2016 QCCA 1361, 2016 QCCA 1361

Unofficial English Translation Auclair c.

R. 2016 QCCA 1361 COURT OF APPEAL CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC REGISTRY OF MONTREAL No.: 500-10-006012-155 ; 500-10-006005-159; 500-10-005996-150; 500-10-006021-156; 500-10-006009-151; 500-10-006006-157; 500-10-006008-153; 500-10-006022-154; 500-10-006024-150; 500-10-006013-153; 500-10-006017-154; 500-10-006002-156; 500-10-006019-150; 500-10-006023-152; 500-10-006011-157; 500-10-006001-158; 500-10-006003-154; 500-10-006010-159; 500-10-005994-155; 500-10-006032-153; 500-10-005995-152; 500-10-006016-156; 500-10-005997-158; 500-10-006004-152; 500-10-006007-155; 500-10-005998-156; 500-10-006027-153; 500-10-006018-152; 500-10-005999-154; 500-10-006015-158; 500-10-006014-151; 500-10-006028-151; 500-10-006000-150; 500-10-005993-157; 500-10-006020-158 (500-01-020150-097; 500-01-094385-132) DATE: August 31, 2016 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE YVES-MARIE MORISSETTE, J.A.

FRANÇOIS DOYON, J.A. NICHOLAS KASIRER, J.A.

AUCLAIR, Guy; AUGER, Mario; BEAULIEU, Georges; BROCHU, Louis; CHALIFOUX, Sylvain; DAVID, Gaétan; DEMERS, Claude; DUQUETTE, Steve; DURAND, Alain; ÉMOND, Jacques; FILTEAU, Jacques; FORGUES, Simon; FORTIER, Michel; FRENETTE, Benoit; GAGNÉ, Sylvain; GAMACHE, Martin; GRENIER, Michel; HAMILTON, Pierre; LACHAPELLE, Pierrot; LEDUC, Yves; MAHEU, Stéphane; MÉNARD, Stéphane; OUELLET, Richard; OUELLETTE, Pierre; OUIMET, Marvin; PELLETIER, Marc; PERRON, Jean-Damien; PRUNEAU, Patrick; ROBERT, Jonathan; RODRIGUE, Yvon; RODRIGUE, Pierre; ROYER, Daniel; RUEST, Alain; THÉORÊT, Normand; VALLERAND, Ghislain APPLICANTS – Accused v.

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN RESPONDENT - Prosecutrix JUDGMENT [ 1 ] Between 2009 and 2013, [1] in the wake of the police operation known as “SharQc”, the applicants were accused of murder, conspiracy to commit murder, criminal organization, and drug trafficking.

However, a stay of proceedings was ordered by the Superior Court on May 31, 2011 (upheld by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada) with respect to the charges of criminal organization and drug trafficking [2] thereby relieving the applicants and their co-accused of these charges. [ 2 ] Subsequently, in the context of negotiations with the prosecution, the applicants, most in 2012 and 2013 and a few others later

on, pleaded guilty to charges of conspiracy to commit murder which, further to joint submissions, resulted in sentences ranging from 12 to 25 years of imprisonment without the possibility of parole before serving half their sentences. [3] Consequently, the other charges were withdrawn.

Note that the negotiation of a guilty plea accompanied by a joint submission on sentencing is a practice recognized by the courts that serves the interests of justice so long as it is the result of rigorous and serious discussions, conducted honourably and forthrightly, [4] in compliance with the prosecution’s disclosure obligations. [5] [ 3 ] On October 9, 2015, while some of the applicants’ co-accused who did not plead guilty were being tried, James L. Brunton, J. of the Superior Court found that the prosecution had breached its obligation to disclose.

The nature of the breach [6] was such that it constituted an abuse that seriously and irremediably jeopardized the fairness of the trial and, thus, the integrity of the justice system. [7] The judge stated the following in this regard: [ translation ] [38] Considering the significance of the information revealed in

summary VDP-17 (R-13) to the preparation of a full answer and defence; considering the amount of evidence from Project Cadbury; considering the request presented by the applicants in August of 2011 to gain access to the Cadbury file; considering the complete lack of evidence establishing the steps taken by the respondent to obtain the contents of Project Cadbury, explaining how it came to be in possession of the material from Project Cadbury, explaining where this material has been stored for the last six years, or explaining why the police officers who were undoubtedly aware that this material existed and that it was important to this case saw fit to suppress it [citation omitted], the Court does not hesitate to find that there has been a serious abuse of process.

This abuse goes beyond negligence or the bringing of a vexatious action. It is an attack on the fundamental principles of fairness that must imbue any criminal prosecution.

The only inference that may be drawn is that the respondent and law enforcement have, until recently, let their desire to win at any cost trump the fundamental principles that are the foundation of our criminal justice system. … [45] With respect to the residual category, the Court takes into account the following cumulative factors: the late disclosure of the evidence, the significance of the evidence, the lack of explanation from the respondent, and the Court’s inference that non-disclosure was a deliberate manifestation of a desire to win at any cost, which convinces the Court that the State engaged in conduct shocking to society’s sense of fair play and decency and that continuing the trial, despite the significance of the criminal behaviour alleged, would be detrimental to the integrity of the justice system . [Emphasis added.] [ 4 ] Accordingly, the judge ordered what in his view was the only available remedy for the breach given the circumstances: a stay of proceedings. [ 5 ] The prosecution did not appeal that judgment.

THE APPLICATIONS [ 6 ] In November 2015, the applicants, informed of Brunton, J.’s judgment, each filed applications for extensions of time to appeal and for leave to appeal the verdicts resulting from their guilty pleas. These applications are similar.

They all essentially assert that the guilty pleas were not made with full knowledge of the facts, that they are therefore vitiated, and that they cannot be considered free and informed because the State knowingly withheld information crucial to the negotiation process and to their ability to exercise their right to make full answer and defence. [ 7 ] In their applications, they seek leave to withdraw their respective pleas (as the Court allowed in Brind'Amour v. R. [8] and Berthiaume v.

R. [9] ) and call for a stay of proceedings for the same reasons as in Berger , considering that the abuse committed by the State is no less serious in their case.

In the alternative, if the Court finds that such a remedy is not warranted in light of the applicable law, they ask the Court to allow them to withdraw their guilty pleas nevertheless and to order a new trial, subject to precise guidelines. [ 8 ] Finally, in a recent application to amend their applications, which should be allowed, they submit that to appropriately sanction the respondent’s conduct, the Court can do nothing short of reducing the sentences resulting from the joint submissions. [ 9 ] The hearing of these applications was deferred to this panel of the Court. [ 10 ] During the appeal proceedings, the parties requested a facilitation conference in criminal matters [10] to better circumscribe the terms of the debate and to identify potential solutions in view of the applicable law.

The Court accepted to hold such a conference, and one was in fact held. THE LAW AND ABUSE OF PROCESS [ 11 ] It is important to note at the outset that the respondent acknowledges the abuse. The circumstances provide ample justification for the respondent’s admission.

That being said, while it restores the honour of the prosecution and the State, this act of contrition does not resolve the issue of the remedy to which the applicants are now entitled. [ 12 ] An abuse of process committed by the State in the context of a criminal trial violates the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the “ Charter ”), whether it affects the fairness of the trial (the “main” category) or the integrity of the justice system (the “residual” category). [11] It calls for a remedy that, in most cases, will be based on s. 24(1) of the Charter :

(1) Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a court ofcompetent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances / Toute personne, victimede violation ou de négation des droits ou libertés qui lui sont garantis par la présente charte, peut s’adresser à un tribunal compétent pourobtenir la réparation que le tribunal estime convenable et juste eu égard aux circonstances. [13] The Court has broad remedial powers under s. 24(1), which allow it to craft remedies tailored to the extent of the violation, asthe Chief Justice wrote in R. v. 974649 Ontario Inc.:[12] 18 First, s. 24(1), like all Charter provisions, commands a broad and purposive

interpretation. This

section forms a vital part ofthe Charter, and must be construed generously, in a manner that best ensures the attainment of its objects: R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., (SCC), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at p. 344; Hunter v. Southam Inc., (SCC), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at p.155; Canadian National Railway Co. v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission), (SCC), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114,at p. 1134. Moreover, it is remedial, and hence benefits from the general rule of statutory

interpretation that accords remedial statutes a“large and liberal”

interpretation: British Columbia Development Corp. v. Friedmann, (SCC), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 447, atp. 458; Toronto Area Transit Operating Authority v. Dell Holdings Ltd., (SCC), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 32, at para.21. Finally, and most importantly, the language of this provision appears to confer the widest possible discretion on a court to craftremedies for violations of Charter rights. In Mills, McIntyre J. observed at p. 965 that “[i]t is difficult to imagine language which couldgive the court a wider and less fettered discretion”.

This broad remedial mandate for s. 24(1) should not be frustrated by a “[n]arrow andtechnical” reading of the provision (see Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker, (SCC), [1984] 1 S.C.R. 357, at p.366). [Emphasis added.] [14] A stay of proceedings is often invoked as a remedy for abuse of process. It remains, however, an exceptional remedy availablein only the clearest of cases,[13] where no other measure can prevent the perpetuation of the breach of fairness of the trial or the integrityof the justice system.

As Moldaver, J. noted in Babos,[14] a stay of proceedings will only be ordered if the following three conditions aremet: [32] The test used to determine whether a stay of proceedings is warranted is the same for both categories and consists of threerequirements:

(1) There must be prejudice to the accused’s right to a fair trial or the integrity of the justice system that “will be manifested,perpetuated or aggravated through the conduct of the trial, or by its outcome” (Regan, at para. 54);

(2) There must be no alternative remedy capable of redressing the prejudice; and

(3) Where there is still uncertainty over whether a stay is warranted after steps (1) and (2), the court is required to balance theinterests in favour of granting a stay, such as denouncing misconduct and preserving the integrity of the justice system, against “theinterest that society has in having a final decision on the merits” (ibid., at para. 57). [33] The test is the same for both categories because concerns regarding trial fairness and the integrity of the justice system are oftenlinked and regularly arise in the same case.

Having one test for both categories creates a coherent framework that avoids“schizophrenia” in the law (O’Connor, at para. 71).

But while the framework is the same for both categories, the test may — and oftenwill — play out differently depending on whether the “main” or “residual” category is invoked. [15] Since the test is the same whether the abuse falls under the residual category, as the respondent submits, or both categories, asthe applicants argue, a stay of proceedings may be ordered only if the conditions set out in Babos are met. [16] A new trial can also remedy the abuse, particularly where the abuse falls under the main category.

That was, in fact, the remedyapplied in Babos. [17] When the abuse arises from a breach of the duty to disclose, the withdrawal of a guilty plea may also be authorized, asillustrated in R. v. Taillefer; R. v. Duguay.[15] Depending on the circumstances, the withdrawal may or may not be followed by a stay ofproceedings.

If not, a new trial or any other measure may be ordered to sanction the State’s misconduct and ensure the harm is repaired.As explained by LeBel, J. in that case: 86 However, even if the requirements for validity are met, a guilty plea may be withdrawn in the event that the accused’sconstitutional rights were infringed. Those rights cannot be ignored in assessing the accused’s legal situation. The purpose of the duty todisclose is, inter alia, to ensure that the decision concerning the accused is made with full knowledge of the relevant facts, this being alsoa prerequisite to the validity of the plea.

In Stinchcombe, supra, at pp. 342-43, this Court in fact held that disclosure of evidence musttake place before the accused is asked to elect a mode of trial or enter a plea: … 90 In my opinion, those decisions adopt an accurate statement of the Dixon test, adapted to the context of the impact of the breach ofthe duty to disclose on the validity of a guilty plea. In the context of a guilty plea, the two separate steps in the analysis requiredby Dixon must be merged, however.

In that situation, it is impossible to separate them, because the entire analysis of the breach mustbear on the accused’s decision to enter the guilty plea that he or she now wishes to be allowed to withdraw. The accused mustdemonstrate that there is a reasonable possibility that the fresh evidence would have influenced his or her decision to plead guilty, if ithad been available before the guilty plea was entered. However, the test is still objective in nature.

The question is not whether theaccused would actually have declined to plead guilty, but rather whether a reasonable and properly informed person, put in the samesituation, would have run the risk of standing trial if he or she had had timely knowledge of the undisclosed evidence, when it is assessedtogether with all of the evidence already known. Thus the impact of the unknown evidence on the accused’s decision to admit guilt mustbe assessed. If that analysis can lead to the conclusion that there was a realistic possibility that the accused would have run the risk of a

trial, if he or she had been in possession of that information or those new avenues of investigation, leave must be given to withdraw the plea . [Emphasis added.] [ 18 ] Depending on the circumstances, this solution (withdrawal of the plea) may be applicable where, as in the present case, the accused enters a guilty plea in the context of negotiations with the prosecution that at the same time lead to a joint submission of the parties on sentencing.

SENTENCE REDUCTION [ 19 ] Reduction of a sentence imposed on a convicted person, whether or not the conviction was based on a guilty plea, is also a possible remedy in some circumstances and may be considered in two ways, as explained in R. v. Nasogaluak . [16] That case raised the following issue: [39] The central issue in this appeal concerns the possibility of reducing an offender’s sentence to take account of a violation of his or her constitutional rights.

Our Court must determine whether a s. 24(1) remedy is necessary to address the consequences of a Charter breach or whether this can be accomplished through the sentencing process. … [ 20 ] On this issue, LeBel, J., for the Court, held that certain violations – including those complained of by the appellant Nasogaluak – may be addressed as part of the sentencing process, as mitigating circumstances in the ordinary application of ss. 718 et seq . Cr. C.

It is then unnecessary to turn to s. 24(1) of the Charter : [47] The sentencing principles described above must be understood and applied within the overarching framework of our Constitution. Thus it may, at times, be appropriate for a court to address a Charter breach when passing sentence. This may be accomplished without resort to s. 24(1) of the Charter , given the court’s broad discretion under ss. 718 to 718.2 of the Code to craft a fit sentence that reflects all the factual minutiae of the case .

If the facts alleged to constitute a Charter breach are related to one or more of the relevant principles of sentencing, then the sentencing judge can properly take those facts into account in arriving at a fit sentence.

Section 718.2(

a) of the Code provides that a court should reduce a sentence “to account for any relevant ... mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender”. It would be absurd to suggest that simply because some facts also tend to suggest a violation of the offender’s Charter rights, they could no longer be considered relevant mitigating factors in the determination of a fit sentence . [48] Indeed, the sentencing regime under Canadian law must be implemented within, and not apart from, the framework of the Charter . Sentencing decisions are always subject to constitutional scrutiny.

A sentence cannot be “fit” if it does not respect the fundamental values enshrined in the Charter . Thus, incidents alleged to constitute a Charter violation can be considered in sentencing, provided that they bear the necessary connection to the sentencing exercise. As mitigating factors, the circumstances of the breach would have to align with the circumstances of the offence or the offender, as required by s. 718.2 of the Code .

Naturally, the more egregious the breach, the more attention the court will likely pay to it in determining a fit sentence. [49] … A sentence that takes account of a Charter violation is therefore able to communicate respect for the shared set of values expressed in the Charter . … … [55] Thus, a sentencing judge may take into account police violence or other state misconduct while crafting a fit and proportionate sentence , without requiring the offender to prove that the incidents complained of amount to a Charter breach.

Provided the interests at stake can properly be considered by the court while acting within the sentencing regime in the Criminal Code , there is simply no need to turn to the Charter for a remedy . However, if a Charter breach has already been alleged and established, a trial judge should not be prevented from reducing the sentence accordingly, so long as the incidents giving rise to the breach are relevant to the usual sentencing regime. Of course, as we shall see, as a general rule, a court cannot reduce a sentence below a mandatory minimum or order a reduced sentence that is not provided for by statute.

That said, circumstances of a Charter breach or other instances of state misconduct, in exceptional circumstances, do allow a court to derogate from the usual rules to which its decisions are subject. … [63] The judgments relying on s. 24(1) appear to have been concerned about instances of abuse of process or misconduct by state agents in the course of the events leading to an arrest, to charges or to other criminal procedures. But, inasmuch as they relate to the offender and the offence, those facts become relevant circumstances within the meaning of the sentencing provisions of the Criminal Code .

As such, they become part of the factors that sentencing judges will take into consideration in order to determine the proper punishment of the offender, without a need to turn to s. 24(1) . Factors unrelated to the offence and to the offender will remain irrelevant to the sentencing process and will have to be addressed elsewhere . In addition, the discretion of the sentencing judge will have to be exercised within the parameters of the Criminal Code.

The judge must impose sentences respecting statutory minimums and other provisions which prohibit certain forms of sentence in the case of specific offences. [Emphasis added, except at para. 47, in which the word “any” is emphasized in the original.] [ 21 ] These excerpts show that sentence reduction as a remedy for the violation of an accused’s constitutional rights (including abuse of process) may be based on one of two sources, depending on the nature of the violation.

When the violation concerns the commission of the offence or the situation of an offender who is already subject to a sanction or punishment, it is unnecessary to rely on s. 24(1) of the Charter , and the judge may, pursuant to the discretionary power conferred by ss. 718 et seq . Cr. C. , mitigate the sentence accordingly as the violation of constitutional rights requires. If the violation is of a different nature, however, it must be considered in another

context, which must of course be that of s. 24(1) of the Charter , under which a possible sentence reduction is not precluded. [ 22 ] In other words, ss. 718 et seq . Cr. C. allow courts to take into account certain types of violations of an offender’s constitutional rights as mitigating factors and to reduce the sentence that would otherwise have been imposed. The door to sentence reduction is not closed in other circumstances, however, but must then be justified under s. 24(1) of the Charter . ANALYSIS [ 23 ] And what of the case at bar? [ 24 ] The abuse alleged against the State is serious.

The harm it caused the applicants is real and substantial. Convinced by the apparent strength of the evidence, the weaknesses of which they did not yet know and which were hidden from them, they entered an agreement with the prosecution to plead guilty to conspiracy to commit murder and suggested, jointly with the prosecution, the sentences we now know.

To top it off, the prosecution insisted that the applicants make their decision within a time period it had established itself. [ 25 ] As previously stated, in the applications to extend the time to appeal and for leave to appeal now before the Court, the applicants suggest various remedies which fall into two categories. The first concerns the issue of guilt, while the second, added by amendment, concerns sentencing. In their written arguments and at the hearing, the applicants now limit themselves to sentencing and submit that the remedy should be a reduction of the sentence.

This amendment to the application is entirely appropriate. [ 26 ] Indeed, a stay of proceedings is a drastic measure that should be granted only in the clearest of cases, where there is no other conceivable remedy. Such cases are rare, and as noted by the Supreme Court in Babos , if any other remedy short of a stay of proceedings is capable of curing the harm the accused has suffered while adequately dissociating the justice system from the impugned State conduct, if necessary, then such an alternate remedy must be considered. An order for a new trial will therefore sometimes be warranted.

Moreover, if neither of these measures is appropriate, other remedies may be considered, including, as we have already seen, sentence reduction. [ 27 ] At the end of the facilitation session, the parties mutually agreed that the just remedy in this case was to reduce the sentence imposed on each of the applicants.

They suggest the following reductions, which take into account both the magnitude of the sentence previously imposed and the particularities of each case: NAME SUGGESTED REDUCTION David , Gaétan Duquette , Steve Vallerand , Ghislain reduction of eight (8) years Auger , Mario Brochu , Louis Filteau , Jacques Fortier , Michel Hamilton , Pierre reduction of seven (7) years

Auclair , Guy Beaulieu , Georges Chalifoux , Sylvain Demers , Claude Durand , Alain Émond , Jacques Forgues , Simon Frenette , Benoît Gagné , Sylvain Gamache , Martin Grenier , Michel Lachapelle , Pierrot Leduc , Yves Maheu , Stéphane Ménard , Stéphane Ouellet , Richard Ouellett E, Pierre OUIMET, Marvin Pelletier , Marc Perron , Jean-Damien Pruneau , Patrick Robert , Jonathan Rodrigue , Yvon Rodrigu E, Pierre Royer , Daniel Ruest , Alain Théorêt , Normand reduction of six (6) years [ 28 ] The proposed measure is appropriate in the circumstances and is a suitable remedy for the abuse alleged against the prosecution, because it obviates the prejudice suffered by the applicants while ensuring the integrity of the justice system. [ 29 ] Given the nature of the abuse alleged against the State, authorization to withdraw the guilty pleas would not be a sufficient remedy without also considering either a stay of proceedings (as in Brind'Amour and Berthiaume ) or an order for a new trial.

The conditions for granting a stay of proceedings are very onerous and, in the circumstances, despite the misconduct alleged against the prosecution, it is uncertain whether it can be established that the real and concrete prejudice suffered by the applicants will continue unless such a remedy is ordered or that it is the only appropriate remedy capable of preserving the integrity of the justice system.

The applicants’ situation is different from that of the accused for whom stays of proceedings were ordered by Brunton, J. in October of 2015, given that in this case the trial has not taken place and the guilty pleas date back to 2012 and 2013 (except for three, made in 2014 and 2015).

It is therefore not unthinkable that, in the applicants’ case, committal for a new trial would mitigate the prejudice that Brunton, J. noted in the case of their co-accused, allowing them to develop an adequate defence strategy and to mount a full and informed defence. [ 30 ] Is committal for a new trial following the authorization to withdraw the guilty pleas the only possible option? [ 31 ] In view of the charges they would face, as well as the strengths and – as we are now aware – the weaknesses of the State’s

evidence, at this stage of the proceedings, the applicants respond in the negative. To them, in the circumstances, a sentence reduction appears to be an appropriate and sufficient remedy that reasonably sanctions the prosecution’s misconduct. The Court is of the view that the prosecution is right to adopt the same position. [ 32 ] This remedy is indeed consistent with public order and the interests of justice. The applicants’ sentences are therefore reduced, but their pleas and implied admissions of guilt remain and are not removed from the record, with all the consequences this entails.

Moreover, the sentence reductions reflect the particular circumstances of the case and the offender’s situation. This reduction does not transform the sentences ordered into unreasonable or inappropriate sentences that do not respect the rules and principles of ss. 718 et seq . Cr.

C. or the case law applicable in such matters, especially since the length of pre-sentence custody has an effect on the result. [ 33 ] The remedy of sentence reduction is logically connected to the circumstances surrounding the guilty plea (when the applicants did not have all the necessary information) and, at the same time, to those surrounding the negotiation of the joint submission that the trial judge accepted in each case. This negotiation, and its result, took into account the strengths and weakness of the positions of each of the parties with respect to the evidence.

To the extent that the balance between these strengths and weakness has been modified by the disclosure of significant and previously unknown evidence, the parties’ discussions on the joint submissions would have taken a different turn. [ 34 ] In addition, the proposed remedy is a concrete expression of the required denunciation of the prosecution’s abusive conduct which, in the circumstances, the justice system cannot allow to go unpunished. [ 35 ] Finally, the context is suitable for such a measure. The proposed remedy would put an end to a case that has been proceeding before the courts for seven years.

It would also avoid the artificiality of ordering a new trial which would likely give rise to new negotiations in first instance given the time served to date by the applicants and the information they now have in their possession.

This could cause delays that would not benefit the parties or the justice system. [ 36 ] Ultimately, the proposed remedy is a balanced solution, especially since the applicants waived their right to contest the guilty verdicts and request withdrawal of their guilty pleas, such that they concede that their appeal should be dismissed in this regard. [ 37 ] Is the quantum of the proposed reductions appropriate? [ 38 ] The initial sentences were, as we know, the result of joint submissions based on both the nature of the State’s evidence against each of the offenders and their personal situations.

Reflecting these factors, the submissions resulted in sentences ranging from 12 to 19 years of imprisonment (in the majority of cases), 20 to 23 years (in several other cases) and 25 years (in a few cases). The reduction suggested on appeal is proportionate to the harshness of the initial sentence and is justified by the circumstances. [ 39 ] Taking into account the situation of each applicant, these reductions are consistent with the law and the circumstances, and they are well founded under s. 24(1) of the Charter . Consequently, the Court will accept them.

With respect to Sylvain Chalifoux, Claude Demers, Simon Forgues, Martin Gamache, Marc Pelletier, Patrick Pruneau and Daniel Royer, although the suggestion to reduce the sentence by six years is accepted, it will be reduced to one day considering that, as a result of pre-sentence custody, the initial sentence imposed would be less than six years. [ 40 ] FOR THESE REASONS , the Court: [ 41 ] ALLOWS the applications to extend the time to appeal; [ 42 ] ALLOWS the applications to amend the applications for leave to appeal by adding an application to reduce the sentences; [ 43 ] ALLOWS the amended applications for leave to appeal; [ 44 ] DISMISSES the appeals from the guilty pleas and verdicts; [ 45 ] ALLOWS the appeals from the sentences; [ 46 ] SETS ASIDE the sentences in part; [ 47 ] NOTES that the applications to adduce new evidence have become moot; [ 48 ] RULES that the order to serve at least half the sentence before being eligible for parole remains in effect; [ 49 ] VARIES the sentences by REDUCING the terms of imprisonment as follows from the date on which the sentences were ordered: Guy Auclair (file 500-10-006012-155): from 11 years and 4 months to 5 years and 4 months; Mario Auger (file 500-10-006005-159): from 14 years and 7 months to 7 years and 7 months; Georges Beaulieu (file 500-10-005996-150): from 7 years and 3 months to 1 year and 3 months; Louis Brochu (file 500-10-006021-156): from 16 years and 6 months to 9 years and 6 months; Sylvain Chalifoux (file 500-10-006009-151): from 5 years and 3 months to 1 day; Gaétan David (file 500-10-006006-157): from 16 years and 3 months to 8 years and 3 months; Claude Demers (file 500-10-006008-153): from 5 years and 3 months to 1 day; Steve Duquette (file 500-10-006022-154): from 20 years to 12 years; Alain Durand (file 500-10-006024-150): from 6 years and 3 months to 3 months; Jacques Émond (file 500-10-006013-153): from 6 years and 3 months to 3 months; Jacques Filteau (file 500-10-006017-154): from 13 years and 6 months to 6 years and 6 months; Simon Forgues (file 500-10-006002-156): from 5 years and 1 month to 1 day;

Michel Fortier (file 500-10-006019-150): from 13 years and 6 months to 6 years and 6 months; Benoit Frenette (file 500-10-006023-152): from 8 years and 3 months to 2 years and 3 months; Sylvain Gagné (file 500-10-006011-157): from 6 years and 3 months to 3 months; Martin Gamache (file 500-10-006001-158): from 5 years and 3 months to 1 day; Michel Grenier (file 500-10-006003-154): from 12 years and 5 months to 5 years and 5 months; Pierre Hamilton (file 500-10-006010-159): from 15 years and 3 months to 8 years and 3 months; Pierrot Lachapelle (file 500-10-005994-155): from 17 years and 5 months to 11 years and 5 months; Yves Leduc (file 500-10-006032-153): from 7 years and 6 months to 1 year and 6 months; Stéphane Maheu (file 500-10-005995-152): from 9 years and 3 months to 3 years and 3 months; Stéphane Ménard (file 500-10-006016-156): from 9 years and 8 months to 3 years and 8 months; Richard Ouellet (file 500-10-005997-158): from 6 years, 11 months and 9 days to 11 months and 9 days; Pierre Ouellette (file 500-10-006004-152): from 8 years and 3 months to 2 years and 3 months; Marvin Ouimet (file 500-10-006007-155): from 18 years, 3 months and 6 days to 12 years, 3 months and 6 days; Marc Pelletier (file 500-10-005998-156): from 4 years and 10 months to 1 day; Jean-Damien Perron (file 500-10-006027-153): from 2 years and 11 months to 1 day; Patrick Pruneau (file 500-10-006018-152): from 5 years and 3 months to 1 day; Jonathan Robert (file 500-10-005999-154): from 10 years and 1 month to 4 years and 1 month; Yvon Rodrigue (file 500-10-006015-158): from 7 years and 3 months to 1 year and 3 months; Pierre Rodrigue (file 500-10-006014-151): from 7 years and 3 months to 1 year and 3 months; Daniel Royer (file 500-10-006028-151): from 2 years to 1 day; Alain Ruest (file 500-006000-150): from 11 years and 3 months to 5 years and 3 months; Normand Théorêt (file 500-10-005993-157): from 7 years and 3 months to 1 year and 3 months; Ghislain Vallerand (file 500-10-006020-158): from 16 years and 3 months to 8 years and 3 months.

YVES-MARIE MORISSETTE, J.A. FRANÇOIS DOYON, J.A. NICHOLAS KASIRER, J.A. Mtre Mylène Lareau Mtre Chantale Gariépy For the applicants, except Jean-Damien Perron and Daniel Royer Mtre Mélany Renaud Avocats Laval For Jean-Damien Perron and Daniel Royer Mtre Marie-Claude Bourassa Mtre Josée Veilleux Director of Criminal and Penal Prosecutions For the respondent Date of hearing: August 22, 2016