R. v. Melnyk, 2016 ONCJ 331

CITATION: R. v. Melnyk , 2016 ONCJ 331 Case Name: R. v. Melnyk Between Regina, and Walter Melnyk Ontario Court of Justice Toronto, Ontario P. Kowarsky J.P. Heard: March 3, 2016 Oral Judgment: March 3, 2016 Written Reasons: June 7, 2016 Counsel Ms. E. Luca: Provincial Prosecutor The self-represented defendant failed to remain for the trial REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND SENTENCING P. KOWARSKY J.P. A. INTRODUCTION 1 . On March 3, 2016, the prosecutor was ready to proceed. However, the defendant once again requested that the matter be adjourned. I denied the request for an adjournment. 2 .

I suggested that the defendant speak with the prosecutor prior to any further proceedings, and gave them half an hour to do so. Upon returning to court, the prosecutor informed me that there was no resolution, and she was ready to proceed. The defendant again requested an adjournment to enable him to retain new counsel. 3 . I denied the request, the defendant stormed out of the court, and the matter proceeded ex parte.

4 . At the conclusion of the trial, after hearing submissions from the prosecutor, I convicted the defendant on all four charges, and said that I would provide written reasons on a later date. I heard the prosecutor’s submissions on penalty, and then reserved my decision on penalty to the date on which the matter was to be adjourned for my written reasons. The matter was adjourned to June 7, 2016 for written reasons and sentencing. These are my Reasons. B. REASONS FOR DENYING THE ADJOURNMENT 5 .

A consideration of the defendant’s request for an adjournment requires the court to assess: • Whether the defendant’s request for an adjournment was reasonable; and • Whether the denial of the adjournment would impact the defendant’s ability to defend himself and to present his case. 6 . In my view, the defendant’s request for an adjournment on the grounds that he wanted to retain new counsel was not reasonable in the particular circumstances of this case. If anything, it is consistent with his numerous prior requests for adjournments resulting in the lengthy history of this case. 7 .

It is important to note that on July 17, 2015 the defendant appeared for the pre-set full-day trial. On that occasion the defendant informed the court that his counsel, Mr. J. Reble, had been disbarred by the Law Society, and was therefore no longer permitted to represent him. Consequently, on July 17, 2015 the court granted the defendant’s request for an adjournment to enable him to retain new counsel. The case was adjourned to August 17, 2015 to be spoken to. On that day the defendant failed to appear, and the case was adjourned to August 20, 2015 for an ex parte trial. 8 .

On August 20, 2015 the defendant did appear, and the matter was adjourned to September 17, 2015 to provide the defendant with more time to retain new counsel. The matter was marked peremptory on the defendant to set a new date for trial. 9 . I am satisfied that between July 17, 2015 when counsel J. Reble ceased to represent the defendant because of his disbarment, and March 3, 2016, the defendant was given more than sufficient time to retain counsel. Consequently, I found his request to be unreasonable. 10 .

Furthermore, I am satisfied that the defendant is completely familiar with the charges, and is well acquainted with the alleged deficiencies including what was and is required to rectify all the deficiencies with respect to his property located at 596 Runnymede Road, Toronto. According to the evidence of Inspector Rome, as recently as a couple of days before the trial on March 3, 1016, when she tried to make arrangements with the defendant to re-inspect the property prior to the trial, the defendant would not make himself available.

Accordingly, I am of the view that the defendant continues to avoid complying with the law; he reneges on his responsibilities towards the safety and protection of his tenants, his property and others in the vicinity. 11 . For the reasons outlined, I am satisfied that the denial of his request for an adjournment would not be prejudicial to the defendant nor that he would be deprived of his right to a fair trial. I denied the adjournment, and ordered that the trial would proceed. C. REASONS FOR THE EX PARTE TRIAL 12 .

When I asked the clerk of the court to arraign, the defendant became enraged, disruptive and aggressive, yelling that he was not willing to plead or to participate in the trial. The defendant’s comments were briefly as follows: “I’m not making any plea….I don’t recognize the procedures here and I remove myself from these procedures. I don’t recognize them. This is an abuse of the system. The city has been abusing me and my rights as a citizen.”

13 . The defendant would not stop this outrageous behaviour. As a result, I warned him that “I will have you removed from the court by police if you continue with this behaviour,” to which the defendant responded: “I am going on my own, sir. I don’t want to have to be forced to be removed.” 14 . I then admonished the defendant in these words: “But I just want you to understand before you leave that you can be convicted in your absence.” The defendant responded as follows: “I understand perfectly. I understand that. I understand what’s going on.” 15 My response to that was: “All right.

There’ll be an ex parte trial.” D. THE CHARGES 16. The defendant is charged with the following four offences alleged to have been committed by him on or about the 12 th day of November, 2008 at 596 Runnymede Road, Toronto – 1. Failing to keep a written record of all tests and corrective measures for each portable fire extinguisher and make them available upon request of the Chief Fire Official, in conformance with

Article 6.2.7.5 pursuant to

Article 1.1.2.1 of Division B of Ontario Fire Code, O’Reg. 213/07 , contrary to Fire Protection and Prevention Act 1997, S.O. 1997, C.4, Subsection 28(1) (c); and 2. Failing to maintain the interconnected smoke alarm system in operating condition in conformance with CAN/ULC- S522, Standard for the Maintenance and Testing of Smoke Alarms” pursuant to Sentence 6.3.2.6 (2) of Division B of Ontario Fire Code, O’Reg. 213/07 , contrary to Fire Protection and Prevention Act, S.O. 1997, C.4, Subsection 28 (1) (c); and 3.

Failing to maintain any part of an elevator shaft, ventilation shaft, means of egress, service room or service space of combustible materials pursuant to Sentence 2.4.1.1 (2) of Division B of Ontario Fire Code, O’Reg. 213/07 contrary to Fire Protection and Prevention Act, 1997, S.O. 1997, C.4, Subsection 28 (1) (c); and 4. Failing to install smoke alarms in each dwelling unit in accordance with

Article 3.2.4.21 of the Building Code pursuant to Sentence 9.5.4.5 (1) of Division B of Ontario Fire Code, O’Reg. 213/07 , contrary to Fire Protection and Prevention Act 1997, S.O. 1997, C.4, Subsection 28 (1) (c). 17. The defendant was initially charged with 5 offences. Prior to the commencement of the trial, the prosecutor withdrew count 4 on the Information. E. THE HISTORY OF THIS CASE 18. I do not intend to set out the date and details of every court appearance in this case, which commenced with the swearing of the Information on January 30, 2009 and culminated with the ex parte trial before me on March 3, 2016. 19. A

summary of the history of this case before the courts is as follows:

a) The defendant appeared on March 26, 2009 and then again on July 2, 2009 on which day a trial date was set for January 26, 2010, marked with or without counsel. After these two appearances there were numerous adjournments granted at the request of the defendant.

b) On October 4, 2011 the defendant was convicted of the five offences on the Information. The defendant filed an appeal. On January 17, 2013 the Ontario Court of Justice sitting as a court of appeal, granted the appeal, and ordered that a new trial be held. The matter was adjourned to March 8, 2013 in W7 Court at 2700 Eglinton Avenue West, Toronto to set a date for a new trial.

c) Mr. Melnyk retained Counsel J. Reble to represent him.

d) On November 29, 2013, after numerous appearances and adjournments granted at the request of the defendant, the matter was set down for a judicial pre-trial on February 28, 2014. Eventually, on May 16, 2014 a new trial date was set for December 5, 2014 for a full day trial.

e) On December 5, 2014 Mr. Melnyk appeared with Counsel Reble. Their request for a further adjournment was granted, and the matter

was adjourned to December 19, 2014 to be spoken to. On December 19, 2014 a half-day special trial was set down at the request of the defendant for March 26, 2015. On that day, the court granted the defendant’s request for a further adjournment to July 17, 2015 marked for a full-day special trial.

f) On July 17, 2015, the defendant informed the court that his counsel, Mr. J. Reble, had been disbarred by the Law Society, and was therefore no longer representing him.

g) Accordingly, the matter was adjourned to August 7, 2015 to be spoken to. On that day the defendant failed to appear, and the matter was adjourned for trial to August 20, 2015 on which date the defendant did appear. At his request, the matter was adjourned to September 17, 2015 to enable the defendant to retain new counsel. The matter was marked peremptory on the defendant to set a date for trial and to retain counsel.

h) On September 17, October 15 and October 30, 2015, the defendant did appear. On each occasion the matter was adjourned at the request of the defendant, and marked peremptory on the defendant to proceed to trial. At the October 30 th appearance, in the presence of the defendant, the matter was adjourned to March 3, 2016 for trial. A full tier was blocked, and the court ordered that it was peremptory on the defendant to proceed with the trial. F. THE EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION 20.

The prosecutor tendered a Notice under the Ontario Evidence Act together with an Affidavit of Service sworn on January 30, 2013 indicating that the Notice had been mailed to the defendant at his home address of 102 Mimico Avenue, Toronto by pre-paid first class mail on January 29, 2013. The Notice advised the defendant that certain documents would be tendered by the prosecution in support of its case during the trial. That Notice was entered into evidence, and marked Exhibit #1. 21. Fire Prevention Inspector Wendy Rome testified that she has been employed as such by the City of Toronto for 21 years. A

summary of her evidence follows. 22. The defendant, Walter Melnyk, is the registered owner of a residential property located at 596 Runnymede Road in Toronto (“the Runnymede Property”). It is a two story building with four residential units; two on each floor. The prosecutor tendered a certified document from the Ministry of Government Services under the Registry Act/Land Titles Act with an attached certified copy of the Transfer/Deed of Land indicating that on May 3 rd 2002, Walter Melnyk purchased the property and thus became the registered owner thereof.

This document was accepted into evidence and marked Exhibit #2. 23. On November 12 th 2008, she responded to a report in regard to an emergency incident which had occurred on October 30 th 2008 at the Runnymede Property. The report indicated that a pot had been left unattended on the stove of one of the units at the Runnymede Property, and that smoke was emanating from the unit. 24. Inspector Rome attended the Runnymede Property, gaining access through the side door, and found the following:

a) No smoke alarms sounded in the entire building.

b) On the first (ground) floor she found that there were excessive combustible items in the foyer and on the stairwell leading up to the second floor, which is shared by three units, the fourth having a separate entrance; these items included wooden shelves, cardboard boxes, construction material and sheets of wood against the wall, all of which are prohibited under the Fire Code .

c) She could not access unit 1-1 but she was able to see into unit 1-2 which was the unit where the pot had been left unattended on the stove leading to the emergency fire call; she was not permitted to enter the unit because of the smoke damage.

d) On the upper floor, unit 2-1 did have a smoke alarm, although unit 2-2 did not have one at all – only a bracket where the smoke alarm should have been.

e) The smoke alarms in the common areas on each floor are required to be interconnected with pole stations so that all the smoke alarms will activate if there is smoke anywhere in the building. However, the smoke alarm on the first (ground) floor where people will exit in the event of a fire was shut off. There was scotch tape holding it in the closed position.

f) There is a fire exit in the common hallway on each floor. The interconnected smoke alarm systems are required to be tested annually. There were no tags or test records which are required to be posted by law. Therefore, there was no visible evidence that the testing had been done at all. 25. The tenant in unit 2-2 gave the inspector the name and telephone number of the owner of the building. 26. On November 13, 2008, she called Mr. Melnyk and explained the violations in relation to the building, and asked him to ensure that all violations were rectified. 27.

On November 13, 2008, she prepared a Notice of Violation setting out the details of the violations under the Fire Protection and Prevention Act, and mailed it to Mr. Melnyk at 596 Runnymede Road, Toronto as well as to his home address: 102 Mimico Avenue,

Toronto and to 93 Coe Hill Drive, Unit 203, Toronto because the “Tax System” indicated that the defendant resides at all three addresses. A copy of the Notice of Violation was tendered and accepted into evidence, marked Exhibit #3. 28. Inspector Rome did not receive any response or other communication from the defendant after serving the Notice of Violation. 29. Consequently, on January 30, 2009, an Information was sworn charging the defendant with five offences pursuant to the Fire Protection and Prevention Act. On the same day, a Justice of the Peace issued a summons against Mr. Walter Melnyk under

section 24 of the Provincial Offences Act, requiring him to appear in the Provincial Offences Court on March 26, 2009, which he did. 30. Between March 2009 and November 2013, despite the exchange of a multitude of email correspondence between the Inspector and the defendant and his counsel, in an effort by the Inspector to arrange for a re-inspection of the Runnymede Property, the defendant perpetually indicated his unavailability to attend, on some occasions, ostensibly for medical reasons. 31.

Eventually, on October 29, 2013, defence counsel agreed that he and the defendant would meet with the Inspector at the Runnymede Property on November 6, 2013 at 3:00 pm, and that the Inspector would be given access to the entire building including the four residential units. On November 6, counsel attended but informed the Inspector that the defendant was unable to attend because of medical issues. On that occasion, the Inspector was only given access to the foyers and unit 1-2 in which the fire alarm had started. There were still no visible records that the interconnected smoke alarms had been tested. 32.

During the court appearance on December 5, 2014, the Inspector asked the prosecutor to arrange for her to re-inspect the Runnymede Property. On December 17, 2014 she re-inspected the property, and the following occurred:

a) The smoke alarm in unit 1-1 was working properly;

b) She could not gain access to the other three units;

c) There was a somewhat cryptic note on the entrance door to the building, which read: Dear Residents, Fire Inspector W. Rome will again inspect your unit on Tuesday June 23 at 2:00 pm. Thank you. W.M. 33. The Inspector had no way of knowing when that note was posted and what year on June 23rd the inspection was scheduled to be done. 34.

During a further inspection sometime after December 17, 2014, although the defendant did not attend, the Inspector found that: • The fire extinguishers appeared to be in order; • There were still deficiencies in relation to the interconnected smoke alarms, which appeared to have been tested, but the smoke alarm on the first floor was not connected to the smoke alarm on the second floor, which would cause the smoke alarms not to operate properly. • There were still combustible materials in the common areas, although less than previously; • The smoke alarms in the units began to work only after she herself had reconnected one and replaced the batteries in two. • When she attended the property on March 1st 2016 there were still no posted records in regard to the testing of the interconnected smoke alarms in the common areas. 35.

After December 17, 2014 she tried unsuccessfully to inform the defendant of the remaining deficiencies. On February 23, 2016 she sent a letter to the defendant informing him that she would be attending the property for an inspection on March 1, 2016 at 4:00 pm, less than 48 hours prior to the trial. On March 1, 2016 she received a fax, dated February 29, 2016, from the defendant, advising that he could not attend on March 1 st but would make himself available to attend on March 4, 2016, that is, a day after the scheduled trial date. 36.

On March 2 nd , the day before the trial, she contacted the defendant and asked him to bring a copy of the annual testing records for the interconnected smoke alarms to court on March 3rd. He did not provide those records prior to the commencement of the proceedings. 37. As a result of her most recent inspections, it is evident that the defendant is still not in compliance with the Fire Code legislation, and that there has been a total lack of co-operation on the part of the defendant. G. THE LAW 38.

The unduly excessive period of time that this case has taken to move through the provincial offences judicial system is extremely worrisome. Even if I separate the entire case into two parts, namely the pre-appeal segment and the post appeal segment, each segment took an extraordinarily long time, particularly for a case that is in and of itself not the most complex and difficult of Fire Code Violation trials. In this regard, I cannot do better than refer to the following pertinent dictum by Montgomery J. in R. v. Golden, [1985] O.J. No. 2006 :

“The intent of the Provincial Offences Act has always been to establish a speedy, efficient and convenient method of dealing withprovincial offences. We’re not here to trap somebody or to deal with the matter on a procedural technicality that amounts to nothingmore than petty foggery. The purpose of the Act is ‘Let’s forget about the nonsense and get down to the meat of the case, and have adecision made on the merits.’ That’s what the P.O.A. is all about.” 39. I am satisfied that the offences in this case are strict liability offences. Consequently, according to the Supreme Court of Canada inR.v. Sault Ste.

Marie (City) (SCC), [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299, the onus is on the prosecution to prove the elements of theoffences beyond a reasonable doubt. If the prosecution succeeds in so doing, the onus shifts to the defendant, in order to avoidconviction, to prove on a balance of probabilities that he acted with due diligence or that he was under a mistaken belief of fact which iftrue would render his actions lawful. 40. I found that the evidence of Inspector Rome was detailed, cogent and compelling in relation to all the charges.

I am satisfied that shemade every reasonable effort and took all reasonable steps to inspect the Runnymede Property on numerous occasions over the years andthat she gave the defendant more than sufficient opportunities to rectify the deficiencies and to cure the violations under the Fire Codelegislation.

Section 1.2.1 of the Fire Code, Ontario Regulation 213/07, made under the Fire Protection and Prevention Act, 1997 (“the Act”)provides that – Unless otherwise specified, the owner is responsible for carrying out the provisions of this Code.

Section 1.1.2.1 (1) of the Code provides that – If this Code requires tests and corrective measures or operational proceedings to be carried out, records shall be madeand the original or a copy shall be retained at the building premises for examination by the Chief Fire Official.

Section 6.3.2.6 (2) of the Code provides that – Interconnected smoke alarms shall be tested and maintained in operating condition in conformance with CAN/ULC-S552,“Standard for Maintenance and Testing of Smoke Alarms”, and as required by this Article.

Section 2.4.1.1 (2) of the Code provides that – Combustible materials, other than those for which the location, room or space is designed, shall not be permitted to accumulatein any part of an elevator shaft, ventilation shaft, means of egress, service room or service space.

Section 9.5.4.5. (1) of the Code provides that – Smoke alarms shall be installed in each dwelling unit and in each sleeping room not within a dwelling unit in accordancewith

Article 3.2.4.21 of the 1990 Building Code. 46. Based on the totality of all the evidence presented by the prosecutor, I find that the prosecution has proven the elements of all fourcharges beyond a reasonable doubt. In the deliberate absence of the defendant, the court has no evidence to challenge and/or contradictthe evidence of the prosecution. H. DISPOSITION 47. For these reasons I found the defendant guilty of all four offences. I. NOTICE OF MOTION 48. On May 16, 2016 the defendant filed a Notice of Motion.

The Notice reads that an application will be made by the defendant on May30, 2016 “in the following matter”: “June 7th 9am ‘W8’ fire code charges (5 counts) at 596 Runnymede Rd. case # 4862999092101378600” for an Order as follows: “withdrawal of all charges, or dismissal of all, and stay proceedings.” 49. On May 30, 2016, the defendant appeared before me with respect to his motion. I explained to the defendant that having convictedhim on March 3, 2016, I am functus officio, and accordingly, I would not hear any submissions with respect to the trial. The motion wasdenied.

50. However, I informed Mr. Melnyk that although I had heard the submissions of the prosecutor with respect to sentence, I had reserved the passing of sentence until June 7, 2016. On May 30, 2016 I informed the defendant that he was entitled to make submissions on penalty, and I offered to advise him of what the prosecutor had submitted in regard to sentencing. I then read my detailed considerations on penalty, which included the possibility of incarceration for up to one year in addition to or in place of the fines. Mr.

Melnyk said that he would prefer to go to jail than pay the fines to which I responded that the prosecutor had not requested incarceration, and that I would not impose incarceration. 51. The defendant stated that he did not want to make submissions on sentence on that day. Accordingly, I invited him to do so on June 7, 2016 if he wished to do so. Furthermore, I told him that after reading my reasons and imposing sentence, I would provide a copy of my reasons to him and to the prosecutor. I then adjourned the matter to June 7, 2016. J. SENTENCING 52.

Prior to imposing sentence today, I again invited the defendant to make submissions on sentence, which he said he did not want to do. 53. The very purpose of the legislation under the Act is set out succinctly in

Part VI,

section 18.1 which states as follows: For the purposes of this Part, fire safety includes safety from the risk that a fire, if started would seriously endanger the health and safety of any person or the quality of the natural environment for any use that can be made of it. 54. It is noteworthy that the Act provides under section 19(2) that – An Inspector may, without a warrant, enter and inspect land and premises for the purposes of assessing fire safety. 55. And section 19(3) confers on an inspector the power to exercise the right to enter and inspect land and premises without a warrant at all reasonable times. 56. Under

section 20 a Justice of the Peace is vested with the jurisdiction in appropriate circumstances, to issue a warrant authorizing an inspector named in the warrant to enter on lands or premises and exercise any of the powers referred to in subsection 19(6) in order to assess fire safety. 57. I note that notwithstanding these powers given to inspectors under the Act , Inspector Rome exerted extreme patience by endeavouring to have the deficiencies rectified without resorting to the exercise of any of such powers.

In my view, over a period of years, she used her best efforts to try and ensure that the deficiencies were rectified for the welfare and safety of the tenants, the building and the surrounding areas. 58. In considering the appropriate penalties, the court is governed by the penalty range provided for in the legislation concerned, as well as by the principles of sentencing, namely: denunciation, protection of the public as well as specific and general deterrence. 59.

Section 28(3) of the Act provides that a person who has been convicted of an offence such as those in the case at bar, is subject to a maximum fine of $20,000.00 for each offence or, depending on the precise

section under which the person was convicted, a maximum fine of $50,000.00 for each offence, and in both cases, a period of imprisonment of not more than one year or to both the fine and imprisonment. 60. In essence, the penalties must express the court’s denunciation of the attitude, the behaviour and the actions of the defendant. They must also be significant enough to serve as a clear message to the defendant himself and to the community at large so as to deter them from similar behaviour in the future. 61.

I find that the aggravating factors are as follows: • Having regard to the extensive history of this case, the defendant has made major efforts to obfuscate the proceedings so as to delay and avoid the trial.

Most of the adjournments were granted at his request, despite prior court orders that it was peremptory on the defendant to proceed. • At the commencement of these proceedings before me, the defendant refused to accept this court’s ruling in denying his application for an adjournment; he showed a total lack of respect towards the court and indeed the administration of justice, by abruptly storming out of the court, and refusing to participate in the trial. • The decision to grant or deny a request for an adjournment is a question of law, made by the presiding justice in considering the particular circumstances of each case. • The defendant did not respond in any way whatsoever to the Notice of Violation served on him as a courtesy by the Fire Department, thereby affording him the opportunity to rectify the problems at an early stage of the proceedings prior to any legal action being instituted against him.

• By failing or refusing to rectify the deficiencies effectively for such a lengthy period of time, the defendant exhibited a serious lack of effort to minimize the potential harm to his tenants and to others in and around the property as well as to the property of his tenants and others in the vicinity. • Such behaviour is a reflection of the defendant’s blatant disregard for his obligations under the law and for the safety of the public. 62. The only mitigating factor that I find is that according to Inspector Rome the defendant made some, albeit minimal attempt to rectify some of the deficiencies. 63.

It is rare that a court will impose a sentence higher or more severe than that proposed by the prosecution, and I do not intend to do so. However, in an effort to drive home the principle of deterrence, I will make reference to certain provisions of the legislation which could be invoked in the event of any further violation by the defendant of his obligations under the Fire Code .

Section 31 sets out the circumstances under which, upon a person’s being convicted of specified offences under the Act , without notice to the convicted person, the Ontario Court of Justice may order that, in the interest of public safety – The Fire Marshal, assistant to the Fire Marshal or fire chief may:

a) Close access to, or remove, the building, structure or premises to which the order relates; or

b) Remove or remove and dispose of any substance, material or thing from the building, structure or premises. 65. In my view, the defendant has shown an unwillingness to comply with the legislation and a total lack of cooperation so much so that even at this time, the court is unsure whether he is now in compliance with the Fire Code or not. 66. Having due regard to the foregoing factors and findings, I nevertheless defer to the submissions of the prosecutor, and impose the following fines upon the defendant: Count 1 – $2000.00 Count 2 – $7000.00 Count 3 - $4000.00 Count 5 - $5000.00. 67.

My refusal to grant the defendant’s request for an adjournment triggered an outbreak of insultive comments by the defendant towards Inspector Rome including allegations that she had committed perjury. In addition, the defendant berated the judge who had allowed his appeal and ordered a new trial, alleging that the judge erred by failing to take into consideration the defendant’s grounds of appeal. 68. Although I strongly condemn such behaviour, I did not place any weight thereon in determining the appropriate punishment.

However, in light of the long list of aggravating factors, I did contemplate imposing a period of incarceration as well. But since the prosecutor did not provide me with a record of any previous convictions for similar offences, I declined to order imprisonment in addition to the fines. 69. At this time I asked Mr. Melnyk how much time he would need to pay these fines. He did not respond other than to say that he planned to appeal. I invited him to give evidence with respect to his financial situation and his ability to pay the fines.

Under oath in the witness box, he informed the court, inter alia, that he owned the Runnymede Property on which he had two mortgages totalling about $250,000.00, and the although that property was likely worth $500,000.00 or $750,000.00 if sold, he would probably not be able to sell it, for reasons which were not clear to me. The monthly rental from the three units which he now rents in the Runnymede Property amounts to about $2,390.00. The fourth unit is used for storage. 70. Mr. Melnyk testified that he resides at 102 Mimico Avenue, Toronto, which he owns.

He has two mortgages on that property amounting to a total of $250,000.00, and if sold, could yield about $500,000.00. He is not employed, and does not financially support anyone other than providing some minimal assistance to his 90-year-old mother who lives by herself in a home which she owns. 71. I ordered that Mr. Melnyk would have 6 months within which to pay the fines that I imposed, amounting to a total of $18,000.00. 72. I express my gratitude to the provincial prosecutor, Counsel E. Luca, for the excellent manner in which she presented the prosecution`s case to the court. P. Kowarsky J.P.