R. v. Jordan, 2017 QCCQ 389

R. c. Lavallée 2017 QCCQ 389 COURT OF QUEBEC CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC DISTRICT OF SAINT-FRANÇOIS LOCALITY OF SHERBROOKE Criminal and Penal Division No.: 450-01-066059-101 DATE : February 3, 2017 ______________________________________________________________________ THE HONOURABLE ÉRICK VANCHESTEIN, J.C.Q., PRESIDING ______________________________________________________________________ THE QUEEN Prosecutrix v. LUC LAVALLÉE Accused ______________________________________________________________________ JUDGMENT ON A MOTION FOR A STAY OF PROCEEDINGS FOR UNREASONABLE DELAY ( ss. 11(

b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms ) ______________________________________________________________________ [ 1 ] In the wake of R. v. Jordan , [1] the accused has filed a motion to stay proceedings, alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time protected under s. 11(

b) of the Charter . [ 2 ] Six other accused, all represented by Mr. Lavallée’s counsel, have filed similar motions and are joined in this proceeding. They consent that the conclusions in this judgment will also apply to their respective cases. [2] BACKGROUND [ 3 ] On June 24, 2010, the accused was stopped for driving his vehicle while impaired by alcohol.

He was officially charged on August 12, 2010. [ 4 ] His blood alcohol concentration was 99 mg in 100 mL of blood. [ 5 ] In this type of situation involving few symptoms of impairment and this blood alcohol level, in the past the accused could usually raise a defence of evidence to the contrary as to the blood alcohol level. [ 6 ] This defence is no longer available since the coming into force on July 2, 2008, of new Criminal Code provisions on such matters, better known as “Bill C-2.” [ 7 ] In Bellerose , [3] this Court stated the following on the subject: [ translation ] 5.

These new measures more specifically affect an accused’s defence of evidence to the contrary as to the results of a blood alcohol test. 6. After the new provisions came into effect, trial courts experienced a period of significant disruption, resulting in a multiplicity of proceedings brought by accused, for the most part actions arguing that the new provisions were constitutionally invalid. 7. At the same time, accused in many cases filed applications for additional disclosure, since the new scheme imposed on them the burden of demonstrating that the approved instrument was malfunctioning. 8.

As for the constitutional validity of the provisions, the Supreme Court agreed to hear an extraordinary proceeding on the issue even before the Court of Appeal dealt with it, thus expediting the entire process of determining the constitutional validity of the new legislative scheme. 9. On November 2, 2012, in St-Onge Lamoureux , the Supreme Court ruled on the issue of constitutional validity. A portion of these new provisions were declared constitutionally invalid, but the scheme was saved pursuant to the terms set out in the judgment.

10. In many pending cases, the accused now knew which legislative scheme applied and had to make decisions about how to proceed with their cases. 11. Subsequent issues concerned primarily the nature and scope of the Crown’s disclosure obligations in such cases. 12. On June 30, 2014, this Court rendered judgment on the motions for disclosure and ordered the disclosure of some of the evidence, as set out in Lavallée . (Citations omitted.) ISSUES [ 8 ] Since July 8, 2016, Jordan has imposed a new analytical framework on s. 11(

b) Charter motions.

This new framework “... including the presumptive ceiling, applies to cases currently in the system, subject to two qualifications”. [4] [ 9 ] The first of these qualifications involves the application of a transitional exceptional circumstance when the delay exceeds the presumptive ceiling. [5] The second contemplates delays below the ceiling and does not apply here. [ 10 ] In this case, the delay is indisputably very long and, regardless of the scenario used to compute them, the presumptive ceiling is greatly exceeded. [ 11 ] Thus, the issues the Court must decide are the following: - Did the prosecution rebut the presumption of unreasonableness by showing that the delay was reasonable because of the presence of exceptional circumstances? - If the answer to the first question is no, since this is a case currently in the system, does the application of the transitional exceptional circumstance demonstrate that the delay was justified based on the parties’ reasonable reliance on the law as it previously existed?

PROCEDURAL HISTORY [ 12 ] The accused was charged on August 12, 2010, and appeared on September 30, 2010. [ 13 ] On the day the motion was presented, 2,279 days, or more than 6 years, had passed. [ 14 ] The parties have submitted a table detailing the various procedural steps in this case. [6] [ 15 ] There is nothing special about the accused’s file; normally, the trial would have lasted a few hours. [ 16 ] Therefore, for a better understanding of what caused the delay, it is helpful to set out a history of the proceedings. [ 17 ] After the appearance, the file was postponed to November 19, 2010, to allow the defence to take a position. [ 18 ] The various subsequent postponements can be grouped together in separate periods to better grasp how the case unfolded.

From November 19, 2010, to December 15, 2011, or 391 days: [ 19 ] The defence requested various postponements until December 15, 2011, when the accused chose to join the group awaiting judgment on the constitutional validity of the new legislative provisions. From December 15, 2011, to October 23, 2012, or 313 days: [ 20 ] This was the period during which the accused waited for the Supreme Court to render judgment in St-Onge Lamoureux . [7] [ 21 ] At the same time, a dispute arose regarding the prosecution’s duty of disclosure for this type of offence.

The parties decided to bind themselves to a judgment in a test case being heard by De La Sablonnière J. [ 22 ] During this period, the accused explicitly waived 174 days.

From October 23, 2012, to April 10, 2013, or 169 days: [ 23 ] On October 23, 2012, the case was postponed until April 3, 2013, still pending the Supreme Court decision and the judgment on disclosure of evidence. [ 24 ] On November 2, 2012, the Supreme Court rendered judgment in St-Onge Lamoureux . [8] It should be noted that that accused did not ask for his case to be moved ahead after the Supreme Court judgment; the case remained set for April 3, 2013. [ 25 ] Therefore, during this period, counsel for the accused analyzed the Supreme Court judgment and evaluated the potential defences.

For various reasons, the test case on disclosure was not decided, and there was no judgment on disclosure rendered during this period. [ 26 ] On April 3, 2013, the case was pushed back to April 10, 2013, for a case management conference. On that date, the Court allowed the defence to file an amended motion regarding disclosure. From April 10, 2013, to September 12, 2013, or 155 days:

[ 27 ] This period was devoted to case management regarding the motions for disclosure. In the District of St-François, two groups formed according to the police department responsible for the individual files. [ 28 ] In the case before us, the Magog police department is involved. The case was set to proceed on the motion on September 12, 2013. The parties estimated that one day would be sufficient.

From September 12, 2013, to March 18, 2014, or 187 days: [ 29 ] This Court heard the motion for disclosure in approximately 50 files, including the one before us now, which constitutes the test case. [ 30 ] The proceedings initially planned for one day were prolonged considerably, given the number of defence counsel and the proliferation of issues. [ 31 ] The expert for the prosecution was examined for two and a half days, which was only possible in January and February 2014, given the schedules of the various counsel for the defence involved.

From March 18, 2014, to June 30, 2014, or 104 days: [ 32 ] This delay was for the Court’s deliberation before judgment on the motion for disclosure. From June 30, 2014, to September 8, 2014, or 70 days: [ 33 ] The Court allowed in substantial part the defence’s motion and ordered the disclosure of several pieces of evidence. [ 34 ] The prosecution completed disclosure on September 8, 2014. From September 8, 2014, to October 24, 2014, or 46 days: [ 35 ] During this period, the defence examined the evidence to properly evaluate the nature of the possible defence.

From October 24, 2014, to June 17, 2015, or 236 days: [ 36 ] The prosecution declared that it was ready to proceed as of October 24, 2014, on any dates to be proposed by the Court. [ 37 ] The defence was not able to properly evaluate its position and the postponements during this period were mainly defence-caused. [ 38 ] The accused remained united as a group. Few set themselves apart to ask for separate trial dates. [ 39 ] They searched for a joint expert. This meant that the defence was not able to set a trial date until June 17, 2015.

From June 17, 2015, to April 26, 2016, or 314 days: [ 40 ] On June 17, 2015, the defence estimated that three days of hearing would be required to adduce their expert evidence. [ 41 ] Given the different schedules of the counsel involved and the expert’s availabilities, the earliest possible dates for the trial were April 26, 27 and 28, 2016. From April 26, 2016, to October 7, 2016, or 164 days: [ 42 ] On September 3, 2015, Richard Côté J. rendered judgment in R. v.

Ruest . [9] The evidence brought by the defence in that case is similar to the evidence the accused wanted to adduce here. [ 43 ] Côté J. did not accept the defence based on the general maintenance of the device. [ 44 ] The expert who testified in Ruest was the same as the one subpoenaed to testify in April 2016. [ 45 ] Because Côté J.’s judgment was appealed by the defence, the parties agreed with the coordinating judge shortly before April 26, 2016, to cancel the subpoena for their expert witnesses and wait for the Superior Court judgment in Ruest . [ 46 ] In the interim, the prosecution gave the parties the option of proceeding by filing testimony from the various experts heard in Ruest . [ 47 ] On April 26, 2016, before the coordinating judge, counsel for the defence were unable to determine whether to accept the prosecution’s offer to proceed on admissions.

It was decided that the entire case would be postponed until August 15, 2016, for which date the expert, who would supplement particular aspects of the evidence in each case, would be subpoenaed. [ 48 ] On August 15, 2016, the expert for the defence, Mr. Kupferschmidt, did not testify. The whole was postponed until October 7, 2016, before this Court, to proceed on admissions. [ 49 ] In July, the Supreme Court rendered judgment in R. v. Jordan . [10] The accused waited until October 7, 2016, to announce that he was filing a motion under s. 11(

b) of the Charter . From October 7, 2016, to November 24, 2016, a total of 48 days: [ 50 ] On October 7, 2016, the accused agreed to proceed by filing documentary evidence.

[ 51 ] The prosecution filed the analyst’s certificate and the qualified technician’s certificate. The defence filed the testimony of the expert Kupferschmidt. In rebuttal, the prosecution filed the testimony of their expert Jacques Tremblay. [ 52 ] Both parties filed written submissions in appeal. The whole was suspended because the accused announced that he was filing a motion for delay. [ 53 ] From October 7, 2016, to November 24, 2016, the accused prepared his case for the motion for delay.

ANALYSIS [ 54 ] As stated earlier, a court hearing this type of motion must now proceed in accordance with the new framework set out in Jordan . [11] [ 55 ] Before deciding the issues set out above, the Court must establish whether the presumptive ceiling of 18 months in this case has been reached. [ 56 ] This computation can be performed by subtracting any “defence-waived or -caused delay” [12] from the overall delay.

COMPUTATION OF DELAY [ 57 ] As of the day the motion was presented, the total delay in this case is 2,279 days. [ 58 ] How much of this delay can be attributed to or was waived by the defence? [ 59 ] The parties agree only on the number of days waived, not on the delay attributable to the defence. [ 60 ] The Court finds that the following periods must be subtracted from the total delay. [ 61 ] The delay from November 19, 2010, to December 15, 2011, a total of 391 days, is entirely attributable to the defence.

There were several postponements to take a position before the decision to join the group challenging the constitutional validity of the new provisions. [ 62 ] Once the accused has decided to join the group challenging the constitutional validity of the new provisions was made, can this delay be attributed to him? [ 63 ] This constitutional challenge cannot be regarded as a frivolous or dilatory tactic.

It is a serious and important debate, which the Supreme Court in fact saw fit to hear quickly, without the case even being heard by the Court of Appeal. [ 64 ] Thus, the remarks of the majority judges in Jordan [13] who state that “...defence actions legitimately taken to respond to the charges fall outside the ambit of defence delay” apply here. [14] [ 65 ] Therefore, from December 15, 2011, to October 23, 2012, a total of 313 days passed, 174 of which should be attributed to the defence because the accused officially waived them. [ 66 ] The Court cannot characterize as defence delay the subsequent period between October 23, 2012, and September 12, 2013, the date set for the hearing of the motion for disclosure, given the various steps that were necessary to argue their position in the wake of St- Onge Lamoureux [15] and the various motions for disclosure. [ 67 ] The parties agree, however, that 60 days of this period should be attributed to the defence. [ 68 ] The delay between September 12, 2013, and June 30, 2014, was spent hearing the motions for disclosure.

It cannot be attributed to the defence because, after St-Onge Lamoureux, these motions were actions legitimately taken [16] in response to the charges against them. [ 69 ] However, the defence is responsible for the delay between October 24, 2014, and June 17, 2015, a total of 236 days. [ 70 ] The disclosure ordered was completed on September 8, 2014.

As of that date, and particularly as of October 24, 2014, the prosecution was ready to proceed in all the cases and on any date. [ 71 ] Moreover, for each of the accused, Crown counsel determined which cases did not have sufficient evidence to support the charge of impaired driving. [ 72 ] The cases in which the prosecution found that there was sufficient evidence of impaired driving were quickly scheduled to proceed in the following months. [ 73 ] The cases that remained concerned only recorded blood alcohol content. [ 74 ] During that period, the defence continued to act as a group and sought the appropriate expert. [ 75 ] This expert, who appears to be the only one in Canada, was not frequently available.

This made coordinating the schedules of all the parties even more complicated. [ 76 ] It was not until June 17, 2015, that the date of April 26, 2015, was set. This period therefore totalled 314 days. [ 77 ] This delay was in large part due to the size of the group, which involved finding an appropriate date for each of the defence

counsel and their joint expert. [ 78 ] In the circumstances, the delay was caused by [ translation ] “actions of the defence” [17] and is therefore attributable to the defence. [ 79 ] The Court also finds that the delay between April 26, 2016, and today, a total of 212 days, is also defence-caused because it results from a deliberate choice on the part of each of the defendants to wait for the outcome of the appeal in Ruest [18] and not to proceed with the specific aspects of their case. [ 80 ] This choice was later given effect when they chose to proceed by filing evidence and arguments from Ruest . [ 81 ] Thus, the total delay attributable to the defence, including the periods waived, is 1,387 days. [ 82 ] After subtracting that number from the total, the balance is 982 days, or 29 months and 22 days. [ 83 ] This delay significantly exceeds the presumptive ceiling.

Did the prosecution rebut the presumption of unreasonableness by showing that the delay was reasonable because of the presence of exceptional circumstances? [ 84 ] According to the Supreme Court in Jordan , exceptional circumstances: … lie outside the Crown’s control in the sense that (1) they are reasonably unforeseen or reasonably unavoidable, and

(2) Crown counsel cannot reasonably remedy the delays emanating from those circumstances once they arise. [19] [ 85 ] The Supreme Court conceded that it is impossible to identify in advance all the circumstances that may qualify as exceptional, affirming that it is therefore necessary to rely on the trial judge’s good sense and experience. [ 86 ] Without drawing up an exhaustive list, the Supreme Court divided exceptional circumstances into two categories: discrete events and particularly complex cases. [ 87 ] In this case, there were no special and discrete events.

But is it a particularly complex case? [ 88 ] The complexity of a case may be defined by several elements including the nature of the issues, novel or complicated legal issues, or a large number of significant issues in dispute. [ 89 ] This case is essentially a simple one, requiring a trial only a few hours long. [ 90 ] The length of the ensuing proceedings was entirely outside the Crown’s control or will. [ 91 ] This case became more complicated because of novel and complicated legal issues. [ 92 ] It is rather uncommon and exceptional for a case of impaired driving to include a motion challenging the constitutional validity of legislative provisions, a motion for a stay of proceedings for disclosure, and a specific and particularly long expert report on device maintenance. [ 93 ] All these issues are entirely outside the Crown’s control. [ 94 ] Dealing with these issues required more time than usual.

Nevertheless, several measures were taken to expedite proceedings. [ 95 ] As noted above, the Supreme Court heard the case directly to determine the constitutional validity of the provisions as quickly as possible. [ 96 ] As soon as St-Onge Lamoureux [20] was rendered, the dispute about the disclosure of evidence followed.

The cases were grouped by sector to facilitate processing, in the best interests of both the accused and justice. [ 97 ] The prosecution cannot be faulted for wanting to hold this debate so that the limits of its obligations in this case could be determined. [ 98 ] The courts of first instance and the Superior Court sitting in appeal are divided on this issue. At the moment, in Jackson , [21] the Court of Appeal for Ontario has leaned more in favour of the position defended by the prosecution.

This position seems in fact to have to be becoming the predominant one in Canada. [ 99 ] That was not this Court’s opinion when it ordered a significant disclosure of evidence related to this case. Once the order was made on June 30, 2014, the counsel of record hurried to comply. Since October 24, 2014, she has been ready to proceed. [ 100 ] The third subject submitted by the defence requires experts to testify for both parties. It would appear that these experts are few and far between and therefore of limited availability. [ 101 ] Again, the issue of the experts is outside the Crown’s control.

There was nothing it could do to expedite proceedings in this respect. [ 102 ] Given all the circumstances, the Court finds that the case has become particularly complex because of the presence of exceptional circumstances.

[ 103 ] Therefore, in accordance with the teachings of the Supreme Court in Jordan , “the delay is reasonable and no stay will issue. No further analysis is required.” [22] [ 104 ] In light of the Court’s conclusion, there is no need to consider the second issue. FOR ALL THESE REASONS, THE COURT: DISMISSES the motion to stay proceedings; __________________________________ ÉRICK VANCHESTEIN, J.C.Q. Mtre Nathalie Robidoux Criminal and penal prosecutor Mtre Alexandre Tardif For the accused Date of hearing: November 24, 2016

SCHEDULE 1 Docket 450-01-071665-116 Charles-Henri Daoust Docket 450-01-065983-103 Greco Leblanc Docket 450-01-067332-101 Francis Longpré Docket 450-01-060448-094 Guillaume Pellerin Docket 450-01-077542-129 Carroll Sayers Docket 450-01-066944-104 Alain Turcotte

SCHEDULE 2 MOTION UNDER s. 11(

b) OF THE CHARTER File No. 450-01-066059-101 Name of accused: Luc Lavallée Date charged: August 12, 2010 Total delay on the day the motion was filed: 2,279 days (6 years, 2 months, 26 days) Delay after subtracting defence-caused delays and waivers: According to the defence: :___1616___ According to DPCP: :____20 months 16 days___

SUMMARY OF DELAYS FOR EACH PARTY Defence Days/months DPCP Days/months Inherent 99 Institutional 719 Caused by defence 663 1,490 days Caused by DPCP 311 616 days Other reasons 314 Waiver 174 174 days Exceptional circumstances 0 TOTAL: 2,280 2,280 days DETAILED HISTORY OF PROCEEDINGS

Date Stage of proceedings Delay between stages Days/ months Reasons for postponement - By whom - Waiver of delay - References in minutes or notes Characterization by defence Characterization by DPCP 24-06- 2010 Arrest 49 12-08- 2010 Charge 49 Inherent Prosecution (institutional) 30-11- 2010 Appearance 50 Inherent Prosecution (institutional) 19-11- 2010 Pro forma 77 Postponement at request of defence. Defence Defence 04-02- 2011 Pro forma 91 Postponement at request of defence. Defence Defence 06-05- 2011 Pro forma 63 Postponement at request of defence.

Defence Defence 08-07- 2011 Position 70 Postponement at request of defence. Defence Defence 16-09- 2011 Position 90 Postponement at request of defence. Defence Defence 15-12- 2011 Pro forma 53 Postponement at request of defence to join the constitutional challenge group. By the respondent: This was a strategic choice on the part of the defence. - Jordan , 2016 SCC 27 , para. 64 Defence Defence See report January 31, 2012, entitled “File of February 6, 2012

06-02- 2012 Pro forma 86 Postponement by the prosecution to group cases nationally and new disclosure. By the respondent: Joint position of the parties. Mtre Fréchette submits that he consents to the postponement. The other lawyers present adopt his position. It was a strategic choice by the defence to wait for the Supreme Court of Canada judgment. — Reference to comments of 15-12- 2011 Prosecution Defence 02-05- 2012 Pro forma 57 Waiver of delays until June 28, 2012. Waiver Defence (waiver) 28-06- 2012 Pro forma 117 The parties await the Supreme Court of Canada judgment.

Waiver Defence (waiver) 23-10- 2012 Pro forma 162 The parties were still waiting for the SCC judgment and bound themselves to the judgment of De la Sablonnière J. By the respondent: It was a strategic choice by the defence to wait for the Supreme Court of Canada judgment and for the accused to bind himself to the decision of De la Sablonnière J. — Reference to comments of 15-12- 2011 Institutional Defence 03-04- 2013 Pro forma 7 Management post- St- Onge Lamoureux. Postponement of case until April 10, 2013. Institutional Prosecution (institutional)

10-04-2013 Casemanagementconference 47 Defence ready toargue motions fordisclosure. Estimation of half aday. Confirms that the trialwill be short. By the respondent: The Court allows thedefence to file anamended motion andasks the prosecutionto take a position onthe charge ofimpairment. Seeminutes. Institutional Prosecution(institutional) 27-05-2013 Scheduling ofdate 108 It is agreed that MtreLachance’s four caseswill be scheduledbecause the sameevidence will beadduced. The defence is notavailable in June andJuly and theprosecution and itsexpert are notavailable in August.

By the respondent: The defence made norequest to proceedonly in his own cases.It was a strategicchoice by the defenceto wait for theSupreme Court ofCanada judgment. - Transcript, pages4, 6, 7 and 18 - Jordan, 2016SCC 27 at para. 64 - Elliott, (2003) (ON CA), 114 CRR(2d) 1 at paras. 175–182. Defence: 60 Crown:48 Defence: 60 Prosecution: 48

12-09- 2013 Motion for disclosure 25 Defence evidence lasts less than half a day. However, the case is one of 50, which considerably prolongs proceedings. Expert for the prosecution was qualified but could not be examined. By the respondent: The defence made no request to proceed only in his own cases.

It was a strategic choice on the part of the defence to proceed as part of a group; the defence wanted to be open to an analysis of a group debate (p. 286 transcript, Requests from the defence were not up to date and the time in court was reduced (p. 282 transcript.) / The defence mistakenly evaluated the length of the group debate / the delay was caused by the conduct of the defence. — See also comments on 27-05-2013 Other Defence 07-10- 2013 Scheduling of date for subsequent procedural steps 107 Counsel for the prosecution and his associate were available for every date.

By the respondent: However, the defence continued to consent to proceeding as a group, even though Mtre Dussault was not available. See also comments on 27- 05-13 and 12-09-13 Other Defence 21-01- 2014 Continuation of hearing of motion 1 The expert was examined and cross- examined. By the respondent: See comments on 27- 05-2013, 12-09-13 and 7-10-13 Other Defence

22-01- 2014 Continuation of hearing of motion 19 The expert was examined and cross- examined By the respondent: See comments on 27- 05-2013, 12-09-13 and 7-10-13 Other Defence 10-02- 2014 Continuation of proceedings 3 Cross-examination of the expert by several other counsel By the respondent: See comments on 27- 05-2013, 12-09-13 and 7-10-13 Other Defence 13-02- 2014 Scheduling of date 27 Attempt to coordinate the schedules of all counsel By the respondent: See comments on 27- 05-2013, 12-09-13 and 7-10-13 Other Defence 12-03- 2014 Arguments on motion 6 Undersigned counsel argued on behalf of all the counsel.

For the respondent The agreement to argue for all the lawyers is proof of the willingness of the respondents to proceed as a group / strategic choice of the defence Other Defence 18-03- 2014 Arguments on motion 83 Undersigned counsel argued on behalf of all the counsel. For the respondent See comments on 12- 03-14 Other Prosecution (Institutional/ deliberations) 09-06- 2014 Pro forma 21 Other Prosecution (Institutional/ deliberations) 30-06- 2014 Judgment on motion for disclosure 70 Prosecution ordered to disclose several pieces of evidence.

Crown Prosecution 08-09- 2014 Disclosure of evidence 46 Necessary delays to analyze the evidence disclosed. Crown Prosecution

24-10- 2014 Pro forma 38 The Crown declares that it has no evidence to offer in regard to the charges of impairment Crown Prosecution 01-12- 2014 Pro forma 53 Postponement by the defence to take a position and verify the expert’s availabilities By the respondent: The prosecution was ready to set a trial date in all C-2 files (see minutes). Defence Defence 23-01- 2015 Position 75 Postponement to take a position. Defence Defence 08-04- 2015 Position 22 Postponement by consent. By the respondent: The defence made submissions seeking to call an expert, Mr.

Kupfferschmidt, to testify on the merits of the case / The defence intended to proceed as part of the group because they raise the same defence and are using the same expert; Mtre Fréchette spoke on behalf of all the lawyers (p. 14 transcript) / the defence did not have the expert’s dates and did not know whether legal aid would authorize the expense (p. 10-11 transcript) / strategic choice of the defence, Jordan , para. 64 , in fine. Other Defence

30-04- 2015

Schedule date 25 Defence (Mtre Tardif) sought additional disclosure and the motion was scheduled for hearing on 25-05- 2015 By the respondent: The defence filed a new motion for disclosure; the subjects in this motion could have been dealt with during the initial debate that began on September 12, 2013; the prosecution responded to this motion on November 24, 2014, and the defence waited until May 8, 2015, to file its motion for disclosure.

Institutional Defence See letter dated November 24, 2014, to Mtre Tardif, “Role of December 1, 2014.” 25-05- 2015 Motion for disclosure 23 Motion struck because information sent by the prosecution By the respondent: All the available trial dates were acceptable for the prosecution (see minutes); the defence decided to continue proceeding as part of the group despite the difficulty in finding a trial date; strategic choice of the defence -- see comments on 8-04-15. Crown Defence 17-06- 2015

Schedule date 314 Because of difficulties in finding a date, trial is scheduled to continue on April 26, 2016 By the respondent: The respondents agree to proceed with the group since they share part of their defence; see comments on April 8, 2015 Institutional Prosecution (Institutional/ 157 days Defence 157 days

26-04-2016 Pro forma 111 After discussions with the coordinating judge, he asked us to bind ourselves to the decision of the Superior Court judge in Ruest and to cancel the hearing of the defence.

By the respondent: The defence agreed to this way of proceeding – strategic choice of the defence, much like waiting for St-Onge Lamoureux / no specific request to distance himself from the group / see comments on 8-04-15; on April 26 and 27, 2016, there was a hearing for disclosure to obtain the briefs through Mtre Michel Dussault on behalf of all the lawyers despite the judgment in Ellyson, 450-01- 080736-130, rendered on February 2, 2016; Institutional Defence 15-08-2016 Pro forma 53 Waiting for the judgment in Ruest .

By the respondent: See the comments on April 26, 2016 Institutional Defence 07-10-2016 Pro forma 10 The defence announced the presentation of motions that were not filed By the respondent: The motions based on delay were filed solely as a result of Jordan ; the prosecution was ready to finalize all the files that day / the Crown even cancelled its witnesses’ subpoenas. Defence Defence 17-10-2016 Motion 21 The Court took note that the defence would file its table by November 7, 2016, and that the prosecution would file its table by November 21, 2016. Defence

07-11-2016 Filing of motion 17-11-16 The prosecution had to send a letter to the Court and the defence because not all the transcripts were filed in support of the motions. See letter dated November 17, 2015, concerning the missing transcripts for the motions based on delay 24-11-16 Hearing of motion for delay and continuation of trial.