2011 NBCA 94, 2011 NBCA 94

COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW BRUNSWICK 42-11-CA DANIEL JASON LONG APPELLANT DANIEL JASON LONG APPELANT - and - - et - HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN RESPONDENT SA MAJESTÉ LA REINE INTIMÉE Long v. R., 2011 NBCA 94 Long c.

R., 2011 NBCA 94 CORAM: The Honourable Chief Justice Drapeau The Honourable Justice Robertson The Honourable Justice Green CORAM : L’honorable juge en chef Drapeau L’honorable juge Robertson L’honorable juge Green Appeal from a decision of the Provincial Court: February 18, 2011 Appel d’une décision de la Cour provinciale : Le 18 février 2011 History of Case: Historique de la cause : Decision under appeal: Unreported Décision frappée d’appel : Inédite Preliminary or incidental proceedings: N/A Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires : s.o.

Appeal heard: September 13, 2011 Appel entendu : Le 13 septembre 2011 Judgment rendered: October 13, 2011 Jugement rendu : Le 13 octobre 2011 Reasons for judgment by: The Honourable Chief Justice Drapeau Motifs de jugement : L’honorable juge en chef Drapeau

Concurred in by: The Honourable Justice Robertson The Honourable Justice Green Souscrivent aux motifs : L’honorable juge Robertson L’honorable juge Green Counsel at hearing: Daniel Jason Long appeared in person For the respondent: Cameron H. Gunn Avocats à l’audience : Daniel Jason Long a comparu en personne Pour l’intimée : Cameron H. Gunn THE COURT The application for leave to appeal sentence isallowed solely for the purpose of correcting the orderunder s. 743.6(1) so that it applies only to thesentence imposed for robbery. The sentencesimposed in the court below otherwise stand unvaried.

LA COUR La demande d’autorisation d’appel de la sentence estaccueillie uniquement pour permettre la modificationde l’ordonnance rendue en vertu du par. 743.6(1) demanière qu’elle s’applique seulement à la peineprononcée pour vol qualifié. Les autres peinesinfligées par le tribunal de première instance restentpar ailleurs inchangées. The judgment of the Court was delivered by DRAPEAU, C.J.N.B. [1] This is an application for leave to appeal sentence. Daniel Jason Long, a mature offender with an extensiverecord of previous convictions, pled guilty to robbery (s. 343(

a) and 344(1)(

b) of the Criminal Code of Canada) and the indictableoffence of breach of probation (s. 733.1(1)(a)). Mr. Long was sentenced to a term of 6 years and 5 months in the penitentiary for robberyand a term of one year consecutive for breach of probation, after receiving credit for pre-sentencing custody. The maximum sentence forrobbery under s. 344(1)(

b) is life imprisonment, while it is imprisonment for a term of 2 years for an offence under s. 733.1(1)(a). [2] The standard of review applicable to appeals against sentence is set out in R. v. R.K.J. (1998), (NB CA), 207 N.B.R. (2d) 24, [1998] N.B.J. No. 483 (C.A. ) (QL): It is the undoubted duty of this Court to review the fitness of any sentence imposed. That it must do so bearing in mind the privilegedposition occupied by the trial judge is settled law. All agree that the sentencing process is hardly an exact science. It is a subjectiveprocess which features a large measure of discretion.

The intrinsically discretionary nature of the sentence decision explains, at least inpart, the Supreme Court's insistence on a deferential approach to all sentence reviews. See R. v. Shropshire, (SCC),[1995] 4 S.C.R. 227 [...], R. v. M. (C.A.), (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500 [...], and R. v. MacDonnell, (SCC), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 305. [...] Nevertheless, deference has its limits, and this Court is duty bound to vary a sentence in appropriate circumstances.

Indeed, if thesentencing court commits an error of law or an error in principle, or if the sentence imposed is clearly unreasonable, there is no longerroom for deference and this Court is required to impose the sentence which it considers fit. See R. v. F.S.A. (1996), (NB CA), 182 N.B.R. (2d) 20 (C.A.) [...], and R. v. Melanson (E.R.) (1998), (NB CA), 199 N.B.R. (2d) 338 (C.A.).

[...] In this context, an error in law most commonly occurs as a result of a misapprehension of the evidence or a misapplication of judicialprecedents. As for an error in principle, it typically involves one or more of the following: the application of wrong sentencing principles,a failure to consider relevant factors or the taking into account of irrelevant considerations.

As well, there will be cases where the failureto give proper weight to each relevant circumstance will amount to an error in principle. (Our court will necessarily be slow to find anerror of this nature for, if it was otherwise, professions of deference would soon ring hollow.) Finally, a sentence will be clearlyunreasonable where it is either inordinately long or inordinately short. It will reach this level only if it is a substantial and markeddeparture from the sentence customarily imposed for similarly situated offenders committing similar crimes. [paras. 11-13] [3] In R. v.

LeBlanc, 2003 NBCA 75, 264 N.B.R. (2d) 341, the Court provided guidance to parties involved insentence appeals and sought to structure its analytical approach by articulating the following framework: [...] intervention on appeal against sentence is inappropriate unless at least one of the following questions is answered affirmatively: (1)Is the sentence the result of an error of law?

(2) Did the sentencing judge err in principle in the exercise of his or her discretion?

(3) Isthe sentence clearly unreasonable having regard to the fundamental purpose and objectives of sentencing (s. 718), as well as theprinciples enunciated in sections 718.1 and 718.2 of the Criminal Code? [para. 17]. [4] In Steeves v. R., 2010 NBCA 57, 360 N.B.R. (2d) 88, the Court added the following to the discussionpertaining to that framework: […] As a practical matter, those three questions serve as a useful reminder of the limited role an appellate court is called upon to play inconsidering the fitness of a sentence. The many examples of the application of that three-pronged approach include R. v.

Munn (P.J.N.)(2004), 272 N.B.R. (2d) 269, [2004] N.B.J. No. 250 (QL), 2004 NBCA 44 (Larlee, J.A. for the Court), R. v. Veysey (J.M.), [2006] N.B.J.No. 365 (QL), 2006 NBCA 55 (Larlee and Robertson, JJ.A. for the Court), R. v. Guay (D.A.) (2008), 337 N.B.R. (2d) 252, [2008] N.B.J.No. 384 (QL), 2008 NBCA 72 (Richard, J.A. for the Court), R. v. Taylor (J.D.), [2009] N.B.J. No. 101 (C.A.) (QL) (Quigg, J.A. for theCourt) and R. v. Daye, 2010 NBCA 53 (Larlee J.A. for the Court).

No one quarrels with the proposition that, absent legislation providing otherwise, the appropriate degree and kind of punishment is in thediscretion of the sentencing judge. That discretion is explicitly recognized in s. 718.3(2) of the Criminal Code. Moreover, it is referencedin R. v. M.(C.A.), (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, [1996] S.C.J. No. 28 (QL) as a principled basis for appellate deference: Appellate courts, of course, serve an important function in reviewing and minimizing the disparity of sentences imposed by sentencingjudges for similar offenders and similar offences committed throughout Canada.

See, e.g., R. v. Knife (1982), (SKKB), 16 Sask.R. 40 (C.A.), at p. 43; R. v. Wood, [1979] O.J. No. 855, 21 Crim. L.Q. 423 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 424; R. v. Mellstrom (1975), (AB CA), 22 C.C.C. (2d) 472 (Alta. C.A.), at p. 485; R. v. Morrissette (1970), (SK CA), 1 C.C.C.(2d) 307 (Sask. C.A.), at pp. 311-12; R. v. Baldhead, (SK CA), [1966] 4 C.C.C. 183 (Sask. C.A.), at p. 187.

But inexercising this role, courts of appeal must still exercise a margin of deference before intervening in the specialized discretion thatParliament has explicitly vested in sentencing judges. [para. 92] [paras. 27-28] [5] After closely scrutinizing the record, I am satisfied the sentencing judge did not commit any error of law orprinciple in setting the sentences mentioned above. Likewise, those sentences are not individually or cumulatively unreasonable,particularly in light of Mr.

Long’s criminal record, which includes 2 prior convictions for robbery and 11 prior convictions for breach ofprobation. [6] In addition to imposing the terms of 6 years and 5 months for robbery and one year for breach of probation,the sentencing judge made a parole-delaying order under s. 743.6(1) of the Criminal Code, which reads as follows:

743.6

(1) Notwithstanding subsection 120(1) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act , where an offender receives, on or after November 1, 1992, a sentence of imprisonment of two years or more, including a sentence of imprisonment for life imposed otherwise than as a minimum punishment, on conviction for an offence set out in

Schedule I or II to that Act that was prosecuted by way of indictment, the court may, if satisfied, having regard to the circumstances of the commission of the offence and the character and circumstances of the offender, that the expression of society’s denunciation of the offence or the objective of specific or general deterrence so requires, order that the portion of the sentence that must be served before the offender may be released on full parole is one half of the sentence or ten years, whichever is less. 743.6

(1) Par dérogation au paragraphe 120(1) de la

Loi sur le système correctionnel et la mise en liberté sous condition , le tribunal peut, s’il est convaincu, selon les circonstances de l’infraction, du caractère et des particularités du délinquant, que la réprobation de la société à l’égard de l’infraction commise ou l’effet dissuasif de l’ordonnance l’exige, ordonner que le délinquant condamné le 1 er novembre 1992 ou par la suite, sur déclaration de culpabilité par mise en accusation, à une peine d’emprisonnement d’au moins deux ans — y compris une peine d’emprisonnement à perpétuité à condition que cette peine n’ait pas constitué un minimum en l’occurrence — pour une infraction mentionnée aux annexes I ou II de cette loi, purge, avant d’être admissible à la libération conditionnelle totale, le moindre de la moitié de sa peine ou dix ans. [ 7 ] The order under s. 743.6(1) purports to apply to the total sentence of 7 years and 5 months.

Although the offence under s. 344(1) (b) (robbery) is included in

Schedule I, the offence under s. 733.1(1)(a) (breach of probation) is neither in

Schedule I nor II. Counsel for the respondent rightly concedes the sentencing judge erred in law in making the order under s. 743.6(1) applicable to the total sentence of 7 years and 5 months. In that regard, I am in agreement with the views expressed by Watson, J.A. for the Court in R. v. Wharry , 2008 ABCA 293 , [2008] A.J. No. 945 (QL): In this case, there is error in assigning parole ineligibility to the firearm count. Although that offence carried with it a minimum period of imprisonment for one year, it was not at the time of the offence listed in the

schedule of offences to which s. 743.6 of the Criminal Code applied. Therefore, a parole ineligibility order was not available on that count. Further, it is error to impose a parole ineligibility order globally to more than one count. It can only be applied to eligible terms of two years or more for eligible offences. Pre-sentence custody cannot be deemed to be added to the quantum for this purpose: R. v. Mathieu (2008), 231 C.C.C. (3d) 1, [2008] S.C.J.

No. 21 (QL), 2008 SCC 21 . […] [para. 28] [ 8 ] I would allow the application for leave to appeal sentence, but solely for the purpose of correcting the parole- delaying order under s. 743.6(1) so that it applies only to the sentence imposed for robbery. Finally, I would otherwise let stand the sentences imposed in the court below. ____________________________________ J. ERNEST DRAPEAU, CHIEF JUSTICE OF NEW BRUNSWICK WE CONCUR: _______________________________________ J.T. ROBERTSON, J.A. ________________________________________ BRADLEY V. GREEN, J.A.