2013 QCCA 1487, 2013 QCCA 1487

Qureshi c. Polygon Fire Protection Inc. 2013 QCCA 1487 COURT OF APPEAL CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC REGISTRY OF MONTREAL N o : 500-09-023576-135 (500-11-029289-069) MINUTES OF THE HEARING DATE: August 28, 2013 THE HONOURABLE MADAM JUSTICE MARIE ST-PIERRE, J.A. PETITIONER ATTORNEY ABID QURESHI In person RESPONDENT ATTORNEY POLYGON FIRE PROTECTION INC. Mtre Jolaine Charbonneau MARCEAU AVOCATS INC. RESPONDENT ATTORNEY NEW HORIZON INTERNATIONAL INC. Mtre Elie Chahwan

Amended MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT RENDERED ON MAY 3 RD , 2013 BY THE HONOURABLE CLAUDINE ROY OF THE SUPERIOR COURT, DISTRICT OF MONTREAL (Art. 26, 494 & 199 C.C.P. ) Clerk: Asma Berrak Court Room: RC.18 HEARING 17 h 54: Beginning of the hearing. Identification of the parties. 17 h 54: Discussion between the judge, Mr. Qureshi and Mtre Chahwan. 17 h 58: Submission by Mr.

Qureshi. 18 h 12: Submission by Mtre Charbonneau. 18 h 13: Mtre Charbonneau files a substitution of attorney (not contested by the other parties). 18 h 21: Suspension of the hearing 18 h 28: Resumption of the hearing. 18 h 28: Reply by Mr. Qureshi. 18 h 35: Suspension of the hearing 19 h 00: Resumption of the hearing. 19 h 00: Judgment - see page 3. 19 h 09: Conclusion of the hearing. Asma Berrak Clerk JUDGMENT

[ 1 ] I am seized of a motion for permission to appeal a judgment rendered by the Superior Court, District of Montreal (Honourable Claudine Roy) on May 3 rd , 2013. The conclusions read as follows : DISMISSES Mr. Qureshi’s “amended motion for garnishee’s erroneous declaration and inscription for judgment"; With costs; GRANTS Polygon’s motion to obtain a discharge from the seizure; With costs. [ 2 ] To decide if a permission can be granted, I have to apply

article 26, second paragraph (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure which reads as follows : 26. (…) An appeal also lies, with leave of a judge of the Court of Appeal, when the matter at issue is one which ought to be submitted to the Court of Appeal, particularly where, in the opinion of the judge, the matter at issue is a question of principle, a new issue or a question of law that has given rise to conflicting judicial precedents, (…) (3) from any judgment or order rendered in matters concerning execution; 26. (…) Peuvent aussi faire l'objet d'un appel, sur permission d'un juge de la Cour d'appel, lorsque la question en jeu en est une qui devrait être soumise à la Cour d'appel, ce qui est notamment le cas s'il est d'avis qu'une question de principe, une question nouvelle ou une question de droit faisant l'objet d'une jurisprudence contradictoire est en jeu: (…) (3) les jugements ou ordonnances rendus en matière d'exécution; [ 3 ] To succeed (to obtain a permission to appeal), the applicant has therefore the burden to establish that the matter raises an issue that ought to be submitted to the Court. [ 4 ] He can do so by demonstrating, namely, that the matter at issue is a question of principle, a new issue or a question of law that has given rise to conflicting judicial precedents.

Raising a mere error that would have been committed by the first judge is not sufficient ( Société en commandite Les bois de Pierrefonds c. Domaine de parc Cloverdale , 2007 QCCA 292 ; Grimard c. Boucher , 2011 QCCA 1285 , paragraphe 7 ; Allali c. Pilon , 2008 QCCA 158 ; Lamontagne c. Rheault , 2009 QCCA 684 ; Crédit Ford du Canada ltée c. Industrielle Alliance Pacifique , 2009 QCCA 755 ; Chhuon c. Société des casinos du Québec inc. , 2010 QCCA 221 ; Celliers Rosyma inc. c. Urgel Charrette Transport inc. , 2010 QCCA 1822 ; Brouillette c. Déom , 2011 QCCA 100 ; Re/Max Action (1992) inc. c.

Dagan , 2011 QCCA 311 ). [ 5 ] The applicant has failed to discharge this burden (there is neither a matter of principle nor a new issue, nor a question of law giving rise to conflicting judicial precedents).

Moreover, in my opinion, an appeal would have no reasonable chance of success. [ 6 ] I was remitted the entire transcript of the audition that took place before Madame Justice Claudine Roy and I read it : I was able to confirm that Madame Justice Roy told the applicant, on numerous occasions, that proof was required and that none was made. [ 7 ] On the topic of the delay (10 days), the judge did recognize that it was not peremptory (in paragraph 8 of her judgment): [ 8 ] The 10-day delay is not peremptory and a party may request an extension of the delay from the Court, but the party must give valid and sufficient reasons for not having acted earlier. [8] At paragraph 9, Justice Claudine Roy wrote : [ 9 ] In his motion, Mr.

Qureshi alleges that he was misled by the bad faith of Polygon and their lawyers. However, he made no such proof at the hearing. The exchanges of letters between the attorneys do not show any intention to extend the 10-day limit, nor bad faith. [9] Moreover, the fact that the contestation would not have been filed on time is not the only reason why the judge came to the conclusion that she had to dismiss the motion.

As can be seen from the content of paragraphs 11 to 17 of her judgment, she also considered the motion and came to the conclusion that it was ill-founded. [11] Furthermore, the motion itself is ill-founded. Mr. Qureshi provided no evidence to show that Polygon made a false declaration. [12] In argument, he contends that Polygon was in possession of the car. He argued the bad faith of Polygon and its lawyers and that Polygon had possession of the car, even if it did not have the keys, because the car was parked in a fenced-in parking lot. [13] However, he presented no evidence to prove his arguments. [14] Mr.

Qureshi chose to represent himself, and although his former attorney was in the courtroom during the hearing, Mr. Qureshi chose not to introduce evidence. [15] Polygon’s representative was present at the hearing. The Court specifically asked Mr. Qureshi if he wanted to examine him and Mr. Qureshi chose not to. [16] The evidence shows that a car belonging to Mr. Abdin was at one time on Polygon’s premises, but the Court has no evidence

which would lead it to the conclusion that Polygon had “possession” within the meaning of

Section 635 C.C.P. Polygon did not have the keys to the car. Mr. Abdin’s son took his father’s car before March 25. [17] There is no evidence that Polygon made a false declaration. (Reference omitted) [ 10 ] I see no error in the above. [ 11 ] Therefore, I make mine the content of the following paragraphs of a judgment rendered by my colleague Madam Justice Marie- France Bich in Chhuon c . Société des casinos du Québec inc. , 2010 QCCA 221 (applicable with the appropriate adaptations being made) . [8] L'affaire porte sur un enjeu d'une valeur inférieure à 50 000 $ et se rattache au rejet d'une action jugée abusive.

L'article 26, second alinéa, paragr. 4.1 et 5, C.p.c. prévoit que l'appel n'est alors pas de plein droit, mais qu'il requiert une permission, laquelle ne saurait bien sûr être accordée chaque fois qu'elle est demandée, ce qui dénaturerait la volonté d’un législateur qui a voulu, dans un souci d'efficacité et de proportionnalité, limiter les pourvois.

Aux termes de l'article 26 C.p.c. , la permission ne sera donc accordée que lorsque la question soulevée « doit être soumise à la Cour », et notamment lorsqu'il s'agit d'une question de principe ou d'une question de droit nouvelle ou controversée ou encore d'une question ayant une portée générale. Ainsi que le rappelle le juge Rochon dans Syndicat des cols bleus regroupés de Montréal,

section locale 301 c. Montréal (Ville de) : [9] Règle générale [renvoi omis], les juges accordent la permission d'appeler si la question est d'intérêt général, soit essentiellement une question de principe, une question nouvelle ou une question de droit faisant l'objet d'une jurisprudence contradictoire. Cette règle avait été énoncée de façon lapidaire par le juge Vallerand dans 2636-5205 Québec inc. c.

Beaudry : …Il m'apparaît dès lors parfaitement admissible que la permission d'appeler en application de l'article 26 paragraphe 4 soit destinée à servir l'élaboration du droit et non pas le justiciable dont l'appel met en cause des intérêts, par définition, relativement minimes, ce pourquoi du reste le jugement qui en dispose est en principe un jugement définitif. [renvoi omis] [9] Ce n'est pas dire que l'appel ne puisse être autorisé que dans ces cas précis, mais le requérant doit alors démontrer que sa cause présente un intérêt spécifique, par exemple parce qu'il s'agit de remédier à un jugement comportant une faille majeure et engendrant une importante injustice.

Ce fardeau est lourd, particulièrement lorsque l'appel porte sur des questions de fait, considérant par ailleurs la norme d'intervention très stricte de la Cour d'appel en ces matières. [10] Enfin, au stade de la permission, dans le cadre de l'article 26 autant que celui de l'article 29 C.p.c. , le juge de la Cour doit s'assurer que l'appel a des chances raisonnables de succès, sans quoi il ne saurait être autorisé. […] [21] Même en postulant l’intérêt de cette question (qui ne paraît pas avoir été soumise à la juge de première instance), il ne convient pas de la soumettre à la Cour puisqu’elle se pose ici dans le contexte d'une affaire qui, en réalité, n'est pas de portée générale ou de principe et vise des faits strictement particuliers. [22] En somme, aucun des moyens d'appel du requérant ne répond aux conditions de l'article 26, second alinéa, C.p.c. , tel qu'interprété par la jurisprudence.

Le requérant n'ayant par ailleurs pas établi que le jugement était entaché d'une faiblesse importante et que son appel avait une chance raisonnable de succès en appel, il n'y aura pas lieu d'accueillir sa requête. (References omitted) [ 12 ] Finally, counsel for the respondent has confirmed not insisting for costs if the permission to appeal was not granted. THEREFORE, THE UNDERSIGNED : [ 13 ] DISMISSES the motion for permission to appeal, but without costs. MARIE ST-PIERRE, J.A.