2012 QCCA 1176, 2012 QCCA 1176

Liu c. McGill University Non-Academic Certified Association (MUNACA) 2012 QCCA 1176 COURT OF APPEAL CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC REGISTRY OF MONTREAL No: 500-09-022612-121 ( 500-17-064032-116 ) MINUTES OF THE HEARING DATE: June 22, 2012 THE HONOURABLE CLÉMENT GASCON, J.A. PETITIONER ATTORNEY JISHENG LIU In person RESPONDENT ATTORNEY McGILL UNIVERSITY NON-ACADEMIC CERTIFIED ASSOCIATION (MUNACA) Me Marie-Claude St-Amant MELANÇON MARCEAU GRENIER & SCIORTINO MIS EN CAUSE ATTORNEY McGILL UNIVERSITY COMMISSION DES RELATIONS DU TRAVAIL Me Rachel Solyom McCARTHY TETRAULT

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT RENDERED ON MARCH 30, 2012, BY THE HON. GERARD DUGRE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT DISTRICT OF MONTREAL Clerk: Annick Nguyen Court Room: RC.18 HEARING 9:30 Commencement of the hearing. 9:31 Submission by Mr. Liu. 10:06 Submission by Mtre St-Amant. 10:17 Reply by Mr. Liu. 10:23 Suspension. 10:37 Resumption of the hearing. BY THE JUDGE. Judgment – See page 3. Annick Nguyen Clerk JUDGMENT [ 1 ] Mr Jisheng Liu presents a Motion for Leave to Appeal an Interlocutory Judgment rendered by Justice Gérard Dugré of the Superior Court, district of Montreal, on March 30, 2012.

By this judgment filed as Exhibit R-1 to the Motion, Dugré J. dismissed without costs Mr Liu's verbal motion for recusation. [ 2 ] I consider that the Motion for Leave to Appeal must be dismissed since it fails to meet the applicable criteria of Articles 29 and 511 C.C.P. [ 3 ] On the one hand, the interlocutory judgment in question was rendered at the beginning of the hearing on Mr Liu's motion for judicial review. As such, it was thus rendered during the trial on the merits of the case at issue. Pursuant to Article 29 (2) C.C.P., no immediate appeal lies from such an interlocutory judgment.

This ruling can normally only be put in question on appeal from the final judgment on the merits of the motion for judicial review. [ 4 ] On the other hand, even if the interlocutory judgment at issue was to be considered as not rendered during the trial, Mr Liu does not convince me that his Motion meets the conditions set forth in Articles 29 (1) and 511 C.C.P. Even if he could argue that the refusal of

the judge to recuse himself could not be remedied by final judgment, this is not a matter where the pursuit of justice requires that leave be granted. [ 5 ] In his judgment, Dugré J. carefully analyzed all the grounds of recusation raised. [ 6 ] He rightfully concluded that the mere fact that Mr Liu appealed one of his prior judgments is not a ground for recusation. The case law is clear in that regard. [ 7 ] He correctly added that the judge's own referral to case law for comments by both parties during a prior hearing was neither a ground for recusation in and of itself.

Again, this is common practice for judges to do so and to raise questions with counsel or the parties on the issues relevant to the matter at hand. [ 8 ] Dugré J. properly stated further that the mere presentation by Mr Liu of a verbal motion in recusation was no more a valid ground for recusation. In fact, to rule otherwise would deprive the applicable articles of the C.C.P. on recusation of any meaning. [ 9 ] Finally, the trial judge correctly applied the Supreme Court test enunciated in Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada , 2003 SCC 45 , on the issue of alleged bias raised by Mr Liu.

Dugré J. opined that the grounds for recusation submitted could not show an apprehension of bias for an informed person viewing the matter realistically and practically and having thought the matter through. I fully agree. [ 10 ] In short, given the state of the record and the applicable case law, I am of the view that Mr Liu has no reasonable chance of convincing the Court to conclude any different than the trial judge. FOR THESE REASONS: [ 11 ] The motion for leave to appeal is DISMISSED , with costs. CLÉMENT GASCON, J.A.