2021 NBCA 42, 2021 NBCA 42

COURT OF APPEAL OF COUR D’APPEL DU NEW BRUNSWICK NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK M.V. and C.H. APPELLANTS 21-21-CA M.V. et C.H. APPELANTS - and - - et - MINISTER OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT RESPONDENT MINISTRE DU DÉVELOPPEMENT SOCIAL INTIMÉ M.V. and C.H. v. Minister of Social Development, 2021 NBCA 42 M.V. et C.H. c.

Ministre du Développement social, 2021 NBCA 42 CORAM: The Honourable Justice Green The Honourable Justice Baird The Honourable Justice French CORAM : l’honorable juge Green l’honorable juge Baird l’honorable juge French Appeal from a decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench: February 26, 2021 Appel d’une décision de la Cour du Banc de la Reine : le 26 février 2021 History of case: Decision under appeal: Unreported Preliminary or incidental proceedings: None Historique de la cause : Décision frappée d’appel : inédite Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires : aucune

Appeal heard: September 14, 2021 Judgment rendered: September 23, 2021 Reasons delivered: December 9, 2021 Appel entendu : le 14 septembre 2021 Jugement rendu : le 23 septembre 2021 Motifs déposés : le 9 décembre 2021 Reasons for judgment by: The Honourable Justice Baird Concurred in by: The Honourable Justice Green The Honourable Justice French Counsel at hearing: For the appellants: Ben Reentovich For the respondent: Nancy Jane Martel Motifs de jugement : l’honorable juge Baird Souscrivent aux motifs : l’honorable juge Green l’honorable juge French Avocats à l’audience : Pour les appelants : Ben Reentovich Pour l’intimée : Nancy Jane Martel THE COURT On September 23, 2021, the Court dismissed the appeal with reasons to follow.

These reasons are set out in the accompanying text. LA COUR Le 23 septembre 2021, la Cour a rejeté l’appel et a indiqué que les motifs suivraient. Ces motifs sont exposés dans le texte qui suit. The judgment of the Court was delivered by BAIRD, J.A.

I. Introduction [ 1 ] This is an appeal from a decision in which permanent guardianship of a child was granted to the Minister of Social Development (Minister) under s. 56(1) of the Family Services Act , S.N.B. 1980, c. F-2.2 (the “ Act ”). The appellants argue the decision should be set aside and a new hearing held, asserting both procedural and substantive errors on the part of the application judge. II. Facts and Procedural Background [ 2 ] The appellants are the parents of two children.

The older child is not the subject of these proceedings because the biological father was granted sole custody of the child in November 2018. The child who is the subject of the current proceedings was born in July 2013 and was originally the subject of an interim supervisory order in effect from August 2013 to January 2014. A second supervisory order issued effective April 2018 and extended to June 2018 when the Minister was granted protective care because of allegations of physical abuse and inappropriate discipline. [ 3 ] In November 2018, a custody order issued for up to six months, effective June 2018.

A series of custody order extensions followed until the Minister applied for permanent guardianship of the child in April 2020. The Minister’s application was heard October 19-21, 2020. On March 9, 2021, the guardianship order issued. [ 4 ] The Minister’s application chronicles a history of verbal and physical abuse directed by the parents toward this child. There were 33 affidavits filed by various professionals who were actively engaged by the Minister to provide services to the parents in an effort to keep the family unit intact, as required by the Act .

In addition, psychologist Robert Doucet completed a Parenting Capacity Report. In all, the court below heard viva voce evidence from thirteen witnesses, including the parents. The Minister’s overriding concern was the failure of the parents, despite numerous interventions, to make sufficient progress to enable them to safely parent the child. III. Grounds of Appeal [ 5 ] The parents seek a new hearing before a different judge, asserting:

a) The judge erred when she relied on hearsay evidence;

b) The judge erred when she relied on the affidavit evidence and did not resolve “discrepancies” between the affidavits and the viva voce evidence; and

c) The judge erred by creating an unreasonable expectation the parents would be required to maintain the type of home provided by the foster parents to ensure the “optimal development” of the child. IV. Standard of Review [ 6 ] The standard of review in child protection cases is narrow and one of deference unless it is clear there was an error in the application of a legal principle, the judge made a palpable and overriding error in the appreciation of the facts of the case, or the reasons were insufficient: S.H. and M.D. v. The Minister of Social Development , 2014 NBCA 20 , 419 N.B.R. (2d) 377 , at para. 4 .

In Van de Perre v. Edwards , 2001 SCC 60 , [2001] 2 S.C.R. 1014 , Bastarache J. reiterated that the standard of review in custody cases is one of deference unless it is determined there has been a material error, a serious misapprehension of the evidence, or an error of law (para. 11). [ 7 ] In child protection cases, the sole consideration is the best interests of the child. Every case is unique, and judges are required to conduct a balanced evaluation of the evidence, weighed against the criteria set out in the legislation.

If there has been material error, appellate intervention is warranted (see Larlee J.A. in P.R.H. v. M.E.L. , 2009 NBCA 18 , 343 NBR (2d) 100 , at para.

8). [8] A judge’s treatment of the facts will be accorded deference, absent palpable and overriding error: M.K.R. v.J.A.R., 2015 NBCA 73, 443 N.B.R. (2d) 313, at paras. 9-11. The same applies to errors of mixed fact and law. Should a judge misapply alegal principle, the standard of review is that of correctness: J.C. v. Minister of Families and Children, 2020 NBCA 24, [2020] N.B.J.No. 126 (QL), at para. 6. [9] This Court has applied these standards on numerous occasions (see, for example, J.S. and J.N. v. Minister ofSocial Development (now Minister of Families and Children), 2018 NBCA 26, [2018] N.B.J.

No. 371 (QL); S.G. and E.S. v. Minister ofFamilies and Children, 2019 NBCA 66, [2019] N.B.J. No. 240 (QL); J.C. v. Minister of Families and Children, 2020 NBCA 24, [2020]N.B.J. No. 126 (QL); D.S. and A.C. v. The Minister of Social Development, 2021 NBCA 25, [2021] N.B.J. No. 128 (QL)). [10] In the absence of specific statutory provisions otherwise, the deferential standard does not apply whenreviewing matters of procedural fairness (see Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of New Brunswick, as represented by theMinister of Education v. Kennedy et al., 2015 NBCA 58, [2015] N.B.J.

No. 251 (QL), per Drapeau C.J.N.B., as he then was, at para. 14;Landry v. Attorney General of New Brunswick, 2020 NBCA 38, [2020] N.B.J. No. 113 (QL), per LaVigne J.A., at para. 36; D.S. andA.C., at para. 10). With respect to the submission the judge relied on hearsay evidence, the standard is that of correctness. The samewould apply to the third ground of appeal. V. Analysis A. The hearsay assertion [11] The appellants complain of the improper use of hearsay evidence in the form of: 1) a letter from Dr. ToddLambert; and 2) a report by Dr. Mary Ann Campbell. Below, I will address each of these in turn. [12] The

preamble to the Act lays the foundation for state action in child protection cases.

Relevant provisions bearrepeating: WHEREAS it is accepted that parents have responsibility for the care and supervision of their children and that children should only beremoved from parental supervision in accordance with the provisions of this Act; and WHEREAS the best interests and safety of the child must always prevail when there is a conflict between the risk to the child and thepreservation of the family unit; and WHEREAS it is recognized that social services provided to children should respect and preserve a child’s need for continuity of carewithin their kinship network, that a child’s best interests should be included in the assessment, planning and decision-making processsurrounding the permanent plans for the child and that any procedural delay should be avoided as much as possible; and […] WHEREAS it is recognized that the rights of children, families and individuals must be guaranteed by the rule of law and that theProvince’s intervention into the affairs of individuals and families so as to protect and affirm these rights must be governed by the rule oflaw[.] [13] Further, in New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v.

C. (G. C.), (SCC),[1988] 1 S.C.R. 1073, [1988] S.C.J. No. 48 (QL), L’Heureux-Dubé J. wrote:

[…] the

preamble of the [Family Services] Act declares that “children should only be removed from parental supervision either partly orentirely when all other measures are inappropriate”. The burden of proof rests upon the Minister to show the propriety of the measure onthe facts of the case. […] [para. 13, cited to QL] [14] As stated, the sole consideration in these cases is the best interests of the child. The term “best interests of thechild” is defined in s. 1 of the Act.

Section 53 of the Act states that, when disposing of an application for guardianship, the court shallplace above all other considerations the best interests of the child (s. 53(2)). I refer to this

section as it is my view that, unless the error isso grievous it cannot be corrected through the use of the proportionality rule (Rule 1.02.1 of the Rules of Court), questions of aprocedural nature should not impede the overriding duty of the court to protect the safety and security of a child: see J.H. v. T.H., 2014NBCA 52, 422 N.B.R. (2d) 388, on the use of the proportionality rule in custody cases. [15] Section 53(4) of the Act permits a court to overlook procedural irregularities or failures to fully comply withthe legislation when it is determined to be in the best interests of a child.

It reads: 53(4) No application shall be dismissedbecause of a procedural defect or lack ofconformity with any requirement of this Partif the court is satisfied that (

a) the defect or lack of conformity has beenor can be compensated for by such substitutedprocedures as the court determines to beadequate in the circumstances; or (

b) failure to cure or compensate for thedefect or lack of conformity has not resultedin or will not result in substantial prejudice tothe interests of a person who may be affectedby the outcome of the proceedings. 53(4) Aucune demande ne peut être rejetéepour vice de procédure ou manque deconformité à toute exigence de la présentepartie si la cour est convaincue que

a) le vice de forme ou le manque deconformité a été ou peut être suppléé partoute autre procédure que la cour estimeconvenir dans les circonstances; ou

b) le défaut de remède ou de suppléance auvice de procédure ou au manque deconformité n’a pas été ni ne sera gravementpréjudiciable aux intérêts de la personne quipeut être touchée par le résultat de laprocédure. [16] The complaint about the use of hearsay evidence in child protection cases is not new. In New Brunswick(Minister of Health and Community Services) v. B.H. and W.L. (1994), (NB CA), 153 N.B.R. (2d) 45, [1994] N.B.J.No. 412 (QL) (C.A.), Ryan J.A., for the Court, ordered a new trial in a child protection case, concluding: “The trial was rampant with theunreined admission of hearsay evidence” (para. 13).

He cited, as one example, the testimony of a social worker that went on “unabated”for 118 pages of transcript, being “rife” with hearsay and including an opinion on the very question the judge was called upon to decide.See also Ferguson J. in Minister of Families and Children v. P.W. et al, 2018 NBQB 162, [2018] N.B.J. No. 214 (QL), at para. 64. [17] On the admission of hearsay evidence, in Fredericks v. R., 2018 NBCA 56, [2018] N.B.J. No. 211 (QL),Richard J.A. (as he then was) wrote the following: […] hearsay statements are presumptively inadmissible.

Such statements may, however, be admitted under one of the traditionalexceptions to the hearsay rule or by application of the principled exception elaborated by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Khan, (SCC), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531, [1990] S.C.J. No. 81 (QL), and its progeny. Not all out-of-court statements constitute inadmissible hearsay. Evidence adduced solely to prove a statement was made, such as for thepurpose of explaining someone's subsequent actions, do not constitute hearsay. “Hearsay is an out-of-court statement tendered for thetruth of its contents”: Bradshaw, at para. 1.

The reason hearsay is presumptively inadmissible is “because – in the absence of the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant at thetime the statement is made – it is often difficult for the trier of fact to assess its truth”: Bradshaw, at para. 1. In Khelawon [R. v.Khelawon, 2006 SCC 57, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 787], Charron J. explains:

[...] the central reason for the presumptive exclusion of hearsay statements is the general inability to test their reliability. Without themaker of the statement in court, it may be impossible to inquire into that person’s perception, memory, narration or sincerity. Thestatement itself may not be accurately recorded. Mistakes, exaggerations or deliberate falsehoods may go undetected and lead to unjustverdicts.

Hence, the rule against hearsay is intended to enhance the accuracy of the court’s findings of fact, not impede its truth-seekingfunction. [para. 2] However, there are instances where the dangers of hearsay are alleviated by certain circumstances. Over the years, it has beenrecognized that, when those circumstances exist, admitting hearsay presents minimal danger of impeding accurate fact finding. There areinstances where “[a] hearsay statement, because of the way in which it came about, may be inherently reliable, or there may be sufficientmeans of testing it despite its hearsay form”: Khelawon, at para. 42.

Thus came the creation of traditional exceptions to the hearsay rule,because courts recognized that, in particular circumstances, it would be exclusion, rather than admission, that would impede the truthfinding function of a trial. However, in some instances, a rigid application of these exceptions could lead to either “the needless exclusionof evidence in some cases, or its unwarranted admission in others”: Khelawon, at para. 42. There was a call for greater flexibility.Eventually, the Supreme Court would respond.

Thus, in Khan, the Supreme Court adopted an approach “based on the two guidingprinciples that underlie the traditional common law exceptions: necessity and reliability”: Khelawon, at para. 42. The principled approach has undergone refinement since its inception in Khan. Its current iteration, particularly as it relates to reliability,is found in the majority reasons in Bradshaw, which build on the general principles derived from Khelawon.

On the question of thresholdreliability, Karakatsanis J. for the majority explained as follows: [...] Threshold reliability is established when the hearsay “is sufficiently reliable to overcome the dangers arising from the difficulty oftesting it” (Khelawon, at para. 49). These dangers arise notably due to the absence of contemporaneous cross-examination of the hearsaydeclarant before the trier of fact (Khelawon, at paras. 35 and 48).

In assessing threshold reliability, the trial judge must identify thespecific hearsay dangers presented by the statement and consider any means of overcoming them (Khelawon, at paras. 4 and 49; R. v.Hawkins, (SCC), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 1043, at para. 75). The dangers relate to the difficulties of assessing the declarant’sperception, memory, narration, or sincerity, and should be defined with precision to permit a realistic evaluation of whether they havebeen overcome.

The hearsay dangers can be overcome and threshold reliability can be established by showing that (1) there are adequate substitutes fortesting truth and accuracy (procedural reliability) or (2) there are sufficient circumstantial or evidentiary guarantees that the statement isinherently trustworthy (substantive reliability) (Khelawon, at paras. 61-63; Youvarajah, [2013 SCC 41, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 720], at para.30). [paras. 26-27] For a statement to be procedurally reliable, there must be adequate substitutes for the traditional method of testing of the evidence bycontemporaneous cross-examination. “These substitutes must provide a satisfactory basis for the trier of fact to rationally evaluate thetruth and accuracy of the hearsay statement”: Bradshaw, at para. 28.

They “include a video recording of the statement, the presence of anoath, and a warning about the consequences of lying” and are usually coupled with “some form of cross-examination of the declarant,such as preliminary inquiry testimony [...] or cross-examination of a recanting witness at trial”: Bradshaw, at para. 28. As for substantive reliability, it is established if the circumstances in which the statement was made make it inherently trustworthy. Todetermine this, the trial judge can also consider any evidence that corroborates or conflicts with the statement. The standard is high.

Itrequires the judge to be satisfied “that the statement is ‘so reliable that contemporaneous cross-examination of the declarant would addlittle if anything to the process’”: Bradshaw, at para. 31, quoting from Khelawon, at para. 49. In assessing substantive reliability, the trialjudge may consider corroborative evidence if it establishes that alternative and even speculative explanations for the hearsay statementsare unavailable: Bradshaw, at para. 48.

The Supreme Court also recognizes that procedural reliability and substantive reliability “are not mutually exclusive” and “may work intandem”: Bradshaw, at para. 32; in other words, elements of both can combine to overcome the specific hearsay dangers a statementmight present, even in a situation where neither procedural reliability nor substantive reliability would have sufficed on its own. [paras.70-77] See also R. v. Srun, 2019 ONCA 453, [2019] O.J No. 2799 (QL), at paras. 123-129, per Watt J.A.

(1) Letter from Dr. Todd Lambert

[ 18 ] In this case, pediatrician Dr. Todd Lambert authored a letter that was attached to one of the affidavits of the lead social worker, Maranda Fullarton. Ms. Fullarton testified and was cross-examined. Had this letter been tendered as an expert’s report concerning a subject critical to the disposition, the appellants’ submission it was improperly admitted might have had some traction; however, the letter was tendered solely to corroborate Ms. Fullarton’s evidence that Dr. Lambert requested the mother not attend future medical appointments when the child was present, due to her disruptive behaviour.

The letter was reproduced in the judge’s reasons, and it reinforced the first-hand evidence of this type of behaviour, which was observed by others who were involved in the care of the child and was identified as an ongoing problem. The appellants assert that, by referring to the letter, the judge violated the rule against the admission of hearsay evidence. The Minister argues there was no violation of the hearsay rule because the letter did not offer a medical opinion. [ 19 ] Ms. Fullarton testified and deposed to what she observed during the appointments with Dr. Lambert.

Her affidavits, sworn October 29, 2019, and October 7, 2020, described the interactions between Dr. Lambert and the mother during those office visits. In the letter, attached to the affidavit, Dr. Lambert wrote the following: […] After reviewing his current status, his mother [M.V.], for the second visit in a row became very abrasive and inappropriate. She is confrontational and argumentative with [the child’s] foster care provider as well as the representation from Social Development, Maranda Fullarton. She makes false accusations and assumptions toward these care providers.

She does not try to listen regarding the assessment and treatment plans for [the child] and is not processing any of the information. She becomes tangential and fixated on her own circumstances and sabotages the appointment for her [child]. She is very disrespectful to the other adults in the room.

It is getting to the point where I believe she is not welcome in the room for [the child’s] visits until I’ve completed my assessment because of her disruption and inability to focus on [the child’s] needs. [ 20 ] I agree it is inappropriate to attach expert reports to affidavits unless leave of the court has been granted under Rule 52.03.

If a report is intended to introduce expert evidence during a trial, notice must be given in accordance with Rule 52.01, and, unless the report is tendered by consent and becomes part of the record on that basis, the expert must be called and be subject to cross- examination. [ 21 ] This case was different, in that the letter was not offered as an expert’s opinion. While hearsay, in that it was offered for the truth of its contents, it corroborated both the affidavit and the viva voce evidence of Ms.

Fullarton, who was present at the office visits, who observed the mother’s behaviour, who testified at the hearing and who received the letter from Dr. Lambert. There was no doubt as to the reliability of the letter or the author. The purpose of the letter was to reinforce Ms. Fullarton’s testimony concerning the mother’s conduct in Dr. Lambert’s office and to explain why the mother was asked to not participate in any further medical appointments with the child present. It is my view that neither the attachment of the letter to Ms.

Fullarton’s affidavit, nor the judge’s reference to this letter, constituted a violation of the hearsay rule.

(2) Report of Dr. Mary Ann Campbell, clinical psychologist [ 22 ] In 2018, Dr. Mary Ann Campbell, a clinical psychologist, conducted a psychological assessment of the parents and authored a report (the Campbell report). Dr. Campbell testified at a protective care proceeding between the Minister and the appellants (see The Minister of Families and Children v. M.V., C.H. and W.D. ) and her report was entered into evidence in that proceeding. However, in this proceeding, Dr. Campbell was not available to testify and, by agreement of the parties, the Campbell report was not entered into evidence.

However, some of the affidavit evidence makes reference to the existence of Dr. Campbell’s report. As well, the report of Robert Doucet, a psychologist who testified in this proceeding (and whose report was entered into evidence), made reference to the Campbell report. [ 23 ] The appellants take issue with the judge relying on the parts of Mr. Doucet’s evidence and report that referenced the Campbell report. Despite specifically acknowledging that the Campbell report was not in evidence in this proceeding, in her reasons for decision, the judge reproduced portions of Mr.

Doucet’s report that referred to the Campbell report. [ 24 ] The appellants argue that, because the Campbell report had been “specifically excluded,” the judge should not have referred to it in her reasons. Although they admit the judge was “open” to discuss Dr.

Campbell’s involvement with the family as part of the narrative, they contend the judge’s erroneous use of the report constitutes an error of law sufficient to call into question the fairness of the hearing. [ 25 ] In her reasons, the judge recited details of the Campbell report to bolster two of the issues she identified as being relevant to the disposition:

a) the lack of progress concerning the mother’s “emotional regulation;” and

b) the mother’s inability to work with third party professionals. [26] The appellants argue that, when he referred to the Campbell report in his parental capacity assessment, RobertDoucet breached the hearsay rule. Although Mr. Doucet referred to the Campbell assessment, he inserted a caveat, writing that he wasnot relying on the Campbell opinion, but: a. That he had read the report; b. That the mother had advised him she was following the recommendations contained in the report; c. That the report included an extensive review of each parent’s early development and personal family histories; and d.

That, when he conducts an assessment, he reviews the affidavits from various social workers as well as the advanced profiles, andany other assessments that have been conducted. [27] The above statements are considered collateral sources. The use of collateral sources was discussed by theSupreme Court in R. v. Lavalee, (SCC), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852, [1990] S.C.J. No. 36 (QL), at paras. 64-77, cited to QL. Inthat case, the majority concluded there are specific instances when hearsay evidence can be properly admitted to show what informationwas gathered by the expert to assist in the preparation of his or her opinion.

This is the exact qualifier found in the Robert Doucet report.In the end, he conducted his own independent assessment, made his own recommendations and was cross-examined. He was properlyqualified as an expert in clinical psychology and parenting capacity assessments, and his January 15, 2019 report along with his updatedreport from September 2020 were entered into evidence. I see nothing wrong with this practice, provided the expert is independent, andthe report is based on his or her own independent testing and findings.

In fact, it is common practice in civil cases for experts to haveaccess to other experts’ reports. [28] The appellants submit the Court should send a message to trial judges that it is inappropriate for the Minister tobootstrap evidence in this way. However, in their submission, they acknowledge there “does seem to be other evidence which couldsupport a finding that guardianship was appropriate in this case notwithstanding the consideration of the hearsay evidence” (para. 38). [29] Relying on D.C.P. v. C.P. & T.P., 2014 PECA 18, [2014] P.E.I.J. No. 45 (QL), the appellants argue a new trialis warranted.

In C.P., Mitchell J.A. found there was sufficient collateral evidence to support a guardianship order, but concluded: However, on the issue of the disposition, I am of the view that highly prejudicial hearsay evidence permeated the trial, unnecessarily,and tainted the trial judge’s reasons to the point that the critical assessment that permanent placement is in the best interests of thechildren S. and K. is vitiated.

I would therefore set aside the disposition and remit the matter back for a new trial. [para. 84] [30] If the circumstances were the same in this case, I would have no hesitation in coming to a similar conclusion.The reliance on untested hearsay evidence, in the absence of a recognized exception, is an error of law, but that is not what happened inthis case. [31] Professor David Paciocco, as he then was, in an

article entitled “The Principled Use of Hearsay in Civil Cases:A Technical Guide to Avoiding Technicality” (2008) 87:2 Can. Bar. Rev. 277, recognized the distinction between criminal and civil casesin the application of the principled exception. In his view: Perhaps the most telling reason for lessening the intensity of the hearsay rule in child protection matters is that the proceedings are less

adversarial and more inquisitorial. [p. 286] [ 32 ] And in R. v.

Bradshaw , 2017 SCC 35 , [2017] 1 S.C.R. 865 , Karakatsanis J. wrote: In my view, corroborative evidence may be used to assess threshold reliability if it overcomes the specific hearsay dangers presented by the statement. […] [para. 4] [ 33 ] Applying Bradshaw , the corroborative evidence must go to the material aspects of the statement and show that, when considered as a whole, in the circumstances of the case, the only likely explanation is that the declarant was truthful, and the statement was accurate. [ 34 ] In this case, the judge expressly recognized the Campbell report was not in evidence, and she referred to it solely to provide context to her other findings.

She used it as part of the narrative. If it had been the only piece of evidence she referred to in support of her decision to grant the guardianship order, the appellants would have cause to complain. In reaching this conclusion, I have also considered the fact there was no objection to the inclusion of Dr. Lambert’s letter in the affidavits filed by the Minister, nor was the judge asked to strike Mr. Doucet’s references to the Campbell report at any time during the trial. [ 35 ] Let us examine what the judge wrote: As stated, psychological assessments were completed by Dr. Campbell in July 2018.

The assessments and Dr. Campbells recommendations were reviewed with the Respondents on July 26, 2018. At the meeting, M.V. began yelling and screaming and couldn’t be reengaged by Dr. Campbell. This meeting, like many others had to be aborted. Dr. Campbell’s assessment was part of the evidentiary matrix before this Court at the time the initial custody order was issued on November 23, 2018. Certain findings were made by the Court based on that evidence, most notably the emotional lability of M.V. Dr.

Campbell did not testify at the guardianship trial and on consent the of the parties, her assessments were not entered as evidence. The evidence at trial did disclose however that many of Dr. Campbell’s recommendations were implemented and that her findings ultimately resulted in disability benefits being put in place for the parents. Two recommendations the Minister ultimately moved forward on were the completion of a psychological parental capacity assessment and a referral to ACLO for support services. [paras. 39-42] [ 36 ] Mr.

Doucet concluded the parents were weak in the area of meeting the child’s needs and protecting the child by not making their home environment safe, and by consistently showing abusive behaviour toward the children, which has resulted in emotional and physical harm (January 15, 2019 report). Although he acknowledged the parents had made some improvements in reducing their undesirable behaviours, it was his opinion the mother’s intellectual and personality dynamics prevented her from achieving harmony in her overall parenting, and he was concerned about the risk to the child.

The judge acknowledged these problems in her reasons. Of particular note is the following, taken from social worker Ms. Marr’s affidavit: She testified that she personally had experienced many volatile exchanges with M.V. during the period of February to April 2020. In her view she believed that despite the gains made over the period of care, the Respondents would still need significant continual support for [the child] to reside with them in the home.

Her observations and concerns are summarized at paragraphs 37 through 39 of her Affidavit, [Record at pages 14 and 15]: 37. [M.V.] and [C.H.] have demonstrated that they struggle to meet [the child]’s emotional needs based on their verbal outburst at each other, at the children and others involved in the family. [M.V.] and [C.H.] struggle to recognize needs outside of their own. They react to their own thoughts, emotions, and needs before being able to recognize the needs of [the child] and ensuring those needs are met.

38. [M.V.] and [C.H.] both require prompts and assistance of those involved with them to be able to stop, look at [the child]’s needs and attempt to recognize how their behaviors effect [the child]. Often [M.V.] is not able to recognize these connections as she becomes very upset and defensive which prevents her from being able to recognize how [the child] is effected. 39.

The Minister has concerns for [M.V.] and [C.H.]’s understanding of child development and [M.V.]’s expectations of academic outcome [from] [the child]. [The child] is reported to be below grade level expectation with multiple learning goals at school. Ms. Marr goes on to provide that in her view M.V. appears to be more successful in visits when the visit can consist of fun activity that she can have planned in advance. Such as attending the Pet Store, going to McDonald’s, or the playground.

When there is an expectation such as homework, a doctor’s appointment or if any activity requires changing, this is when, in her view, M.V. struggles to regulate her emotions. She further confirmed C.H.’s continued struggle with recognizing and respecting personal boundaries. She acknowledged that during access visits C.H. has improved his ability to respect [the child]’s. It is less frequent that he requests hugs or for [the child] to sit on him. However, she noted he does still make the request.

If [the child] says “no” C.H. has learned (although not consistently) to not become upset and disengage as he did in the past. However, C.H. still appears to seek out the affection and cuddling to meet his needs versus [the child]’s needs. She discussed the fact that M.D. no longer has access with M.V. In November of 2019, W.D. advised that M.D. did not want to attend visits with the Respondents further. There was no explanation provided for in the evidence presented at trial.

M.D.’s father simply terminated these visits. [The child] continues to have access to his brother M.D. through supervised visits facilitated by the department and ACLO in the community every second Saturday. Ms. Marr sees value in the continued relationship between the brothers. Ms. Marr in her evidence discussed the fact that as the supervisor on the file, she was made aware that support workers were not comfortable working one on one with M.V. for several reasons.

Firstly, M.V.’s propensity to make false allegations against workers, an example being that made against Tammy Zigante[,] Maranda Fullerton and the foster parent. Secondly, support workers were hesitant to raise concerns with M.V. as a result of her reactions and defiance. She would often become combative argumentative and escalate when these areas of concern were raised. These concerns persisted throughout the period of time that Ms. Marr case managed the file. I found Ms. Marr’s evidence to be sincere and credible. Her evidence was corroborative of that of Ms.

Fullerton, ACLO and the family support workers. [paras. 99-104] [ 37 ] In his subsequent report, Mr. Doucet added: Although both parents have shown improvements in these areas they most probably have shown us the best of what they will be able to carry forward in their parenting skills. Therefore, the positive learning they have shown in the past year does not outweigh the negative impact their negative behaviours have on [the child]. I do not believe the addition of other services will be able to correct the parenting deficiencies observed in each parent.

For these reasons as well as the comments put forward in this

section I support the application for guardianship for the child […]. [ 38 ] The evidence established ongoing concerns relative to emotional abuse, verbal intimate partner violence, emotional regulation, the lack of cognitive abilities of both parents and ongoing concerns the parents did not understand the limitations of the child due to learning disabilities. The judge wrote: I do not agree that is sufficient to ensure that [the child] ’s emotional and psychological health will not be impacted. Whether M.V. yells at a purse or a person is irrelevant.

Her escalations, regardless of where directed create a chaotic [and] unsettling environment. I believe this to be an environment that will be frightening for [the child] and one that will, as explained by Dr. Doucet trigger emotions of fear and anxiety for [the child] . I am also influenced by Dr. Doucet’s conclusion that [the child]’s intellectual and cognitive functioning difficulties when combined with her personality dynamics make her highly vulnerable to stress and frustration which produce a tendency to become overwhelmed and to

display angry outbursts and rigid thinking. At these times M.V. is unable to focus on [the child]’s needs and does not acknowledge the impact [of the] behavior on [the child]. It is important to note that any progress made by M.V. has been made without the added stress of a child in the home. I am very concerned that the introduction of [the child] back into the family dynamic will create a high stress situation for M.V. that ultimately will trigger her and impact the progress she has made.

I simply am also not satisfied her gains can be maintained. [the child]’s issues relate to her cognitive functioning and personality dynamics. These issues require counseling to be properly managed. Although, MV has shown progress in allowing service providers in her home and engaging in parenting and anger management courses, she has not maintained the counseling component of her case plan. This is concerning. Additionally, M.V. has not over the time [the child] has been in care resolved her situation of high conflict with service providers. She continues to view advice as criticism.

This causes her to escalate and make false accusations. Her evidence on cross examination establishes she continues to lack the insight necessary to eliminate conflict with service providers that are necessary for [the child]’s health care. She remains hesitant to follow the direction of health care providers. This significantly impairs her ability to ensure that [the child]’s needs will be appropriately addressed going forward. [paras. 259-263] [ 39 ] To conclude, I see no merit to this ground of appeal, and I would dismiss it. B.

Discrepancies between the affidavit evidence and the viva voce evidence [ 40 ] The appellants contend the judge’s failure to “reconcile” discrepancies between the affidavits of the Minister’s witnesses and their viva voce evidence tainted the result and was also an error of law. They point to the fact there was some evidence the mother had made progress with her “emotional regulation” from the date the application was filed to the date of the trial.

In addition, they argue the judge’s reliance on evidence that predated the filing of the application for guardianship to the exclusion of evidence concerning changes the parents had made from that date to the date of trial was an error. They state the onus was on the Minister to prove that a guardianship order was in the best interests of the child at the time of the hearing, and she reversed that onus. [ 41 ] In S.H. v.

The Minister of Social Development , 2013 NBCA 35 , 406 N.B.R. (2d) 242 , the Court stated: […] The question the judge must ask is whether [it is] now in the best interests of this child that the order sought be issued, not whether it was so in the past , i.e. a year ago. […] [Emphasis in original; para. 13] [ 42 ] The appellants submit this statement conflicts with J.S. and J.N. , where the Court concluded: […] A child’s future should not be determined based on a snapshot of his or her life; rather, it should include the historical overview of his or her situation, from the point in time when the state takes the decision to intervene, up to and including the date of the hearing. […] [para. 52] [ 43 ] In her reasons, the judge acknowledged she was required to base her decision on the best evidence tendered at the time of the hearing.

She added: “The law is clear that parents are provided 24 months to address the issues that present child protection concerns” (para. 254). The appellants submit that the judge reversed the onus by requiring the parents to prove they could address the Minister’s concerns, and that she minimized any progress they had made in their parental capacity following the date the application for guardianship was filed. [ 44 ] There are several problems with this contention.

As noted, the Act requires the state to attempt family reunification before any other measures are taken to permanently remove children from parental care. From the time the state becomes involved, the goal is to offer supportive services to the family unit to address the issues that have been identified as harmful to the children.

[45] In this case, the Minister’s involvement with this child began in 2013, shortly following his birth. There was anabundance of evidence from witnesses who saw and heard the parents level degrading and humiliating statements toward the child. [46] Once the Minister became involved with the family, a variety of services were offered. Following theSupervisory Order that issued in 2018, separate psychological assessments were conducted.

A referral was made to the New BrunswickAssociation for Community Living (NBACL), a provincial, non-profit organization that works with children and adults who suffer fromintellectual or developmental disabilities. The mother initially refused to consent to the referral. Both parents were referred forcounselling services. As noted, psychologist Robert Doucet prepared a Parenting Capacity Report. All the relevant history concerningthe Minister’s involvement with this family was properly before the court and could be considered by the judge.

In fact, s. 9 of the Actstates: Admissibility of evidence taken onprevious proceeding In considering any application brought underthis Act, the court, upon notice to the parties,may allow to be read into the record asevidence, or, upon notice of the nature of theevidence, may take into considerationwithout reading into the record, any evidencetaken on any previous proceeding, if thatevidence is informative in any way as to thepsychical, psychological, social or physicaldevelopment of the child, his parent or anyother person living with the child or in such aclose relationship with the child as to be in aposition to influence the nature of the careand control exercised with respect to thechild, and if it is relevant to any matter underconsideration by the court.

Preuve consignée lors de procéduresantérieures est admissible En considérant toute demande présentée enapplication de la présente loi, la cour peut,après en avoir avisé les parties, autoriser lalecture, comme preuve à verser au dossier, detout témoignage reçu dans une procédureantérieure, ou, après les avoir avisées de lanature du témoignage, peut prendre cetémoignage en considération sans lecture s’ilest de quelque façon révélateur dudéveloppement psychique, psychologique,social ou physique de l’enfant, de son parentou de toute autre personne vivant avecl’enfant ou si étroitement liée à lui qu’elle esten mesure d’influer sur la nature des soins etde la direction dont il fait l’objet, et si cetémoignage est pertinent à toute questionexaminée par la cour. [47] The Family Law Act, S.N.B. 2020, c. 23, contains a similar provision in s. 3.

The Minister gave notice in hisapplication that he would be asking the court to consider the affidavit evidence filed to support previous applications and motions inrespect to this family. There was no objection raised by the appellants; therefore, it was open for the judge to consider the historicalinterventions made by the Minister, as well as to review the prior interventions and services offered to this family.

For example, theparents were offered parenting support services, and the child was offered speech language therapy and the help of educational assistantsin the classroom, and was also referred to an occupational therapist. The child had supervised access with the parents on Monday,Tuesday, Wednesday, and Friday from 2:30-4:30 p.m. and two Saturdays monthly from 10 a.m.-12 p.m., with the exception of the periodwhen COVID-19 restrictions were in place from March 2020 to May 2020.

The affidavits of the various support workers were before thecourt. [48] In October 2019, during a Permanency Planning Conference, it was noted the mother had made some progresswith emotional regulation, and there was less “yelling” between the parents. The parents wanted the child returned to their care byDecember 2019; however, the Minister determined this was not realistic, concluding they were not able to parent on their own. InNovember, a further six-month custody order was signed. The application for guardianship was filed on April 30, 2020. The groundsthat underpinned the application are numerous. In

summary, the Minister had ongoing and long-standing concerns that the parentsshowed limited short-term ability to make the necessary changes because of their intellectual disabilities and their emotional andpsychological issues. [49] All the interventions taken by the Minister from the time he became involved with this family were relevant,because this evidence formed the backdrop to the Minister’s ultimate decision to apply for a guardianship order. As stated in J.S. andJ.N., a guardianship order should not issue based on a “snapshot” of a child’s life. These applications are considered in context.

In NewBrunswick v. M.L. (1983), (NB KB), 56 N.B.R. (2d) 343, [1983] N.B.J. No. 420 (QL), Deschênes J. was alive to thisprinciple when he wrote: [TRANSLATION]

As regards the plan of action to be taken by the Minister, it is important that the court be able to enquire into the State’s plan for takingthe child into its care so that the court can compare the advantages of this plan of action with the advantage to the child of returning orstaying with his parents. Without this evidence, it is practically impossible for the court to conclude that it is in the “best interests of thechild” to grant the order sought. [para. 28] [50] Past parenting is relevant.

In S.H. and M.D., Larlee J.A., for the Court, wrote: In truth, the trial judge made every effort to compare the history of the family with the current situation. In my opinion he needed tothoroughly examine the evidence of past parenting because it is relevant to both the finding of protection and in deciding upon a properdisposition if the children are found in need of protection […]. [para. 21] [51] In Minister of Family and Community Services v.

S.B., 2008 NBCA 16, 327 N.B.R. (2d) 101, Robertson J.A.concluded: […] the conclusion that the mother would be rehabilitated in a reasonable period of time ignores the fact that the Act already prescribes areasonable period of time: twenty-four months. Truly, if more time were needed to complete the rehabilitation, it would be open to theMinister and the parent to enter into a custody agreement as provided under s. 44(1) of the Act. The truth of the matter is that theLegislature wanted to avoid the very argument being addressed.

The Legislature has vested the Minister with the responsibility andobligation to ensure that the best interests of the child are promoted. The child’s parents have two years in which to acquire the necessaryparenting skills or to effect the necessary lifestyle changes to ensure that the child’s basic needs will be met. After two years, it is up tothe Minister to take appropriate action.

Once a permanent guardianship order is issued, the former parents’ continued involvement withthe child is at the Minister's discretion, unless the court orders access while granting the guardianship order. [para. 16] [52] In a similar case, S.G. and E.S., Green J.A. stated: In her analysis, the application judge readily acknowledged the progress the mother had made with respect to finding suitable housing,maintaining a clean home, spending, budgeting, and meal planning. She was also quick to point out the strong bond between the motherand her child, and the love between them.

However, her preoccupation was clearly the following: In my view, the primary areas of concern are with [the mother]’s parenting skills and knowledge and her ability to ensure [the child]’ssafety. [para. 118] [para. 18] [53] In D.S. and A.C., the Court concluded: The historical evidence in this case was relevant. The historical overview of his or her situation, from the time the State takes thedecision to intervene, up to and including the date of the hearing, is relevant (see J.S. and J.N., at para. 52).

The Supreme Court in C.(G.C.) concluded that guardianship is a judgment that must be made after cautious consideration (para. 13). [para. 58] [54] Also in D.S. and A.C., referring to Young v. Young, (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3, [1993] S.C.J.No. 112 (QL): […] the Supreme Court iterated that the assessment of a child’s best interests encompasses not only the physical and economic well-being, but also his or her emotional, psychological, intellectual and moral well-being. In New Brunswick (Minister of Health andCommunity Services) v. M.R. and A.R. (1998), (NB CA), 198 N.B.R. (2d) 201 (C.A.), [1998] N.B.J.

No. 142 (QL),at para. 20, the Court adopted the trial judge’s comments that it was “absolutely unreasonable” to conclude that a court can determine theparenting skills of parents without considering the background of their family relationships (see J.S. and J.N. v. Minister of SocialDevelopment (now Minister of Families and Children), 2018 NBCA 26, [2018] N.B.J. No. 371 (QL), at para. 52). In Gordon v. Goertz, (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 27, [1996] S.C.J. No. 52 (QL), the Supreme Court states that the best interests of the child testis contextual and not exact.

In child protection hearings, a judge is required to undertake a review of the various interventions made byministerial representatives as a matter of context and to include a review of Case Plans that were implemented, and the expert reports thatwere prepared. It is clear that a court should not delegate its duty to determine what parenting arrangement is in a child’s best interests by

deferring to expert reports (see P.R.H. v. M.E.L., 2009 NBCA 18, 343 N.B.R. (2d) 100). He or she can consider them, but, in the end,must conduct his or her own analysis so as to inform the parents of the reasons for the decision. [para. 40] [55] Finally, in V.C. and J.C. v. The Minister of Social Development et al., 2015 NBCA 28, 435 N.B.R. (2d)205, the Court adopted this principle: In New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. A.R. (1998), (NB CA), 198 N.B.R. (2d) 201,[1998] N.B.J.

No. 142 (C.A.) (QL), this Court stated: I am of the opinion that the appellants’ argument on the relevance of the testimony in previous cases is without merit. This Court has inthe past held that this type of evidence is of relative importance although, as a general rule, it should not be determinative as such (seeNew Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. M.R. and A.R. (supra).

In the case at bar, there is sufficient evidence ofa relationship between previous testimony on the one hand and parenting skills and the best interests of the children at the criticalmoment, i.e., the time of trial on the other.

In light of this evidence, I adopt in essence, Boisvert, J.’s comments when he stated that “[i]tis absolutely unreasonable to conclude that a court can determine the parenting skills of the [appellants] without considering thebackground of their family [...]”. [para. 20] [para. 22] [56] In this case, the application for guardianship was filed in April 2020, and was heard six months later; however,the Minister had been actively involved with this family for 23 months prior to the hearing. The Minister’s focus shifts when anapplication for guardianship is filed.

Following that date, family reunification is no longer the goal, and services that were once offeredwith that goal in mind shift. From April 30, 2020, to the date of the decision on March 9, 2021, the Minister continued to offer services tothe family, even following the filing of the guardianship application. The Minister fulfilled his statutory obligation. The onus was on theMinister to prove the grounds set out in the application for guardianship.

The appellants had every opportunity to challenge that evidencethrough cross-examination and through their case in chief. [57] I respectfully disagree with the appellants’ contention the Minister reversed the onus by requiring them toprove they were capable of parenting this child, for the reasons stated above. The Minister called several witnesses who were subject tocross-examination on this very issue.

The judge was alive to the appellants’ submissions; however, she remained unconvinced theparents had the capacity to parent the child. [58] In keeping with the above, I am not able to find fault with the judge’s reasons. They met the live issues thatwere before the court and they addressed the key criteria for a best interests of the child analysis. The judge heard the evidence, sheobserved the witnesses, and she was in the best position to decide credibility. She reviewed the affidavits and provided a functional, fact-specific analysis, which sufficiently met the principled approach established in Van de Perre.

C. The judge applied an unreasonable standard [59] The appellants argue the judge applied an unreasonable standard when she stated the parents’ homeenvironment remains disruptive and unpredictable and is not “the secure environment [the child] requires to achieve optimaldevelopment and meet [the child’s] full potential” (para. 256). [60] They state these terms are “loaded,” undefined terms, and the judge held the parents to a higher standard thanis realistic given their personal and economic limitations.

Implicit is the suggestion the judge was importing her subjective views of childdevelopment and parenting skills into her reasons instead of looking at the reality of these parents and this family. They refer to adecision where a Court of Queen’s Bench judge employed the terms “a reasonably acceptable level” (New Brunswick (Minister of SocialDevelopment) v. N.C. et. al., [2016] N.B.J. No. 137 (QL), at para. 131).

They argue they do not have to prove they are the “best” parents,nor do they have to prove they are “better” parents than the foster parents. [61] Had the judge measured the parental ability and the standard of living of the parents against those of the fosterparents, she would have committed reversible error. She did not do so. It is my view the decision reflects her findings that these parentsare not able to provide this child with a secure environment to enable this child to reach a full potential in life, consistent with the child’s

best interests. The judge made this statement as a finding of fact, and in consideration of the extensive body of evidence she had before her. I see no error and would dismiss this ground of appeal. D. Miscellaneous [ 62 ] There are two further issues that bear discussion.

The first concerns the use of affidavit evidence, which the appellants argue shows the trial judge did not give adequate consideration to the testimony of witnesses, and, in particular, the testimony that contradicted or materially amplified the events or circumstances described in the affidavits filed by the Minister and reproduced by the trial judge. In the reasons, the judge “cut and pasted” extensive excerpts from the affidavits filed in support of the Minister’s application, and there was limited reference made to the viva voce evidence.

Cross-examination revealed the affidavits are prepared by ministerial employees who take their information from the notes prepared by the workers. One of the social workers admitted during her cross-examination that sometimes evidence of “good parenting” is not referred to in the affidavits. [ 63 ] In D.S. and A.C. , the Court wrote: […] Trial judges are entitled to place limits on cross-examination when it is determined to be a means of harassment, it is irrelevant or repetitive, it misrepresents the truth, or when its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value.

Although it is true unreasonable restrictions on the examination of witnesses can affect the fairness of the process ( see R. v. Lyttle , 2004 SCC 5 , [2004] 1 S.C.R. 193 , at para. 66 ), that did not occur in this case. [para. 15] [ 64 ] Lengthy, wandering, and irrelevant cross-examinations should be trial-managed, but, if there are significant discrepancies between the affidavit evidence and the viva voce evidence that are revealed in cross-examinations, they should be dealt with in the reasons. It is important for a judge to fully explain how she or he reconciled the discrepancies.

The weighing of the evidence is vital. Although there was limited reference to the viva voce evidence in the reasons in this case, I am not persuaded this supports the appellants’ submission the trial judge disregarded the viva voce evidence and/or ignored where that evidence differed from the portion of the affidavits she reproduced in her decision.

Additionally, there was some evidence the parents had made progress in their understanding of parenting, and they were actively participating in the programs being offered to them; however, there was ample evidence this progress was not sufficient. [ 65 ] The second issue concerns s. 53(3) of the Act , which states: 53

(3) The court shall dispose of an application made under this Part within thirty days after it is made unless the court is satisfied that exceptional circumstances require the disposition of the application to be delayed beyond such day , in which case the court may so order, stating in the order the circumstances that gave rise to the order; but a failure to comply with this subsection does not deprive the court of jurisdiction. [Emphasis added.] 53

(3) La cour doit dans les trente jours statuer sur une demande faite en vertu de la présente

partie à moins qu’elle ne soit convaincue que des circonstances exceptionnelles exigent un report de sa décision , auquel cas elle peut rendre une ordonnance à cet effet en y indiquant ces circonstances; mais un défaut de conformité au présent paragraphe ne rend pas la cour incompétente. [Le soulignement est de moi.] [ 66 ] Robertson J.A. discussed this provision in The Minister of Family and Community Services v. S.B . , 2008 NBCA 16 , 327 N.B.R. (2d) 101 . The Court summarized this discussion in J.S. and J.N. : In The Minister of Family and Community Services v.

S.B. , 2008 NBCA 16 , 327 N.B.R. (2d) 101 , the Court concluded, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, the statutory time lines set out in the Act are to be respected. […] [para. 26] [ 67 ] In this case, there was a four-month delay between the last day of the hearing and the filing of the reasons. There were no noted exceptional circumstances. There is a strong public policy rationale for the requirement that reasons be filed within

thirty days in these cases. Should the Minister’s application be unsuccessful, the child’s reunification with his or her family is unnecessarily delayed. Should an order issue, the ability of the Minister to move forward with adoption or other placement plans for a child is also delayed. Both are contrary to the best interests of a child, whose status remains uncertain while the decision is awaited. VI. Disposition [ 68 ] It is for these reasons I joined with my colleagues to dismiss the appeal. Version française de la décision de la Cour rendue par LA JUGE BAIRD I.

Introduction [1] Il s’agit d’un appel d’une décision accordant au ministre du Développement social (le Ministre) la tutelle d’un enfant à

titre permanent en vertu du par. 56(1) de la

Loi sur les services à la famille , L.N.-B. 1980, ch. F-2.2 (la Loi ). Les appelants soutiennent que la décision devrait être annulée et qu’un nouveau procès devrait être tenu, invoquant à l’appui des erreurs de procédure et de fond de la part de la juge saisie de la demande. II. Contexte factuel et procédural [2] Les appelants sont les parents de deux enfants. Le plus âgé ne fait pas l’objet de la présente instance, car le père biologique en a obtenu la garde exclusive en novembre 2018.

L’enfant visé par la présente instance est né en juillet 2013 et a initialement fait l’objet d’une ordonnance de surveillance provisoire en vigueur d’août 2013 à janvier 2014. Une deuxième ordonnance de surveillance est entrée en vigueur en avril 2018 et a été prolongée jusqu’en juin 2018, le Ministre ayant à ce moment été autorisé à placer l’enfant sous un régime de protection en raison d’allégations de violence physique et de mesures disciplinaires inappropriées. [3] En novembre 2018, une ordonnance de garde entrant en vigueur en juin 2018 a été rendue pour une durée maximale de six mois.

Une série de prolongations de cette ordonnance a suivi jusqu’à ce que le Ministre demande la tutelle de l’enfant à

titre permanent en avril 2020. La demande du Ministre a été entendue du 19 au 21 octobre 2020. L’ordonnance de tutelle a été rendue le 9 mars 2021. [4] La demande du Ministre fait état d’antécédents de violence verbale et physique exercée par les parents à l’égard de cet enfant. Trente-trois affidavits ont été déposés par divers professionnels qui ont été activement engagés par le Ministre à fournir des services aux parents dans le but de préserver le noyau familial, comme le prescrit la Loi . De plus, le psychologue Robert Doucet a procédé à une évaluation de la capacité parentale.

En tout, le tribunal de première instance a entendu les témoignages de treize personnes, dont celui des parents. La préoccupation principale du Ministre était l’incapacité des parents, malgré de nombreuses interventions, à faire des progrès suffisants leur permettant d’exercer sans risque le rôle de parent à l’égard de l’enfant. III. Moyens d’appel [5] Les parents sollicitent une nouvelle audience devant un autre juge en invoquant les raisons suivantes :

a) la juge a commis une erreur en se fondant sur du ouï-dire;

b) elle a commis une erreur en s’appuyant sur les éléments de preuve par affidavit et en ne résolvant pas les [TRADUCTION]« divergences » entre les affidavits et les témoignages de vive voix;

c) elle a commis une erreur en s’attendant de façon déraisonnable à ce que les parents maintiennent un foyer comparable à celuifourni par les parents nourriciers pour assurer le [TRADUCTION] « développement optimal » de l’enfant. IV. Norme de contrôle [6] La norme de contrôle en appel en matière de protection de l’enfance est stricte et doit être empreinte deretenue, sauf s’il y a une erreur évidente dans l’application d’un principe juridique, si le juge a commis une erreur manifeste etdominante dans l’appréciation des faits de l’affaire, ou si les motifs étaient insuffisants (S.H. et M.D. c.

Ministre du Développement social, 2014 NBCA 20, 419 R.N.-B. (2e) 377, par. 4). Dans l’arrêt Van de Perre c. Edwards, 2001 SCC 60 , [2001]2 R.C.S. 1014, le juge Bastarache a réitéré que la norme de contrôle en matière de garde d’enfant prescrit la déférence, sauf s’il y a uneerreur importante, une erreur significative dans l’interprétation de la preuve ou une erreur de droit (par. 11). [7] Dans les affaires de protection de l’enfance, l’unique considération est l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant.

Chaquecas est unique et les juges sont tenus de procéder à une évaluation équilibrée des éléments de preuve, en fonction des critères énoncésdans la loi. En présence d’une erreur importante, l’intervention en appel est justifiée (voir les propos de la juge Larlee dans l’arrêt P.R.H. c. M.E.L., 2009 NBCA 18, 343 R.N.-B. (2e) 100, par. 8). [8] Le traitement qu’un juge a donné des faits appelle la déférence, sauf erreur manifeste et dominante (M.K.R. c. J.A.R., 2015 NBCA 73, 443 R.N.-B. (2e) 313, par. 9 à 11). Il en va de même pour les erreurs mixtes de fait et de droit.

Si un juge aappliqué erronément un principe de droit, la norme de contrôle qui s’applique est celle de la décision correcte (J.C. c. Ministre des Familles et des enfants, 2020 NBCA 24, [2020] A.N.-B. no 126 (QL), par. 6). [9] Notre Cour a appliqué ces normes à de nombreuses reprises (à

titre d’exemples, voir les arrêts J.S. et J.N. c. Ministre du Développement social (maintenant ministre des Familles et des Enfants), 2018 NBCA 26, [2018] A.N.-B. no 371 (QL); S.G. et E.S. c. Ministre des Familles et des Enfants, 2019 NBCA 66, [2019] A.N.-B. no 240 (QL); J.C. c. Ministre des Familles et des enfants, 2020 NBCA 24, [2020] A.N.-B. no 126 (QL); et D.S. et A.C. c.

Ministre du Développement social, 2021 NBCA 25, [2021] A.N.- B. no 128 (QL)). [10] En l’absence de dispositions législatives précises à l’effet contraire, la norme de déférence ne s’applique pas àl’examen des questions d’équité procédurale (Sa Majesté la Reine du chef du Nouveau-Brunswick, représentée par le ministre de l’Éducation c. Kennedy et autres, 2015 NBCA 58, [2015] A.N.-B. no 251 (QL), motifs du juge en chef Drapeau (tel était alors son titre), par. 14; et Landry c.

Procureure générale du Nouveau-Brunswick, 2020 NBCA 38, [2020] A.N.-B. no 113 (QL), motifs de lajuge LaVigne, par. 36; D.S. et A.C., par. 10). En ce qui concerne l’argument selon lequel la juge s’est appuyée sur du ouï-dire, la normeest celle de la décision correcte. Il en va de même pour le troisième moyen d’appel. V. Analyse A. La prétention relative au ouï-dire [11] Les appelants se plaignent de l’utilisation abusive de preuve par ouï-dire, sous la forme 1) d’une lettre du Dr Todd Lambert; et 2) d’un rapport de la psychologue Mary Ann Campbell.

J’aborderai ci-dessous chacune de ces questions à tour derôle. [12] Le préambule de la Loi pose les fondements de l’action de l’État dans les affaires de protection de l’enfance.Les dispositions pertinentes méritent d’être citées :

ATTENDU que prendre soin de leurs enfants et les surveiller est une responsabilité reconnue aux parents et qu’on ne devrait soustraireles enfants à la surveillance parentale que conformément aux dispositions de la présente loi; et ATTENDU que l’intérêt supérieur et la sécurité de l’enfant doivent toujours prévaloir lorsqu’il y a conflit entre la protection de l’enfantcontre les dangers et le maintien du noyau familial; et ATTENDU qu’il est reconnu que les services sociaux fournis aux enfants devraient respecter et préserver leurs besoins de continuité desoins au sein de leur réseau de parenté, que le processus d’évaluation, de planification et de prise de décision visant les plans permanentsdestinés aux enfants devrait s’opérer dans leur intérêt supérieur et que les délais procéduraux devraient être évités le plus possible; et […] ATTENDU qu’il est reconnu que la règle de droit doit garantir les droits des enfants, des familles et des individus et que l’interventionde la province dans les affaires des individus et des familles pour la protection et l’affirmation de ces droits doit être régie par la règle dedroit[.] [13] De plus, dans l’arrêt Nouveau-Brunswick (Ministre de la Santé et des Services communautaires) c.

C. (G. C.), (SCC), [1988] 1 R.C.S. 1073, [1988] A.C.S. no 48 (QL), la juge L’Heureux-Dubé a dit ce qui suit : […] Le préambule de la Loi [sur les services à la famille] porte « qu’on ne devrait soustraire les enfants, partiellement ou complètement,à la surveillance parentale que lorsqu’aucune autre mesure ne convient ». Le Ministre a le fardeau de démontrer que la mesure estappropriée compte tenu des faits de l’affaire. […] [par. 13, avec renvoi à QL] [14] Comme il a été dit, le seul facteur à considérer dans ces cas est l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant.

Le terme« intérêt supérieur de l’enfant » est défini à l’art. 1 de la Loi. L’article 53 de la Loi énonce que, lorsqu’elle statue sur une demande detutelle, la cour doit placer l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant au-dessus de toute autre considération (par. 53(2)).

Je me réfère à ce paragraphede la Loi, car je suis d’avis que, à moins d’une erreur grave au point qu’il soit impossible de la corriger par le recours à la règle de laproportionnalité (règle 1.02.1 des Règles de procédure), les questions de nature procédurale ne devraient pas faire obstacle au devoir primordial du tribunal de préserver la sécurité d’un enfant (voir l’arrêt J.H. c.

T.H., 2014 NBCA 52, 422 R.N.-B. (2e) 388, pour ce quiconcerne le recours à la règle de la proportionnalité dans les affaires de garde d’enfant). [15] Le paragraphe 53(4) de la Loi permet à un tribunal de passer outre aux irrégularités de procédure ou auxmanquements à la loi lorsqu’il est dans l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant de le faire. Il est ainsi libellé : 53(4) No application shall be dismissedbecause of a procedural defect or lack ofconformity with any requirement of this Partif the court is satisfied that (

a) the defect or lack of conformity has beenor can be compensated for by such substitutedprocedures as the court determines to beadequate in the circumstances; or (

b) failure to cure or compensate for thedefect or lack of conformity has not resultedin or will not result in substantial prejudice tothe interests of a person who may be affectedby the outcome of the proceedings. 53(4) Aucune demande ne peut être rejetéepour vice de procédure ou manque deconformité à toute exigence de la présentepartie si la cour est convaincue que

a) le vice de forme ou le manque deconformité a été ou peut être suppléé partoute autre procédure que la cour estimeconvenir dans les circonstances; ou

b) le défaut de remède ou de suppléance auvice de procédure ou au manque deconformité n’a pas été ni ne sera gravementpréjudiciable aux intérêts de la personne quipeut être touchée par le résultat de laprocédure.

[16] Les contestations relatives à l’utilisation de preuve par ouï-dire dans les affaires de protection de l’enfance nesont pas nouvelles. Dans l’arrêt New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) c. B.H. and W.L., (1994), (NB CA), 153 R.N.-B. (2e) 45, [1994] A.N.-B. no 412 (QL) (C.A.), le juge Ryan, s’exprimant au nom de notre Cour, a ordonné latenue d’un nouveau procès dans une affaire de protection de l’enfance et a conclu ainsi : [TRADUCTION] « Tout au long du procès, despreuves par ouï-dire ont été admises sans aucune retenue » (par. 13). Il a cité, à

titre d’exemple, le témoignage d’un travailleur social quiétait [TRADUCTION] « pétri » de ouï-dire – comprenant une opinion sur la question même que le juge était appelé à trancher – et quis’est poursuivi [TRADUCTION] « sans restriction » sur 118 pages de transcription. Voir également les propos du juge Ferguson dans l’arrêt Minister of Families and Children c. P.W. et al, 2018 NBQB 162, [2018] A.N.-B. no 214 (QL), au par. 64. [17] En ce qui concerne l’admissibilité du ouï-dire, le juge d’appel Richard (tel était alors son titre) s’est exprimé ainsi dans l’arrêt Fredericks c.

R., 2018 NBCA 56, [2018] A.N.-B. no 211 (QL) : […] les déclarations relatées sont présumées inadmissibles. Ces déclarations peuvent toutefois être admises sur le fondement de l’unedes exceptions traditionnelles à la règle du ouï-dire ou par l’application de l’exception raisonnée créée par la Cour suprême du Canada dans l’arrêt R. c. Khan, (SCC), [1990] 2 R.C.S. 531, [1990] A.C.S. no 81 (QL), et sa descendance. Les déclarations extrajudiciaires ne constituent pas toutes du ouï-dire inadmissible.

Une preuve qui n’est présentée que pour prouverqu’une déclaration a été faite, comme une preuve présentée dans le but d’expliquer les actes subséquents d’une personne, ne constituepas une preuve par ouï-dire. « Le ouï-dire est une déclaration extrajudiciaire présentée pour établir la véracité de son contenu » :Bradshaw, au par. 1. Le ouï-dire est présumé inadmissible « puisqu’en l’absence de la possibilité de contre-interroger le déclarant au moment où il fait sadéclaration, il est souvent difficile pour le juge des faits d’en évaluer la véracité » : Bradshaw, au par. 1.

Dans Khelawon [R. c.Khelawon, 2006 CSC 57, [2006] 2 R.S.C. 787], la juge Charron donne l’explication suivante : [...] l’exclusion dont les déclarations relatées sont présumées faire l’objet tient essentiellement à l’incapacité générale d’en vérifier lafiabilité. Si le déclarant n’est pas présent en cour, il peut se révéler impossible de mettre à l’épreuve sa perception, sa mémoire, sarelation du fait en question ou sa sincérité. Il se peut que la déclaration elle-même ne fasse pas l’objet d’un compte rendu exact.

Deserreurs, des exagérations ou des faussetés délibérées peuvent passer inaperçues et mener à des verdicts injustes. Ainsi, la règle interdisantle ouï-dire est censée accroître l’exactitude des conclusions de fait du tribunal et non entraver sa fonction de recherche de la vérité[.][par. 2] Il existe toutefois des cas où certaines circonstances atténuent les dangers du ouï-dire. Au fil des ans, on a reconnu qu’en présence de cescirconstances l’admission d’une preuve par ouï-dire présente un danger minime de gêner la constatation exacte des faits.

Il existe des casoù « [une] déclaration relatée peut, en raison de la manière dont elle a été faite, être intrinsèquement fiable, ou il peut existersuffisamment de moyens de la vérifier en dépit du fait qu’elle est relatée » : Khelawon, au par. 42. Ainsi, des exceptions traditionnelles àla règle du ouï-dire ont été établies, parce que les cours ont reconnu que, dans des circonstances particulières, c’est l’exclusion, plutôtque l’admission, qui gênerait le rôle de constatation des faits que joue un procès.

Il existe toutefois des cas où une application rigide deces exceptions pourrait donner lieu « à l’exclusion inutile d’éléments de preuve ou, dans d’autres cas, à leur admission injustifiée » :Khelawon, au par. 42. On a préconisé une souplesse accrue. La Cour suprême du Canada a répondu à la demande avec le temps. Ainsi,dans l’arrêt Khan, la Cour suprême a adopté une méthode d’analyse « fondée sur les deux principes directeurs qui sous-tendent lesexceptions de common law traditionnelles, à savoir la nécessité et la fiabilité » : Khelawon, au par. 42.

La méthode d’analyse raisonnée a été perfectionnée depuis son adoption dans l’arrêt Khan. Sa formule actuelle, surtout en ce qu’elle serapporte à la fiabilité, se trouve dans les motifs de la majorité dans Bradshaw, qui s’appuient sur les principes généraux issus de l’arrêtKhelawon. Sur la question du seuil de fiabilité, la juge Karakatsanis, au nom de la majorité, a donné l’explication suivante : [...] Le seuil de fiabilité est atteint lorsque la preuve « est suffisamment fiable pour écarter les dangers que comporte la difficulté de lavérifier » (Khelawon, par. 49).

Ces dangers surviennent notamment en raison de l’impossibilité de contre-interroger le déclarant devantle juge des faits au moment où il fait sa déclaration (Khelawon, par. 35 et 48). En appréciant le seuil de fiabilité, le juge du procès doitcerner les dangers spécifiques du ouï-dire que pose la déclaration et envisager des moyens de les écarter (Khelawon, par. 4 et 49; R. c.Hawkins, (SCC), [1996] 3 R.C.S. 1043, par. 75).

Ces dangers se rapportent au fait qu’il peut être difficile d’évaluer laperception du déclarant, sa mémoire, sa relation du fait ou sa sincérité, et ils devraient être définis avec précision pour qu’on puisseévaluer de façon réaliste s’ils sont écartés.

Les dangers du ouï-dire peuvent être écartés et le seuil de fiabilité peut être atteint s’il est démontré (1) qu’il existe d’autres façonsadéquates de vérifier la vérité et l’exactitude (fiabilité d’ordre procédural), ou (2) qu’il existe des garanties circonstancielles ou relativesà la preuve conférant une fiabilité inhérente à la déclaration relatée (fiabilité substantielle) (Khelawon, par. 61-63; Youvarajah, 2013 SCC41 , [2012 CSC 41, [2013] 2 R.C.S. 720], par. 30). [par. 26 et 27] Pour qu’une déclaration soit fiable d’un point de vue procédural, il doit exister des substituts adéquats à la façon traditionnelle de vérifierla preuve par le contre-interrogatoire du déclarant au moment précis où il s’est exprimé.

« Ces autres façons de vérifier la preuve doiventfournir au juge des faits une base satisfaisante pour apprécier rationnellement la véracité et l’exactitude de la déclaration relatée » :Bradshaw, au par. 28.

Ces substituts sont notamment « un enregistrement vidéo de la déclaration, l’existence d’un serment et unavertissement au sujet des conséquences liées au fait de mentir » et sont habituellement combinés à « une certaine forme de contre-interrogatoire du déclarant, comme le témoignage recueilli à l’enquête préliminaire [...] ou le contre-interrogatoire d’un témoin qui serétracte au procès » : Bradshaw, au par. 28. Pour ce qui est de la fiabilité substantielle, elle est établie si les circonstances de la déclaration la rendent intrinsèquement fiable.

Pourtrancher cette question, le juge du procès peut aussi prendre en considération quelque preuve que ce soit qui corrobore ou contredit ladéclaration. La norme est élevée.

Elle nécessite que le juge soit convaincu « que la déclaration est “si fiable qu’il aurait été peu ou pasutile de contre-interroger le déclarant au moment précis où il s’est exprimé” » : Bradshaw, au par. 31, citant Khelawon, au par. 49.Lorsqu’il apprécie la fiabilité substantielle, le juge du procès peut prendre en considération la preuve corroborante si elle démontre qued’autres explications, même conjecturales, des déclarations relatées ne sont pas disponibles : Bradshaw, au par. 48.

La Cour suprême reconnaît aussi que la fiabilité d’ordre procédural et la fiabilité substantielle « ne sont pas des catégories mutuellementexclusives » et « peuvent aller de pair » : Bradshaw, au par. 32; autrement dit, des éléments de l’une et de l’autre peuvent se conjuguerpour écarter les dangers spécifiques du ouï-dire qu’une déclaration peut présenter, même dans une situation où ni la fiabilité d’ordreprocédural ni la fiabilité substantielle n’auraient suffi individuellement. [par. 70 à 77] Voir également l’arrêt R. c. Srun, 2019 ONCA 453, [2019] O.J. No. 2799 (QL), aux par. 123 à 129, motifs du juge Watt.

(1) Lettre du Dr Todd Lambert [18] En l’espèce, le Dr Todd Lambert, pédiatre, a rédigé une lettre qui a été jointe à l’un des affidavits de la travailleuse sociale principale, Maranda Fullarton. Mme Fullarton a témoigné et a été contre-interrogée. Si cette lettre avait été présentéeà

titre de rapport d’expert concernant un sujet crucial pour la décision, l’argument des appelants selon lequel elle a été admise à tort aurait pu avoir un certain poids; cependant, la lettre a été présentée uniquement pour corroborer le témoignage de Mme Fullarton selon lequel le Dr Lambert a demandé que la mère n’assiste pas aux rendez-vous médicaux à venir de l’enfant lorsque ce dernier sera présent, en raisonde son comportement dérangeant.

Reproduite dans les motifs de la juge, la lettre a renforcé les éléments de preuve de première main ducomportement en question, qui a été observé par d’autres personnes qui ont joué un rôle dans la prise en charge de l’enfant et qui a étéreconnu comme un problème persistant. Les appelants affirment que, en faisant référence à la lettre, la juge a violé la règle del’inadmissibilité du ouï-dire.

Le Ministre soutient qu’il n’y a pas eu violation de la règle du ouï-dire parce que la lettre ne contenait pasd’avis médical. [19] Mme Fullarton a témoigné de vive voix et par affidavit sur ce qu’elle a observé lors des rendez-vous avec le Dr Lambert. Ses affidavits souscrits les 29 octobre 2019 et 7 octobre 2020 décrivent les interactions entre le Dr Lambert et la mère lors de ces visites au cabinet.

Dans sa lettre jointe à l’affidavit, le Dr Lambert écrit ce qui suit : [TRADUCTION] [...] Après avoir examiné son état actuel, sa mère [M.V.] a tenu, pour la deuxième visite consécutive, des propos offensants etinappropriés. Elle s’en prend au parent nourricier [de l’enfant] et à la représentante du m

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