A.N.-B. n o 113 (QL) ) .

Le dossier dont dispose la Cour montre que cette action n’a jamais suivi son cours. [12] La commissaire d’Entremont a pris sa retraite et, le 20 juin 2018, Michel Carrier, c.r., a été nommé commissaire par intérim en attendant la nomination du remplaçant de la commissaire d’Entremont. [13] Le 21 août 2018, l’Association a déposé une requête en révision judiciaire afin que le rapport de la commissaire d’Entremont soit évoqué à la Cour et annulé. L’Association alléguait un manquement à l’équité procédurale relativement à son allégation selon laquelle elle n’aurait pas été consultée.

Elle soutenait en outre que des inexactitudes factuelles figuraient dans le rapport. Le commissaire par intérim Carrier et l’Association ont entamé des discussions sérieuses concernant la façon de traiter la requête.

La plupart des discussions se sont faites par courriel. [14] Le 24 septembre 2018, le commissaire Carrier a communiqué avec l’avocat de l’Association et lui a indiqué que, si l’Association était prête à consentir à « l’arrêt des procédures » relativement à la requête en révision judiciaire, il était prêt à affirmer publiquement que la qualité de la traduction du NCLEX-RN était adéquate et ainsi régler cette question.

Le jour suivant, l’avocat de l’Association a accepté de reporter la mise au rôle de la requête et de poursuivre les discussions. [15] Le 30 novembre 2018, le commissaire Carrier a informé l’avocat de l’Association que son bureau avait retenu les services d’un avocat relativement à la requête en révision judiciaire, mais qu’il préférait poursuivre les discussions avec lui personnellement pour le moment.

Les discussions se sont poursuivies. [16] Le 3 janvier 2019, l’avocat de l’Association a envoyé un courriel au commissaire Carrier dans le but de parvenir à un règlement amiable relativement aux « conclusions [qu’ils avaient] discutées ». Les cinq « conclusions » revêtant une importance pour l’appel sont les suivantes : 1. La version française du NCLEX-RN est conforme aux exigences de l’art. 41.1 de la Loi ; 2. Le Commissariat reconnaît que l’Association n’a aucun contrôle sur la préparation et la production des ressources documentaires en langue française;

3. Le Commissariat reconnaît les efforts entrepris par l’Association pour mettre les ressources documentaires à la disposition des étudiants francophones; 4. Les tribunaux sont actuellement saisis de la question des ressources documentaires dans le cadre de l’ action de la SANB et le Commissariat confirme qu’il ne commentera pas la question pendant que l’affaire est en instance; 5.

Le Commissariat considère maintenant le dossier comme étant clos. [17] Le 4 janvier 2019, le commissaire Carrier a répondu par courriel qu’il était prêt à confirmer que la traduction du NCLEX-RN était adéquate et que le rapport de la commissaire d’Entremont n’avait pas conclu que la traduction violait l’art. 41.1 de la Loi . Il a aussi reconnu les efforts entrepris par l’Association afin de rendre disponibles les ressources documentaires en langue française.

Toutefois, il a décidé de laisser les tribunaux trancher la question de leur disponibilité, tout comme l’avait conclu le rapport de la commissaire d’Entremont : « Nous devons respecter le processus juridique. » Avec égards, comme je le mentionnerai dans l’analyse ci-dessous, le commissaire par intérim a commis une erreur en déléguant aux tribunaux son obligation d’origine législative d’instruire la question.

Néanmoins, la position du commissaire par intérim était sans doute à l’origine de la deuxième requête en révision judiciaire, qui constitue maintenant le fondement du présent appel. [18] Le 7 janvier 2019, l’avocat de l’Association a envoyé un courriel au commissaire Carrier pour l’informer que sa cliente « accept[ait] [leurs] suggestions de règlement » et que, si l’affaire pouvait être réglée, il ne serait pas nécessaire de reporter à nouveau la mise au rôle de la requête en révision judiciaire. [19] Le 10 janvier 2019, le commissaire Carrier a envoyé un courriel à l’avocat pour lui rappeler que la question de la disponibilité des ressources documentaires en langue française n’avait toujours pas été réglée et que l’action de la SANB portant sur cette question allait se poursuivre.

Toutefois, avec cette précision, il considérait que le dossier était clos. [20] Le 14 janvier 2019, l’avocat de l’Association a informé la greffière du tribunal que la requête en révision judiciaire avait été retirée puisque le dossier avait été « réglé ». [21] Plusieurs mois plus tard, à la fin du mois de juillet et au début du mois d’août 2019, deux nouvelles plaintes ont été déposées auprès du Commissariat, les deux sollicitant une réinstruction de la question des ressources documentaires.

La première des deux plaintes a été déposée par l’Association des aînés du Nouveau-Brunswick et la deuxième, par un groupe de personnes représenté par Lise Guérette-Daigle et Véronique Landry. Plus tard en août 2019, une rencontre a eu lieu entre le commissaire Carrier, l’Association et les représentants des parties plaignantes. Le commissaire Carrier a indiqué que les tribunaux étaient toujours saisis de la question des ressources documentaires et que son bureau n’allait pas instruire les nouvelles plaintes.

Il a clairement indiqué que sa décision de ne pas procéder à l’enquête reposait sur le fait que l’ action de la SANB était toujours en instance et qu’il n’écartait pas la possibilité d’une enquête plus poussée si la situation par rapport à l’action changeait. Il convient de préciser qu’il n’a pas indiqué que le [TRADUCTION] « règlement amiable » empêcherait une enquête plus poussée. [22] Le 22 novembre 2019, Shirley MacLean,

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