R. v. Losier, 2011 NBCA 102

COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW BRUNSWICK 107-11-CA HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN APPELLANT SA MAJESTÉ LA REINE APPELANTE - and - - et - SERGE ALAIN LOSIER RESPONDENT SERGE ALAIN LOSIER INTIMÉ R. v. Losier, 2011 NBCA 102 R. c.

Losier, 2011 NBCA 102 CORAM: The Honourable Chief Justice Drapeau The Honourable Justice Larlee The Honourable Justice Quigg CORAM : L’honorable juge en chef Drapeau L’honorable juge Larlee L’honorable juge Quigg Appeal from a decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench: June 28, 2011 Appel d’une décision de la Cour du Banc de la Reine : Le 28 juin 2011 History of Case: Historique de la cause : Decision under appeal: 2011 NBQB 177 Décision frappée d’appel : 2011 NBBR 177 Preliminary or incidental proceedings: Provincial Court: 2010 NBPC 24 Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires : Cour provinciale : 2010 NBCP 24 Appeal heard: October 11, 2011 Appel entendu : Le 11 octobre 2011 Judgment rendered: October 11, 2011 Jugement rendu : Le 11 octobre 2011

Counsel at hearing: For the appellant: Pierre Roussel, Q.C. For the respondent: Marco R. Cloutier and Lucie Laboissonnière Avocats à l’audience : Pour l’appelante : Pierre Roussel, c.r. Pour l’intimé : Marco R. Cloutier et Lucie Laboissonnière THE COURT Grants the Attorney General leave to appeal, but dismisses the appeal without costs. LA COUR Accueille la demande en autorisation d’appel de la procureure générale, mais rejette l’appel sans dépens. English version of the judgment delivered by THE COURT (Orally) I.

Introduction [ 1 ] This application for leave to appeal involves the decision of a judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench to confirm the respondent’s acquittal on two charges, one of operating a motor vehicle while his blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit ( s. 253(1) (

b) of the Criminal Code ), the other of operating a vehicle while his ability to do so was impaired by alcohol ( s. 253(1) (a)): 2011 NBQB 177 , [2011] N.B.J. No. 240 (QL). These acquittals were entered following the exclusion, pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms , of a qualified technician’s certificate purporting to establish the blood alcohol level in question. According to the trial judge, exclusion was justified because the respondent’s rights to be served in the official language of his choice and to be informed of this right had been violated.

Again according to the trial judge, the right to this information, which is expressly recognized in s. 31(1) of the Official Languages Act , S.N.B. 2002, c. O-0.5, arises by implication from s. 20(2) of the Charter . II.

Background [ 2 ] The decision under appeal gives a very useful overview of the background, both factual and procedural, that led to the verdicts of acquittal in Provincial Court: [TRANSLATION] The Attorney General appeals a decision of a Provincial Court judge ( see: 2010 NBPC 24 ) who excluded from evidence the qualified technician’s certificate in a case of impaired driving on the ground the language rights of the accused, Serge Alain Losier, had been violated.

The trial judge found that the absence of an active offer of service in both official languages on the part of the peace officer and the violation of these language rights amounted not only to a violation of s. 31(1) of the Official Languages Act , but also to a violation of s. 20(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms . As a result, this opened the way to remedial action under s. 24(2) of the Charter . The facts On September 4, 2008, Mr. Losier was charged with operating a motor vehicle while his blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit, an offence set out in s. 253(1) (

b) of the Criminal Code , and with operating a vehicle while his ability to drive was impaired by alcohol, contrary to s. 253(1) (a). While conducting a spot check program, the Fredericton Police Force stopped the vehicle driven by Mr. Losier. Constable Brandon Jordan, one of the three officers on site, noticed that Mr. Losier’s eyes were red and glassy. The officer asked Mr. Losier, in English, for the usual documents and found out that he had been drinking in a nightclub and was on his way home.

The officer suspected the presence of alcohol and ordered him to proceed to the patrol car to undergo a test on an approved screening device. Mr. Losier complied with the demand and the officer recorded an “F” on the device, that is, a fail. Based on this result, the officer stated that he had reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Losier was impaired and ordered the latter to accompany him to the police station for a breathalyser test. He then read him the usual warning and informed him of his right to retain and instruct counsel. The entire conversation between the police officer and Mr.

Losier took place in English up to this point. In response to the question concerning his right to counsel, Mr. Losier replied in basic English that he wanted to speak to a French-speaking lawyer. Having already noticed Mr. Losier’s basic English, the officer asked him if he preferred to communicate in French. He replied in the affirmative and the officer informed him that he would have access to a Francophone officer and lawyer once they arrived at the police station. More than 30 minutes had elapsed since he had initially been stopped at the spot check site. At the police station, Mr.

Losier met a bilingual officer who again read him the warning and his rights under the Charter , this time in French. Mr. Losier spoke to a French-speaking lawyer and then provided two breath samples to a qualified technician. At trial, on cross-examination, Constable Jordan admitted that he was aware of the provisions of the Official Languages Act of New Brunswick concerning the duty to make an active offer under s. 31(1) , having learned this during his police training and later as a member of the Fredericton Police Force. He also acknowledged he had noticed Mr.

Losier spoke English with a strong French accent even before he read him his rights and made the breathalyser demand. It was only after this that he asked him if he preferred to communicate in French; Mr. Losier gave an affirmative answer and the officer informed him that this service was available at the police station. In his decision rendered on May 4, 2010, the trial judge indicated Constable Jordan had violated Mr. Losier’s Charter language rights for approximately 30 minutes – a period during which he gathered evidence which led to his arrest.

He found that the failure to respect language rights is a breach of s. 31(1) of the Official Languages Act and of s. 20(2) of the Charter. After conducting an analysis to determine if remedial action under s. 24(2) was warranted, the trial judge excluded the qualified technician’s certificate from evidence; as a matter of law, he then had to acquit Mr. Losier of the offence under s. 253(1) (

a) of the Criminal Code . The accused was also acquitted of the charge under s. 253(1) (

b) as the Crown Prosecutor had admitted the evidence did not establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [paras. 1-12] [Emphasis added.] [ 3 ]

Section 31 of the Official Languages Act reads as follows:

31(1) Members of the public have the right, when communicating with a peace officer, to receive service in the official language of their choice and must be informed of that right . 31(2) If a peace officer is unable to provide service in the language chosen under subsection (1), the peace officer shall take whatever measures are necessary, within a reasonable time, to ensure compliance with the choice made under subsection (1). 31(3) A police force or agency, as the case may be, shall ensure the availability of the means necessary to respond to the choice made by a member of the public under subsection (1) and to support the obligation placed on a peace officer under subsection (2). [Emphasis added.] 31(1) Tout membre du public a le droit, lorsqu’il communique avec un agent de la paix, de se faire servir dans la langue officielle de son choix et il doit être informé de ce choix . 31(2) Lorsque l’agent de la paix n’est pas en mesure d’assurer la prestation des services dans la langue officielle choisie en vertu du paragraphe (1), il doit prendre les mesures nécessaires et ce dans un délai raisonnable pour lui permettre de répondre au choix fait par le membre du public au paragraphe (1). 31(3) Il incombe aux agences responsables ou aux corps policiers, le cas échéant, de veiller à mettre en œuvre les mesures nécessaires pour répondre au choix fait par un membre du public en vertu du paragraphe (1) et pour appuyer l’obligation de l’agent de la paix au sens du paragraphe (2). [Nous avons souligné.] [ 4 ] The Charter provisions referenced in the submissions are: Official languages of New Brunswick 16.

(2) English and French are the official languages of New Brunswick and have equality of status and equal rights and privileges as to their use in all institutions of the legislature and government of New Brunswick. Advancement of status and use 16.

(3) Nothing in this Charter limits the authority of Parliament or a legislature to advance the equality of status or use of English and French. Langues officielles du Nouveau-Brunswick 16.

(2) Le français et l’anglais sont les langues officielles du Nouveau-Brunswick; ils ont un statut et des droits et privilèges égaux quant à leur usage dans les institutions de la Législature et du gouvernement du Nouveau-Brunswick. Progression vers l’égalité 16.

(3) La présente charte ne limite pas le pouvoir du Parlement et des législatures de favoriser la progression vers l’égalité de statut ou d’usage du français et de l’anglais.

English and French linguistic communities in New Brunswick 16.1

(1) The English linguistic community and the French linguistic community in New Brunswick have equality of status and equal rights and privileges, including the right to distinct educational institutions and such distinct cultural institutions as are necessary for the preservation and promotion of those communities. Role of the legislature and government of New Brunswick 16.1(2) The role of the legislature and government of New Brunswick to preserve and promote the status, rights and privileges referred to in subsection (1) is affirmed. Communications by public with New Brunswick institutions 20.

(2) Any member of the public in New Brunswick has the right to communicate with, and to receive available services from, any office of an institution of the legislature or government of New Brunswick in English or French . [Emphasis added.] Communautés linguistiques française et anglaise du Nouveau- Brunswick 16.1(1) La communauté linguistique française et la communauté linguistique anglaise du Nouveau-Brunswick ont un statut et des droits et privilèges égaux, notamment le droit à des institutions d’enseignement distinctes et aux institutions culturelles distinctes nécessaires à leur protection et à leur promotion.

Role de la législature et du gouvernement du Nouveau- Brunswick 16.1(2) Le rôle de la législature et du gouvernement du Nouveau-Brunswick de protéger et de promouvoir le statut, les droits et les privilèges visés au paragraphe (1) est confirmé. Communications entre les administrés et les institutions du Nouveau-Brunswick 20.

(2) Le public a, au Nouveau-Brunswick, droit à l’emploi du français ou de l’anglais pour communiquer avec tout bureau des institutions de la législature ou du gouvernement ou pour en recevoir les services . [Nous avons souligné.]

Enforcement of guaranteed rights andfreedoms 24.

(1) Anyone whose rights or freedoms, asguaranteed by this Charter, have beeninfringed or denied may apply to a court ofcompetent jurisdiction to obtain such remedyas the court considers appropriate and just inthe circumstances. Exclusion of evidence bringingadministration of justice into disrepute 24.

(2) Where, in proceedings undersubsection (1), a court concludes thatevidence was obtained in a manner thatinfringed or denied any rights or freedomsguaranteed by this Charter, the evidence shallbe excluded if it is established that, havingregard to all the circumstances, the admissionof it in the proceedings would bring theadministration of justice into disrepute. Recours en cas d’atteinte aux droits etlibertés 24.

(1) Toute personne, victime de violationou de négation des droits ou libertés qui luisont garantis par la présente charte, peuts’adresser à un tribunal compétent pourobtenir la réparation que le tribunal estimeconvenable et juste eu égard auxcirconstances. Irrecevabilité d’éléments de preuve quirisqueraient de déconsidérer l’administrationde la justice 24.

(2) Lorsque, dans une instance visée auparagraphe (1), le tribunal a conclu que deséléments de preuve ont été obtenus dans desconditions qui portent atteinte aux droits oulibertés garantis par la présente charte, ceséléments de preuve sont écartés s’il est établi,eu égard aux circonstances, que leurutilisation est susceptible de déconsidérerl’administration de la justice. [5] In a remarkably detailed decision, the Court of Queen’s Bench judge, sitting on appeal under

Part XXVII ofthe Criminal Code, dismissed the Attorney General’s appeal after ruling: (1) the trial judge had jurisdiction to decide the issue ofwhether the respondent’s language rights had been violated after he was stopped; (2) the police officer’s duty to inform the respondent ofhis right to be served in the official language of his choice arises not only from s. 31(1) of the Official Languages Act, but also from s.20(2) of the Charter; and (3) the trial judge correctly concluded the rights conferred upon the respondent by these provisions had beenviolated and properly excluded the qualified technician’s certificate pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter. [6] The Attorney General seeks leave to appeal.

She contends the trial judge erred in law: [TRANSLATION](1) “by recognizing the jurisdiction of the Provincial Court to rule on a language rights violation in the present circumstances”; (2) “byimporting the requirements of natural justice into language rights and vice versa”; (3) “in his

interpretation and application of s. 31 of theOfficial Languages Act and s. 20(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms”; and (4) “ by granting [a remedy] that is notjustified in law and which could bring the administration of justice into disrepute.” III. Analysis and decision [7] The grounds of appeal raise important questions of “law alone” within the meaning of s. 839(1) of theCriminal Code.

Accordingly, the Attorney General is granted leave to appeal. [8] That being said, we are in substantial agreement with the reasons given by the judge of the Court of Queen’sBench (see paras. 14-49 in particular).

In our opinion, those reasons reflect a sound appreciation of the pertinent principles of law,particularly with respect to the meaning and scope to be given to s. 20(2) of the Charter. [9] The police officer who stopped the respondent was under a duty to comply with the obligations imposed oninstitutions of the government of New Brunswick by s. 20(2) of the Charter (see Société des Acadiens et Acadiennes du Nouveau-Brunswick Inc. v. Canada, 2008 SCC 15, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 383; R. v. Gautreau (1989), (NB KB), 101 N.B.R. (2d) 1, [1989] N.B.J.

No. 1005 (Q.B.) (QL), rev’d on other grounds (1990), (NB CA), 109 N.B.R. (2d) 54, [1990] N.B.J. No.860 (C.A.) (QL), leave to appeal refused [1991] 3 S.C.R. viii, [1990] S.C.C.A. No. 444 (QL); and R. v. Gaudet, 2010 NBQB 27, [2010]N.B.J. No. 25 (QL)).

[10] As the majority pointed out in R. v. Beaulac, (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 768, [1999] S.C.J. No.25 (QL), it is incumbent upon courts to eschew a restrictive

interpretation of legislative and constitutional provisions dealing withlanguage rights. We draw additional guidance from that landmark decision. Indeed, among the

interpretations that might reasonably begiven to such provisions, courts must favour the one that is more likely to reflect the application of the following principles: (1) the rightto use one or the other official language requires acknowledgement of a duty on the part of the state to take positive steps to promote theexercise of that right; and (2) the objective of the entrenchment of this right in the Charter was none other than to contribute to “thepreservation and protection of official language communities”: Language rights are not negative rights, or passive rights; they can only be enjoyed if the means are provided.

This is consistent with thenotion favoured in the area of international law that the freedom to choose is meaningless in the absence of a duty of the State to takepositive steps to implement language guarantees; see J. E. Oestreich, “Liberal Theory and Minority Group Rights” (1999), 21 Hum. Rts.Q. 108, at p. 112; P. Jones, “Human Rights, Group Rights, and Peoples’ Rights” (1999), 21 Hum. Rts. Q. 80, at p. 83: “[A] right . . . isconceptually tied to a duty”; and R. Cholewinski, “State Duty Towards Ethnic Minorities: Positive or Negative?” (1988), 10 Hum.

Rts.Q. 344. […] Language rights must in all cases be interpreted purposively, in a manner consistent with the preservation and development of officiallanguage communities in Canada; see Reference re Public Schools Act (Man.), supra, at p. 850. To the extent that Société des Acadiensdu Nouveau-Brunswick, supra, at pp. 579-80, stands for a restrictive

interpretation of language rights, it is to be rejected. The fear that aliberal

interpretation of language rights will make provinces less willing to become involved in the geographical extension of those rightsis inconsistent with the requirement that language rights be interpreted as a fundamental tool for the preservation and protection ofofficial language communities where they do apply. It is also useful to re-affirm here that language rights are a particular kind of right,distinct from the principles of fundamental justice. They have a different purpose and a different origin. I will return to this point later.[paras. 20, 25] [Emphasis added.] We are of the opinion that the

interpretation the Provincial Court, as well as the Court of Queen’s Bench, gave to s. 20(2) is in synch withthose instructions. We note that it echoes the

interpretation adopted by the Court of Queen’s Bench in R. v. Gautreau (Richard C.J.Q.B)and R. v. Gaudet (LaVigne J.). At any rate, we reject the restrictive

interpretation of s. 20(2) espoused in other decisions, notably R. v.Robichaud, 2009 NBPC 26, 350 N.B.R. (2d) 113. [11] Finally, while there is no question that language rights under the Charter are “infrangible” (see R. v. McGraw,2007 NBCA 11, 312 N.B.R. (2d) 142 and Bujold v.

R., 2011 NBCA 24, 369 N.B.R. (2d) 262) and that s. 24 must be interpreted in a waythat upholds “Charter rights by providing effective remedies for their breach” (see R. v. 974649 Ontario Inc., 2001 SCC 81, [2001] 3S.C.R. 575 at para. 19), it bears underscoring that exclusion of evidence essential to the prosecution is not necessarily the appropriateremedy for every violation of language rights, regardless of the circumstances.

The analysis required under s. 24(2) must be carried out. [12] The trial judge’s analysis in this case is, in all respects, harmonious with s. 24(2) and the instructions providedby McLachlin C.J.C. in R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353. Given the circumstances and the applicable standard of review(see R. v. Silveira, (SCC), [1995] 2 S.C.R. 297, [1995] S.C.J. No. 38 (QL) and R. v. Buhay, 2003 SCC 30, [2003] 1S.C.R. 631), we are of the view, like the judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench, that the trial judge’s decision to exclude the qualifiedtechnician’s certificate should not be reversed. IV.

Disposition [13] For these reasons, the appeal is dismissed, but without costs. _____________________________________

J. Ernest Drapeau, Juge en chef du Nouveau-Brunswick ______________________________________ M.E.L. Larlee, j.c.a _______________________________________ Kathleen A. Quigg, j.c.a.