2015 QCCQ 481, 2015 QCCQ 481

Unofficial English Translation Couillard c. Québec (Procureur général) 2015 QCCQ 481 COURT OF QUEBEC CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC DISTRICT OF MONTREAL "Civil Division" No.: 500-22-188353-117 DATE: January 15, 2015 ______________________________________________________________________ PRESIDING: BRIGITTE CHARRON, J.C.Q. J.C.Q. ______________________________________________________________________ JEAN-FRANÇOIS COUILLARD Plaintiff v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF QUEBEC and CITY OF LONGUEUIL Defendants ______________________________________________________________________ JUDGMENT ______________________________________________________________________ [ 1 ] The Court has before it a motion to institute proceedings brought by Mr. Jean-François Couillard against the Attorney General of Quebec and the City of Longueuil. [ 2 ] Essentially, the plaintiff was arrested on Friday, April 22, 2011, in the evening, while at the home of Ms. M.V. in Cowansville. [ 3 ] The Sûreté du Québec officers, who had gone to Ms.

V.'s home for other reasons, noted that the plaintiff had violated a condition of his release, i.e. not to contact M.V. or go to her home, when they found him in her company. [ 4 ] Although the plaintiff and Ms. V. explained to the Sûreté du Québec officers that this condition was no longer in force and that they had no grounds to arrest the plaintiff, they nevertheless did so. [ 5 ] In fact, as the evidence shows, the officers discovered by checking the CRPQ that the plaintiff had been released on the condition that he abstain from communicating, directly or indirectly, with Ms.

M.V., in accordance with an undertaking given by the plaintiff to a peace officer, filed as Exhibit D-1: CITY OF LONGUEUIL UNDERTAKING GIVEN TO A PEACE OFFICER OR CANADA AN OFFICER IN CHARGE PROVINCE OF QUEBEC Form 11.1 Sections 493, 499 and 503 DISTRICT OF LONGUEUIL Event number: LGM 10 12 02-110 CITY OF LONGUEUIL Adult I, Couillard Jean-François, born on …, residing at … B, Brossard, understand that it is alleged that I have committed assault with bodily injury. In order that I may be released from custody by way of a promise to appear, I undertake to : …

c) abstain from communicating, directly or indirectly, with M.V. or from going to her home and/or place of work. …

[6] Sûreté du Québec officer Yvan Masut contacted the City of Longueuil police department to ensure that the conditions imposedon the plaintiff were still in force. [7] Upon receiving confirmation by telephone that the conditions were still in force, Officer Yvan Masut maintained his decisionto arrest the plaintiff for having violated a condition of his release. [8] In addition, when the plaintiff and Ms.

V. insisted that the undertaking D-1 had lapsed, the officers, to properly verify thetruthfulness of this claim, did a second verification of the information in the CRPQ and requested a written confirmation from the City ofLongueuil police department, as well as a copy of the condition recorded in the CRPQ. [9] It appears that the City of Longueuil police department confirmed that the conditions were still in force and sent a copy of thecondition imposed on the plaintiff, as appears from the fax cover sheet and the document filed as Exhibit D-2. [10] On the basis of these facts, the Sûreté du Québec officers therefore proceeded to arrest and detain the plaintiff, who was held atthe Cowansville detention facility and transferred to the Sherbrooke detention facility the next day, on April 23, 2011. [11] Because April 23 was a Saturday, the plaintiff had to spend the entire weekend behind bars, with no possibility of seeing ajudge or rectifying the situation.

It was not until Tuesday, April 26, 2011, that the plaintiff was finally brought to the Granby Courthouseto be heard by a judge. [12] When the authorities realized that an error had been committed, the plaintiff was released at around noon on Tuesday, April 26,2011, i.e., after four days of detention.

The evidence shows that on April 11, 2011, at the Longueuil Court House, Judge Anne-MarieJacques of the Court of Quebec had acquitted the plaintiff of the offence with which he had been charged and ordered the plaintiff toenter into a recognizance to keep the peace, as appears from the computerized minutes filed as Exhibit D-4 and the recognizance enteredinto by the plaintiff under

section 810 of the Criminal Code, filed as Exhibit D-5. [13] In so doing, the undertaking previously given by the plaintiff was revoked. [14] Following standard court procedures, on April 11, 2011, the court clerk present at the hearing, Ms.

Josie Langelier, filed a copyof the roll which she had annotated in the box of the City of Longueuil police department, informing them of the situation and of thedecision revoking the undertaking previously given by the plaintiff and filed as Exhibit D-1. [15] As of April 11, 2011, or the next morning at the latest, the City of Longueuil police department had in its box at the LongueuilCourthouse a copy of the recognizance to keep the peace, Exhibit D-5, as well as a copy of the annotated roll, Exhibit D-6, showing theplaintiff's acquittal and the removal of the condition D-1. [16] Essentially, the plaintiff alleges that he was unlawfully and wrongfully detained and seeks the resulting damages. [17] The issue of unlawful and wrongful arrest will be examined here first. [18] There is no doubt, in the circumstances, that Mr.

Couillard's detention was unlawful and, consequently, wrongful, and that itinfringed his fundamental rights. [19] It is useful to note here that the right to liberty and security of the person as well as the right to protection against arbitrarydetention are fundamental constitutional rights that, when violated, give rise to an appropriate remedy. [20] As the Quebec Court of Appeal rightly noted in Régie inter-municipale de police des Seigneuries v. Michaelson (C.A.) , 7 at para. 40: [TRANSLATION] "The courts have on many occasions awarded damages following an unlawful and wrongful arrest.

Generally, part of the award seeks tocompensate for the moral injury, psychological stress, and pain, suffering and hardship suffered by the victim". [21] The Attorney General argues in defence that the Sûreté du Québec officers involved acted diligently, at all times obtaining theappropriate information in the circumstances, and that they contacted the City of Longueuil, which was responsible for entering theabove-mentioned condition in the CRPQ. [22] Furthermore, the Attorney General of Quebec argues that according to the CRPQ policies and procedures handbook, it is up tothe police department that enters information in the CRPQ to update it and to verify its accuracy and validity (6.1.e): [TRANSLATION] "The department is responsible for the validity, relevance and quality of the information it enters in the various CRPQ/CIPC data banksand it must ensure that its information in the police record is sufficient to enable it to establish its accuracy and validity for a requestingagency as quickly as possible". [23] In addition, as appears from the evidence, the Sûreté du Québec officers complied with the usual standard requirements in thisregard, verifying twice rather than once with the City of Longueuil police department that the condition was still in force, as appearsfrom the confirmation they received, Exhibit D-2. [24] The Honourable Michel Lassonde J.C.Q., ruling in Marc Loiseau v.

Ville de Saint-Hubert, (QC CQ), stated: [TRANSLATION]

[35] What must be understood is that the different police forces in Quebec can use this service and can also provide relevant information to the C.R.P.Q. [36] In the present case, it is the Town of Saint-Luc police department that provided information to the C.R.P.Q. concerning the charges of breach of probation and of obstructing police officers made against the plaintiff. [37] It is also this police department that informed the C.R.P.Q. of the undertakings made by the plaintiff to obtain his release. [38] As we have previously seen, it was therefore up to the Saint-Luc police department to inform the C.R.P.Q. that the plaintiff had been acquitted of the charges against him and that, consequently, the above-mentioned undertakings had lapsed. [39] The Saint-Luc police officers failed lamentably in their duties, apparently because of a lack of personnel and the absence of a liaison officer who could have followed up on the criminal records and verified the status of each record originating from this police department. [40] In fact, it is difficult to explain how the C.R.P.Q. failed to be updated between October 5 and October 23. [41] Worse, it appears that the delay would have been much longer had it not been for the plaintiff's arrest. [42] There is no doubt in the mind of the Court that the Saint-Luc police department made a blunder engaging its liability. [ 25 ] The Court must conclude that the Sûreté du Québec officers conducted themselves in accordance with the standards demanded of them and that the evidence shows no fault that could result in a judgment against the Attorney General of Quebec. [ 26 ] But what about the defendant, City of Longueuil? [ 27 ] In the circumstances, the City of Longueuil, while denying any liability, at least tried to diminish its scope.

First, the City of Longueuil argued that the plaintiff did not have in his possession the recognizance D-5, establishing the new conditions to which the he was subject. [ 28 ] The Court notes that this defence argument is, to say the least, irrelevant, and that the plaintiff had no obligation to have this document in his possession to show the police officers, especially since, even if he were in possession of such a document, considering the information that the City of Longueuil and its clerks had entered in the CRPQ and confirmed to the Sûreté du Québec officers, they would likely have still proceeded with the arrest, which was their duty. [ 29 ] The attempt by the defendant, City of Longueuil, to shift responsibility for his own arrest to the plaintiff the appears not only futile but inappropriate. [ 30 ] The City of Longueuil is also trying to avoid its responsibility with respect to the CRPQ, in spite of the CRPQ rules themselves.

It seems clear that it was up to the Longueuil police department to update the data it had entered in the CRPQ, which it manifestly did not do. In all likelihood, the City of Longueuil police department made an error or was negligent, as was the case with the Town of Saint-Luc in Loiseau , supra . [ 31 ] There is no doubt that the defendant, City of Longueuil, is liable in the circumstances for the damages suffered by the plaintiff. [ 32 ] In Dominique Dumais v.

Procureur général du Québec and Ville de Longueuil (C.S.) 2011 QCCS 4609 , the Honourable Manon Savard of the Superior Court, as she was then, in her judgment rendered on September 1, 2011, wrote as follows in paragraphs 70, 77, 78 and 79: [TRANSLATION] [70] In light of the evidence, the Court concludes, by presumption and on a balance of probabilities, that the City of Longueuil police department received a copy of this decision in November of 2003, but failed to make the necessary changes in the CRPQ.

It also failed to inform the SPVM police officers who verified the validity of the probation order following Mr. Dumais’ arrest of the existence of the Court of Appeal judgment.

This presumption is based on the following facts, which are serious, precise and concordant. [77] Considering these elements, the Court cannot find, as the City maintains, that its police department did not obtain a copy of the Court of Appeal judgment in a timely manner so as to be able to strike the probation order from the CRPQ. [78] The City of Longueuil police department received this judgment but committed a fault by failing to update the CRPQ, thereby incurring the City's liability.

It also committed a fault by confirming the validity of the probation order to the City of Montreal police officers, without mentioning that it was set aside by the Court of Appeal. [79] The Court must therefore determine if Mr. Dumais suffered harm as a result of the City’s fault and for which it is liable.

First, the Court must examine the City's argument concerning the prescription of the action. [ 33 ] As for the nature of his damages, the plaintiff claims the sum of $24,000, representing $6,000 per day for the four days he spent in wrongful and unlawful detention, which deprived him of his freedom and enjoyment of life, plus the sum of $20,000 for all the moral prejudice suffered because of the trauma experienced and the stress, anxiety, loss of sleep and loss of enjoyment of life caused by his imprisonment, as well as, by way amendment, a sum of $1,000 for loss of wages. [ 34 ] But before considering the question of damages, the Court must consider the argument raised by the City of Longueuil concerning the prescription of the action brought by the plaintiff. [ 35 ] The defendant, City of Longueuil, invokes

section 586 of the Cities and Towns Act , CQLR c C-19 and its short prescriptive

period, which applies here: 586. Every action, suit or claim against the municipality or any of its officers or employees, for damages occasioned by faults, or illegalities, shall be prescribed by six months from the day on which the cause of action accrued, any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding. [ 36 ] In this regard, we must conclude, as did the Honourable Manon Savard of the Superior Court of Quebec in Dominique Dumais , supra , in paragraph 90 of her judgment, that it is the short prescriptive period of

section 586 of

chapter C-19 of the Revised Statutes of Quebec that applies in the circumstances. [ 37 ] In Andrusiak v. Montréal (Ville de) , the Court of Appeal concluded that prejudice that is strictly moral, directly related to interference with fundamental rights, does not constitute bodily injury within the meaning of

section 2930 of the Civil Code of Québec , when it is unrelated to damage involving the physical integrity of the person. She relies on the following observation of the Supreme Court in Schreiber v. Canada (Attorney General) : 64. … Interferences with fundamental rights such as freedom , privacy or reputation interests may give rise to claims characterized as moral or material, depending in the personal interests affected. The shock caused by an unjustified arrest was thus held to give rise to a claim for moral damages, but not to an action for “préjudice corporel” : see Michaud v.

Québec (Procureur général) , [1998] R.R.A. 1065 (Sup. Ct.) ; and Gardner, supra , at p. 22. Absent other forms of damage involving the physical integrity of the person, the loss of personal freedom caused by illegal police or state action with the attendant sense of humiliation, the loss of the ability to act independently, and the psychological stresses that flow from such situations, is assimilated into a form of moral damage and must be compensated as such . See: J.-L. Baudouin and P.

Deslauriers, La responsabilité civile (5th ed. 1998), at p. 288. (emphasis added by the Honourable Manon Savard, J.C.S.) [ 38 ] In Dumais , when the Court determined that the short prescriptive period applied, it concluded that the plaintiff had brought his action late. [TRANSLATION] [82] On October 7, 2005, Mr. Dumais learned that his detention was unlawful. He said it was only in late May 2006 that he learned that the City of Longueuil police department was responsible for compiling the information entered in the CRPQ for offences committed in the district of Longueuil.

He sent a formal notice to the City on June 9, 2006, but did not bring his action until December 18, 2006, i.e., more than six months later. … [92] Again, what happened to Mr. Dumais is deplorable. Many persons, including his lawyer, looked at his record without noting the error of the City of Longueuil police department. Mr.

Dumais definitely suffered moral prejudice. [93] However, since he waited too long before bringing his action against the City, he must assume the consequences of his failure to proceed within the prescribed time period. [94] Only the items of claim for bodily injury at the time of his arrest and during his incarceration are not prescribed. [ 39 ] The City of Longueuil argues that the prescriptive period for the plaintiff to bring his action was therefore six months, beginning on the day of the plaintiff's release, April 26, 2011, at the Granby Courthouse. [ 40 ] According to the City of Longueuil, since October 23, 2011, was a Saturday, the deadline for the plaintiff to bring his action was October 25, 2011, and since his motion to institute proceedings was stamped in late December of 2011 and served in early January of 2012, the action is therefore prescribed. [ 41 ] The plaintiff submits that the prescriptive period raised by the City cannot be calculated from the date of his release because it was impossible for him at that time to know of the City of Longueuil's fault. [ 42 ] In fact, he was only informed of the facts of the case concerning the responsibility and role of the City of Longueuil during an exchange of letters with counsel for the Sûreté du Québec. [ 43 ] It appears from Exhibit P-7 that on June 6, 2011, counsel for the plaintiff, Mtre Jean Denis, sent a formal notice to the Attorney General of Quebec.

The reply from the Attorney General of Quebec was in the form of Exhibit P-8, i.e., a letter from the general headquarters, professional standards department, signed by Bruno Jolicoeur, a lawyer with this department.

In the letter, dated September 7, 2011, and addressed to Mtre Jean Denis, he said: [TRANSLATION] "Since it is the responsibility of the police department to update the CRPQ data bank, and since their clerk confirmed the validity of the conditions, we believe that no fault was committed by our members and, subsidiarily, by the Sûreté du Québec". [ 44 ] In this matter, it was only when the reply from the Attorney General of Quebec, Exhibit P-8, dated September 7, 2011, was sent to counsel for Mr.

Couillard, that the plaintiff was informed of the facts indicating a fault committed by the City of Longueuil. [ 45 ] It was only then that the plaintiff was informed of the role of the City of Longueuil in this matter. It was therefore impossible for him to act earlier. On October 24, 2011, counsel for the plaintiff served by bailiff a formal notice to the City of Longueuil police department, filed as Exhibit P-9.

[ 46 ] Impossibility to act is defined as follows by the authors Jean-Louis Baudouin and Patrice Deslauriers in La responsabilité civile , 5 th edition, Yvon Blais, 1726, at 1031 and 1032: [TRANSLATION] "... when it is impossible for victims to identify the person responsible for the prejudice, when because of their unconsciousness or a psychological state of fear, they can neither know nor exercise their right, when they are unaware of the prejudice that was caused or, more generally, when they are unaware of the legal facts that provide a basis for their right of action .

However, mere unawareness of the exact extent of the damages that can be claimed is not a valid cause for suspension. The impossibility to act required by law remains a question to be assessed by the courts which, in light of the wording of

article 2904 C.C.Q. and the recent Supreme Court decision, should be less strict than under the previous system.

Impossibility to act should not be confused here with mere unawareness of one's right, which is not a valid reason for suspension". (emphasis added) [ 47 ] It was therefore impossible for the plaintiff to act earlier and it was therefore only from that date that the Court should calculate the prescriptive period to ensure that the plaintiff acted within the short prescriptive period under sections 585 (5) and 586 of the Cities and Towns Act . [ 48 ] It is useful here to reread what the Honourable Gilles Mercure wrote in Pneus Gaumond ltée v. Prévost , 2009 QCCS 4032 : [TRANSLATION] [110] In Frédéric Breault v.

Hôpital Laval and Docteur Jean-Claude Côté , our colleague Boisvert J. wrote: [TRANSLATION] "Before knowing the diagnoses made by these two doctors, at the very least the diagnosis made by Dr. Nadeau (cf. at 139, examination of January 25, 2001), the plaintiff was unaware of the alleged fault committed by Dr. Côté, so how could he have taken action? I believe that the reasoning of Rayle J. in April v. Les héritiers Seltzer , Sup. Ct.

No. 500-17-001265-977 (October 27, 1997), is unassailable (at 3 and foll.): [TRANSLATION] Three elements must be present to bring a civil liability action, i.e., fault, injury and a causal link (art. 1457, second paragraph, C.C.Q. ). As long as the plaintiff is unaware of a fault, it is impossible to identify the causal link between the fault and the injury suffered. The court adopts the position put forward by Judge Jean-Louis Baudouin, which position favours a subjective rather than an objective satisfaction of the preconditions for bringing action.

It is not sufficient for the legal condition (here fault) to exist; the victim must have identified it as such: 1417 - … To resolve this dilemma, we must consider the very basis of extinctive prescription: to sanction negligent conduct. In our opinion, the prescriptive period should start on the day on which a reasonably prudent and informed victim could have suspected the link between the injury and the fault (at 742, La responsabilité civile , 4 th ed.)". [111] In Lise Boisvert v.

Marc-André Gagnon , Dutil J., as she was then, wrote: [TRANSLATION] "Article 2880 C.C.Q. states: "T he day on which the right of action arises determines the beginning of the period of extinctive prescription". The right of action exists only when there is a fault and when it is known. It is true that putting in a fixed bridge did not solve the health problems that Ms. Boisvert had before 1990. However, this fact did not suffice to make her aware of a fault committed by Dr. Gagnon. According to Jean-Louis Baudouin, J.A., prescription serves to sanction negligent conduct.

The prescriptive period cannot therefore start until the day on which a reasonably prudent and informed victim could have suspected the link between the injury and the fault". [ 49 ] In the circumstances, the plaintiff became aware of the facts that could give rise to liability of the defendant, City of Longueuil, on September 7, 2011, at the earliest, and he filed his claim in the office of the court on December 28, 2011, and had it served on the City of Longueuil on January 4, 2012, within the time period prescribed by law.

Consequently, the prescription argument raised by the defendant, City of Longueuil, should be dismissed. [ 50 ] The damages must now be established. In this regard, many decisions have reviewed the case law on damages for injury in cases of unjustified arrest. [ 51 ] On December 17, 2010, the Honourable Marie Michelle Lavigne of this court, in Riad Tayeb Cherif v. Banque Nationale du Canada and Allstate Compagnie d’assurance (C.Q.) 2010 QCCQ 19126 , at 11, reviewed these decisions: [TRANSLATION] "In Corrigan v.

CUM , ( 1980 C.S. 853 to 860), a plaintiff who had been arrested and held for three hours was awarded $5,000 for moral damages and material damages.

In Rodrigue v. CUM, (1981 C.S. 442 to 446), the Court awarded damages of $10,000 for an arrest and unlawful detention that lastedmore than four hours. In Spooner v. CUM, (J.E. 87-365), Rouillard J. awarded the plaintiff, who had been held and detained for more than one hour, damagesof $5,000 for unlawful search and arrest, unjustified imprisonment, and humiliation. In Heath v.

P.G. du Québec, (1987 R.J.Q. 1168 to 1173), the Court awarded damages of $7,000 for abuse and humiliation following anunjustified arrest, a 30-minute discussion, handcuffing for a short period, and unjustified detention at the police station for anindeterminate, but apparently short, period. In Crépeau v. Yannonie, (1988 R.R.A. 265 to 272), the Court awarded $5,000 for moral damages and an additional $5,000 for exemplarydamages because the defendant had displayed conduct unbecoming a peace officer. See also Cagney v. CUM, (1998 R.R.A. 515 (Sup. Ct.); Tomer v. CUM, (500-02-019404-941 (C.Q.); Laflamme v.

CUM, 1996 R.R.A.689 (Sup. Ct.); Girard v. CUM, (500-05-013361-926 (Sup. Ct.). In Michaelson et al. v. Régie intermunicipale de police des Seigneuries, J.E. 2002-2191 (Sup. Ct.), upheld by J.E. 2005-113 (C.A.), theSuperior Court awarded $10,000 to an individual who had been unlawfully detained for one evening and subsequently acquitted. In Québec (Procureur général) v. Allard, (QC CA), J.E. 99-1780 (C.A.), the plaintiff was arrested and incarceratedon a Friday afternoon, around 4 p.m. He was held until Monday morning.

The plaintiff was awarded $10,000 for wrongful arrest and$25,000 for unlawful and wrongful detention. In Leroux v. Communauté urbaine de Montréal, (QC CS), J.E. 97-1423 (Sup. Ct.), the judge awarded $5,000 to anindividual who had been unlawfully arrested and detained. An additional amount of $5,000 was awarded to him for prolonged detention.The individual had been arrested around 9 p.m. and released around 3 a.m., when he could have been released much sooner. In Ruckenstein v. Montréal (Ville de), 2009 QCCQ 7011 , AZ-50568995, the Court awarded the plaintiff $5,000 for having beenwrongfully detained for one hour.

In Côté v. Longueuil (Ville de), Mr. Côté was arrested and spent around one hour at the police station before being released on a promiseto appear. He was awarded damages of $4,000. In Khoury v. Dupuis, (QC CQ), AZ-50226730, B.E. 2004BE-828, the plaintiff was awarded $5,000 for infringementof his freedom and injury to his dignity after having being unlawfully arrested and deprived of his freedom for one hour". [52] Similarly, the Honourable Brian Riordan, in Patrick Duval v. Alain Fredette and Le Procureur general du Québec, (Sup.

Ct.)2006 QCCS 5064, August 31, 2006, at 22, under the heading [TRANSLATION] "Damages", reviewed the case law on damagesawarded per day of detention: [114] Seven hours (1988) $3,000 per day of detention One night (1986) $3,000 per day of detention One night (1995) $8,000 per day of detention, including stress and depression One night (1999) $6,000 per day of detention One day (1999, 2003: C.A.) $5,000 per day of detention Three nights (1998) $4,000 per day of detention Three days (2004) $2,000 per day of detention Four days (2005) $2,500 per day of detention, including loss of enjoyment of life, anxiety, stress, hardshipand inconvenience Five days – Christmas (1991) $4,000 per day of detention, including moral damages, anxiety and humiliation Five days (2002) $3,000 per day of detention [53] In Du-Lude v.

Canada, (FCA), [2001] 1 F.C. 545, the Federal Court of Appeal, per Richard C.J.,Létourneau and Noël, JJ.A., reviewed a case concerning the quantum of damages for unlawful arrest and stated the following: [19] There is some disparity between the amounts awarded for an unlawful arrest and detention. This disparity has to do with thespecial facts of each case and the circumstances surrounding them. I hasten to add that on the question of quantum, pre-Charter decisionsare of limited use and value. ...

They are three fundamental constitutional rights, the unjustified infringement of which also involves aconstitutional right to suitable compensation, whereas in the past the right to compensation was much more uncertain. … [54] In paragraph 25 and following, the Court noted the damages awarded: [25] In Montminy v. Brossard (Ville de), [1991] R.R.A. 299 (Que. Sup. Ct.), the plaintiff received $7,000 for her unlawful arrest, theviolation of her domicile and unjustified use of force by a bailiff. The Court referred to Rodrigue v.

C.U.M., [1981] C.S. 442 (Que.),appeal to the Court of Appeal dismissed, in which a plaintiff who was unjustly arrested and detained for over four hours at the policestation was awarded the sum of $10,000.

[26] The plaintiff Stewart obtained $10,000 for moral and psychological damage and for the hardship caused by her unlawful arrest and unjustified detention for three and a half hours. The infringement of the plaintiff's fundamental rights was not deliberate and the police officers did not act maliciously or in bad faith. Consequently, no punitive damages were awarded: Stewart v. Dugas , [1992] R.R.A. 268 (Que. Sup. Ct.) . See also Chartier v. Montréal (Communauté urbaine de) , [1993] R.R.A. 66 (Que. Sup. Ct.) , in which Mr.

Chartier and another plaintiff received sums of $6,000 and $4,000 respectively for the humiliation, anxiety and anguish resulting from their unlawful arrest and the excessive means used by the police to make it. [27] I conclude this illustration of judicial precedents by reference to two current decisions. In Leroux v. Montréal (Communauté Urbaine de) , [1997] R.J.Q. 1971 (Sup. Ct.

Que) , the defendants, civilian police officers at the time of the events, were ordered to pay the victim of an unlawful arrest and detention and the use of unjustified force the sum of $45,000, namely $5,000 for the arrest, $5,000 for the detention and $25,000 for the moral damage suffered. Additionally, although infringement of the victim's rights was not deliberate but accidental, the Court ordered them to also pay the sum of $10,000 as exemplary damages: see also Mitchell v. Québec (Procureur général) , [1995] R.J.Q. 1836 (Sup. Ct.

Que.) , in which $5,000 was awarded to the victims for unlawful arrest, $4,000 for arbitrary detention and $6,000 for exemplary damages. [28] Finally, our fellow judge Sharlow J., as she then was, came to the conclusion in Stewart v. Canada (Attorney General) , [1999] F.C.J. No. 1996 (T.D.) (QL) , that the force used in arresting the plaintiff was not excessive.

If her conclusion had been different regarding the defendants' liability, she would have awarded general damages of $12,500 for minor injury and slight psychological damage and $12,500 for punitive damages. [ 55 ] The Court concludes from the review of all this case law that in 2014, an award of $10,000 per day of unlawful incarceration would not be unreasonable.

Taken as a whole, and updating the amounts awarded, previous decisions fix comparable awards, considering the years in which these judgments were rendered. [ 56 ] In light of the case law, the initial claim of $44,000 should therefore be reduced to $40,000, without it being necessary to distinguish between each item claimed, since the award includes all the items claimed as moral and psychological damages, as well as the hardship caused by the plaintiff's unlawful and wrongful detention for four days. [ 57 ] With regard to the damages claimed by way amendment, i.e., $1,000 for loss of wages, no credible and preponderant evidence was adduced that would justify such an award.

FOR ALL OF THESE REASONS, THE COURT: ALLOWS in part the motion to institute proceedings against the defendant, City of Longueuil. CONDEMNS the defendant, City of Longueuil, to pay to the plaintiff, Jean-François Couillard, the sum of $40,000, with interest at the legal rate and the additional indemnity provided in

article 1619 of the Civil Code of Québec , from the date of the formal notice, with costs. DISMISSES the motion to institute proceedings against the defendant, Attorney General of Quebec, without costs. __________________________________ BRIGITTE CHARRON, J.C.Q. Me Jean Denis Cardinal Léonard Denis, Attorneys n.p. For the plaintiff Me Alexandre Duval Bernard, Roy (Justice-Québec) For the defendant Attorney General of Quebec Me Pierre-Marc Boyer Rivard Vézina Larose, Attorneys For the defendant City of Longueuil Dates of hearing: March 26, 27 and 28, 2014