2022 NBCA 17, 2022 NBCA 17

COURT OF APPEAL OF COUR D’APPEL DU NEW BRUNSWICK NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK S.A.H. APPELLANT 64-21-CA S.A.H. APPELANT - and - - et - K.A.H. RESPONDENT K.A.H. INTIMÉE S.A.H. v. K.A.H., 2022 NBCA 17 S.A.H. c.

K.A.H., 2022 NBCA 17 CORAM: The Honourable Justice Green The Honourable Justice Baird The Honourable Justice French CORAM : l’honorable juge Green l’honorable juge Baird l’honorable juge French Appeal from a decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench: May 6, 2021 Appel d’une décision de la Cour du Banc de la Reine : le 6 mai 2021 History of case: Decision under appeal: 2021 NBQB 98 Preliminary or incidental proceedings: N/A Historique de la cause : Décision frappée d’appel : 2021 NBBR 98 Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires : s.o.

Appeal heard: January 12, 2022 Judgment rendered: May 12, 2022 Appel entendu : le 12 janvier 2022 Jugement rendu : le 12 mai 2022 Reasons for judgment by: The Honourable Justice Baird Concurred in by: The Honourable Justice Green The Honourable Justice French Counsel at hearing: For the appellant: Howard T. Myatt For the respondent: Kimberly A. McCurdy Motifs de jugement : l’honorable juge Baird Souscrivent aux motifs : l’honorable juge Green l’honorable juge French Avocats à l’audience : Pour l’appelant : Howard T. Myatt Pour l’intimée : Kimberly A.

McCurdy THE COURT The appeal is allowed, in part, with costs of $750. The cross-appeal is allowed, in part, with costs of $2,500. LA COUR L’appel est accueilli en partie, avec dépens de 750 $. L’appel reconventionnel est accueilli en partie, avec dépens de 2 500 $. The judgment of the Court was delivered by BAIRD, J.A.

I. Introduction [ 1 ] In this appeal, the appellant (“father”) argues the trial judge failed to conduct a proper analysis under s. 9 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines , SOR/97-175 (“ Guidelines ”).

He asks that the order concerning the amount of monthly child support and special expenses be “overturned” and a “new” amount be calculated, that the ruling with respect to the father’s payment of property taxes and insurance premiums be “reversed and set aside,” that the order requiring him to produce evidence concerning financial contributions by his mother to household expenses be reversed, and that he be awarded costs.

Both parents agree the judge made errors. [ 2 ] The cross-appeal engages the law concerning variations of spousal support orders under ss. 15.2 and 17 of the Divorce Act , R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp .) (“ Act ”). The respondent (“mother”) asserts the judge’s assessment, which was attached as

schedule “A” to the decision, did not conform with the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (“ SSAG ”), the judge failed to draw a distinction between a review and variation of spousal support, and he erred when he ordered a review. II. Grounds of Appeal Resolved by Court Order [ 3 ] Following the filing of the decision, on May 6, 2021, DeWare C.J.Q.B. signed an order on November 3, 2021. As an aside, she was not the judge who rendered the decision, because the trial judge had retired. The order she signed reflected the trial judge’s decision, with some minor corrections.

The parties were required to provide proof of their life insurance coverage within 30 days, child support was calculated for the periods from December 1, 2017, to May 31, 2018, June 1, 2018, to December 31, 2018, January 1, 2019, to September 30, 2019, and October 1, 2019, to December 31, 2019, in accordance with the decision.

The father was ordered to provide financial documentation within 30 days to satisfy the mother and the court as to what, if any, financial contributions his mother had made to his household expenses. [ 4 ] Under ss. 3 and 9 of the Guidelines , the father was ordered to pay $891 monthly as child support for the period from October 1, 2019, to December 31, 2019. Commencing January 1, 2020, the father was ordered to pay $1,240 monthly pending further orders of the court. [ 5 ] Arrears of “special expenses” for the children under s. 7 of the Guidelines were calculated and set out for the years 2017-2020.

The father was ordered to pay arrears in the amount of $5,420 forthwith. Commencing in 2021 and continuing each year thereafter, the parents were ordered to exchange copies of their income tax returns and Notices of Assessment no later than May 31. [ 6 ] Provisions concerning the parents’ disclosure of expenses for the children and adjustments to child support reflected the judge’s decision.

Provisions concerning the payment of spousal support were set out and reflected a review date of May 31, 2026. [ 7 ] The father was ordered to pay 50 percent of the property taxes and property insurance levied against the marital home commencing in 2018. [ 8 ] There were provisions concerning the transfer of Registered Education Savings Plans for the children. Finally, costs were ordered in the amount of $7,000 payable forthwith. The same order contained corrections to mathematical errors made by the judge, and it dealt with arrears of child support for the months of October and November 2017.

All of the above, with the exception of the minor mathematical corrections the parents agreed to make, reflected the trial judge’s decision of May 6, 2021. [ 9 ] The father argues the following errors remain:

a) That the judge committed reversible error when he failed to adjust child support for the child C., from December 1, 2018, using the formula set out in s. 9 of the Guidelines ;

b) That the judge failed to provide sufficient reasons to support his calculation of child support for C. under ss. 7 and 9 of the Guidelines ;

c) That the judge erred in law when he found the appellant was jointly responsible to pay the real property taxes and propertyinsurance premiums for the marital home;

d) That the judge erred when he ordered the father to disclose third-party contributions, if any, paid by his mother to help him withhis household expenses;

e) That the judge failed to calculate child support in accordance with the current incomes of the parties in the calendar year when theorder took effect, contrary to s. 2(3) of the Guidelines; and

f) That the trial judge erred in law when he failed to determine if arrears of child support were owed, or, if the appellant had overpaidchild support. [10] As noted, the cross-appeal engages ss. 15.2 and 17 of the Act, how the judge framed the order for spousalsupport, and how he calculated it under the SSAG. [11] There were three children born of this marriage. At the time of the separation, H. was sixteen years of age, K.was thirteen years of age, and C. was ten years of age.

Sadly, this family has been before the courts of New Brunswick since August 14,2017, when the Petition for Divorce was filed by the mother. Not only has there been a significant investment made by both parents interms of time and financial resources, but they also still have no permanent resolution, despite having had a hearing September 9-12,2019, June 12, 2020, and June 15-17, 2020, with reasons rendered May 6, 2021.

Both parties acknowledge there remain significant issuesthat require resolution, and they look to this Court to offer them a solution. [12] As we raised during the appeal hearing, this is a classic example why the settlement conference rule (Rule62.1) exists. Under this rule, the Court, on its own motion, cannot order a settlement conference; however, both parties may request one.A request for a settlement conference shall be made jointly by the solicitors for the parties and shall be signed by them. The rulespecifies what is required of the participants and sets out the authority of the presiding judge.

Given the lengthy delays in obtaining trialdates and the expense associated with an appeal thereafter, it is my view this rule should be used more often at the appellate level,particularly in cases such as this. III. Standard of Review [13] This Court is an error correcting court. An appeal hearing does not give a party the opportunity to re-litigate hisor her case, nor do courts of appeal “tinker” with the decisions made by lower court judges. Deference will be accorded to a trial judge’sfindings of fact, unless it is concluded they were so manifestly wrong as to rise to a level of palpable and overriding error.

An error oflaw is reviewable on the standard of correctness. I adopt the reasons of Larlee J.A. in MacDonald v. MacDonald, 2011 NBCA 25, 372N.B.R. (2d) 179, where she wrote: The standard of review that applies to family matters generally is that the judge’s decision must be given considerable deference. Anappellate court is empowered to set aside or vary a decision or order where it is the product of an error of law, an error in principle, asignificant misapprehension of the evidence or if it is clearly wrong (see Hickey v. Hickey, (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 518,[1999] S.C.J. No. 9 (QL) para. 11; Van de Perre v.

Edwards, 2001 SCC 60, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 1014; Savoie v. Levesque, 2009 NBCA 47,[2009] N.B.J. No. 282 (QL); Ms. P.H. v. Mr. P.H., 2008 NBCA 17, [2008] N.B.J. No. 52 (QL); Milton v. Milton, 2008 NBCA 87, 338N.B.R. (2d) 300, para. 14.; J.E.J. v. S.L.M., 2007 NBCA 33, [2007] N.B.J. No. 249 (QL), para. 35; S.H. v. V.B., 2007 NBCA 69, 321N.B.R. (2d) 314, para. 2). [para. 7] IV. Analysis A., B. & D. Did the judge err in his analysis under ss. 7 and 9 of the Guidelines? Did the judge err in ordering the appellant todisclose his mother’s financial contributions towards his household expenses?

Should the judge’s s. 9 analysis have included the periodprior to the execution of Minutes of Settlement in September 2019?

[ 14 ] The father submits that s. 9 of the Guidelines applies because C. moved in with him on alternating weeks, commencing the month of November 2018, and his child support payments should have been recalculated under s. 9 based on his shared custody of C. He argues further that the judge erred when he ordered him to produce information concerning any financial contributions his mother had made towards his household expenses, despite his evidence that she did not do so. [ 15 ] Because these grounds are linked, they will be dealt with together in this part of the analysis.

The third sub- issue will be dealt with last. [ 16 ] The father contends the judge failed to conduct a proper analysis under s. 9 and the reasons are inadequate. He maintains a proper analysis would have led the judge to conclude a straight set-off under s. 9 (

a) was appropriate from November 2018. As noted, beginning in November 2018, C. started living in his home on alternating weeks, despite the interim order of November 2017, which provided for C. to reside primarily with the mother. The judge rejected the father’s argument for reasons I conclude do not reflect reversible error on the facts of this case. [ 17 ] C. was born October 3, 2006. When the parties separated on April 1, 2017, he was ten years of age. By the time the decision was rendered, he was fourteen years of age. The mother sought sole custody of him, or, joint custody with his primary residence to be with her, and a

schedule of alternating weekends, and midweek overnight access to the father. In his Amended Counter- Petition filed May 14, 2018, the father sought an order for shared parenting of C. with a

schedule of alternating weeks. He claimed that child support should be calculated pursuant to both ss. 3 and 9 of the Guidelines , and that special expenses under s. 7 of the Guidelines should be paid proportionately; however, for the first time, he raised a claim that income should be imputed to the mother under s. 19 of the Guidelines .

The mother replied to the Amended Counter-Petition opposing the claim that her income be imputed, and she asked to be heard with respect to custody and access. [ 18 ] On February 12, 2018, the same judge who ultimately heard the case signed an interim order, which, as noted, was effective November 14, 2017. The order did not provide for the custody of H. because of her age; however, the parents were granted joint custody of the children K. and C., with their primary care and residence to be with the mother.

The father was granted “regular custodial care” on alternating weekends and alternating Wednesdays, and provisions were made for vacation access. [ 19 ] With respect to child support, the interim order required that:

a) The father would pay child support for K. and C. based on his 2016 income of $111,600 minus union dues of $944. The judge calculated the monthly table amount of child support to be $1,537;

b) The mother would pay child support to the father for H. in the amount of $497, based on her 2016 income of $59,224 less professional union dues of $1,370, for a total support order of $497 monthly ; and

c) The above two amounts would be “set off,” resulting in a monthly payment of $1,040 by the father to the mother commencing December 1, 2017. [ 20 ] In para. 22, the judge ordered that any arrears of child support would be dealt with at the hearing.

Section 7 expenses for the children were set out and were to be shared between the parents in proportions of 65.7 percent paid by the father and 34.3 percent paid by the mother. It is argued the calculations in the court order were incorrect because the judge used previous years’ income figures. [ 21 ] The father’s first complaint is that the judge did not conduct a proper s. 9 analysis, in part, because of his conclusion that “Mr. H. has substantially better finances than Mrs.

H. and, as between the two parents, she is the one who needs more money and she is the spouse who uses the money for the children” (para. 233). This represents a simplification of the judge’s analysis. After considering the evidence, the judge found that it was the mother who had the financial responsibility for the children in her care and it was she who had paid for most of the expenses for C., even following November 2018, when he started residing with his father on alternating weeks.

[22]

Section 9 of the Guidelines reads: Shared parenting time 9 If each spouse exercises not less than 40%of parenting time with a child over the courseof a year, the amount of the child supportorder must be determined by taking intoaccount (

a) the amounts set out in the applicabletables for each of the spouses; (

b) the increased costs of shared parentingtime arrangements; and (

c) the conditions, means, needs and othercircumstances of each spouse and of anychild for whom support is sought. Temps parental partagé 9 Si les deux époux exercent chacun au moins40 % du temps parental au cours d’une annéeavec un enfant, le montant de l’ordonnancealimentaire est déterminé compte tenu :

a) des montants figurant dans les tablesapplicables à l’égard de chaque époux;

b) des coûts plus élevés associés autemps parental partagé;

c) des ressources, des besoins et, d’unefaçon générale, de la situation de chaqueépoux et de tout enfant pour lequel unepension alimentaire est demandée. [23] In some cases, it is only one parent who buys or primarily buys the school supplies and pays for the lunches atschool, the clothing and the extracurricular expenses, or perhaps the uninsured portion of dental and medical expenses. In that case, theobligation on a judge to consider the increased costs of shared parenting and “the conditions, means, needs and other circumstances ofeach spouse and of any child for whom support is sought” may cause the judge to deviate from the straight set-off.

Section 9 has beendescribed as a “vexing”

section for lawyers and judges because it sets out a two-step process to the analysis, but it allows for a deviationfrom a straight set-off as a matter of discretion. [24] In J.C.M. v. M.J.M., 2018 NBCA 42, [2018] N.B.J. No. 158 (QL), the Court wrote: In my opinion, this ground of appeal has merit.

Section 9 is a vexing

section for both lawyers and courts alike. In 2005, the SupremeCourt attempted to answer some of the questions concerning its applicability. In Contino, Bastarache J. set out a framework for theanalysis when there is a finding the parents have a shared custody arrangement (para. 43). In doing so, Bastarache J. stated the following: These objectives create a palpable tension in the Guidelines (Rogerson, at pp. 59 and 93). At para. 40 in Francis v. Baker (SCC), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 250, [1999] S.C.J.

No. 52], I wrote that the proper construction of a provision “requires that the objectives ofpredictability, consistency and efficiency on the one hand, be balanced with those of fairness, flexibility and recognition of the actual‘condition[s], means, needs and other circumstances of the children’ on the other”. Like s. 4 in that case, s. 9 must here be interpretedwith these objectives in mind.

Parliament, in adopting s. 9, deliberately chose to emphasize the objectives of fairness, flexibility andrecognition of the actual conditions, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse and of any child for whom support is sought,even if to the detriment of predictability, consistency and efficiency to some degree. The legislator recognized in s. 9 that there is a widerange of situations of shared custody depicting the reality of different families. The British Columbia Court of Appeal, in the same vein,observed that there is a myriad of fact patterns which come under the application of s. 9: Green v.

Green, [2000 BCCA 310, [2000]B.C.J. No. 1001], at para. 34. [...]

The specific language of s. 9 warrants emphasis on flexibility and fairness. The discretion bestowed on courts to determine the child support amount in shared custody arrangement calls for the acknowledgment of the overall situation of the parents (conditions and means) and the needs of the children. The weight of each factor under s. 9 will vary according to the particular facts of each case. [...] [...]

Section 9(

c) vests the court a broad discretion for conducting an analysis of the resources and needs of both the parents and the children. As mentioned earlier, this suggests that the Table amounts used in the simple set-off are not presumptively applicable and that the assumptions they hold must be verified against the facts, since all three factors must be applied. Here again, it will be important to keep in mind the objectives of the Guidelines mentioned earlier, requiring a fair standard of support for the child and fair contributions from both parents.

The court will be especially concerned here with the standard of living of the child in each household and the ability of each parent to [absorb] the costs required to maintain the appropriate standard of living in the circumstances. [paras. 33, 39, 68] [paras. 30-31] [ 25 ] An analysis under s. 9 is more complex than a simple set-off calculation.

It is clear that a s. 9 analysis also requires consideration of the increased costs of shared parenting and a comparison of the household standards of living, the rationale being that children should expect to enjoy comparable standards of living in each parental household. A simple calculation based on a straight set-off between the incomes of the parents was described by Bastarache J. in Contino v. Leonelli-Contino , 2005 SCC 63 , [2005] 3 S.C.R. 217 , as the “starting point” (para. 44).

It is then incumbent upon each parent to provide child-focussed budgets in which they particularize the expenses they incur for the children. He eschewed a strict formulaic approach (paras. 37-39 and 82). [ 26 ] In G.F. v. J.A.C.F. , 2016 NBCA 21 , 449 N.B.R. (2d) 34 , the Court wrote: Julien D. and Marilyn A. Payne in their text, Child Support Guidelines in Canada , 2015 (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2015) state: The language of

section 9 is imperative in that its provisions are to be applied if the 40 percent criterion is satisfied. A court has no discretion to depart from the 40 percent minimum threshold, although a discretion exists with respect to the quantification of child support under sections 9 (a), (b), and (

c) of the Guidelines . These criteria are conjunctive; they must all be considered . [page 308] [Emphasis added.] See also Payne, Julien D. and Marilyn A., Canadian Family Law , 6th ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2015) pp. 411-412. [para. 13] [ 27 ] There are a number of considerations that flow from the above and explain the trial judge’s decision not to order a straight set-off under s. 9 . He found that, even though C. was alternating his time between the two households, it was the mother who continued to pay most of his expenses.

In addition, he found the father offered no evidence that his household expenses had increased because of C.’s presence, as contemplated in s. 9 (b). In addition, the father had not complied with the interim court order with respect to the s. 7 expenses, and the father did not file any child-focussed budgets ( see Contino , at paras. 31-33 ). [ 28 ] There is discretion to deviate from a straight set-off, with reasons. The judge exercised his discretion in this case, and he laid out why he thought the existing child support order was fair for the reason C. continued to be in the primary care of his mother.

As an aside, I would observe that, because of the inadequate financial disclosure, it would not have been possible for the judge to conduct a detailed s. 9 analysis in any event (see A.S.L. v. L.S.L. , 2020 NBCA 15 , [2020] N.B.J. No. 63 (QL) ; G.F. v. J.A.C.F. ; J.C.M. v. M.J.M. ; F.M. v. T.H. , 2016 NBCA 29 , 449 N.B.R. (2d) 240 ). [ 29 ] I adopt what Bastarache J. wrote in Contino : The determination of an equitable division of the costs of support for children in shared custody situations is a difficult matter; it is not amenable to simple solutions.

Any attempt to apply strict formulae will fail to recognize the reality of various families. A contextual approach which takes into account all three factors enunciated by Parliament in s. 9 of the Guidelines must be applied. [Emphasis added; para. 82]

[30] It is my view the judge turned his mind to ss. (a), (

b) and (

c) of s. 9. The father’s overall conduct affected theoutcome because he did not provide evidence of increased expenses associated with C. and the conditions, means, needs and othercircumstances of each spouse and of any child for whom support is sought, informed his analysis. I would dismiss this ground of appeal. [31] I move now to the issue of the order requiring financial disclosure. As noted, the Guidelines require disclosureof personal income tax returns, Notices of Assessments and Reassessments, and the most recent statements of earnings showing totalearnings year-to-date.

However, it is also incumbent upon a spouse to reveal, as part of their budgetary disclosure, any financialassistance they receive from third parties. This would apply to common-law partners, roommates and family members who live with aparent and who contribute towards household expenses, and would include the receipt of non-taxable subsidies, benefits, grants, and cashas examples. The standard Financial Statement prompts a parent to disclose income from all sources and to provide details concerningthe amount and type of monthly expenses he or she incur.

The mother stated she believed her mother-in-law, who lived with the father,was contributing towards his household expenses, and she requested an order requiring the father to disclose this information. Althoughthe order was granted, the father has never complied either for the purposes of the hearing, or to date. In the circumstances, given thebroad discretion given to trial judges concerning financial disclosure in child support cases, it was appropriate for the judge to make theorder.

For the above reasons, I would not disturb the trial judge’s decision requiring the father to disclose whether he received financialaid from his mother. In the absence of palpable and overriding error, deference is owed. I would dismiss this ground of appeal. [32] Moving to sub-issue number three, as noted, C. lived with his father on alternating weeks from mid-November2018. The father maintained that, by improperly excluding consideration of this period under s. 9 of the Guidelines, the judge committedreversible error.

Although an error not to consider this period for the reasons expressed by the judge, this error would not change theoutcome since the judge’s determination respecting s. 9 generally is equally applicable to this period as it was from September 2019,when the Minutes of Settlement were signed. There is no merit to this submission, in my opinion, and I would dismiss this ground. C.

The order requiring the father to pay half of the property taxes and property insurance on the marital home [33] Following the separation, on April 1, 2017, the father continued to reside in the marital home until September29, 2017, and he contributed towards the household expenses. Following his departure, he terminated all financial contributions towardsthe household expenses. The judge ordered him to pay 50 percent of the property taxes and the house insurance premiums, reasoning asfollows: In the recent case of J.E.M. v.

L.M.M., as yet unreported, I said: Property taxes and home insurance are not comparable to utilities. If a resident uses electric power or water during a month, it isreasonable to expect that resident to be responsible for the cost of the resources consumed. Property taxes and insurance are accounts forthe building regardless of consumption. The property taxes are a bill submitted by the government to the owner of the building toreimburse the government for the expenses that it incurs for all properties in the area.

Property taxes will support emergency services,road construction, parks and recreation, infrastructure, and other necessary services. The insurance is intended to be a protection for theproperty owners if there is serious damage to the building or some claim of injury that occurs at that locale. There is no basis for one ofthe owners of a building to pass that expense off to the other unless it is in an offset situation. (Mr.

M. has raised that argument, however,as already indicated and set out below, his claim that his townhouse is a marital asset supporting such an offset is not considered to bevalid.) A legal reference to support the court’s position on the taxes and insurance is the case of G. (C.J.) v. T.(L.), a N.B.Q.B. decision of Baird,J, (now Baird, J.A.) cited at 2009 NBQB 175, 2009 CarswellNB 279. Justice Baird simply determined that both owners were equallyliable for the property taxes and insurance (see paragraph 105). [para. 367] [34] The father argues the judge erred in law when he made this order.

I respectfully disagree. Until the issue of thefinal disposition of the marital home is resolved, it is my view that both spouses are equally responsible for the property taxes andproperty insurance, unless there has been an order requiring one party to pay occupation rent. In this case, the mother had assumedresponsibility for the utilities and the day-to-day operating expenses of the home. Had the marital home been sold, adjustments wouldhave been made for the property taxes and house insurance. The father retained an insurable interest in the marital home until the issue ofits final ownership was resolved.

The Marital Property Act, R.S.N.B. 2012, c. 107, grants authority to a judge to make such interimorders as are necessary for the delivering up, safekeeping and preservation of the marital home or household goods (s. 25). These arediscretionary orders and are fact driven (see Fox v. Fox (1993), (NB KB), 133 N.B.R. (2d) 361, [1993] N.B.J. No.

188 (QL), varied in

part in Fox v. Fox (1994), (NB CA), 153 N.B.R. (2d) 1, [1994] N.B.J. No. 415 (QL) (C.A.);C.J.G. v. L.T.G., 2009 NBQB 175, 346 N.B.R. (2d) 217, affirmed in L.T.G. v. C.J.G., 2011 NBCA 12, 369 N.B.R. (2d) 202). [35] It is my view the judge’s decision requiring the parties to equally pay the property taxes and property insuranceon the marital home until its final disposition was reasonable, and I would not disturb it. I would dismiss this ground of appeal. E. Did the judge use the wrong income figures to calculate child support?

Were the arrears calculated incorrectly? [36] The trial judge used previous year’s figures for the parents’ incomes when he calculated child support. Thiswas clearly wrong.

The Guidelines require disclosure of not only proof of income for the three years prior to the year of the hearing,along with the Notices of Assessments and Reassessments, but they also require current year-to-date proof of income to ensure the courthas the best income figures it can possibly have at the time the child support order is made (s. 21). [37] An interim order, effective November 14, 2017, required the parents to exchange income information on anannual basis no later than June of each year, and it was contemplated they would adjust their child support payments effective thatmonth.

As an example, at para. 221 of the decision, the judge states that his “intention was that child support would be adjusted based onthe incomes of the preceding year with an adjustment date of June 1 in each [year]. This would suggest, for at least the first 5 months of2018, the parties’ income for 2016 would be the basis for child support.” This was the first error. [38] As noted by the judge in para. 222 of his decision, neither party exchanged his or her financial information asrequired. However, what the Guidelines contemplate is clear. Child support is income driven.

Once a parent is aware that his or herincome has changed from the previous taxation year, he or she has an obligation to disclose that change to the other parent. Taxpayershave until April 30 to file their T1 General Income Tax Return. Typically, a Notice of Assessment, or Notice of Reassessment, if any, isreceived by midyear. Any adjustment in child support has retroactive effect to January 1 of that calendar year. In Colucci v. Colucci,2021 SCC 24, [2021] S.C.J.

No. 24 (QL), Martin J. described adequate, accurate and timely financial disclosure as the linchpin on whichfair child support depends (paras. 4 and 45-50). [39] It is an error of law for a court to calculate child support based on outdated financial disclosure, absent,perhaps, an order made under ss. 17 or 19(1) of the Guidelines in a case where income is averaged or imputed (see Trevors v. Jenkins,2011 NBCA 61, 375 N.B.R. (2d) 293, at para. 15; Campbell v. Vaughan, 2016 NBCA 9, 447 N.B.R. (2d) 132; M.K.R. v. J.A.R., 2015NBCA 73, 443 N.B.R. (2d) 313, at para. 27; G.F. v.

J.A.C.F., 2016 NBCA 21, 449 N.B.R. (2d) 34). [40] In M.K.R., the Court wrote: In Scott v. Scott, 2004 NBCA 99, 278 N.B.R. (2d) 61, Richard J.A. states: The governing principles for the determination of income for the purposes of child support are set out in ss. 16-20 of the Federal ChildSupport Guidelines subject to the interpretive rule set out in s. 2(3) that “the most current information must be used”. (para. 35) [para. 25] [41] On the issue of arrears, the father argues that if there are arrears owing, they should be assessed and set out inthe order. I agree. As the Court concluded in T.M.D. v.

J.P.G., 2018 NBCA 15, [2018] N.B.J. No. 44 (QL), when a court assesses arrears,the resulting order must specify the amount; otherwise, there can be no enforcement of the order (para. 16). The arrears assessed by thejudge in his decision require adjustment to December 1, 2017, due to the incorrect use of income information. [42] Because of the delay in rendering the decision, current financial disclosure was not available to the judge. Thejudge neither considered nor requested the parents’ incomes for 2020 and 2021. The respondent has conceded this ground of appeal.

Iwould refer the issue of the calculation of child support under s. 3 of the Guidelines, as well as the payment of pro rata shares of specialexpenses for the children under s. 7 of the Guidelines, to be recalculated from December 1, 2017, to the date of the decision, May 6,2021. The actual incomes of the parties for those calendar years will determine the amount of child support to be paid under s. 3 of the

Guidelines , as well as the pro rata shares of eligible s. 7 expenses to be paid, minus the payments the father made during those years. The arrears can be calculated, if any, and dealt with by the judge consistent with these reasons. However, this result should be read bearing in mind our rejection of the father’s submission the judge erred in his s. 9 analysis. F. Cross-Appeal: was the judge’s decision to order a review of spousal support incorrect? [ 43 ] The mother cross-appeals asking whether the trial judge erred in not providing for a review of spousal support on the cessation of child support.

The father took no position. The judge started his spousal support analysis with a review of s. 15.2 of the Act . In the following paragraph, he wrote: I have concluded Ms. H. is entitled to spousal support on a compensatory basis for an indeterminate period and subject to a review of her employment and her financial circumstances after 5 years. Spousal support shall be at the mid-range. [para. 323] Here he was referring to the mid-range of the SSAG . [ 44 ] Neither party takes issue with the fact this was a long-term relationship.

They had cohabited prior to their nineteen-year marriage, during which three children were born. Following the births of the children, Ms. H. took extended maternity leaves. She was working part-time as a licenced physiotherapist at the time of separation. The judge found she was the primary caregiver to the children, attending school activities, medical/dental appointments and extracurricular activities. There was evidence, which the judge accepted, that she suffered from a number of job-related physical problems for which she had received medical treatment. This troubled him.

He found that, with the child support he had ordered, she was self-sufficient, but he was concerned about whether she could continue to work. [ 45 ] Mr. H. had a permanent full-time job with NB Power and, in 2017, his income was $99,358.62. At the time of the separation, the marital home was mortgage free, there were substantial savings and pension funds, RESP funds and very little debt. The judge conducted a thorough review of the monthly expenses for each spouse. He looked at the individual line items set out in their respective financial statements.

He then decided he would use their 2016 incomes as being the most representative of their circumstances (para. 351). He noted this was the year the parties “chose to use when they first appeared” before him in October 2017. He applied these figures for the calculation of spousal support under the SSAG using the “with child support” formula. [ 46 ] In 2016, Mr. H.’s employment income was $110,656, and Ms. H. had employment income of $57,554 (para. 353). At para. 354 of the decision, after completing the necessary calculations, the judge decided Ms.

H. was entitled to receive $39 monthly (the mid-range) for her spousal support, subject to a review on or before May 31, 2026, should her employment income be reduced because of her physical inability to perform her duties. Prior to this decision, no spousal support was paid, although it had been requested in the Petition for Divorce. There was no discussion concerning the retroactive effect of this order, and it is not a ground in the cross-appeal. At para. 356, he wrote that the review was to be focussed on Ms. H.’s “economic circumstances at the time.” At para. 353, the analysis goes off track, in my opinion.

The judge assesses spousal support for 2017, using the New Brunswick Table effective November 22, 2017; however, he uses 2016 income figures for the purposes of his calculations, and he did not apply the proper algorithm. The duration of the relationship exceeded twenty years. After he fixes the amount of spousal support at the mid-range, he adds: “As noted, she is entitled to support for an indefinite period, based upon the mid-range.” This statement is incompatible, in my opinion, with what he did next.

Starting at para. 355, the judge provides his rationale for a review of spousal support on or before May 31, 2026, as noted. [ 47 ] Ms. H. agrees the judge correctly awarded indefinite, compensatory spousal support. However, she submits the judge committed two reversible errors of law. First, she argues he did not provide for a review of spousal support on the basis the father’s obligation to pay child support would cease, and he failed to differentiate between a review and a variation of spousal support. Second, he used the wrong income figures in

Schedule “A” of his decision and erred in applying the SSAG when he fixed the quantum of spousal support, as attached as

Schedule “A” to his decision. [ 48 ] Before wading further into the analysis, I believe it useful to review the principles which animate spousal support variation orders under the Act . Subsections 17(1) , (4.1) and (7) of the Act provide as follows: Variation order Ordonnance modificative

(1) A court of competent jurisdiction may make an order varying, rescinding or suspending, retroactively or prospectively, (

a) a support order or any provision of one, on application by either or both former spouses; (

b) a parenting order or any provision of one, on application by (

i) either or both former spouses, or (ii) a person, other than a former spouse, who is a parent of the child, stands in the place of a parent or intends to stand in the place of a parent; or (

c) a contact order or any provision of one, on application by a person to whom the order relates. Factors for spousal support order

(4.1) Before the court makes a variation order in respect of a spousal support order, the court shall satisfy itself that a change in the condition, means, needs or other circumstances of either former spouse has occurred since the making of the spousal support order or the last variation order made in respect of that order, and, in making the variation order, the court shall take that change into consideration. Objectives of variation order varying spousal support order

(7) A variation order varying a spousal support order should (

a) recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the former spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown; 17

(1) Le tribunal compétent peut rendre une ordonnance qui modifie, annule ou suspend, rétroactivement ou pour l’avenir :

a) une ordonnance alimentaire ou telle de ses dispositions, sur demande des ex-époux ou de l’un d’eux;

b) une ordonnance parentale ou telle de ses dispositions, sur demande : (

i) des ex-époux ou de l’un d’eux, (ii) d’une personne autre qu’un ex-époux qui est l’un des parents de l’enfant, lui en tient lieu ou a l’intention d’en tenir lieu;

c) une ordonnance de contact ou telle de ses dispositions, sur demande de toute personne visée par l’ordonnance. Facteurs — ordonnance alimentaire au profit d’un époux

(4.1) Avant de rendre une ordonnance modificative de l’ordonnance alimentaire au profit d’un époux, le tribunal s’assure qu’il est survenu un changement dans les ressources, les besoins ou, d’une façon générale, la situation de l’un ou l’autre des ex-époux depuis que cette ordonnance ou la dernière ordonnance modificative de celle-ci a été rendue et tient compte du changement en rendant l’ordonnance modificative. Objectifs de l’ordonnance modificative de l’ordonnance alimentaire au profit d’un époux

(7) L’ordonnance modificative de l’ordonnance alimentaire au profit d’un époux vise :

a) à prendre en compte les avantages ou inconvénients économiques qui découlent pour les ex-époux du mariage ou de son échec;

b) à répartir entre eux les conséquences

(

b) apportion between the former spouses anyfinancial consequences arising from the careof any child of the marriage over and aboveany obligation for the support of any child ofthe marriage; (

c) relieve any economic hardship of theformer spouses arising from the breakdownof the marriage; and (

d) in so far as practicable, promote theeconomic self-sufficiency of each formerspouse within a reasonable period of time. économiques qui découlent du soin de toutenfant à charge, en sus de toute obligationalimentaire relative à tout enfant à charge;

c) à remédier à toute difficulté économiqueque l’échec du mariage leur cause;

d) à favoriser, dans la mesure du possible,l’indépendance économique de chacun d’euxdans un délai raisonnable. [49] The starting point for an analysis under s. 15.2 of the Act is the determination whether there is a bona fideclaim under the compensatory, contractual or non-compensatory principles that were skilfully set out by McLachlin J., as she then was,in Bracklow v. Bracklow, (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 420, [1999] S.C.J. No. 14 (QL).

This requires the court to considerwhether, or not, the spouse seeking spousal support has suffered an economic disadvantage arising from the marriage or its breakdown.The language first emerged in Moge v. Moge, (SCC), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813, [1992] S.C.J. No. 107 (QL), whereL’Heureux-Dubé J. opened the discussion concerning the socio-economic realities of stay-at-home spouses of that era. She wrote: The financial consequences of the end of a marriage extend beyond the simple loss of future earning power or losses directly related tothe care of children.

They will often encompass loss of seniority, missed promotions and lack of access to fringe benefits such as pensionplans, life, disability, dental and health insurance (see H. Joshi and H. Davies, “Pensions, Divorce and Wives’ Double Burden” (1992), 6Int’l J. L. & Fam. 289).

As persons outside of the work force cannot take advantage of job-retraining and the upgrading of skillsprovided by employers, one serious economic consequence of remaining out of the work force is that the value of education and jobtraining often decreases with each year in comparison to those who remain active in the work force and may even become redundantafter several years of non-use.

All of these factors contribute to the inability of a person not in the labour force to develop economicsecurity for retirement in his or her later years. [p. 867] [50] Economic self-sufficiency is embedded in s. 15.2 of the Act. A spousal support order should be tailored topromote the economic self-sufficiency of the recipient spouse as soon as practicable and in consideration of the person’s age, education,health and other circumstances. [51] In L.M.P. v. L.S., 2011 SCC 64, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 775, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the goal ofeconomic self-sufficiency may not be realistic in every case.

Recently, in D.G. v. M.G., 2019 NBCA 69, [2019] N.B.J. No. 281 (QL),Quigg J.A. discussed the objectives of spousal support under s. 15.2 of the Act. She wrote: In determining duration of spousal support, the length of the relationship is only one of the factors to be considered pursuant to s. 15.2(4)of the Divorce Act.

According to s. 8.5 of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, there are two tests that establish the range forduration in the basic “with child support” formula: 1) the “length-of-marriage” test; and 2) the “age-of-children” test. [para. 41] [52] The judge, in this case, recognized the mother should try to attain economic self-sufficiency. He wasconcerned it might not be realistic because of her health issues.

He was clearly alive to the fact that, with her combined employmentincome and child support, she could support herself; however, given the ages of children, the child support would cease in a few years.He tied the review of spousal support to the mother’s ability to achieve economic self-sufficiency, which, in his opinion, would bepossible by 2026, or in five years. The mother argues this was wrong. I agree. The Supreme Court weighed in on the difference betweena review and a variation of spousal support in Leskun v.

Leskun, 2006 SCC 25, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 920, clearly distinguishing between them,and cautioning trial judges about using reviews. [53] This leads to the judge’s analysis in this case. It is clear the judge recognized the distinction. A review of aspousal support order does not require the recipient spouse to prove there has been a material change in his or her circumstances since themaking of the previous order, as is required in a s. 17 variation application. In Black v. Black, 2015 NBCA 63, [2015] N.B.J. No. 235(QL), this Court wrote:

Review hearings carry different evidentiary burdens than variation hearings pursuant to s. 17 of the Act. In Leskun, the Supreme Courtcautioned judges not to order reviews of final spousal support orders unless there is an essential issue requiring review, and only whenthe terms of the review have been “tightly delimited” in the original order for corollary relief. The rationale for this instruction isgrounded in the prohibition against re-litigation of a decided issue. On a review hearing, “nobody bears an onus to show changed circumstances” (Leskun, para. 39).

The recipient spouse should presentevidence of his/her efforts to achieve self-sufficiency, and the motion judge can then modify or terminate the order. On a variationhearing, however, the moving party bears the onus to satisfy the threshold requirement of material change stipulated in s. 17 of the Act.These are important distinctions that govern how a hearing judge must approach motions to vary spousal support.

These distinctions arealso of importance to the parties, as, arguably, on a review, it is contemplated that support would continue absent any change towardseconomic self-sufficiency by the recipient spouse. On a variation hearing, the hearing judge has broader latitude in the scope of evidencehe/she will receive to conduct the analysis set out in s. 17 of the Act. Hence, it is of critical importance for the hearing judge to identifythe jurisdictional basis for the decision, i.e. whether the case falls under the compensatory or non-compensatory model of support.

In thecase at bar, both parties sought a variation of the corollary relief order, thus, both had an onus to provide proof of material change. Thecourt must have been satisfied “[t]his means a change, such that, if known at the time, would likely have resulted in different terms”(Willick, per Sopinka J. at para. 21). [paras. 15-16] [54] The purpose of a review hearing is discussed in the SSAG: The Revised User’s Guide (2016), at p. 73.

Inreality, it is a trial de novo during which the court receives evidence and considers anew the objectives of a spousal support order inconsideration of the criteria set out in s. 15.2 of the Act. At a variation hearing, the authority of the court is limited to a consideration ofthe material change of circumstances argument (see Willick v. Willick, (SCC), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 670, [1994] S.C.J. No. 94 (QL)). See also Droit de la famille – 141364, 2014 QCCA 1144, [2014] J.Q. no 5419 (QL), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2014]S.C.C.A. No. 459; Dedes v. Dedes, 2015 BCCA 194, [2015] B.C.J. No. 883 (QL); Goodkey v.

Goodkey, 2015 ABCA 394, [2015] A.J.No. 1361 (QL). [55] I adopt the reasons in Goodkey, where the Court of Appeal of Alberta concluded the cessation of child supportconstituted a material change of circumstances sufficient to justify a variation in spousal support. As an aside, it is now settled that theSSAG apply the same way in applications to vary spousal support as they do in initial applications (see Gray v. Gray, 2014 ONCA 659;[2014] O.J. No. 4519 (QL); Schulstad v. Schulstad, 2017 ONCA 95, [2017] O.J. No. 513 (QL); Pustai v. Pustai, 2018 ONCA 785,[2018] O.J. No. 5225 (QL); Black v.

Black). [56] In this case, the judge writes, at para. 361, that “the first two objectives in s. 15.2(6) [of the Act] were ofprimary importance” to him. He then states, “[…] if Ms. H. suffers economic hardship as a result of her inability to continue doing herjob, it is as a direct result of the breakdown of the marriage and her loss of a financial lifeline Mr. H. would have provided and it wouldrestore to Ms. H. an income that would continue to promote or re-establish economic sufficiency.” With respect, this statementmisinterprets the facts.

The judge offered no explanation to support his conclusion the mother’s inability to work was a direct result ofthe breakdown of the marriage. This family made a decision she would work part-time so that she could be the primary caregiver to thechildren. [57] The mother’s career setback was further complicated by health issues that were directly related to her work as aphysiotherapist. The judge found she was entitled to “indefinite” spousal support based on ss. 15.2(6)(

a) and (

b) of the Act, which statethat a spousal support order should:

a) recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown; and

b) apportion between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over and above anyobligation for the support of any child of the marriage. These two provisions were comprehensively discussed in Bracklow. In that case, the wife had suffered from a medical condition that wasknown to both spouses, and that predated the breakdown of the marriage.

The Supreme Court comprehensively canvassed how pre-existing conditions would affect an application to vary under s. 17 of the Act. [58] A material change has been described as significant and long-lasting and cannot have been contemplated by thespouses at the time of the original order (see G. (L.) v. B. (G.), (SCC), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 370, [1995] S.C.J. No. 72 (QL),

at paras. 48-51 ; L.M.P. at para. 35 ; Black , at paras. 40-42 ). A material change in this case would include the cessation of child support as contemplated in s. 15.3(3) of the Act . In L.M.P. , the Supreme Court described material change as a change that is substantial and continuing and that, if known at the time, would likely have resulted in a different order or agreement; however, in L.M.P. , the Supreme Court did not have to consider the fact that child support, by statute, is given priority over spousal support. [ 59 ] In this case, s. 15.3 of the Act applies, yet it was not considered.

Section 15.3 of the Act provides: Priority to child support 15.3

(1) Where a court is considering an application for a child support order and an application for a spousal support order, the court shall give priority to child support in determining the applications. Reasons

(2) Where, as a result of giving priority to child support, the court is unable to make a spousal support order or the court makes a spousal support order in an amount that is less than it otherwise would have been, the court shall record its reasons for having done so. Consequences of reduction or termination of child support order

(3) Where, as a result of giving priority to child support, a spousal support order was not made, or the amount of a spousal support order is less than it otherwise would have been, any subsequent reduction or termination of that child support constitutes a change of circumstances for the purposes of applying for a spousal support order, or a variation order in respect of the spousal support order, as the case may be . [Emphasis added.] Priorité aux aliments pour enfants 15.3

(1) Dans le cas où une demande d’ordonnance alimentaire au profit d’un enfant et une demande d’ordonnance alimentaire au profit d’un époux lui sont présentées, le tribunal donne la priorité aux aliments de l’enfant. Motifs

(2) Si, en raison du fait qu’il a donné la priorité aux aliments de l’enfant, il ne peut rendre une ordonnance alimentaire au profit d’un époux ou fixe un montant moindre pour les aliments de celui-ci, le tribunal enregistre les motifs de sa décision. Réduction ou suppression des aliments de l’enfant

(3) Dans le cadre d’une demande d’ordonnance alimentaire au profit d’un époux ou d’une ordonnance modificative de celle-ci, la réduction ou la suppression des aliments d’un enfant constitue un changement dans la situation des ex-époux si, en raison du fait qu’il a donné la priorité aux aliments de l’enfant, le tribunal n’a pu rendre une ordonnance alimentaire au profit de l’époux ou a fixé un montant moindre pour les aliments de celui-ci . [C’est moi qui souligne.] [ 60 ] The framework set out in s. 15.3 is consistent with the legislative intent of the Guidelines . Priority is given to orders for child support.

The SSAG recognize this as well. Because of a child support order, the quantum of spousal support is potentially reduced, as it was in this case. The drafters of the Act clearly acknowledged this reality when they contemplated that any reduction or termination of child support would constitute a change of circumstances for the purpose of applying for, or varying, a spousal support order under s. 17 . [ 61 ] Having found an indefinite entitlement to spousal support, the judge, in my view, should have left the order there.

His decision was not properly grounded on the promotion of economic self-sufficiency for the reasons noted, yet he ordered a review on that basis. The decision to order a review, in my opinion, was clearly wrong, and I would reverse the trial judge’s decision by removing the reference to a review in the order. The mother may apply to vary the quantum of spousal support when child support ceases, or should she suffer a material change in her circumstances as set out in s. 17 of the Act .

The issue concerning the judge’s calculation of spousal support is genuine, however, and I would refer it to a judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench to conduct the proper calculations under the SSAG .

[62] It is clear the judge recognized the distinction between a review and a variation hearing. However, in my view,he fell into reversible error when he ordered a review on the terms noted. The judge also erred when he calculated the quantum ofspousal support by using the incorrect income information and algorithm. I would allow the cross-appeal for these reasons. G. Additional comments [63] In M.R. v. J.R., 2018 NBCA 12, [2018] N.B.J.

No. 104 (QL), on the issue of the failure to comply with courtorders, this Court wrote: Public confidence in the judicial system is undermined when litigants are permitted to willfully disobey court orders or statutoryobligations without redress. Parties who obtain court orders are entitled to take comfort in the knowledge the system will not let themdown and that there will be consequences to the party who fails to comply. Respect for the administration of justice and the rule of law isthe cornerstone of our democracy, and court orders must be obeyed.

This matter, in my opinion, is a textbook case of the scorched earthapproach to family litigation which, sadly, is becoming all too common. In Leskun v. Leskun, 2006 SCC 25, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 920, the Supreme Court quoted with approval, the comments of Fraser J. in Cunha v.da Cunha, (BC SC), [1994] B.C.J. No. 2573 (S.C.) (QL), regarding the impact of non-disclosure in family litigation: In all of these circumstances, the appellant has a poor platform from which to launch an attack against the trial judge’s conclusionregarding his assets and liabilities. As Fraser J. commented in Cunha v.

Cunha (1994), (BC SC), 99 B.C.L.R. (2d) 93(S.C.), at para. 9: Non-disclosure of assets is the cancer of matrimonial property litigation. It discourages settlement or promotes settlements which areinadequate. It increases the time and expense of litigation. The prolonged stress of unnecessary battle may lead weary and drainedwomen simply to give up and walk away with only a share of the assets they know about, taking with them the bitter aftertaste of areasonably-based suspicion that justice was not done. […] (para. 34) See also Gray v. Rizzi, 2016 ONCA 152, [2016] O.J.

No. 958 (QL), at para. 31. [paras. 38-39] [64] It was drawn to our attention that the father has yet to comply with “any of the resulting orders of the trialjudge” as found in the order dated November 3, 2021 (Respondent’s submission, at p. 5). He did not seek a stay of those orders pendingthis appeal. I am steadfast in my belief that the judiciary remain the gatekeepers to a healthy, functioning system of justice. To maintainthe confidence in, and the respect for, the administration of justice, judges must ensure that court orders are obeyed, and when they arenot, consequences should follow.

Penalties for the failure to comply with statutory financial disclosure obligations have been built intoRule 72.14(6) and into s. 22 of the Guidelines. The penalties include the imposition of a fine, the striking out of pleadings and the refusalto hear a claim. Sanctions of this nature should be applied in these cases. I am aware that some courts have refused to entertain an appealwhen a stay of the lower court decision has not been sought and/or granted, in those cases when the appellant is in clear violation of alower court’s decision (see Dickie v.

Dickie, 2007 SCC 8, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 346, at para. 6; Chiaramonte v. Chiaramonte, 2013 ONCA641, [2013] O.J. No. 4790 (QL), at paras. 28-29; Manchanda v. Thethi, 2016 ONCA 909; [2016] O.J. No. 6290 (QL); Cosentino v.Cosentino, 2017 ONCA 593, [2017] O.J. No. 3608 (QL); Mullin v. Sherlock, 2018 ONCA 1063, [2018] O.J. No. 6743 (QL)). [65] We recognize that ongoing litigation may become yet another vehicle of harassment and economic oppressionin some family law cases.

Economically disadvantaged spouses are often unable to meet the case, because they cannot afford legalrepresentation, they represent themselves, or the funds they receive as a result of a settlement are depleted by ongoing legal fees.

In myopinion, in those cases where a party comes to this Court, seeking to overturn an order of a lower court when a stay has not beensubstantially requested or ordered, and matters of child and/or spousal support are in play, this Court has discretion not to hear the caseuntil that party is in compliance with the lower court order, or there has been a stay granted with respect to that order. This case isexceptional because there was a cross-appeal concerning the spousal support order itself. V. Costs

[ 66 ] There were six grounds of appeal and, as noted, the sixth ground contained sub-grounds, some of which were resolved by way of the Order executed November 3, 2021. The appellant has been successful with respect to one ground of his appeal, that being, the judge erred in law by failing to use the actual incomes of the parties in the calendar years when child support was to be calculated. I would order costs based on this one ground of appeal at $750. The respondent has been substantially successful in her cross- appeal. I would order costs in the amount of $2,500. VI.

Disposition [ 67 ] I would allow the appeal with respect to the child support calculations for the years 2017 to May 6, 2021, and I would refer that issue to a Court of Queen’s Bench judge for calculation under both ss. 3 and 7 of the Guidelines . I would order costs on the appeal in the amount of $750. I would allow the cross-appeal in part, vary the judge’s order to delete any reference to a review, and I would refer the proper calculation of spousal support under the SSAG to a judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench. I would order costs on the cross-appeal in the amount of $2,500.

Version française de la décision de la Cour rendue par LA JUGE BAIRD I. Introduction [1] Dans l’appel dont nous sommes saisis, l’appelant (le père) prétend que le juge de première instance n’a pas procédé à une analyse appropriée pour l’application de l’ art. 9 des Lignes directrices fédérales sur les pensions alimentaires pour enfants , DORS/97-175 (les Lignes directrices ).

Il demande que l’ordonnance concernant le montant mensuel des aliments pour enfants et les dépenses spéciales soit [TRADUCTION] « annulée » et qu’un [TRADUCTION] « nouveau » montant soit calculé, que la décision concernant le paiement de l’impôt foncier et des primes d’assurance par le père soit [TRADUCTION] « infirmée et annulée », que l’ordonnance lui enjoignant de présenter une preuve des contributions financières de sa mère aux dépenses du ménage soit annulée, et que des dépens lui soient accordés.

Les deux parties conviennent que le juge a commis des erreurs. [2] La demande reconventionnelle fait intervenir le droit en matière de modification des ordonnances alimentaires matrimoniales rendues en vertu des art. 15.2 et 17 de la

Loi sur le divorce , L.R.C. 1985, ch. 3 (2 e suppl .) (la Loi ). L’intimée (la mère) affirme que l’évaluation faite par le juge, qui était jointe à la décision comme

annexe A, n’était pas conforme aux Lignes directrices facultatives en matière de pensions alimentaires pour époux (les Lignes directrices facultatives ), que le juge n’a pas fait de distinction entre la révision et la modification des aliments matrimoniaux et qu’il a commis une erreur lorsqu’il a ordonné une révision. II. Moyens d’appel résolus par ordonnance judiciaire [3] La juge en chef DeWare a signé une ordonnance le 3 novembre 2021, à la suite du dépôt de la décision le 6 mai 2021. Entre parenthèses, ce n’est pas la juge DeWare qui a rendu la décision; le juge du procès avait pris sa retraite.

L’ordonnance qu’elle a signée reflétait la décision du juge de première instance, avec quelques corrections mineures. Les parties devaient fournir une preuve de leur assurance-vie dans les trente jours qui suivraient, les aliments pour enfants ont été calculés pour les périodes du 1 er décembre 2017 au 31 mai 2018, du 1 er juin 2018 au 31 décembre 2018, du 1 er janvier 2019 au 30 septembre 2019 et du 1 er octobre 2019 au 31 décembre 2019, conformément à la décision.

Il a été ordonné au père de fournir de la documentation financière dans les trente jours qui suivraient, afin de convaincre la mère et la Cour du montant des contributions que sa mère avait faites aux dépenses de son ménage, le cas échéant. [4] En application des art. 3 et 9 des Lignes directrices , il a été ordonné au père de verser des aliments pour

enfants de 891 $ par mois pour la période allant du 1 er octobre 2019 au 31 décembre 2019. À compter du 1 er janvier 2020, le père devait verser 1 240 $ par mois, jusqu’à nouvelle ordonnance de la Cour. [5] L’arriéré des « dépenses spéciales » visées à l’art. 7 des Lignes directrices qui ont été supportées pour les enfants a été calculé et fixé pour les années 2017 à 2020. Il a été ordonné au père de payer l’arriéré de 5 420 $ immédiatement.

Il a été ordonné aux parents de s’échanger des copies de leurs déclarations de revenus et de leurs avis de cotisation au plus tard le 31 mai, à partir de 2021 et chaque année par la suite. [6] Les dispositions touchant la communication par les parents des dépenses supportées pour les enfants et les rajustements aux aliments pour enfants reflétaient la décision du juge.

Des dispositions touchant le paiement des aliments matrimoniaux ont été établies et reflétaient une date de révision du 31 mai 2026. [7] Il a été ordonné au père de payer cinquante pour cent de l’impôt foncier et de l’assurance habitation à l’égard du foyer matrimonial à compter de 2018. [8] Il y avait des dispositions concernant le transfert des régimes enregistrés d’épargne-études pour les enfants. Enfin, des dépens de 7 000 $ ont été accordés, payables immédiatement.

La même ordonnance contenait des corrections à des erreurs mathématiques faites par le juge et traitait de l’arriéré des aliments pour enfants pour les mois d’octobre et de novembre 2017. Toutes ces dispositions, à l’exception des corrections mathématiques mineures auxquelles les parents ont consenti, reflétaient la décision rendue par le juge de première instance le 6 mai 2021. [9] Le père prétend qu’il reste les erreurs suivantes :

a) Le juge a commis une erreur justifiant l’infirmation de la décision en n’ajustant pas les aliments pour l’enfant C. à compter du 1 er décembre 2018 selon la formule établie à l’art. 9 des Lignes directrices ;

b) Le juge n’a pas donné suffisamment de motifs à l’appui de son calcul des aliments pour l’enfant C. conformément aux art. 7 et 9 des Lignes directrices ;

c) Le juge a commis une erreur de droit lorsqu’il a conclu que l’appelant était conjointement responsable de payer l’impôt foncier et les primes d’assurance habitation à l’égard du foyer matrimonial;

d) Le juge a commis une erreur en ordonnant au père de communiquer les contributions faites par un tiers, le cas échéant, à savoir les contributions faites par sa mère pour l’aider à payer les dépenses de son ménage;

e) Le juge n’a pas calculé les aliments pour enfants en fonction des revenus les plus à jour des parties dans l’année civile dans laquelle l’ordonnance a pris effet, contrairement au par. 2(3) des Lignes directrices ;

f) Le juge de première instance a commis une erreur de droit en ne déterminant pas si l’appelant devait payer un arriéré d’aliments pour enfants ou s’il avait fait des paiements en trop. [10] Comme nous l’avons indiqué, l’appel reconventionnel fait intervenir les art. 15.2 et 17 de la Loi , le libellé de l’ordonnance alimentaire matrimoniale et la manière dont le juge a calculé le montant des aliments matrimoniaux en application des Lignes directrices facultatives . [11] Trois enfants sont nés du mariage. Au moment de la séparation, H. avait seize ans, K. avait treize ans et C. avait dix ans.

Malheureusement, cette famille se retrouve devant les tribunaux du Nouveau-Brunswick depuis le 14 août 2017, date à laquelle la mère a déposé la requête en divorce. Non seulement les deux parents ont-ils investi beaucoup en termes de temps et de ressources financières, mais ils n’ont toujours pas de solution permanente, malgré une audience tenue du 9 au 12 septembre 2019, le

12 juin 2020 et du 15 au 17 juin 2020, les motifs de la décision ayant été rendus le 6 mai 2021. Les deux parties reconnaissent qu’il y aencore des questions importantes à résoudre, et elles se tournent vers notre Cour pour leur offrir une solution. [12] Comme nous l’avons mentionné pendant l’audience relative à l’appel, nous voyons ici un exemple classiquedu genre de situation qui a conduit à l’adoption de la règle portant sur les conférences de règlement amiable (règle 62.1).

Cette règle nepermet pas à la Cour de prescrire la tenue d’une conférence de règlement amiable de sa propre initiative; les deux parties peuventtoutefois en faire la demande. La demande de conférence de règlement amiable doit être faite conjointement par les avocats des parties etêtre signée par les avocats. La règle précise ce que les participants doivent faire et ce que peut faire le juge qui préside la conférence.

Vules longs délais pour obtenir des dates de procès et les coûts associés à un appel subséquent, j’estime que l’on devrait avoir plus souventrecours à cette règle en appel, surtout dans des cas comme celui dont nous sommes saisis. III. Norme de contrôle [13] Notre Cour est une instance correctrice d’erreurs. Une audience en appel ne fournit pas à une

partie l’occasionde plaider sa cause de nouveau; le tribunal d’appel ne [TRADUCTION] « remanie » pas non plus les décisions rendues par les jugesd’instance inférieure. La Cour fera preuve de retenue à l’égard des conclusions de fait auxquelles le juge du procès est arrivé, sauf si elleconclut que ces conclusions étaient si manifestement erronées qu’elles constituent une erreur manifeste et dominante. Une erreur de droitest susceptible de contrôle selon la norme de la décision correcte. Je souscris aux motifs de la juge Larlee dans MacDonald c.

MacDonald, 2011 NBCA 25, 372 R.N.-B. (2e) 179, où elle a écrit ce qui suit : La norme de contrôle qui s’applique généralement aux affaires familiales exige une grande retenue face à la décision du juge. Untribunal d’appel a le pouvoir d’annuler ou de modifier une décision ou une ordonnance lorsqu’elle est le fruit d’une erreur de droit, d’uneerreur de principe, d’une erreur significative dans l’interprétation de la preuve, ou si elle est manifestement erronée (voir Hickey c. Hickey, (SCC), [1999] 2 R.C.S. 518, [1999] A.C.S. no 9 (QL), par. 11, Van de Perre c. Edwards, 2001 CSC 60, [2001] 2 R.C.S. 1014, Savoie c.

Levesque, 2009 NBCA 47, [2009] A.N.-B. no 282 (QL), Mme P.H. c. M. P.H., 2008 NBCA 17, [2008] A.N.-B. no 52 (QL), Milton c. Milton, 2008 NBCA 87, 338 R.N.-B. (2e) 300, par. 14, J.E.J. c. S.L.M., 2007 NBCA 33, [2007] A.N.-B. no 249 (QL), par. 35, et S.H. c. V.B., 2007 NBCA 69, 321 R.N.-B. (2e) 314, par. 2). [par. 7] IV. Analyse A., B. & D. Le juge a-t-il commis une erreur dans l’analyse qu’il a effectuée conformément aux art. 7 et 9 des Lignes directrices? Lejuge a-t-il commis une erreur en ordonnant à l’appelant de divulguer les contributions financières de sa mère aux dépenses de sonménage?

L’analyse faite par le juge conformément à l’art. 9 aurait-elle dû comprendre la période qui a précédé la signature du compterendu du règlement amiable en septembre 2019? [14] Le père soutient que l’art. 9 des Lignes directrices s’applique, puisque C. a emménagé avec lui par alternancehebdomadaire à compter du mois de novembre 2018, et que les aliments qu’il devait payer à son égard auraient dû être recalculésconformément à l’art. 9 en fonction de sa garde partagée de C.

Il prétend en outre que le juge a commis une erreur lorsqu’il lui a ordonnéde fournir de l’information concernant les contributions financières que sa mère aurait faites, le cas échéant, à l’égard des dépenses deson ménage, malgré le fait qu’il a témoigné qu’elle n’avait pas fait de contributions. [15] Comme ces moyens d’appel sont liés, je les examinerai ensemble dans cette

partie de l’analyse. La troisièmequestion secondaire sera examinée en dernier lieu. [16] Le père prétend que le juge n’a pas procédé à une analyse appropriée conformément à l’art. 9 et que les motifsqu’il a donnés sont insuffisants. Il soutient qu’une analyse appropriée aurait amené le juge à conclure qu’une compensation simpleconformément à l’al. 9a) était appropriée à compter de novembre 2018.

Comme je l’ai indiqué, à compter de novembre 2018, C. acommencé à vivre chez son père par alternance hebdomadaire, malgré l’ordonnance provisoire rendue en novembre 2017 qui prévoyaitque C. habiterait surtout chez la mère. Le juge a rejeté l’argument du père pour des motifs qui, à mon avis, ne révèlent pas d’erreurjustifiant l’infirmation de sa décision selon les faits de l’espèce. [17] C. est né le 3 octobre 2006. Lorsque les parties se sont séparées le 1er avril 2017, il avait dix ans. Lorsque ladécision a été rendue, il avait quatorze ans.

La mère en a demandé la garde exclusive, ou la garde conjointe, sa résidence principale

devant alors être chez elle; elle a aussi demandé un calendrier d’alternance hebdomadaire et un accès avec nuitée pour le père au milieu de la semaine. Dans la demande reconventionnelle modifiée qu’il a déposée le 14 mai 2018, le père a sollicité une ordonnance de parentage partagé de C., avec un calendrier d’alternance hebdomadaire.

Il soutenait que les aliments pour enfants devaient être calculés conformément aux art. 3 et 9 des Lignes directrices et que les dépenses spéciales prévues à l’art. 7 des Lignes directrices devaient être payées proportionnellement; cependant, pour la première fois, il a prétendu qu’un revenu devait être attribué à la mère en vertu de l’art. 19 des Lignes directrices .

En réponse à la demande reconventionnelle modifiée, la mère a contesté la demande d’attribution de revenu et a demandé d’être entendue relativement à la garde et à l’accès. [18] Le 12 février 2018, le même juge qui a été saisi de l’affaire en fin de compte a signé une ordonnance provisoire qui, comme je l’ai indiqué, a pris effet le 14 novembre 2017. L’ordonnance ne prévoyait rien quant à la garde de H., en raison de son âge; les parents ont toutefois obtenu la garde conjointe des enfants K. et C., la mère étant la pourvoyeuse principale de soins et les enfants devant vivre chez elle.

Le père a obtenu la [TRADUCTION] « garde régulière » par alternance hebdomadaire et un mercredi sur deux, et des dispositions ont été prévues pour l’accès pendant les vacances. [19] S’agissant des aliments pour enfants, l’ordonnance provisoire prévoyait ce qui suit :

a) Le père payerait des aliments pour K. et C. en fonction de son revenu pour 2016, soit 111 600 $ moins des cotisations syndicales de 944 $. Le juge a établi à 1 537 $ le montant mensuel des aliments payables selon la table applicable;

b) La mère verserait au père des aliments de 497 $ à l’égard de H., en fonction de son revenu de 59 224 $ pour 2016 moins les cotisations professionnelles syndicales de 1 370 $, ce qui donne une ordonnance alimentaire totale de 497 $ par mois;

c) Les deux montants ci-dessus seraient [TRADUCTION] « compensés », pour donner un paiement mensuel de 1 040 $ du père à la mère à compter du 1 er décembre 2017. [20] Au paragraphe 22, le juge a ordonné que tout arriéré d’aliments pour enfants soit traité lors de l’audience. Les dépenses pour les enfants prévues à l’art. 7 ont été établies et les parents devaient se les partager, le père en payant 65,7 % et la mère en payant 34,3 %. On prétend que les calculs faits dans l’ordonnance de la cour étaient inexacts, étant donné que le juge s’est fondé sur le revenu d’années antérieures. [21] Le père se plaint d’abord que le juge n’a pas procédé à une analyse appropriée conformément à l’art. 9, en

partie en raison de sa conclusion selon laquelle [TRADUCTION] « la situation financière de M. H. est sensiblement meilleure que celle de M me H. Entre les deux parents, c’est elle qui a le plus besoin d’argent, et c’est elle qui utilise l’argent au profit des enfants » (par. 233). Il s’agit là d’une simplification de l’analyse faite par le juge.

Après avoir examiné la preuve, le juge a conclu que c’était la mère qui avait la responsabilité financière des enfants à sa charge et que c’était elle qui avait payé la plupart des dépenses associées à C., même après novembre 2018, alors qu’il avait commencé à vivre chez son père une semaine sur deux. [22] L’article 9 des Lignes directrices est libellé ainsi :

Shared parenting time 9 If each spouse exercises not less than 40%of parenting time with a child over the courseof a year, the amount of the child supportorder must be determined by taking intoaccount (

a) the amounts set out in the applicabletables for each of the spouses; (

b) the increased costs of shared parentingtime arrangements; and (

c) the conditions, means, needs and othercircumstances of each spouse and of anychild for whom support is sought. Temps parental partagé 9 Si les deux époux exercent chacun au moins40 % du temps parental au cours d’une annéeavec un enfant, le montant de l’ordonnancealimentaire est déterminé compte tenu :

a) des montants figurant dans les tablesapplicables à l’égard de chaque époux;

b) des coûts plus élevés associés autemps parental partagé;

c) des ressources, des besoins et, d’unefaçon générale, de la situation de chaqueépoux et de tout enfant pour lequel unepension alimentaire est demandée. [23] Dans certains cas, un seul des parents achète toutes les fournitures scolaires, ou presque, et paie les déjeunersscolaires, les vêtements et les activités parascolaires ou peut-être la

partie non assurée des frais médicaux et dentaires. Dans de tellessituations, l’obligation de tenir compte des coûts plus élevés associés au parentage partagé et « des ressources, des besoins et, d’unefaçon générale, de la situation de chaque époux et de tout enfant pour lequel une pension alimentaire est demandée » peut amener le jugeà s’écarter d’une compensation simple.

On a dit de l’art. 9 qu’il s’agit d’une disposition « épineuse » pour les avocats et pour les jugespuisqu’il prévoit une analyse à deux étapes, mais il permet de s’écarter d’une compensation simple dans l’exercice d’un pouvoirdiscrétionnaire. [24] Dans J.C.M. c. M.J.M., 2018 NBCA 42, [2018] A.N.-B. no 158 (QL), la Cour a écrit ce qui suit : À mon avis, ce moyen d’appel est fondé. L’article 9 est une disposition épineuse à la fois pour les avocats et pour les tribunaux. En 2005,la Cour suprême a tenté de répondre à certaines des questions touchant son applicabilité.

Dans l’arrêt Contino, le juge Bastarache aénoncé un cadre d’analyse qui s’applique lorsque le juge conclut que les parents ont un arrangement de garde partagée (par. 43). Ce faisant, le juge Bastarache s’est exprimé ainsi : Ces objectifs créent une tension palpable dans les lignes directrices (Rogerson, p. 59 et 93). Dans Francis c.

Baker (SCC), [1999] 3 R.C.S. 250, [1999] A.C.S. no 52], j’ai dit que pour interpréter correctement une disposition, « il faut soupeser lesobjectifs de prévisibilité, d’uniformité et d’efficacité en fonction des objectifs d’équité, de souplesse et de reconnaissance des"ressources, des besoins et, d’une façon générale, de la situation [réelle] des enfants" (par. 40). Comme l’art. 4 dans cette affaire, l’art. 9doit en l’espèce être interprété en gardant ces objectifs présents à l’esprit.

Le législateur, en rédigeant l’art. 9, a volontairement misl’accent sur les objectifs d’équité, de souplesse et de reconnaissance des ressources, des besoins et, d’une façon générale, de la situationde chaque époux et de tout enfant pour lequel une pension alimentaire est demandée, même si cela compromet jusqu’à un certain point laprévisibilité, l’uniformité et l’efficacité. Le législateur reconnaît à l’art. 9 que les divers profils familiaux se traduisent par une grandevariété de modalités de garde partagée.

Dans le même ordre d’idées, la Cour d’appel de la Colombie-Britannique a fait observer qu’unemultitude de situations tombent sous le coup de l’art. 9 : Green c. Green, [2000 BCCA 310, [2001] B.C.J. No. 1001], par. 34. […] Le libellé de l’art. 9 justifie l’accent mis sur la souplesse et l’équité. Le pouvoir discrétionnaire conféré au tribunal pour la déterminationdu montant de l’ordonnance alimentaire dans le cas d’une garde partagée exige que l’on tienne compte de la situation globale des parents

(ressources et besoins) et des besoins de l’enfant. L’importance accordée à chacun des facteurs de l’ art. 9 variera selon les faits de l’espèce. […] […] L’ alinéa 9

c) confère au tribunal le vaste pouvoir discrétionnaire d’examiner les ressources et les besoins à la fois des parents et des enfants. Il s’ensuit, je le rappelle, que l’application des montants figurant dans la table et à partir desquels la compensation simple est effectuée ne saurait donc être présumée et qu’il faut s’assurer de la véracité des hypothèses qui sous-tendent ces montants au regard des faits, puisque les trois facteurs doivent être appliqués.

À nouveau, il importe de garder présents à l’esprit les objectifs des lignes directrices énoncées précédemment –normes équitables en matière de soutien alimentaire des enfants et juste contribution de chacun des parents. Dans la présente affaire, notre Cour se souciera particulièrement du ni

[…]