Barry Baker - v. -, 2018 SKPC 033

IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF SASKATCHEWAN CIVIL DIVISION Citation: 2018 SKPC 033 Date: April 18, 2018 File: 624/17 Location: Regina _____________________________________________________________________________ Between: Barry Baker - and - Amy Hall Barry Baker For the Plaintiff Amy Hall For the Defendant _____________________________________________________________________________ JUDGMENT DEMONG, J _____________________________________________________________________________ Introduction [ 1 ] On May 8, 2015, Mr. Baker entered into a credit financing agreement to assist Ms.

Hall with the purchase of a used 2010 Jeep Patriot. He has been making bi-weekly payments in the sum of $143.55 on that loan ever since. There is still $11,627.55 owing under that agreement and payments are expected to continue until May 22, 2020. [ 2 ] Mr. Baker asks this Court to order Ms. Hall to indemnify him for all of the loan payments that he has made since April 1, 2017,

and for all of those payments that he will be required to make into the future. In the alternative, he asks the Court to order that the Jeep be sold, and that the proceeds of that sale be applied to his potential liability under the credit agreement. [ 3 ] Mr. Baker’s statement of claim does not identify the legal basis for the relief that he seeks but the arguments advanced at trial appear to be twofold. First, he appears to be asserting that he either owns the vehicle or has an ownership interest in the vehicle and he was just letting Ms. Hall use the vehicle.

Second, he appears to suggest that his payments were conditional on Ms. Hall retaining custody of, and bearing primary financial responsibility for, a child that they had together. Since Ms. Hall no longer has custody of the child, he reasons that he should have no further obligation in respect to the credit agreement he signed and that those obligations should be borne by Ms. Hall. [ 4 ] Ms. Hall has defended this action. She asserts that she owns the vehicle and that Mr. Baker’s decision to enter into the credit financing agreement and make payments on the vehicle was a gift to her.

She says that there were no conditions attached to the gift at the time the vehicle was purchased, and she argues that Mr. Baker is now seeking to attach conditions to that gift in light of a change in circumstances in the nature of their relationship. She asks this Court to dismiss Mr. Baker’s claim. [ 5 ] For the reasons which follow, I agree with Ms. Hall and I dismiss Mr. Baker’s claim on a without costs basis. Evidence, Analysis, and Findings of Fact [ 6 ] Where the evidence between Ms. Hall and Mr. Baker conflict, I prefer the evidence of Ms. Hall.

While I am satisfied that neither of the parties are perfectly accurate historians, Mr. Baker has offered up little in the way of corroborative evidence to satisfy me that his version of what transpired, did in fact transpire, at least in so far as it relates to ownership of the Jeep. Comparatively speaking, Ms. Hall’s version is corroborated by her step-father, and her use of the vehicle appears to me to be more in harmony with her allegation of a gift. [ 7 ] Mr. Baker and Ms. Hall had a child together. They were never married, and they did not, to my knowledge, ever live common- law.

It appears that the child was the product of a fleeting intimacy. That child was born in 2003, and is one of three children born to Ms. Hall. Up until approximately April 1 of 2017, Ms. Hall had exclusive custody of that child. No evidence was lead to show whether or not either party had ever sought or obtained court orders in respect to custody, access, or child support. While the evidence is far from clear, it appears that Mr. Baker had, from time to time, made payments towards a loan in relation to a previous vehicle that Ms. Hall owned, and that he considered these payments a form of voluntary child support.

Ms. Hall conceded that Mr. Baker made some payments but took issue with the quantum of monies paid, and took issue with his assertion that those payments somehow gave him an ownership interest in that earlier vehicle. [ 8 ] Some time prior to 2015 Ms. Hall was in a motor vehicle accident and the vehicle that she was driving was damaged and written off by SGI. She received an insurance payment in the amount of $2,800.00. Mr. Baker conceded that even though he had made some loan payments for Ms. Hall on that vehicle, this money belonged to Ms. Hall. [ 9 ] Ms. Hall was without a motor vehicle for a period of time.

She says that Mr. Baker told her that he wanted to buy a vehicle for her because she had been primarily responsible in both a financial and custodial sense, for the care of their daughter. She says that he told her that if she applied the money she had received from her accident settlement towards the purchase of a vehicle, he would undertake to pay out the remaining amount that would be due. [ 10 ] Mr.

Baker does not dispute that this conversation occurred nor did he offer any evidence as to what the common intentions of the parties were when, on May 8, 2015, they went to a used car dealership to purchase a vehicle. I take special note that Ms. Hall’s step- father, who is admittedly interested in the outcome of this case, gave evidence that shortly before the vehicle was purchased, Mr. Baker had said to him that he intended to buy Ms. Hall a vehicle ‘within three months’. Mr.

Baker did not dispute that the conversation took place, nor did he even attempt to cross-examine the step-father on this issue. [ 11 ] On May 8, 2015, the parties attended at Auto Gallery, a new and used car dealership in Regina and after looking at a number of vehicles, they agreed that Ms. Hall would purchase a 2010 Jeep Patriot. The original price for the vehicle was $13,898.00. After adding on some additional items, and the inclusion of tax, the total cost of the vehicle came to $18,073.65. After Ms.

Hall paid a non-refundable partial payment of $2,800.00, the balance due was $15,273.65. [ 12 ] At trial each of the parties submitted almost identical bills of sale. The only difference between the two is that Amy Hall has signed one of the Bills of Sale, and the finance manager appears to be someone with the first name of ‘Jessica’. Mr. Baker signed a duplicate copy of the Bill of Sale and the name of the finance manager on his copy appears to have the first name of ‘Kim’. No evidence was led by Mr. Baker to explain why there are two Bills of Sale. Mr.

Baker also submitted into evidence a credit agreement that he signed on the same date and which obligated him to make the loan payments on the remaining balance due on the purchase price. It was not executed by Ms. Hall and she advises that she was never asked to sign it or any other document. Mr. Baker offers no explanation as to why she is not a co-signatory on the credit agreement. [ 13 ] Ms. Hall took the vehicle home, and with the exception of what appears to be only one occasion, when Ms. Hall gave up possession of the vehicle so that Mr.

Baker could do some mechanical work on it, the vehicle has been in Ms. Hall’s exclusive possession. She has, exclusively, paid for all repairs, fuel, and insurance. The vehicle has always been registered, solely, in Ms. Hall’s name. Mr. Baker asserts that he attempted to have the vehicle registered in both their names, but he has provided no corroborative evidence in this regard. It appears that he only ever did so in anticipation of this action. [ 14 ] On or about April 1 of 2017 Ms. Hall lost custody of their child, who is soon to be fifteen years old.

There is a suggestion that the child was apprehended from her care and placed with Mr. Baker. Regardless of how it came to be, the child moved in with Mr. Baker and continues to reside with him. Because the child now lives with him, Mr. Baker seeks to avoid making any further payments under the credit agreement, and he seeks to recover all of those payments that he has made since April 1 of 2017. According to his statement of claim he is seeking ‘the return’ of the vehicle that ‘he’ purchased so that it can be sold to pay the creditor.

[15] There is no question that Ms. Hall has an ownership interest in the vehicle. She made a down payment on the vehicle with what Ihave concluded was her own money, and she has incurred the costs of maintaining and repairing that vehicle for the last three years. Assuch, the best that Mr. Baker may seek from this court is a determination of the nature and extent of his ownership interest in the vehicleand some form of remedy to secure his share of that ownership interest.

Simply put, I cannot, as he asks for in his statement of claim,‘return’ a vehicle to him which was never exclusively his, and that he did not exclusively own. [16] I am satisfied that when the vehicle was purchased, that portion of the purchase price that Mr. Baker undertook to pay, and anyownership interest that he may have acquired thereby, was given to Ms. Hall as a gift.

I well understand that when property, or aninterest in property, is transferred from one person to another in situations other than a parent to a minor child, there is a presumption ofresulting trust and not a presumption that the transfer was intended as a gift. [17] ‘Resulting trust’ simply means that where property appears to have been transferred to another, (like an ownership interest in avehicle), and the person who receives it has paid nothing for that transfer, then the law presumes that the transferee holds that interest forthe benefit of the transferor.

However, the presumption of resulting trust can be rebutted. The onus to demonstrate that a gift wasintended, rather than an implied resulting trust, lies with the transferee, and that onus must be proven on a balance of probabilities. [See,generally: Pecore v Pecore, 2007 SCC 17, [2007] 1 SCR 795]. [18] I am satisfied that Mr. Baker gifted his interest in the vehicle to Ms. Hall when it was purchased. I say this for several reasons.First, Mr. Baker had told Ms. Hall’s step-father that he intended to present this form of gift to Ms.

Hall in the near future and there wasno evidence whatsoever that he advised the step-father that the gift was to be of a conditional nature. Second, he thereafter told Ms. Hallof this intention and they subsequently purchased the Jeep. Third, Ms. Hall was never called upon to execute the credit agreement, norwas she even familiar with the obligations under that agreement. Fourth, there is no convincing evidence that Ms. Hall was ever asked byMr. Baker, (until her child moved in with Mr. Baker) to make any contribution to the loan.

Fifth, the vehicle was effectively transferredinto her exclusive possession and she was exclusively responsible for gas and maintenance and insurance. Sixth, the vehicle wasregistered in her name only. Seventh, and, finally, there is no compelling evidence that Mr. Baker ever sought to have the vehicleregistered in his name prior to the child moving in with him. [19] In short, I find that there was a verbal expression of an intention to gift the vehicle, made not only to Ms. Hall, but also to herfather-in-law; there was a physical transfer of the vehicle into her exclusive possession; and, thereafter, Ms.

Hall exercised soleresponsibility over that vehicle’s physical condition. [20] I do not accept Mr. Baker’s suggestion that the gift was conditional, and that the parties either knew or ought to have known thatthe transfer of his interest in the vehicle was conditional on Ms. Hall maintaining exclusive financial responsibility for, and custody of,their child. While that may have been Mr. Baker’s intention, I do not believe that this was ever communicated to Ms. Hall.

I believe herwhen she says that she was of the view that the gift that had been made was upon consideration of her earlier care and support of herchild and not for any future obligation. I believe the step-father when he stated that Mr. Baker intended to buy Ms. Hall a vehicle,without identifying any qualifying conditions. [21] Mr. Baker’s assertion is rife with complication. If the facts were changed slightly, to the effect that Ms. Hall gave up custody fora period of one month, would the gift then fail? How about two weeks? How about one day?

What if the child had died two weeks afterthe vehicle had been purchased. Could Mr. Baker resile from the gift with the effect that the financing company could then take thevehicle back, sell it at a reduced price, and thereafter leave Ms. Hall out of pocket her down payment? Could this have been within thereasonable contemplation of Ms. Hall when she agreed to the gift? I think not.

There is no convincing evidence before the Court tosuggest that the parties understood that the gift was conditional on a certain state of affairs remaining static, and there is no convincingevidence before the Court to identify with precision the scope of that presumed condition. With due respect to Mr. Baker, the evidence,when considered in its entirety, convinces me, more likely than not, that Mr. Baker unconditionally gifted any ownership interest that hemay have had in the gift to Ms. Hall. [22] Furthermore, I conclude that the law makes it clear that it is not open to Mr.

Baker, at a later date, to retroactively attachconditions to a gift that was understood to be unconditional. [See, generally: Child v Chase (1980), (SKDC), 9 Sask R248 (SKDC)]. [23] For all of these reasons, I dismiss Mr. Baker’s claim. It is clear to me that he did, on May 8, 2015 unconditionally gift to Ms. Hallhis entire interest in the vehicle in question. As such, the vehicle is hers, subject to any legal or equitable interests parties other than Mr.Baker may have in relation to the vehicle. As such, she has no obligation to pay any money to Mr.

Baker or assume the legal obligationsthat he may have under the credit agreement simply because he now chooses to renege on a gift already advanced. [24] I am not prepared to make any award of costs in this matter. I believe that any nominal amount that I could award would causethe parties ongoing grief, and I suspect that each of them would like this matter to be finally concluded. In any event, I note that Ms. Halldid not seek her costs in this matter. ____________________

P. Demong, J