2018 QCCQ 1108, 2018 QCCQ 1108

Huegeli Imports Inc. c. Discount Car and Truck Rentals Ltd. 2018 QCCQ 1108 COURT OF QUEBEC Small Claims Division CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC DISTRICT OF MONTREAL Civil Division No: 500-32-152391-167 DATE: February 16, 2018 ______________________________________________________________________ BEFORE THE HONOURABLE ENRICO FORLINI, J.C.Q. ______________________________________________________________________ HUEGELI IMPORTS INC. Plaintiff v.

DISCOUNT CAR AND TRUCK RENTALS LTD Defendant ______________________________________________________________________ JUDGMENT ______________________________________________________________________ [ 1 ] Huegeli Imports Inc. (Huegeli) claims $871 [1] from Discount Car and Truck Rentals Ltd. (Discount). It asks for the restitution of an amount which Discount obliged it to pay for the replacement of a vehicle ignition key plus additional damages.

Huegeli argues that Discount breached its obligation as a car lessor in that the key of the vehicle which it rented from Discount was not delivered in a good state of repairs, and therefore it should not have been obliged to pay for the replacement ignition key. [ 2 ] Discount denies all liability. It argues that the claim is prescribed, that the vehicle’s key broke as a result of improper use, and that in any event, the Plaintiff has not suffered any damages since it was indemnified by the manufacturer or dealer of the vehicle. Questions in Issue

a) Is Huegeli’s claim prescribed?

b) Did Discount breach its obligations as a lessor in that the ignition key of the vehicle it rented to Huegeli was not in a good state of repair (article 1854 C.C.Q.)?

c) What damages, if any, is Huegeli entitled to? Context [ 3 ] Discount operates a car leasing business. [ 4 ] Huegeli is a corporation involved in the importation of raw materials. Eric Alexander is its president and one of its directors. Amanda Pichette is Mr. Alexander’s wife. [ 5 ] On May 8, 2013, Huegeli rented from Discount a Mazda 3 vehicle (“Vehicle”) since its automobile was undergoing repairs. [2] [ 6 ] On May 9, 2013, Mrs. Pichette was driving the Vehicle.

Before setting off, she attached a key strap measuring roughly thirty centimeters in length to the Vehicle ignition key through a metal half ring connected to the plastic key fob. [ 7 ] As she was making a turn with the Vehicle and turning the steering wheel, the key strap accidently got caught around the steering column and wheel, which caused the Vehicle ignition key to break. [ 8 ] On the same day, Mrs. Pichette returned to the Discount service location to have the Vehicle ignition key replaced. [ 9 ] Discount refused to replace the broken key unless Huegeli agreed to pay $371 for a replacement key.

Considering that it felt it had no choice to pay if it wanted to continue using the Vehicle, Huegeli reluctantly paid $371 for a replacement key. [3] Moreover, on the same day Huegeli purchased at a cost of $200 “total protection” coverage for damages to the Vehicle. [ 10 ] Huegeli argues that as a lessor, Discount was obliged to deliver the Vehicle, including the ignition key, in good state of repairs.

It claims that the breakage of the ignition key on May 9, 2013 was not caused by improper or abusive use, but rather because the ignition key that was provided was not in good state of repair. [ 11 ] Hence, Huegeli claims Discount should have paid for the replacement key and therefore it seeks restitution of the payment

($371) made on May 9, 2013 which was not due,[4] plus refund of the $200 paid for extra coverage and $300 in damages for the troubleand inconvenience caused by its unjustified refusal to replace the key at no cost, for a total of $871. Analysis and Decision

a) Is Huegeli’s claim prescribed? [12]

Article 2925 of the Civil Code of Québec (C.C.Q.) provides that an action to enforce a personal right is prescribed by threeyears. If a lawsuit or judicial application is not filed before the expiry of the prescriptive period, then unless the prescription period hasbeen suspended,[5] the creditor’s right is extinguished. [13] The underlying purpose of the rules of prescription was recently expressed as follows by the Supreme Court of Canada inMontréal (City) v.

Dorval: [1] In Quebec civil law, court actions have always been subject to prescriptive periods that vary in length depending on the nature of acase or the identities of the parties. [2] In the most recent reform of the Civil Code of Québec (“C.C.Q.” or “Code”), the legislature aimed to simplify the rules on theprescription of actions by harmonizing them and thereby promoting access to justice. Such rules are essential in a democratic society thatwishes to preserve public order, sanction the negligence of creditors or ensure social peace (C. Gervais, La prescription (2009), atpp. 4-5).

These are some of the purposes behind the obligation imposed on litigants to act and to bring an action within a specific period,without which they will no longer be able to obtain a remedy.[6] [14] The three year prescription period begins to run on the day on which the right of action arises.[7] [15] In Pellerin Savitz LLP v.

Guindon[8], the Supreme Court of Canada provided the following explanation for the notion of “thearising of the right of action”: [11] The beginning of the period of extinctive prescription is the “day on which the right of action arises” (art. 2880 para. 2 C.C.Q.).As this Court has stated, “the prescription of an action cannot begin to run before the right to institute it originates” (Morin v. CanadianHome Assurance Co., (SCC), [1970] S.C.R. 561, at p. 565).

The arising of the right of action and the beginning of theprescription period are highly factual questions; how they are answered varies from case to case depending on the circumstances andcalls for great deference on the part of an appellate court (C. Gervais, La prescription (2009), at p. 106; Mignault, at p. 522; Beaulieu v.Paquet, 2016 QCCA 1284, at para. 20 ; Dupuy v. Leblanc, 2016 QCCA 1141, at para. 22 ; on the standard of review,see also Benhaim v.

St Germain, 2016 SCC 48, [2016] 2 S.C.R. 352, at paras. 36 39). [12] In contract, the creditor’s right of action arises once the debtor’s obligation has arisen and is exigible (Re 9022 8818 Québec inc.,2005 QCCA 275, at para. 51 ; J. L. Baudouin and P. G. Jobin, Les obligations (7th ed. 2013), by P. G. Jobin and N. Vézina, atNo. 1127; Martineau, at para. 247).

When this occurs varies with the circumstances, and especially with the terms of the contract itself. [16] The right of action arises on the first day that the plaintiff or creditor of a claim is aware of the existence of a fault anddamages.[9] [17] Huegeli admits at trial that its right of action arose on May 9, 2013 and that the three year prescription period of

article 2925C.C.Q. began to run on this day. [18] Considering that the right of action arose on May 9, 2013, Huegeli’s claim against Discount had to be filed with the Court at thelatest on May 9, 2016. [19] According to the plumitif and the stamp appearing on the Huegeli’s lawsuit, it filed its claim on May 11, 2016, after the expiryof the prescriptive period. [20] Mr. Alexander, Huegeli’s president, admits at the trial that there are no facts which would constitute impossibility to act orwhich would otherwise support a claim for suspension or interruption of prescription. [21] Mr.

Alexander nonetheless argues that he filed the lawsuit and paid the court fee on May 9, 2016 and not on May 11, andtherefore Huegeli’s claim is not prescribed. [22] He adds that he was fully aware that that the prescriptive period expired on May 9, 2016, which is why he wrote on that veryday in an email to Discount “I have filed the proceedings in court today and Discount will be served accordingly.”[10] [23] However, the Introductory Motion filed by Huegeli bears the following court stamp: “DROITS DE GREFFE 0327698-0075-1130 Gouvernement du Québec 150,00 Palais de Justice MONTRÉAL 2016-05-11”. (Underlining added.) [24] Moreover, the plumitif also indicates that the Introductory Motion was filed on May 11, 2016. [25] According to

Section 224 of the Courts of Justice Act (R.S.Q., c. T-16), when a person files a judicial proceeding at thecourthouse, it must pay a court office fee for the filing or the issue of the proceeding. This provision further adds that the date of filingand, where applicable, the date of payment and the amount of the costs and fees must be entered on the proceeding or document filed. [26] Moreover,

section 6 of the Regulation of the Court of Québec (R.R.Q., c. C-25.011, r. 9) requires the Court to maintain aregister of proceedings filed by parties, which is commonly referred to in the province of Québec as the plumitif. The plumitif mustnotably contain the date on which the file is opened (Schedule 1 of the Regulation). [27] The court stamp affixed to a proceeding pursuant to

section 224 of the Courts of Justice Act and the plumitif do not lie. Both

constitute authentic acts pursuant to article 2814(3) C.C.Q. and their contents make proof as against all persons and must be taken as proven. [11] [ 28 ] According to the plumitif and the stamp appearing on Huegeli’s lawsuit, it was filed on May 11, 2016 and not on May 9 as Mr. Alexander claims. [ 29 ] Accordingly, Huegeli’s application will be dismissed because it is prescribed.

b) Other Questions in Issue [ 30 ] Considering the Court’s conclusion on the first question in issue, the Court need not address the remaining two questions in issue. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT; [ 31 ] DISMISSES Huegeli Imports inc.’s application; [ 32 ] WITH COSTS of $150 payable to Discount Car and Truck Rentals Ltd. __________________________________ ENRICO FORLINI, J.C.Q. Date of hearing: June 26 and November 14, 2017. The matter was taken under advisement on December 8, 2017, date on which the Court received documents sent by Mr. Alexander pursuant to the Court’s order issued at trial.