Jared Gossen - v. -, 2018 SKPC 40

IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF SASKATCHEWAN CIVIL DIVISION Citation: 2018 SKPC 040 Date: July 31, 2018 File: 608 of 2017 Location: Saskatoon _____________________________________________________________________________ Between: Jared Gossen - and - Ashlyn Weninger Self -represented For the Plaintiff Self -represented For the Defendant _____________________________________________________________________________ JUDGMENT R.D. JACKSON , J _____________________________________________________________________________ I INTRODUCTION [ 1 ] The plaintiff claims for two sums outstanding from the defendant, an $1,800.00 cash loan and an unauthorized Visa charge

of $629.25. [ 2 ] The defendant denies that the $1,800.00 loan was advanced and states that the Visa transaction was authorized and that, in any event, the Visa charge was reversed such that the plaintiff has no claim. Further, she maintains that the plaintiff is statute barred from pursuing any indebtedness against her by virtue of The Limitations Act . [1] [ 3 ] The plaintiff and his wife, Crystal Carlson, testified on behalf of the plaintiff.

The defendant and Edith Murdoch, proprietor of Kazeema Hair Designs where the Visa transaction occurred, gave evidence on behalf of the defendant. [ 4 ] The parties are former common-law spouses. The debt allegations arise from events which occurred post-cohabitation. Evidence regarding these circumstances was, to say the least, diametrically opposed. Given such divergent positions on the facts, both parties were suitably cautioned at the outset regarding the solemnity of providing sworn evidence.

Such cautions aside, both were anxious to proceed. [ 5 ] Within the confines of the broader picture, many issues emerged for determination primarily focusing on credibility as to what transpired between the parties. The back and forth narrative was punctuated with attacks on character, allegations of fabrication and surprising admissions, the upshot of which, as will become apparent, resembled a hyperbolic manuscript which likely would have been rejected for its implausibility.

II BACKGROUND [ 6 ] The parties cohabited for an approximate two year period which terminated in October 2014, evidenced by a Separation Agreement executed between the parties. The defendant however, continued to reside in the home with the plaintiff until mid-December 2014 for financial reasons. [ 7 ] By virtue of the Separation Agreement, the defendant received a $12,000.00 cash settlement from the plaintiff as her share of the equity of their property.

To determine her payout, the residence was professionally appraised by one Kristene Johnson. [ 8 ] The defendant learned shortly after the settlement was completed however, that the plaintiff was having a sexual affair at this time with the appraiser which, understandably, assailed the credibility of her findings. Although it does not appear that any monetary adjustment was sought, the defendant did report this individual to the Appraisal Institute of Canada. Following a hearing, the Institute found the allegations to have been proven and she was sanctioned accordingly.

In the overall scope of the trial, this evidence was admitted for its marginal relevance to assess overall credibility of the parties including motive to fabricate. [ 9 ] Notwithstanding this somewhat alarming turn of events, the defendant freely admitted to continuing an ongoing intimate relationship with the plaintiff over the next half year after leaving their shared residence.

She testified that this consisted of several encounters a month both at the plaintiff’s residence as well as her new place which “petered out” toward the end of May, beginning of June 2015, coinciding with the plaintiff starting a new relationship. [ 10 ] It was during this period that the plaintiff alleges that he advanced the sum of $1,800.00 cash to the defendant, at her request, to help her with the purchase of her new condo from Jastek Homes, for whom she worked. Details of this arrangement, he stated, were agreed to on March 19, 2015 at the defendant’s new residence.

The loan was to be repaid when the defendant received her income tax refund in the spring. [ 11 ] To corroborate this transaction, the plaintiff produced a handwritten agreement dated March 19, 2015 purportedly signed by both parties, marked as Exhibit P-1.

[ 12 ] Further, he tendered bank records evidencing an e-transfer from his account in the amount of $1,800.00 dated the next day, March 20, 2015. The plaintiff testified that this was to the account of the defendant.

However, he was denied confirmation of this information from his bank for privacy reasons. [ 13 ] For her part, the defendant flatly denied that the $1,800.00 loan was made citing that the “agreement” was a forgery done either by the plaintiff or his wife. [ 14 ] When asked by the Court to compare the signature on Exhibit P-1 to her signature on Exhibit P-5 (discussed later), which she acknowledged was her signature, she admitted they appeared identical but was adamant that nonetheless she did not sign the loan agreement. [ 15 ] She further denied that the $1,800.00 e-transfer from the plaintiff’s account went to her although she had no bank records to corroborate this.

She stated she would have had the records but that she did not receive these documents from the plaintiff to allow her to prepare. When the Court pointed out that the documents were actually part of his package disclosed on his Document List and purported to have been served on her, she was still of the view that she had never received them. [ 16 ] She testified that her tax refund would not have been available in any event as same was subject to garnishment proceedings due to outstanding student loans.

She testified this could be verified by her records but once again, these had never been disclosed or produced. [ 17 ] Regarding repayment of the $1,800.00 loan, the plaintiff made repeated inquiries about the tax refund beginning in late spring. However, no information was forthcoming from the defendant. [ 18 ] At some point in July, meanwhile, the plaintiff discovered an entry on his Visa for $629.25 payable to Kazeema Hair Designs.

He was aware this was charged by the defendant but he had not authorized it so he contacted his credit card company to reverse this transaction. [ 19 ] Before this could be effected, he talked to the defendant who assured him that this expense for a hair piece was covered through medical insurance and that reimbursement would be forthcoming shortly. [ 20 ] Accordingly, he contacted his credit card company and cancelled the investigation. [ 21 ] Apparently, however, according to the defendant, the damage had been done as she was advised by Edith Murdoch at Kazeema Hair Designs that the Visa payment had been reversed out of the business account.

This was especially upsetting to her since she maintained the payment had been agreed to by the plaintiff at the time and in fact, it was he who called in the Visa number to Kazeema to authorize payment. [ 22 ] Edith Murdoch, in her evidence, corroborated that she had been advised by her receptionist that a male individual had indeed called in the Visa number for payment. Ms. Murdoch was familiar with the plaintiff and knew him as the boyfriend of the defendant. Accordingly, she assumed it was he who placed the call.

She also confirmed that the transaction had been reversed such that the defendant was required to make payment, which she did. The Court found, refreshingly, that Ms. Murdoch was a reliable witness who provided straightforward credible testimony. [ 23 ] The plaintiff denied he called in his Visa number for payment and to this day, he has not been credited back on his card for the $629.25 originally charged. [ 24 ] Returning to the narrative, matters continued to escalate between the protagonists during the month of July 2015. The

plaintiff continued to press for repayment of his $1,800.00 loan and the reimbursement from the defendant’s health insurance for the Visa payment. [ 25 ] Finally, at some point in July, the plaintiff was told he would not be receiving repayment of the loan monies, as evidenced by the following exchange with the Court: Transcript page 15, lines 20 - 34 Q So you were making -- you were making inquiries, but -- A Oh, constant, yes. Q -- and not getting any information. What -- what was -- A No. Q -- were you getting back for information? A Just basically -- Q What -- what was the defendant telling you?

A That -- at first, that she hadn ’ t got it yet. And then after that, it turned into basically I wasn ’ t going to be getting it. Q When did she start telling you that? A I believe that was sometime in July. [ 26 ] Then on July 31, 2015

an act of vandalism took place at the cottage owned by the defendant’s parents at Emerald Lake. The plaintiff was among a small group caught on security video as the perpetrators. The defendant immediately texted the plaintiff informing him of this fact and that criminal charges would be laid. This is the last communication she had with the plaintiff, she testified. [ 27 ] The plaintiff denied causing any damage but admitted that he had been present and been unable to prevent the others from doing so.

The plaintiff was subsequently charged, resolving to take the blame personally as he did not wish to involve the others. [ 28 ] Coincident in time to this around the end of July or beginning of August, the plaintiff in fact did receive a reimbursement cheque from Blue Cross insurance in the amount of $492.50 for the hair piece expenditure.

Although not for the entire amount, the plaintiff did not wish to pursue it any further so went directly over to the defendant at her condo for endorsement as the cheque was made payable to her. [ 29 ] His girlfriend (now wife) Crystal, accompanied him but she stayed in the truck while he attended inside to obtain the defendant’s signature. Crystal confirmed this evidence in her testimony. She testified that the plaintiff was back in a few minutes and advised that he had been successful in obtaining the defendant’s endorsement.

He did not show her the actual cheque, however. [ 30 ] The defendant testified that no such meeting took place, emphasizing that she had no further contact with the plaintiff after the July 31 vandalism incident. Further, at no time did she ever endorse this cheque over to the plaintiff. When she received confirmation that Blue Cross had sent the cheque to the residence of the plaintiff (her old address) and that it had been negotiated, she informed them that this had to be forged as she had not signed it. Consequently, Blue Cross commenced a fraudulent transaction investigation

dishonouring the cheque resulting in the funds being taken out of the plaintiff’s account. [ 31 ] Entered into evidence by the plaintiff was the declaration to Blue Cross alleging the fraud duly executed by the defendant (Exhibit P-5 referred to paragraph 13 above). It was this document that bore suspicious familiarity to the signature on the $1,800.00 loan agreement.

As noted, the defendant nonetheless denied she had signed the loan agreement although same appeared identical to the signature on Exhibit P-5. [ 32 ] Once the monies were removed from his account, the plaintiff attempted to reinstitute the credit card investigation into the original transaction being unauthorized. However, he was advised that once cancelled by him, it could not be resurrected. [ 33 ] Concurrent with the discussions with Blue Cross, the defendant went to the police who then initiated a fraud investigation into the alleged forgery.

The plaintiff was interviewed regarding same but no charges were preferred. [ 34 ] The next year was spent dealing with the criminal charge of mischief against the plaintiff arising from the vandalism to the cottage. Ultimately, he pled guilty and received a conditional discharge and six months probation in August, 2016. Part of his probationary terms required him to pay $1,700.00 restitution to the defendant’s parents which payment was made the day following court. [ 35 ] On January 15, 2017 the plaintiff sent a demand letter to the defendant forming the subject matter of this claim.

He was advised by his legal counsel as well as his Probation Officer to wait until his six month probationary term was over in 2017 to do so. He sent the letter a few weeks early however, as he was leaving on an extended honeymoon with his new wife. III DETERMINATION $1,800.00 loan [ 36 ] On the evidence, the Court has no difficulty in determining that these monies were advanced by the plaintiff to the defendant, as claimed.

The Court is persuaded by the handwritten loan agreement purportedly signed by the defendant, which in all respects appears to match up identically with her signature on Exhibit P-5 which she admitted was hers. Further, her evidence regarding the e- transfer and receipt of court documents regarding same was less than convincing. Her answers were equivocal and evasive.

Simply put, she was not telling the truth. [ 37 ] The following excerpts from transcript between the Court and the defendant illustrate the above findings: T 57, lines 13 - 41 Q So at the time of the alleged advance by the plaintiff, $1,800, that would have been encompassed in that period, you were seeing him at that time -- A Yes. Q -- and having sexual contact? A Yes. Q Yes? A Yeah.

Q Okay. I ’ m going to show you Exhibit P-1. I want you to look at that carefully. And that ’ s been tendered in evidence as P-1 by the plaintiff. It ’ s dated March 19th, 2015. It appears to be all in one person ’ s handwriting, other than the bottom signature. Would you look at that very carefully -- A M-hm. Q -- tell me, did you write that note?

A It looks very similar to my handwriting, but I did not write this note for March -- Q When you say it ’ s very similar to your handwriting, you recognize it as being -- A I recognize it -- like, Jared and I had many loan documents such as this during our relationship. It -- he -- I always owed him money. It turned out at the end, when we went to lawyers, that he had kept a running tally of everything I owed him from when we were dating to when we were living together. If it was $2 hairspray, it was on that list. And I had never seen that before until after. Every receipt had been kept.

So my guess is this is from a past date, and he ’ s trying to use it now. T 58, line 2 - 41 Q So you had never seen -- you ’ ve never seen that document up until this court proceedings? A No. And I do not have a copy. I would think that we -- everything we did was so formal, that it would have been typed up with a date to pay it back. Another problem with it is, when receives tax money. My tax refunds are automatically recouped by this Canadian Revenue Agency to pay my student loans. So I don ’ t see that money. Q All right.

Well, I ’ m going to come back to that, but what you ’ re saying then, if I understand you, is that that document appears to be in your handwriting. It looks like your handwriting -- A Yes. Q -- is that correct? A Yes. Q But you didn ’ t -- you have no recollection of actually filling that document out or -- A No. Q -- writing that? A Because during this period, my tax refunds weren ’ t -- Q Well, I ’ ll get to the tax refunds in a moment. That does look like your handwriting. If I look, for example, at Exhibit P-5, and that ’ s the statutory declaration that you filed. A M-hm.

Q If you look at the signature on that, would you agree that those two signatures on those documents look pretty much identical? A Yes.

Q And -- A But -- Q -- you did sign the second document? A Yes. Q Not the first, that ’ s P-5? A Yes. T 59, lines 2 - 9 , lines 39 - 41, T 60, lines 1 - 40 Q And that is your signature. But you ’ re saying on P-1, even though the two signatures look identical, that that ’ s not your signature? A That ’ s right. Q And the explanation you have then, is that the plaintiff then wrote that document out, is that what you ’ re telling me? A Yes, because this wasn ’ t produced until -- until 2018 here. I ’ ve never seen it before.

Q Now, Exhibit P-3 provided by the plaintiff, Scotiabank statement of his account, shows on March 20th, there was a withdrawal. And an email money transfer to what appears to be 82586429. I want you to look at that and advise me if that has any relationship to your account. A I don ’ t think so. Q When you say you don ’ t think so, why is that? A It just doesn ’ t match the account numbers that I have. Q Where was your bank? A My bank is with RBC. Q Which branch? A Ludlow. Q Sorry? A Ludlow. Q Okay. RBC in Ludlow. And was it a -- a checking or a savings, what kind of account? A I have both. Q All right.

And you ’ ve checked those records? Do you have those records here today? A No, I don ’ t.

Q Why wouldn ’ t you -- A Like, this information wasn ’ t provided to me by the plaintiff before court today. Q This was never brought up? These documents were never filed prior? A No. Not this one. When I was served, I actually had to come down to the court clerk to get the supporting documents because they weren ’ t served to me. Q But you ’ ve never received a copy of that document prior to today? A No. Q You ’ ve never seen it? A I have this stuff I was supplied right here. Q Well, on the court file, it indicates that that was with the package of documents that ’ s been provided to the court.

A It ’ s not on my list. T 61, lines 1 - 25 Q Apart from that, it is on the document list and in the documents filed with the court. You ’ re saying you never received them? A No, I have never received them. Q You would think that would be important, if someone said they transferred $1,800 to your account, that that would be something that you would find to be significant if it never happened. Would you agree with me? A Yes, this was one of the documents that was supposed to be provided to me before today. Q Would you agree with me that that -- A Yes, I do. Q -- would be significant?

If I said I transferred $1,800 to you and you never got that, that would be something in which you would be concerned about? A Yes. Q Yes? A Yes. Q So knowing that that is the allegation made, why wouldn ’ t you produce your bank record in and around that time to verify you never received that money into your account? A He didn ’ t provide the documents, so I didn ’ t go searching for them with the exact date of when it would have happened.

$629.25 Visa payment [ 38 ] Two issues emerge concerning the Visa payment - first whether same was authorized and second, whether the defendant can be held accountable for this amount. [ 39 ] The first issue is somewhat moot in that the plaintiff testified he commenced an investigation initially because he had not authorized the payment for the hair piece.

Subsequently, however, he appears to have been mollified by the defendant to the extent of cancelling the investigation and was content to wait for reimbursement from the defendant’s health care insurance. [ 40 ] Edith Murdoch from Kazeema Hair Designs also gave credible evidence that she accepted the payment by reason of a “male individual” calling in the number.

Although the plaintiff postulated this could have been any male person because the defendant had his credit card number on the computer, this seems somewhat of an elaborate and unnecessary ruse since she could simply have provided this number herself directly. Ms. Murdoch testified she was aware that the defendant had been, or was, in a relationship with the plaintiff so would not have had any reason to question this. [ 41 ] As to the second point as to whether the plaintiff has sustained this loss at the hands of the defendant, this is more problematic. Ms.

Murdoch gave evidence that the $629.25 payment was reversed out of her business account such that she required the defendant to make the payment personally, which she did. This evidence accords with the plaintiff’s testimony that he alerted his credit card provider that the payment had not been authorized by him. As noted, Ms. Murdoch provided straightforward and credible evidence which the Court has no reason to not accept. [ 42 ] As indicated, the plaintiff was deprived of the $492.50 partial reimbursement from Blue Cross at the behest of the defendant due to its “forged” signature.

For what it is worth, the signature of “Ashlyn Weninger” endorsed on the back of this cheque (Exhibit P-6) does not appear to have the same features and similarities as does the signatures on the loan note (Exhibit P-1) and the Declaration Form (Exhibit P-5) of “Ashlyn Weninger”.

However, no conclusions can be drawn beyond that. [ 43 ] Although the plaintiff produced Visa statements from July through October, 2015, inclusive (Exhibit P-7) evidencing that the $629.25 had not been credited back onto his card (at least throughout that period) as one would expect if the charge was reversed out of the Kazeema account, this is a matter between he and his credit card company. Ms.

Murdoch swore that she did not receive the benefit of this Visa payment and was paid directly in cash subsequently by the defendant. [ 44 ] Unfortunately, the plaintiff was apparently advised that once he cancelled the investigation, his credit card company considered the matter closed and unable to be re-opened. The Court leaves this to the plaintiff to pursue but, in any event, no liability for this payment can attach to the defendant in the circumstances.

Statute of Limitations [ 45 ] Although it does seem somewhat anti-climatic to this War of the Roses redux, the end result is that the plaintiff’s claim is statute-barred. [ 46 ] The loan agreement did not call for repayment by a specific date. Rather, the repayment was contingent upon the particular occurrence of a specific event in future - receipt of the defendant’s personal income tax refund.

[ 47 ] When no clear terms of repayment are stated, the obligation to pay arises upon demand as set out in s. 10 of the Limitations Act [2] . [ 48 ] In Hopkins v Stockman [3] , the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal stated: [12] I find additional support for the appeal judge’s conclusions in s. 10 of The Limitations Act . The trial judge found there were no clear terms of payment between the parties (i.e. the debt arising was not a term debt obligation). As such, the respondents’ obligation to pay the appellant must be characterised as a demand obligation.

Section 10 provides that “in the case of a default in performing a demand obligation, the day on which

an act or omission on which a claim is based takes place is the day on which the default occurs.” . . . [ 49 ] A similar conclusion was reached by Scott, J of this Court in Norman Ray Hill v Crystal Braun and Harry Braun [4] . In that case, on facts very much analogous to the present matter, the repayment of the loan was predicated upon the sale of the defendant’s house trailer at some point in the future. When no sale materialized and did not appear to be likely, the plaintiff made demand for repayment.

In the circumstances, the Court held that the obligation to pay arose once this demand was made which was then the starting point for the limitation period calculation. [ 50 ] In the case at bar, the plaintiff testified that he made several demands of the defendant throughout the spring and summer of 2015 but definitively, he was told some time in July pursuant to such a demand that he would not be receiving payment. [ 51 ] He did not commence action for the debt until September 20, 2017 (issued September 25, 2017), which was approximately two months past the two year period statutorily mandated to bring the claim. [5] [ 52 ] Although the plaintiff explained his reasons for holding off (advice from his counsel and Probation Officer) this does not have the lawful effect of abrogating the time limit upon which he was required to commence.

IV COSTS [ 53 ] By virtue of s. 36 of The Small Claims Act [6] , the Court has power to award costs in appropriate circumstances: Costs 36(1) A judge may at any time, in any proceeding before the court, award costs, other than lawyer-related costs, on any terms and conditions that the judge considers appropriate, including: (

a) the prescribed fee for issuing a summons or a notice of third party claim; (

b) costs incurred to effect service; (

c) fees paid to a witness pursuant to

section 23; and (

d) charges incurred pursuant to

section 30.

(2) Subject to the regulations, a judge may at any time, in any proceeding before the court, award additional costs, other than lawyer-related costs, on any terms and conditions that the judge considers appropriate for each instance in which a party:

(

a) without reasonable excuse, fails to attend or prepare for any stage of a proceeding before the court; or (

b) takes any step for the purpose of delaying a proceeding or increasing costs of another party.

(3) Subject to the regulations, in addition to any costs awarded pursuant to subsection (1) or (2), a judge may, at the conclusion of a matter, award additional costs, other than lawyer-related costs, on any terms and conditions that the judge considers appropriate if the judge is of the opinion that additional costs are appropriate after taking into account one or more of the following factors: (

a) access to justice; (

b) fairness to the parties; (

c) whether or not the defendant or third party prepared a reply; (

d) any offer to settle made by a party; (

e) the conduct of the parties ; (

f) the failure of a party to comply with an order of a judge made pursuant to this Act; (

g) any other factor that the judge considers appropriate. [emphasis added] [ 54 ] In the present case, the Court has found that, but for the expiry for the limitation period, the plaintiff would have been successful on the portion of the claim involving the $1,800.00 loan advanced to the defendant. This conclusion was reached by the Court by determining that the defendant had provided patently false evidence respecting this transaction.

Although unnecessary to stipulate, the Court nonetheless gave specific direction to the parties at the outset of the trial in regard to providing false evidence. [ 55 ] A very similar circumstance was dealt with by my brother Judge Agnew in Kevin Jones o/a Guns ’N Hoses Construction v Meinema [7] , commencing at para 40. The Court found paras 44 - 46 to be particularly apt to the present case: [44] The power to award substantial costs is used sparingly in proceedings under the Act . Again, this relates at least in part to the philosophy of the Act .

A court process, even one as welcoming as Civil Division attempts to be, is a strange and arcane journey for most people, and parties should not be discouraged from bringing their issues to court by fear that they will be punished if they inadvertently make a mis-step along the way. [45] However, the fact that the Court typically declines to award significant costs does not mean that it has no power so to do.

For example, costs may be awarded where, as here, a party has caused a great deal of court time to be wasted, or has otherwise engaged in conduct deserving censure in the course of the legal proceedings [8] .

[46] In the case before me, the Plaintiff lied to the Court. There are at least two implications that arose from his deliberate decision so to do. Firstly, he created the need for the Defendants to call a witness to prove his duplicity. The Defendants have therefore been put to additional effort. Secondly, he has affected everyone else involved in a search for justice. Our courts always struggle with “time to trial”: that is, the delay between when an action is commenced and when it can be heard bearing in mind the Court’s caseload.

Obviously, the more cases there are to be heard, and the longer each takes, the longer before the next case in line can be heard. In this case, I estimate that a half-day of trial time was occupied with the issue of the floor joists. The Plaintiff, then, has not only created additional problems for the Defendants and attempted to perpetrate a fraud on the Court, but by causing the trial to be a half-day longer than necessary he has also delayed justice for everyone else. His actions affect not only the Defendants but all other persons who seek to use the court system.

For these reasons, that is the fact of the Plaintiff lying to the Court, the problems and expense that lie has caused the Defendants, and the delay which he has caused to all others awaiting trial dates, I award the Defendants costs in the amount of $1,000.00. [9] [ 56 ] The Court finds the defendant’s prevarication on the material issue of the $1,800.00 loan to be equally egregious and analogous to the above-mentioned decision falling within the parameters of s. 36(3)(

e) relating to the conduct of the parties in the within matter. By virtue of s. 6(3) of The Small Claims Regulations [10] , the Court is able to award costs as follows:

(3) The total costs awarded in favour of a party pursuant to subsection 36(3) of the Act shall not exceed the greater of the following amounts: (a) $200; (b) 10% of the amount of the claim. Accordingly, the Court awards the sum of $242.93 costs being 10% of the total amount claimed in this action of $2,429.25. V CONCLUSION [ 57 ] The plaintiff’s claim is dismissed. The defendant is ordered to pay costs to the plaintiff in the amount of $242.93. ____________________ R.D. Jackson, J [1] SS 2004, c L-16.1 , s2 [2] Demand obligations 10 Unless otherwise provided in this Act , in the case of a default in performing a demand obligation, the day on which

an act or omission on which a claim is based takes place is the day on which the default occurs.

[3] 2013 SKCA 118, 427 Sask R4 [4] (Unreported SC#609(2015)) [5] See s.5, The Limitations Act [6] 2016,SS 2016, c S-50.12 [7] 2010 SKPC 126, appealed and affirmed on other grounds see: 2011 SKQB 130 [8]Mattabi Mines Ltd. v Schmachtel (1987), (ON SC), 59 OR (2d) 199 (Ont S C), Smith v. Sterling SecuritiesCorporation, Limited, (SK CA), [1933] 3 WWR 347 (Sask C A), Travelers Indemnity Co. of Canada v. Kehoe, (NS CA), 66 NSR (2d) 434, 30 ACWS (2d) 229 (NSSC App Div) [9] This case was decided prior to the recent cost amendments to The Small Claims Act as reflected herein. [10] The Small Claims Regulations, 2017, c S-50.12 Reg1