2021 NBCA 25, 2021 NBCA 25

COURT OF APPEAL OF COUR D’APPEL DU NEW BRUNSWICK NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK D.S. and A.C. APPELLANTS 79-20-CA D.S. et A.C. APPELANTS - and - - et - THE MINISTER OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT RESPONDENT MINISTRE DU DÉVELOPPEMENT SOCIAL INTIMÉE D.S. and A.C. v. The Minister of Social Development, 2021 NBCA 25 D.S. et A.C. c.

Ministre du Développement social, 2021 NBCA 25 CORAM: The Honourable Justice Quigg The Honourable Justice Baird The Honourable Justice LeBlond CORAM : l’honorable juge Quigg l’honorable juge Baird l’honorable juge LeBlond Appeal from a decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench: October 7, 2020 Appel d’une décision de la Cour du Banc de la Reine : le 7 octobre 2020 History of case: Decision under appeal: 2020 NBQB 185 Preliminary or incidental proceedings: None Historique de la cause : Décision frappée d’appel : 2020 NBBR 185 Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires : aucune

Appeal heard: April 13, 2021 and May 11, 2021 Judgment rendered: May 13, 2021 Reasons delivered: July 29, 2021 Appel entendu : le 13 avril 2021 et le 11 mai 2021 Jugement rendu : le 13 mai 2021 Motifs déposés : le 29 juillet 2021 Reasons for judgment by: The Honourable Justice Baird Concurred in by: The Honourable Justice Quigg The Honourable Justice LeBlond Counsel at hearing: For the appellants: Chelsea L.

Seale For the respondent: Scott Nathaniel Larson Motifs de jugement : l’honorable juge Baird Souscrivent aux motifs : l’honorable juge Quigg l’honorable juge LeBlond Avocats à l’audience : Pour les appelants : Chelsea L. Seale Pour l’intimée : Scott Nathaniel Larson THE COURT On May 13, 2021, the appeal with respect to the guardianship order and access was dismissed with reasons to follow. These are the reasons. LA COUR Le 13 mai 2021, l’appel concernant l’ordonnance de tutelle et l’accès a été refusé avec motifs à suivre. Voici ces motifs. The judgment of the Court was delivered by BAIRD, J.A.

I. Introduction [ 1 ] The parents appeal an Order which granted permanent guardianship of four young children to the Minister of Social Development (Minister), under s. 56(1) of the Family Services Act , S.N.B. 1980, c. F-2.2 , ( Act ), with no right of access to the parents.

The parents argue there was a lack of procedural fairness, that submissions made by the children’s legal representative were ignored, the reasons focused on issues other than the best interests of the children, the judge was biased, and the result is so tainted a new hearing is required, or, alternatively, this Court should issue a supervisory order. [ 2 ] In child protection hearings, the burden is always on the Minister to prove his or her case. Process is crucial, factual review is necessary, adherence to the rules of evidence is required, the correct

interpretation of legal principles is fundamental, and, finally, the neutrality and objectivity of the decision maker is expected. In

summary, the appellants contend all of the above were not respected. A. History of the proceedings [ 3 ] A.C. and D.S. are the parents of four children, A.S., aged five, B.S., aged three, R.S., aged two, and S.S., aged one when the guardianship order was granted. B.S. suffers from a condition that has delayed her development, and she experiences problems with eating and swallowing.

She has been regularly followed by an occupational therapist and a speech pathologist, both of whom testified at the hearing. [ 4 ] In addition to the viva voce evidence, the Minister filed 43 affidavits which were introduced under s. 9 of the Act . The judge stated he would not rely on that evidence when rendering his decision. The following is a

summary of the proceedings which preceded the application for guardianship: 1. In October 2014, A.S. was placed in protective care, and later returned to her parents’ care; 2. In January 2018, A.S., B.S. and R.S. were placed in protective care; 3. In March 2018, following a contested hearing, an interim custody order issued for up to six months with regards to A.S., B.S. and R.S.; 4. In August 2018, A.S., B.S. and R.S. were placed in protective care, and an interim custody order issued for three months; 5. In November 2018, a custody order for up to six months issued with respect to A.S., B.S. and R.S.; 6.

In February 2019, a custody order for up to six months was signed by consent with respect to A.S., B.S. and R.S.; 7. In September 2019, S.S. was taken into protective care; 8. In October 2019, a custody order was signed with respect to S.S.; 9. In November 2019, an extension to the interim custody order issued with respect to A.S., B.S., R.S. and S.S.; 10. In May 2020 A.S., B.S., R.S. and S.S. were taken into protective care, and a six-month custody order issued; and

11. In May 2020, the Minister’s application for permanent guardianship of the children was filed, and an interim custody order issued following a contested hearing in June 2020. [ 5 ] The Minister originally filed an application for custody on November 15, 2019, and then she sought consolidation of that application with her guardianship application. On June 15, 2020, the Minister filed a motion to discontinue the custody application, which was contested. The original hearing of that application, scheduled for April 27 to 29, 2020, was cancelled.

At a hearing on June 25, 2020, a judge discontinued the Minister’s custody application for the reason the substratum of the application had disappeared. Legal counsel for the children was then appointed under ss. 6 and 7.1(1) of the Act , and the application for guardianship was scheduled for hearing. [ 6 ] The Minister’s application was filed under ss. 51 and 56 of the Act , and Rule 73.15 of the Rules of Court .

The grounds for the application were that, under s. 31 of the Act , the security or development of the children “may” be in danger because they were receiving inadequate care, supervision or control, they were living in unfit or improper circumstances, they were in the care of “a person” who was unable or unwilling to provide them with adequate care, supervision or control, and they were in the care of a person whose conduct “endangers” their life, health or emotional well-being.

At the time of the hearing, the parents had six supervised visits per week with the children in their home, pursuant to a Case Plan that had been created in March 2020; however, those visits were interrupted between March and July due to COVID-19 restrictions. On September 25, 2020, following a five-day hearing, the Guardianship Order issued. B. The process [ 7 ] On the fifth day of the hearing, the judge rendered an oral decision in which he briefly referred to the criteria set out in s. 1 of the Act . The balance of the decision consists of select excerpts from the evidence. The decision contained no

summary of the evidence, no history of the legal proceedings, and no analysis of the expert evidence. II. Grounds of Appeal [ 8 ] The appellants raise basic questions concerning the requirements of judicial impartiality and procedural fairness.

They argue the judge relied on evidence that was not relevant to the best interests of the children. [ 9 ] The parents ask the Order be varied to a Supervisory Custody Order, or, in the alternative, the Order be set aside, and a new hearing be held because the judge: 1. erred in instructing defence counsel their cross-examination was limited to fifteen to twenty minutes; 2. erred when he did not grant the children access to their parents post guardianship; 3. erred when he “indicated” he was departing from the duty of “absolute impartiality” and “substituted his own bias” when he rendered his oral decision; 4. ignored the best interests submissions of counsel for the children, failed to conduct a best interests of the child analysis and substituted his own opinions to determine their best interests; 5. misapprehended the facts when he determined the mother had positioned herself as a subordinate to the father; and 6. failed to conduct an analysis of the Minister’s grounds under s. 31(1) of the Act and considered factors outside the scope of the Act and beyond the grounds for relief.

III. Standard of Review [ 10 ] The standard of review applicable in these cases is narrow (see S.B. v. Minister of Family and Community Services , 2006 NBCA 41 , [2006] N.B.J. No. 167 (QL) ). As stated in D.L.M. v. J.A.M. , 2008 NBCA 2 , 326 N.B.R. (2d) 111 , the presumption of deference may be set aside if the trial judge’s findings of fact are plainly wrong and go to the root of the challenged findings of fact (paras. 11-12).

Generally, an appellate court will not intervene in child protection cases unless the trial judge’s decision has no factual merit, or it is based on an error in principle, a failure to consider all relevant factors or the consideration of an irrelevant factor (see Nouveau-Brunswick (Ministre des Services familiaux et communautaires) v. A.N. et Y.N. , 2003 NBCA 45 , 264 N.B.R. (2d) 80 , at para. 11 ). This principle was reviewed by Quigg J.A. in V.C. and J.C. v. The Minister of Social Development et al ., 2015 NBCA 28 , 435 N.B.R. (2d) 205 , where issues of procedural fairness were in play.

When the rules of procedural fairness are in issue, the standard of review changes from that of deference to that of correctness. IV. Analysis A. The judge’s instruction concerning cross-examination [ 11 ] Unlike some other provinces, notably Ontario, New Brunswick does not have a focused hearing Rule that permits trial judges to impose time restrictions for the examination of witnesses, as part of case management protocols. In this case, the judge stated he was placing time limits on cross-examination at the beginning of the second day of the hearing.

At the beginning of the second day of the hearing, the Minister called clinical psychologist Dr. Paul King to provide expert evidence. Before Dr. King began giving his evidence, the judge stated the following: “And we’ve got two witnesses, we’ve got four lawyers. I’m expecting each lawyer will limit his or her examination of the witness to 15- 20 minutes. Please continue, Mr.

Larson, call your first witness.” [ 12 ] The appellants argue the judge’s instruction to limit their cross-examination to fifteen to twenty minutes, “hampered the procedural fairness of the hearing” and their ability to make full answer and defence to the application.

They submit, because the Minister presented numerous affidavits and four expert reports and provided disclosure of “copious notes” of various support workers, they had a right to effectively cross-examine the witnesses, and they contend the restriction placed them at a procedural disadvantage. [ 13 ] The Minister argues the trial judge had an inherent right to manage the conduct of the trial as a matter of discretion.

She acknowledges this was not a situation where there were irrelevant questions, or allegations of misrepresentation or repetitiveness of evidence, or allegations of harassment of witnesses, nor was this an issue of prejudice or lack of probative value. She contends the judge’s instruction to limit cross-examination fell within the range of reasonable decisions made as part of trial management, and, if there were a palpable error, it had no impact on the conduct of the trial, nor on the ability of the appellants to mount a defence to the application. To support her contention, the Minister says: 1.

The restrictions applied only to the expert witnesses proffered on the second day of the trial; 2. Counsel did not object to the restrictions; 3. When counsel asked for more time, it was granted; 4. Counsel was never refused more time to ask questions; 5. The appellants do not inform what further evidence might have been elicited; and 6. All counsel were subject to the same restrictions.

[ 14 ] No counsel raised an objection to the limiting instruction, which applied equally to both the appellants and the respondent. A reading of the transcript reveals that counsel were not restricted in their ability to pose questions. In the end, counsel for the father acknowledged she was able to adduce sufficient evidence in the time allotted. There were occasions when counsel requested more time, and it was granted.

In spite of what the judge stated, at no time did he interfere with or cut off the cross-examinations. [ 15 ] Trial process is governed by the rules of procedure, which ensure that both sides have an adequate opportunity to present their case, and to test the evidence of the opposing party. Trial judges are entitled to place limits on cross-examination when it is determined to be a means of harassment, it is irrelevant or repetitive, it misrepresents the truth, or when its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value.

Although it is true unreasonable restrictions on the examination of witnesses can affect the fairness of the process ( see R. v. Lyttle , 2004 SCC 5 , [2004] 1 S.C.R. 193 , at para. 66 ), that did not occur in this case. [ 16 ] In V.C. and J.C. , Quigg J.A. dealt with the contention a trial judge’s interventions during the hearing resulted in an unfair trial. In dismissing that ground, she concluded the interventions by the judge, although inappropriate, did not affect the result.

She observes: “The judge did not limit the questioning and gave counsel, over the course of 17 days, proper opportunity to respond to his concerns,” thus providing the foundation for the conclusion there was no unfairness in the process (para. 14). In this case, the issue is whether the judge’s instruction, not implemented, adversely affected the fairness of the hearing. In J.C.M. v. M.J.M. , 2018 NBCA 42 , [2018] N.B.J.

No. 158 (QL) , this Court writes: Given the issue of custody was resolved, the application judge signaled to these parties he wished to limit the examinations to the remaining issue of child support. The issue raised by the appellant is not trivial; however, we would only interfere if the judge’s decision to limit cross-examination affected the result. In this case, after reading the transcripts, I am not convinced it did. […] [para. 16] [ 17 ] It was improper for the judge to instruct he would limit cross-examinations.

Such a practice is inappropriate and should not be encouraged, in the interests of trial fairness. However, in this case, the appellants concede the limitation did not affect their ability to properly present their case. There were no objections raised by counsel, but, more importantly, the judge permitted counsel to exceed the mandated period. Before us, the appellants acknowledged they were not prejudiced. Where the appellants admit they were not prejudiced by the proposed limiting instruction, I see no merit to this ground of appeal, and I would dismiss it. B.

Did the judge misapprehend the evidence concerning self-subordination of the mother and, as a result, show bias? [ 18 ] There was a significant difference in the ages of the parents in this case. The father was a friend of the mother’s family, having met her when she was a child. The judge described the relationship as being “unusual.” He writes: So, we have this age imbalance […], and we now have a situation where the father is the dominant personality within the couple.

At times, as recently as 2018, the Minister and the Court were all recognizing that he was the primary parent. […] At different times throughout the evidence there are references to the father feeling that he was caring for the mother and the children, and as noted, even the mother thought that way, when she was asked about it yesterday. That unusual view is troubling, and I don’t want to say or do anything to suggest approval of it. […] [paras. 14 and 16] [ 19 ] The appellants argue the decision is replete with statements that demonstrate judicial bias.

They argue it was the Minister who encouraged the father to become the children’s primary caregiver and to take over the major decision-making for them, and that any imbalance in the parenting relationship had somewhat diminished before the hearing in any event. They submit the judge’s failure to consider this change constituted palpable and overriding error. They assert the judge’s comments suggest that “alternative family dynamics cannot be sanctioned within the bounds of our legal system,” and his choice of the word “unusual” imported judicial bias and subjectivity into the reasons.

Examples include: An unusual situation here is that in the past the father has been recognized as the primary parent of the children. […]

[…] I don’t want to get bogged down in ancient history, but I do want to give a bit of background explanation about the unusual relationshiphere in which the father was the primary parent. […] […] That different status is not only unusual, but it runs afoul of our cultural tradition, which is to strive for legal equality. […] […] […] With their parents, the mother’s example includes a great deal of self-subordination to her partner, thinking of herself and acting asif she is just one of the children to be cared for by him.

That is not a positive example. […] [paras. 8, 12, 15 and 38] [20] The respondent replies that the evidence of the social workers and other professionals engaged with this familysupported their opinion the mother considered herself as one of the children and the father had adopted a caregiving role towards her. Infact, an interim court order described the father as the primary parent. [21] After hearing the evidence, the judge was not convinced the children could flourish and thrive in such anenvironment (para. 38).

In his view, self-subordination, if it continued, would affect the ability of the mother to parent the children andwould be a poor example to the children. This was a legitimate concern, and I am not persuaded these observations constitute overridingerror.

The assertions the judge was biased and he imported his personal views of family dynamics into his analysis, I would also reject.The test for judicial bias requires the consideration whether a reasonable and informed person would more likely than not conclude thetrial judge substituted his or her own views on a particular subject, rather than applying the law. [22] In M.A.(L.)B. v. T.J.L., 2021 NBCA 5, [2021] N.B.J.

No. 24 (QL), a recent case where judicial bias was alsoraised, LaVigne J.A. concluded: While all judges bring their own perspective to the role of judging, a judge’s opinions about the nature of teenage boys add nothing tothe analysis, are not based on evidence, and amount to conjecture. More specifically, gender stereotyping must be avoided. Had the trialjudge based critical findings on personal views not grounded in evidence, this could have been fatal.

While some of the judge’scomments were unnecessary and inappropriate, they did not affect the results of the case and do not give rise to a reasonableapprehension of bias. [para. 63] [23] In L.P. v. Minister of Families and Children, 2019 NBCA 83, [2019] N.B.J. No. 398 (QL), this Court wrote: The reasonable apprehension of bias test was set out in R. v. S. (R.D.), (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484, [1997] S.C.J. No.84 (QL).

To successfully advance such an argument, one must show that the judge was influenced by his or her own beliefs, opinions orbiases, to the extent he or she was not able to reach an independent conclusion. The threshold is high. See Lambert v. Lacey-House, 2013NBCA 48, 406 N.B.R. (2d) 346. [para. 31] [24] In Lambert v. Lacey-House, 2013 NBCA 48, 406 N.B.R. (2d) 346, Green J.A. observed: The passage which follows is extracted from Ethical Principles for Judges, a publication of the Canadian Judicial Council. The objectsof the Council are set out in s. 60(1) of the Judges Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.

J-1: “to promote efficiency and uniformity, and to improve the

quality of judicial service, in superior courts”. The Principles are intended to serve as guidelines for judges in the discharge of their responsibilities. On the subject of impartiality and reasonable apprehension of bias, the Principles have this to say; Impartiality is not only concerned with perception, but more fundamentally with the actual absence of bias and prejudgment. This dual aspect of impartiality is captured in the often repeated words that justice must not only be done, but manifestly be seen to have been done. As de Grandpre, J. put it in Committee for Justice and Liberty v.

National Energy Board , the test is whether “an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically – and having thought the matter through –” would apprehend a lack of impartiality in the decision maker. Whether there is a reasonable apprehension of bias is to be assessed from the point of view of a reasonable, fair minded and informed person. [p. 31] [para. 4] [ 25 ] In

summary, there is a subjective and an objective component to the bias test. If either component is met, the test is made out. The subjective component requires a judge to decide whether he or she can adjudicate impartially. The objective component requires a judge to consider whether the grounds giving rise to the apprehension of bias are sufficiently serious as to rebut the presumption he or she can abide by his or her oath of office and judge the matter fairly. The threshold is high, and the onus lies with the asserting party. See Bossé et al. v.

Lavigne , 2015 NBCA 54 , 440 N.B.R. (2d) 118 , where the Court concluded the grounds for apprehension of bias must be substantial and the evidence cogent. [ 26 ] The assertion of bias must fail for the reasons the judge provided an evidentiary based explanation for his comments, and there was no cogent evidence of bias, as suggested. I would therefore dismiss this ground of appeal. C.

The judge ignored the submissions made by legal counsel for the children [ 27 ] The appellants submit the judge was required to summarize the submissions made by legal counsel for the children, and his failure to do so constitutes an error in law. [ 28 ] The role of legal counsel who represent children in child custody and access disputes has changed over the years. Under s. 1 of the Act , the views and preferences of children are but one of the criteria to be considered under the best interests of the child test.

They can be placed before the court either through a Voice of the Child report that is prepared by a counsellor or psychologist with expertise in that area, or, in some cases, through representations made by legal counsel on behalf of a child. The role of counsel as advocate has been the subject of academic discussion and judicial commentary, because, in the absence of legislative direction, there have been differing opinions concerning their role. [ 29 ] When this case was heard, ss. 7 and 7.1 of the Act governed the appointment of counsel for children.

Where the Minister is a party to the proceedings, and the court is of the opinion the interests and concerns of a child should be represented, a judge shall advise the Attorney General that, in his or her opinion, counsel, or a responsible spokesperson, should be made available to assist in the representation of the child’s interests. [ 30 ] Under s. 7.1, before making such a request, the court shall consider:

a) whether the child is over the age of twelve;

b) whether the child’s wishes, where they can be expressed, have been given consideration;

c) whether the Minister is able to identify the child’s wishes;

d) whether there is a difference between the interests and concerns of the child and the Minister;

e) whether counsel is better placed to identify the child’s interests and concerns; and

f) any other factors the court considers relevant. However, as the judge stated in the trial decision in V.C. and J.C. , which statement was adopted by this Court, it is the court that must make the decision for the children and not the children themselves (para. 33). The views and preferences of children who are at an age where those views can be expressed are but one consideration. [ 31 ] In this case, despite the Minister’s opposition, counsel for the children was appointed and she fully participated in the trial.

She examined and cross-examined the various witnesses, summarized the evidence and gave her recommendations. [ 32 ] The Minister submits the Act does not particularize the role of legal counsel for children in these types of proceedings. I agree. In J.D. v. Minister of Family and Community Services , 2001 NBCA 43 , 238 N.B.R. (2d) 201 , this Court was asked to provide instructions concerning the role of a solicitor for children in child protection hearings.

Following that decision, s. 7.1 of the Act was proclaimed, which, as noted, deals with the criteria for the appointment of children’s counsel, but does not define their actual

role. The Court of Appeal of Quebec cited J.D. in M.F. c. J.L., [2002] J.Q. no 480 (QL), writing: An attorney representing a child is not a witness and she is not entitled to give evidence or opinions on the question of what she feels willbe in the best interests of the child. That will be for the court to determine after it has heard all the evidence, including the evidence as tothe wishes of the child, the evidence of the parents and others having some knowledge of the circumstances of the child, as well as anyexpert evidence relative to the child’s best interest.

Where the court considers that the ends of justice will be better served, the courtitself would have the power, of its own motion, to order an expertise as to any contentious facts or circumstances affecting the interestsof the child […] [para. 41] [33] Once legal counsel has been appointed for a child, he or she has the right to fully participate in any process thataffects the child.

This means the right to receive full disclosure, the right to examine and cross-examine witnesses and the right toparticipate in legal arguments, including the right to place the views and preferences of the child before the court (see Strobridge v.Strobridge, (ON CA), [1994] O.J. No. 1247 (QL) (C.A.), at para. 36). In New Brunswick (Minister of Health andCommunity Services v. G. (J.), (SCC), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46, [1999] S.C.J.

No. 47 (QL), the Supreme Court went so faras to conclude the mother’s, as well as the children’s, s. 7 Charter rights, would have been threatened without such legal representation(para. 81). [34] Advocating on behalf of a client is the traditional role of children’s counsel. The goal is to protect the child’slegal rights through the observance of proper procedures, the presentation of technical questions of law, the testing of the evidence, and,depending on the age of the child, to express his or her wishes (see J.E.S.D. v. Y.E.P., 2018 BCCA 286, [2018] B.C.J.

No. 1373 (QL)). [35] The answer to the appellants’ contention that a court must summarize best interests submissions made onbehalf of a child, is found not only in the M.F. decision, but also in an

article authored by Professor Nicholas Bala, entitled: “ChildRepresentation in Alberta: Role and Responsibilities of Counsel for the Child in Family Proceedings” (2006), 43:4 Alta. L.R. 845. Hedescribes the role of children’s counsel in child protection hearings as that of representing a child’s “interests,” not to be confused withbest interests advocacy. I agree. [36] In my opinion, once legal counsel for the children have fully participated in a hearing, and they have had theopportunity to effectively represent the rights and interests of the children, they have fulfilled their role.

A judge should consider thesubmissions made on behalf of the children, but he or she is under no obligation to refer to, to recite, or to follow them. The judicial roleis to review the evidence, to make findings of fact based on that evidence, to apply proper legal principles and render a decision thatoffers justification, intelligibility and transparency. The fact a judge has not referred to the submissions made by counsel for the childrenis not an error in law in my view. I would therefore dismiss this ground of appeal. D.

The judge considered factors outside the scope of ss. 1 and 31 of the Act, and he failed to perform an analysis of the Minister’sgrounds [37] The appellants contend the judge considered factors outside the scope of the legal analysis for the best interestsof the child, as well as factors beyond the grounds for relief set out in the Minister’s application. In R.B. and T.R. v. The Minister ofFamilies and Children and C.H., 2019 NBCA 32, [2019] N.B.J. No. 149 (QL), this Court states: Application judges are not limited to the criteria set out in s. 1 alone.

A judge deciding a custody application exercises his or herdiscretion, taking into consideration, in a contextual way, all relevant factors. This is a balancing process which includes a considerationof the importance of the continuity in care, the physical, emotional and psychological needs of a child and the plan, if any, for the futurecare of a child.

At the end of the day, having heard the evidence, and having weighed it in a principled and holistic way, unless the judgehas misapprehended the facts, has failed to consider a relevant and necessary fact, or has conducted an incomplete analysis withinsufficient reasons, his or her conclusion will be shown great deference (see Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto v.M.(C.), (SCC), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 165, [1994] S.C.J. No. 37 (QL)). [para. 26] [38] The Minister’s application was grounded on s. 31 of the Act. The appellants argue this

section of the Act doesnot apply. In D.A.M. v. R. (1983), (NB CA), 47 N.B.R. (2d) 41, [1983] N.B.J. No. 16 (QL) (C.A.), the Courtconcluded it was an error for a court to rely on s. 31 of the Act in guardianship hearings, for the reason the

section is limited toapplications for the protective care of children. In the result, when a court conducts a best interests of the child analysis, it is s. 1 of theAct that applies.

[39] In V.C. and J.C., the court reiterated the best interests of the child test: “As this Court has said many times, thebest interests of the child (from a child-centred perspective) is the sole test used to determine custody” (para. 15). The child-centred focuswas discussed by the Supreme Court in New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. C. (G.C.), (SCC), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 1073, [1988] S.C.J.

No. 48 (QL): […] By focussing on the welfare of the child, the legislatures and the courts now consider the best interests of the child from thestandpoint of the child and not from the standpoint of the parents. […]. [para. 14] [40] In Young v. Young, (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3, [1993] S.C.J. No. 112 (QL), the Supreme Courtiterated that the assessment of a child’s best interests encompasses not only the physical and economic well-being, but also his or heremotional, psychological, intellectual and moral well-being. In New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v.

M.R.and A.R. (1998), (NB CA), 198 N.B.R. (2d) 201 (C.A.), [1998] N.B.J. No. 142 (QL), at para. 20, the Court adoptedthe trial judge’s comments that it was “absolutely unreasonable” to conclude that a court can determine the parenting skills of parentswithout considering the background of their family relationships (see J.S. and J.N. v. Minister of Social Development (now Minister ofFamilies and Children), 2018 NBCA 26, [2018] N.B.J. No. 371 (QL), at para. 52). In Gordon v. Goertz, (SCC), [1996]2 S.C.R. 27, [1996] S.C.J.

No. 52 (QL), the Supreme Court states that the best interests of the child test is contextual and not exact. Inchild protection hearings, a judge is required to undertake a review of the various interventions made by ministerial representatives as amatter of context and to include a review of Case Plans that were implemented, and the expert reports that were prepared. It is clear that acourt should not delegate its duty to determine what parenting arrangement is in a child’s best interests by deferring to expert reports (seeP.R.H. v. M.E.L., 2009 NBCA 18, 343 N.B.R. (2d) 100).

He or she can consider them, but, in the end, must conduct his or her ownanalysis so as to inform the parents of the reasons for the decision. [41] In this case, there was extensive affidavit evidence, and, as noted, there was evidence from three familysupport workers, four experts, the foster mother and two social workers. In addition, the following other exhibits formed part of theRecord: 1. Supreme Human Services Inc. reports dated from January 24, 2020, to March 16, 2020: 2. A copy of the decision dated February 16, 2018, where a six-month custody order was granted to the Minister; 3.

A Family Case Plan, unsigned and undated; 4. A copy of a Procedural Order dated February 10, 2020, following a Judicial Case Conference; 5. A copy of the Case Plan dated July 13, 2020; 6. The mother’s affidavit sworn August 21, 2019; and 7. Supreme Human Services Inc. reports dated January 13, 2019; January 15, 2019; May 24, 2020; and January 10 to February 5,2020. [42] Two psychologists testified for the Minister. Dr. King gave evidence concerning his Psychological ParentingCapacity Assessment dated October 2, 2018, as updated in 2019. Dr.

McNamara testified with respect to a Psychological ParentingCapacity Assessment she conducted, dated October 2, 2018. Dr. McNamara stated that the assessment considers a range of issues,including individual characteristics of the parents, the developmental needs of the children, certain relational and environmentalconditions and provides both a diagnosis of current parenting ability and a prognosis of likely, future ability to parent.

At page 27 of Dr.McNamara’s report, she concluded the parents had not shown they met the minimal standards of being “good enough” parents for threedaughters, and the possibility of positive change in the future seemed unlikely. She recommended supervised visits and that the parentsshould continue to receive personal counseling for stress and anger issues. The judge referred to neither report in his reasons.

[43] Two other reports were entered into evidence. These reports were authored by Ms. Andrea Pelham, speechlanguage pathologist, and April Lambert, an occupational therapist. Both reports discussed the developmental issues experienced by B.S.and the measures that were being employed to correct them. The judge referred to neither report in his reasons. [44] The judge was not bound to follow the recommendations of the experts; however, it is my view he wasrequired:

i) to provide a fulsome review of the facts of the case; ii) to show that he was alive to the grounds for relief; iii) to indicate what evidence he accepted or rejected and why; and iv) to perform the best interests of the child analysis under s. 1 of the Act. [45] Reasons inform how, and on what evidentiary basis, a trial judge has reached his or her conclusions. Therationale for reasoned decisions is expressed in R. v. Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869. Reasons must explain the basis forthe decision to allow for meaningful appellate review.

If they do not, there is an error of law. [46] Reasons do not have to be perfect, but they need to show that a judge has at least turned his or her mind to theproper criteria and has provided the basis upon which the conclusion was reached (see J.H. v. T.H., 2014 NBCA 52, 422 N.B.R. (2d)388, per Larlee J.A.). Conclusory reasons do a disservice to the parties.

Understandably, such an approach creates the impression thejudge engaged in subjective, or first impression reasoning, rather than analysing the facts of the case and performing the requiredfunctional and principled analysis. [47] In previous cases, this Court has ordered a new trial when it concluded that reasons were deficient, or groundedon irrelevant facts (see Lahey Estate v. St. Joseph’s Hospital (1993), (NB CA), 137 N.B.R. (2d) 366, [1993] N.B.J.No. 617 (QL)). Under Rule 62.21(1), we can step into the shoes of the trial judge, conduct the appropriate analysis and make any orderthat ought to have been made.

Where there is no issue with the record itself, and all the evidence is available, the Court can make thedecision that ought to have been made (see Abrams v. RTO Asset Management, 2020 NBCA 57, [2020] N.B.J. No. 200 (QL)). Doing sois consistent with Rule 1.02.1, which requires that courts apply the Rules in a manner that is “proportionate to what is at stake […] andthe importance and complexity of the issues.” [48] In my view, the reasons in this case were deficient because:

a) they did not offer a fulsome review of the factsof the case;

b) they did not address the grounds for relief;

c) they did not advise what evidence was accepted or rejected by the judge; andd) the judge paid lip service to the best interests of the child test. Because of the length of the hearing, the volume of evidence, the factthe children have been in the Minister’s care since January 2018, and the prejudice certain to be caused by further delay, performing theanalysis that ought to have been made is the only reasonable option (see T.B. v. R.G., 2021 NBCA 8, [2021] N.B.J. No. 29 (QL); Lahey,at p. 7). E. Analysis with respect to the best interests of the children [49] Section 53(2) of the Act states that, when disposing of an application under

Part IV, the court shall at all timesplace above all other considerations the best interests of the child. [50]

Section 1 of the Act reads:

“best interests of the child” means the bestinterests of the child under the circumstancestaking into consideration (

a) the mental, emotional and physical healthof the child and his need for appropriate careor treatment, or both; (

b) the views and preferences of the child,where such views and preferences can bereasonably ascertained; (

c) the effect upon the child of any disruptionof the child’s sense of continuity; (

d) the love, affection and ties that existbetween the child and each person to whomthe child’s custody is entrusted, each personto whom access to the child is granted and,where appropriate, each sibling of the childand, where appropriate, each grandparent ofthe child; (

e) the merits of any plan proposed by theMinister [of Families and Children] underwhich he would be caring for the child, incomparison with the merits of the childreturning to or remaining with his parents; (

f) the need to provide a secure environmentthat would permit the child to become auseful and productive member of societythrough the achievement of his full potentialaccording to his individual capacity; And (

g) the child’s cultural and religiousheritage[.] « intérêt supérieur de l’enfant » désignel’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant dans lescirconstances, compte tenu

a) de l’état de santé mentale, affective etphysique de l’enfant et du besoin qu’il a desoins ou de traitements convenables, ou desdeux;

b) des vues et préférences de l’enfantlorsqu’il est raisonnablement possible de lesconnaître;

c) de l’effet sur l’enfant de toute atteinte à lastabilité dont un enfant éprouve le besoin;

d) de l’amour, de l’affection et des liens quiexistent entre l’enfant et chaque personne à lagarde de qui il a été confié, chaque personnequi a obtenu le droit de lui rendre visite et, lecas échéant, chaque frère ou soeur de l’enfantet, le cas échéant, chaque grand-parent del’enfant;

e) des avantages de tout projet de prise encharge de l’enfant par le ministre [desFamilles et des Enfants] comparés àl’avantage pour l’enfant de retourner ou derester auprès de ses parents;

f) du besoin pour l’enfant d’être en sécurité,dans un milieu qui lui permette de réaliserpleinement son potentiel, selon ses aptitudespersonnelles et, ce faisant, de devenirmembre utile et productif de la société; et

g) du patrimoine culturel et religieux del’enfant[.] [51] The above animates the analysis where child custody and access is involved, whether the Minister is a party, ornot. The criteria are not self-limiting and can be expanded to include other factors, depending on the nature of the case (see Shaw v. Shaw(1997), (NB KB), 189 N.B.R. (2d) 84, [1997] N.B.J. No. 211 (QL); and Rideout v. Rideout (1998), (NB KB), 201 N.B.R. (2d) 249. [1998] N.B.J. No. 233 (QL)). When a court conducts an analysis under s. 1, it should, at aminimum, tie the facts of the case to the relief sought.

As noted, it is not enough for a court to indulge in conclusory reasons (see R.B.and T.R., at para. 26). It is to the evidence I now turn. [52] The Minister has been involved with this family since 2014. Following 2014, there were approximately nineinvestigations by the Minister, which resulted in several open child protection files. Both neglect and emotional abuse figuredprominently in those files. Despite having offered extensive support services to the parents, the original concerns about their ability toproperly care for the children had not abated by the time the application for guardianship was filed.

[ 53 ] A social worker, Candace Ducey, was assigned to work with the family in April 2018. She was the lead social worker until December 2019. She prepared eleven affidavits. In July 2019, the Minister observed the following:

a) the parents were struggling with the October 2019 Case Plan;

b) the parents were “yelling” at the children;

c) there was an inability to respond to the children’s cries;

d) the parents were cancelling visits;

e) medical appointments for the children were cancelled;

f) the condition of the apartment was substandard; and

g) there were issues with hygiene, snacks and the children’s routines. [ 54 ] Another social worker, Mr. Terrence Stewart, testified that, when he took over the file in January 2020, his mandate was to look at the situation with a different “set of eyes” to see how the Minister could move forward on the file and whether reunification between the parents and the children was possible. He increased the children’s visits to six times per week, all supervised.

The Minister’s goal at that time was reunification. [ 55 ] During the first two months of 2020, the Department engaged two supervisors to work with the family with the view to providing maximum services. Trial dates for the custody extension hearing in April 2020 were cancelled because of the pandemic restrictions. Visits between the parents and the children were cancelled between March 17 th and May 18 th for the same reason. The Family Case Plan that had been in existence since October 2019 was abandoned, because 50 percent of the visits had been cancelled by the parents. Mr.

Stewart admitted there were some “positives” between the months of January to March, but he added: “[…] there were also lots of negatives.” [ 56 ] In 2019, Ms. Pelham and Ms. Lambert agreed that B.S. required extensive follow-up from the parents and between 2019 and 2020, the family support workers continued to document the need to regularly prompt them. By the time of trial, and despite multiple interventions, there had been limited progress in basic parenting skills.

It was recorded the parents had a “spotty” attendance record at meetings with representatives from the Department. [ 57 ] In his affidavit, sworn May 25, 2020, social worker Mr. Stewart deposed the Minister was seeking a guardianship order due to continued concerns about the parent’s ability to provide for the children’s emotional, social, developmental and physical needs. He stated the parents interacted minimally with them, they yelled at each other in front of the children, and they minimally intervened when prompted.

The children had been in the Minister’s care for 21 months without significant changes in the parents’ abilities. The affidavits offered a comprehensive history of the issues that had been identified, starting in 2018, and provided a full explanation for the Minister’s decision to seek a guardianship order. [ 58 ] The historical evidence in this case was relevant. The historical overview of his or her situation, from the time the State takes the decision to intervene, up to and including the date of the hearing, is relevant ( see J.S. and J.N. , at para. 52 ).

The Supreme Court in C. (G.C.) concluded that guardianship is a judgment that must be made after cautious consideration (para. 13). [ 59 ] As stated, both parents were assessed for cognitive function, and both tested at the lower end of the range. In Dr. King’s opinion, the “[P]roblems with cognitive functioning can be expected to interfere with effective parenting to ensure their young children’s nurturance, safety and overall needs – such problems can be expected to lead to inconsistent parenting for both parents, inadvertently putting their children [at risk] for neglect, and/or emotional abuse.

This is not to say that [D.] and [A.] do not love their daughters, as this love was evident to the family support workers, and examiners at the time” (Report of Dr. Paul King, August 17, 2020, p. 2). [ 60 ] Turning to s. 1 of the Act : a. The mental, emotional and physical health of the children and their need for appropriate care or treatment or both. In this case, there was evidence of domestic abuse in the home. Professionals working with the family stated the father parented from his chair and was observed “yanking” the children apart from each other by their arms.

There was evidence the child, A., was favoured over the other

children. During one visit, a child was observed attempting to play in a kitty litter box, while another was observed attempting to obtain asnack for herself from the refrigerator. Medical appointments had been missed; b. The views and preferences of the children are not relevant in this case because of their age; c. With respect to the disruption in the children’s sense of continuity, the parents started missing visits with the children in 2020.The “spotty” attendance for visits continued, COVID restrictions aside.

The children’s regular contact with their parents was thereforenot consistent, thus disrupting the continuity of their care; d. It is not disputed the parents love and have great affection for the children, but that is not enough to ensure their best interests; e. The Minister has a plan for the children, which, as stated by the adoption coordinator, Ms. Irish, includes their adoption; f.

The children have a right to a secure environment that will allow them to grow to become productive members of society.From the evidence, it was the Minister’s position this would not be possible if they remained in the appellants’ care. I agree. g. There was no evidence concerning the children’s cultural or religious heritage. [61] Taking the above into consideration, it is my view a guardianship order was the appropriate disposition in thiscase. Because I have concluded the guardianship order should issue, I need not address the alternate ground, that is, whether asupervisory order should issue.

In J.S. and J.N., the Court states: “[…] supervisory orders are designed as a temporary measure, untilsuch time as a final decision issues on the merits of the application” (para. 53). An ongoing supervisory order would not have beenappropriate in this case, in any event. F. The judge’s failure to grant an access order [62] The parents sought an order for access and visitation. Counsel for the children raised the issue of ongoingaccess between the children and their parents with the social worker, Mr. Stewart, and he testified he had not discussed this with hissupervisor.

Before embarking on the analysis of this issue I observe the Supreme Court, and other courts in Canada, including in NewBrunswick, have concluded access is not the right of the parent; it is the right of the child. [63] In New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. L. (M.), (SCC), [1998] 2S.C.R. 534, [1998] S.C.J. No. 52 (QL), Gonthier J., writing for the Court, was clear. He writes: My consideration of whether access should be granted is based on the following principles. First, there is no inconsistency in principlebetween a permanent guardianship order and an access order.

Second, access is the exception and not the rule. Third, the principle ofpreserving family ties cannot come into play in respect of granting access unless it is in the best interests of the child to do so, havingregard to all the other relevant factors. Fourth, an adoption, which is in the best interests of the child, must not be hampered by theexistence of a right of access.

Fifth, access should not be granted if its exercise would have negative effects on the physical orpsychological health of the child. [para. 39] [64] I add here the fact the Minister argues that ongoing access between a parent and child may hinder the adoptionprocess should not take priority over access, when a court concludes it is in a child’s best interests to continue to have a relationship withhis or her parents (see M.A.G., Re. (1986), (NB CA), 73 N.B.R. (2d) 443, [1986] N.B.J. No. 126 (QL); Nouveau-Brunswick (Ministre de la Santé et des Services communautaires) v. L.L., [1997] N.B.J.

No. 417 (QL); Nouveau-Brunswick (Ministre de

la santé et des Services communautaires) v. L.L. et N.L. (1990), (NB KB), 109 N.B.R. (2d) 202, [1990] N.B.J. No.727 (QL)). [65] In J.C. v. Minister of Families and Children, 2020 NBCA 24, [2020] N.B.J. No. 126 (QL), the Court was askedto overturn a judge’s decision to make a guardianship order with no right of access to the father. The father argued the judge had“supplanted” the best interests of the child analysis with minimal evidence an access order would impede the adoption of the children.

Inrejecting the father’s argument, we concluded the decision not to grant the children access to their father was not exclusively anchored tothe adoption issue, and we opined the preservation of access following a guardianship order does not hinge exclusively on whether theadoption process would be hampered (para. 16). The Court has affirmed these principles in The Minister of Social Development v. G.B.,F.H. and R.O., 2012 NBCA 62, 392 N.B.R. (2d) 209; N.J.P. v. The Minister of Social Development, 2012 NBCA 3, 382 N.B.R. (2d) 245;C.A. v. Minister of Families and Children, 2018 NBCA 67, [2018] N.B.J.

No. 246 (QL). [66] The Supreme Court confirmed that access is the exception, and not the rule, in this context. Gonthier J. quotedfrom this Court’s reasoning in M.A.G., Re., where Hoyt J.A. (as he then was) concluded that it is only in rare situations that access wouldbe ordered. The following principles emerge from Gonthier J.’s decision: a. There is no inconsistency in principle between a guardianship order and an access order; b. While a liberal

interpretation of the Act is appropriate, the best interests of the child are the primary consideration and thepreservation of family ties is subordinate (para. 46); c. If adoption is more important for the ongoing welfare of a child, and it would be jeopardized if a right of access were exercised,access should not be granted; d. In considering whether to preserve a child’s right of access with his or her parents, a judge is required to weigh the variouscomponents of the best interests of the child. Evidence concerning how access has historically been exercised becomes particularlyrelevant; and e.

Access should not be granted if it would have a negative effect on the physical or psychological health of the child (para. 51). [67] In this case, although the children know their parents and have had a relationship with them, there was noevidence how the preservation of access would benefit them. In fact, the parents historically did not attend all of the access visits. By thetime of the hearing, they were still missing about 50 percent of the visits. The adoption coordinator, Ms. Irish, acknowledged this issuemight “shrink the pool” of prospective adoptive parents should an access order be granted.

There was no evidence the children werebenefiting either physically or psychologically from their visits with the parents. In my view, on the facts of this case, the judge’sdecision not to preserve a right of access was the correct one. There were no exceptional circumstances to support an access order. Iwould dismiss this ground of appeal. V. Disposition [68] It is for these reasons that, on May 13, 2021, I joined my colleagues in dismissing the appeal. No costs wererequested, so none were ordered. Version française de la décision de la Cour rendue par LA JUGE BAIRD

I. Introduction [1] Les parents font appel d’une ordonnance qui accorde la tutelle permanente de quatre jeunes enfants à la ministre du Développement social (la ministre) en vertu du par. 56(1) de la

Loi sur les services à la famille , L.N.-B. 1980, ch. F-2.2 (la Loi ), sans accorder de droit d’accès aux parents.

Les parents soutiennent qu’il y a eu manque d’équité procédurale, que l’on n’a pas tenu compte des observations faites par la représentante légale des enfants, que les motifs portaient essentiellement sur des questions autres que l’intérêt supérieur des enfants, que le juge n’était pas impartial et que le résultat est entaché au point de rendre une nouvelle audience nécessaire ou que, subsidiairement, notre Cour devrait rendre une ordonnance de surveillance. [2] Dans les audiences portant sur la protection d’un enfant, la charge de la preuve incombe toujours au ministre.

Le processus est d’une importance fondamentale, un examen des faits est nécessaire, le respect des règles de preuve est requis, l’interprétation correcte des principes juridiques est fondamentale et, pour terminer, l’on s’attend à ce que la personne qui prend la décision soit neutre et objective. En somme, les appelants prétendent que l’on n’a respecté aucune de ces exigences. A. Historique de l’instance [3] A.C. et D.S. sont les parents de quatre enfants, A.S., B.S., R.S. et S.S., qui étaient âgées de cinq ans, trois ans, deux ans et un an respectivement au moment où l’ordonnance de tutelle a été rendue.

B.S. souffre d’un problème médical qui a retardé son développement, et elle éprouve des difficultés à manger et à avaler. Elle est suivie régulièrement par une ergothérapeute et une orthophoniste, qui ont toutes deux témoigné lors de l’audience. [4] Outre les témoignages oraux, la ministre a déposé 43 affidavits, qui ont été présentés en vertu de l’art. 9 de la Loi . Le juge a indiqué qu’il ne se fonderait pas sur cette preuve pour rendre sa décision. Voici un résumé des procédures antérieures à la demande de tutelle : 1.

En octobre 2014, A.S. a été placée sous un régime de protection, et elle a par la suite été renvoyée à la charge de ses parents; 2. En janvier 2018, A.S., B.S. et R.S. ont été placées sous un régime de protection; 3. En mars 2018, à la suite d’une audience contestée, une ordonnance de garde provisoire d’une durée maximale de six mois a été rendue à l’égard de A.S., B.S. et R.S.; 4. En août 2018, A.S., B.S. et R.S. ont été placées sous un régime de protection, et une ordonnance de garde provisoire d’une durée de trois mois a été rendue; 5.

En novembre 2018, une ordonnance de garde d’une durée maximale de six mois a été rendue relativement à A.S., B.S. et R.S.; 6. En février 2019, une ordonnance de garde d’une durée maximale de six mois a été signée par consentement relativement à A.S., B.S. et R.S.; 7. En septembre 2019, S.S. a été placée sous un régime de protection; 8. En octobre 2019, une ordonnance de garde a été signée relativement à S.S.; 9. En novembre 2019, l’ordonnance de garde provisoire relativement à A.S., B.S., R.S. et S.S. a été prorogée;

10. En mai 2020, A.S., B.S., R.S. et S.S. ont été placées sous un régime de protection, et une ordonnance de garde d’une durée de six mois a été rendue; 11. En mai 2020, la ministre a déposé une demande de tutelle permanente des enfants, et une ordonnance de garde provisoire a été rendue à l’issue d’une audience contestée en juin 2020. [5] La ministre a initialement déposé sa demande en vue d’obtenir la garde des enfants le 15 novembre 2019, puis elle a demandé la fusion de cette demande et de la demande de tutelle.

Le 15 juin 2020, la ministre a présenté une motion pour se désister de sa demande de garde, motion qui a été contestée. L’audition initiale de la demande, qui devait avoir lieu du 27 au 29 avril 2020, a été annulée. Lors d’une audience qui a eu lieu le 25 juin 2020, un juge a autorisé le désistement de la demande de garde de la ministre au motif que celle-ci n’avait plus de fondement.

Une avocate a alors été désignée comme porte-parole des enfants en vertu de l’art. 6 et du par. 7.1(1) de la Loi , et une date a été fixée pour la tenue d’une audience sur la demande de tutelle. [6] La demande de la ministre a été déposée en vertu des art. 51 et 56 de la Loi et de la règle 73.15 des Règles de procédure .

La demande était fondée sur les motifs suivants : aux termes de l’art. 31 de la Loi , la sécurité ou le développement des enfants « peuvent » être menacés du fait qu’elles étaient privées de soins, de surveillance ou de direction convenables, qu’elles vivaient dans des conditions inappropriées ou inconvenantes, qu’elles étaient à la charge « d’une personne » qui ne pouvait ou ne voulait pas leur assurer les soins, la surveillance ni la direction convenables, et qu’elles se trouvaient à la charge d’une personne dont la conduite « menace » leur vie, leur santé ou leur équilibre affectif.

Au moment de l’audience, les parents avaient six visites surveillées avec leurs enfants par semaine à leur domicile, aux termes d’un plan d’intervention qui avait été créé en mars 2020; ces visites ont toutefois été interrompues entre mars et juillet en raison des restrictions liées à la COVID-19. Le 25 septembre 2020, à l’issue d’une audience de cinq jours, l’ordonnance de tutelle a été rendue. B. Le processus [7] Le cinquième jour de l’audience, le juge a rendu une décision orale dans laquelle il mentionne brièvement les critères énoncés à l’art. 1 de la Loi .

Le reste de la décision comprend des extraits tirés de la preuve. La décision ne comprenait aucun résumé de la preuve, aucun historique des procédures judiciaires et aucune analyse de la preuve d’expert. II. Moyens d’appel [8] Les appelants soulèvent des questions de fond touchant l’impartialité des juges et l’équité procédurale.

Ils soutiennent que le juge s’est fondé sur des éléments de preuve qui n’étaient pas pertinents relativement à l’intérêt supérieur des enfants. [9] Les parents demandent que l’ordonnance soit transformée en ordonnance de garde sous surveillance ou, subsidiairement, que l’ordonnance soit annulée et qu’une nouvelle audience ait lieu, parce que le juge : 1. a commis une erreur lorsqu’il a dit à l’avocate de la défense que son contre-interrogatoire devait se limiter à quinze à vingt minutes; 2. a commis une erreur lorsqu’il n’a pas accordé aux enfants un droit d’accès à leurs parents après la mise en tutelle; 3. a commis une erreur lorsqu’il a [TRADUCTION] « indiqué » qu’il s’écartait de son obligation d’[TRADUCTION] « impartialité absolue » et y a [TRADUCTION] « substitué ses propres préjugés » en rendant sa décision orale; 4. n’a pas tenu compte des observations de l’avocate des enfants touchant l’intérêt supérieur de celles-ci, n’a pas effectué d’analyse relativement à l’intérêt supérieur des enfants et a substitué ses propres opinions pour déterminer leur intérêt supérieur;

5. a mal apprécié les faits lorsqu’il a conclu que la mère s’était mise dans une position de soumission par rapport au père; 6. a omis d’effectuer une analyse des motifs invoqués par la ministre au

titre du par. 31(1) de la Loi et a tenu compte de facteurs qui sortent du cadre de la Loi et qui vont au-delà des motifs invoqués à l’appui des mesures sollicitées. III. Norme de contrôle [10] La norme de contrôle qui s’applique dans le genre d’affaires dont nous sommes saisis est étroite (voir S.B. c. Le Ministre des Services familiaux et communautaires , 2006 NBCA 41 , [2006] A.N.-B. n o 167 (QL) ). Comme la Cour l’a indiqué dans D.L.M. c.

J.A.M. , 2008 NBCA 2 , 326 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 111 , la présomption de retenue peut être écartée si les conclusions de fait du juge du procès sont manifestement erronées et compromettent irrémédiablement les conclusions de fait contestées (par. 11 et 12).

De façon générale, un tribunal d’appel n’interviendra dans des affaires touchant la protection des enfants que si la décision du juge du procès n’a aucun fondement factuel, ou si elle est fondée sur une erreur de principe, sur le défaut de prendre en compte tous les facteurs pertinents ou sur la prise en compte d’un facteur sans pertinence (voir Nouveau-Brunswick (Ministre des services familiaux et communautaires c. A.N. et Y.N. , 2003 NBCA 45 , 264 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 80 , au par. 11 ). Ce principe a été examiné par la juge Quigg dans V.C. et J.C. c.

La ministre du Développement social et autre , 2015 NBCA 28 , 435 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 205 , où des questions d’équité procédurale étaient en cause. Lorsque les règles d’équité procédurale sont en cause, la norme de contrôle cesse d’être la déférence et devient la norme de la décision correcte. IV. Analyse A.

Les directives du juge relativement au contre-interrogatoire [11] Contrairement à certaines autres provinces, notamment l’Ontario, le Nouveau-Brunswick n’a pas de règle précise régissant les audiences qui permet au juge du procès d’imposer des limites de temps pour l’interrogatoire de témoins dans le cadre des protocoles de gestion des instances. En l’espèce, le juge a indiqué au début de la deuxième journée de l’audience qu’il imposait des limites de temps aux contre-interrogatoires.

Au début de la deuxième journée de l’audience, la ministre a demandé à Paul King, psychologue clinicien, de témoigner en tant que témoin expert. Avant que M. King ne commence à témoigner, le juge a dit ce qui suit : [TRADUCTION] Et nous avons deux témoins, nous avons quatre avocats. Je m’attends à ce que chaque avocat limite son interrogatoire du témoin à quinze à vingt minutes.

Je vous prie de continuer, M e Larson, appelez votre premier témoin. [12] Les appelants prétendent que la directive du juge portant que les avocats devaient limiter leur contre- interrogatoire à quinze à vingt minutes [TRADUCTION] « a entravé l’équité procédurale de l’audience » ainsi que leur capacité de présenter une défense pleine et entière à la demande.

Ils soutiennent que, puisque la ministre a présenté de nombreux affidavits et quatre rapports d’expert et a communiqué les [TRADUCTION] « notes abondantes » de différents travailleurs de soutien, ils avaient le droit de contre-interroger les témoins de façon efficace, et ils prétendent que la restriction les a mis dans une position désavantageuse sur le plan procédural. [13] La ministre soutient que le juge du procès avait un droit inhérent de gérer le déroulement du procès, dans l’exercice de son pouvoir discrétionnaire.

Elle reconnaît qu’il ne s’agit pas d’une situation où il y avait des questions non pertinentes, des allégations d’assertion inexacte ou de répétitivité des éléments de preuve ou des allégations de harcèlement de témoins, ni d’une question de préjudice ou de manque de valeur probante.

Elle prétend que la directive du juge de limiter les contre-interrogatoires se situait dans l’éventail des décisions raisonnables rendues dans le contexte de la gestion de l’instance et, dans la mesure où il y aurait une erreur manifeste, celle-ci n’a eu aucune incidence sur le déroulement du procès ni sur la capacité des appelants de présenter une défense à la demande. À l’appui de son argument, la ministre dit ce qui suit : 1. Les restrictions ne s’appliquaient qu’aux témoins experts qui ont été appelés à la barre la deuxième journée du procès. 2. Les avocats ne se sont pas opposés aux restrictions.

3. Lorsque les avocats ont demandé plus de temps, leur demande a été accueillie. 4. On n’a jamais refusé aux avocats du temps supplémentaire pour poser des questions. 5. Les appelants n’indiquent pas quelles preuves additionnelles auraient pu être obtenues. 6. Tous les avocats étaient assujettis aux mêmes restrictions. [14] Aucun avocat n’a soulevé d’objection à la directive limitative, qui s’appliquait tout autant aux appelants qu’à l’intimée. À la lecture de la transcription, l’on constate que la capacité des avocats de poser des questions n’était pas limitée.

En fin de compte, l’avocate du père a reconnu qu’elle avait pu présenter suffisamment de preuve dans le temps prévu. À quelques moments, les avocats ont demandé plus de temps, et ils l’ont obtenu.

Malgré ce qu’il avait dit, le juge n’est, à aucun moment, intervenu dans les contre-interrogatoires et il ne les a, à aucun moment, interrompus. [15] Le processus d’instruction est régi par les règles de procédure, qui garantissent aux deux parties une possibilité réelle de présenter leurs arguments et de vérifier la preuve de la

partie adverse. Le juge du procès est autorisé à imposer des limites à un contre-interrogatoire lorsqu’il estime que l’on s’en sert comme moyen de harcèlement, qu’il est non pertinent ou répétitif ou déforme la vérité, ou que son effet préjudiciable l’emporte sur sa valeur probante. Même s’il est vrai que des limites déraisonnables à l’interrogatoire de témoins peuvent avoir une incidence sur l’équité du procès (voir R. c.

Lyttle , 2004 CSC 5 , [2004] 1 R.C.S. 193 , au par. 66 ), ce ne fut pas le cas en l’espèce. [16] Dans V.C. et J.C. , la juge Quigg a traité l’argument selon lequel les interventions du juge du procès pendant l’audience ont rendu le procès injuste. En rejetant ce moyen d’appel, elle a conclu que les interventions du juge, même si elles n’étaient pas appropriées, n’ont pas eu d’incidence sur l’issue du procès.

Elle dit ce qui suit : « Le juge n’a pas limité les interrogatoires et il a donné aux avocates, sur une période de dix-sept jours, une occasion suffisante de répondre à ses préoccupations », ce qui permettait de conclure que le processus n’était pas injuste (par. 14). En l’espèce, la question est de savoir si la directive du juge, qui n’a pas été appliquée, a eu une incidence négative sur l’équité de l’audience. Dans J.C.M. c.

M.J.M. , 2018 NBCA 42 , [2018] A.N.-B. n o 158 (QL) , notre Cour a écrit ce qui suit : Puisque la question de la garde avait été réglée, le juge saisi de la requête a signalé aux parties qu’il voulait limiter les interrogatoires à la question des aliments pour enfant encore en litige. La question soulevée par l’appelant n’est pas négligeable; toutefois, nous ne sommes disposés à intervenir que si la décision du juge de limiter le contre-interrogatoire a influé sur le résultat.

En l’espèce, après avoir lu les transcriptions, je ne suis pas convaincue que ce soit le cas. […] [par. 16] [17] Il ne convenait pas pour le juge d’indiquer qu’il limiterait les contre-interrogatoires. Une telle pratique est inopportune et ne devrait pas être encouragée, dans l’intérêt de l’équité du procès. Cependant, en l’espèce, les appelants reconnaissent que la restriction n’a pas eu d’incidence sur leur capacité de présenter adéquatement leurs arguments. Les avocats n’ont soulevé aucune objection, mais, plus important encore, le juge a permis aux avocats de dépasser la limite de temps prescrite.

Devant notre Cour, les appelants ont reconnu qu’ils n’ont pas subi de préjudice. Puisqu’ils reconnaissent qu’ils n’ont pas subi de préjudice par suite de la directive limitative proposée, je ne vois aucun fondement à ce moyen d’appel et je le rejetterais. B. Le juge a-t-il mal apprécié la preuve touchant l’autosoumission de la mère et, en conséquence, a-t-il fait preuve de partialité? [18] Il y a une grande différence d’âge entre les parents en l’espèce. Le père était un ami de la famille de la mère, et il a rencontré cette dernière alors qu’elle était enfant.

Le juge a décrit la relation comme étant [TRADUCTION] « inhabituelle ». Il écrit ce qui suit : [TRADUCTION] Nous avons donc ce déséquilibre des âges […], et nous faisons maintenant face à une situation où le père est la personne dominante dans le couple. À certains moments, pas plus tard qu’en 2018, la ministre et la Cour reconnaissaient toutes deux qu’il était le parent principal.

[…] À différents moments lors des témoignages, on mentionne que le père avait l’impression qu’il s’occupait de la mère et des enfants, et comme je l’ai mentionné, même la mère était de cet avis lorsqu’on lui a posé la question hier. Cette perspective inhabituelle est troublante, et je ne veux rien dire ou faire qui laisserait entendre que j’y souscris. […] [par. 14 et 16] [19] Les appelants soutiennent que la décision est remplie d’assertions qui montrent le manque d’impartialité de la part du juge.

Ils prétendent que c’est la ministre qui a encouragé le père à devenir le pourvoyeur principal de soins des enfants et à prendre la charge des principales décisions pour les enfants, et que, de toute façon, tout déséquilibre dans la relation parentale avait quelque peu diminué avant l’audience. Ils soutiennent que le défaut du juge de tenir compte de ce changement constituait une erreur manifeste et dominante.

Ils affirment que les observations du juge laissent entendre que [TRADUCTION] « d’autres formes de dynamique familiale ne sauraient être sanctionnées dans le cadre de notre système juridique » et que son emploi du terme [TRADUCTION] « inhabituelle » introduisait dans les motifs un manque d’impartialité et une subjectivité de la part du juge.

En voici quelques exemples : [TRADUCTION] Nous constatons une situation inhabituelle ici, du fait que, dans le passé, c’est le père qui a été reconnu comme étant le parent principal des enfants. […] […] Je ne veux pas m’embourber dans de l’histoire ancienne; je veux, cependant, expliquer un peu le contexte de la relation inhabituelle en l’espèce, où le père était le parent principal. […] […] Cette situation différente n’est pas seulement inhabituelle, elle va à l’encontre de notre tradition culturelle, qui vise l’égalité juridique. […] […] […] S’agissant de leurs parents, l’exemple de la mère comprend beaucoup d’autosoumission à son partenaire; elle se voit comme tout simplement une des enfants dont il doit s’occuper, et elle se comporte ainsi.

Ce n’est pas un exemple positif. […] [par. 8, 12, 15 et 38] [20] L’intimée répond que le témoignage des travailleurs sociaux et d’autres professionnels qui ont des rapports avec cette famille étaye le point de vue selon lequel la mère se voyait comme une des enfants et le père avait adopté un rôle de pourvoyeur de soins à son égard. En fait, une ordonnance provisoire de la cour qualifiait le père de parent principal. [21] Après avoir entendu les témoignages, le juge n’était pas convaincu que les enfants pouvaient s’épanouir et se développer dans un tel environnement (par. 38).

À son avis, l’autosoumission, si elle continuait, influerait sur la capacité de la mère de remplir son rôle de parent et donnerait un mauvais exemple aux enfants. Il s’agit là d’une préoccupation légitime, et je ne suis pas convaincue que ces observations constituent une erreur dominante. Je rejetterais aussi les allégations voulant que le juge n’était pas impartial et qu’il a incorporé dans son analyse son point de vue personnel sur la dynamique familiale.

Le critère pour déterminer s’il y a partialité judiciaire nous oblige à nous demander si une personne raisonnable et bien renseignée serait susceptible, selon toute

vraisemblance, de conclure que le juge du procès a substitué son propre point de vue sur une question particulière au lieu d’appliquer ledroit. [22] Dans M.A.(L.)B. c. T.J.L., 2021 NBCA 5, [2021] A.N.B. no 24 (QL), une décision récente où la question de lapartialité judiciaire a aussi été soulevée, la juge LaVigne a conclu ainsi : Bien que chaque juge apporte à son rôle sa propre perspective, ses opinions sur la nature des adolescents n’ajoutent rien à l’analyse, nes’appuient pas sur la preuve et relèvent de la conjecture. Il faut éviter, tout particulièrement, le stéréotypage fondé sur le sexe.

Si desconclusions essentielles du juge de première instance s’étaient fondées sur des vues personnelles non étayées par la preuve, cela aurait puêtre fatal. Quoique certains commentaires du juge n’étaient ni utiles ni opportuns, ils n’ont pas influé sur l’issue de l’affaire et nesoulèvent pas une crainte raisonnable de partialité. [par. 63] [23] Dans L.P. c. La ministre des Familles et des Enfants, 2019 NBCA 83, [2019] A.N.-B. no 398 (QL), notre Coura écrit ce qui suit : Le critère de la crainte raisonnable de partialité a été énoncé dans R. c. S. (R.D.), (SCC), [1997] 3 R.C.S. 484, [1997] A.C.S. no 84 (QL).

Pour faire valoir avec succès un tel argument, il faut démontrer que le juge était influencé par ses propres croyances,opinions et préjugés, dans une mesure telle qu’il était incapable de tirer une conclusion indépendante. Le seuil est élevé. Voir Lambert c. Lacey-House, 2013 NBCA 48, 406 R.N.-B. (2e) 346. [par. 31] [24] Dans Lambert c. Lacey-House, 2013 NBCA 48, 406 R.N.-B. (2e) 346, le juge Green a fait l’observationsuivante :

Le passage qui suit est extrait des Principes de déontologie judiciaire, une publication du Conseil canadien de la magistrature. Lamission du Conseil, qui est « d’améliorer le fonctionnement des juridictions supérieures, ainsi que la qualité de leurs services judiciaires,et de favoriser l’uniformité dans l’administration de la justice devant ces tribunaux », est énoncée au par. 60(1) de la

Loi sur les juges,L.R.C. 1985, ch. J-1. Les Principes visent à servir de lignes directrices pour les juges dans l’exercice de leurs fonctions. Au sujet del’impartialité et de la crainte raisonnable de partialité, les Principes sont ainsi rédigés : L’impartialité s’entend non seulement de l’absence apparente, mais, chose encore plus fondamentale, de l’absence réelle, de préjugé et departi pris. Les deux volets de l’impartialité sont énoncés dans la célèbre maxime selon laquelle non seulement justice doit être renduemais encore il doit être manifeste que justice est rendue.

Comme le juge de Grandpré l’a dit dans l’arrêt Committee for Justice andLiberty c. L’Office national de l’énergie, le critère applicable consiste à se demander si « une personne bien renseignée qui étudierait laquestion en profondeur, de façon réaliste et pratique » craindrait que le juge ne soit pas impartial.

La question de savoir s’il existe unecrainte raisonnable de partialité doit être examinée en fonction du point de vue d’une personne raisonnable, impartiale et bien informée.[p. 31] [par. 4] [25] En résumé, le critère servant à déterminer l’existence de partialité a une composante subjective et unecomposante objective. Si l’une ou l’autre composante est établie, le critère est rempli. La composante subjective oblige le juge à déciders’il peut juger de manière impartiale.

La composante objective oblige le juge à se demander si les motifs soulevant une crainte departialité sont sérieux au point de réfuter la présomption qu’il peut respecter son serment d’office et juger l’affaire de manière équitable.Le critère préliminaire est rigoureux, et la charge d’établir la partialité incombe à la

partie qui formule l’allégation de partialité. Voir Bossé et autres c. Lavigne, 2015 NBCA 54, 440 R.N.-B. (2e) 118, où la Cour a conclu que les motifs qui sous-tendent la crainte departialité doivent être substantiels et la preuve qui l’établit doit être forte. [26] L’allégation de partialité doit être rejetée au motif que le juge a donné une explication fondée sur la preuvepour ses observations, et il n’y avait pas de preuve forte de partialité, comme on l’a laissé entendre. Je rejetterais donc ce moyen d’appel. C.

Le juge n’a pas tenu compte des observations de l’avocate des enfants [27] Les appelants prétendent que le juge avait l’obligation de résumer les observations faites par l’avocate des

enfants et que le fait de ne pas les avoir résumés constitue une erreur de droit. [28] Le rôle d’un avocat qui représente des enfants dans des litiges portant sur la garde d’enfants et l’accès à ceux-ci a changé avec le temps. Aux termes de l’art. 1 de la Loi, les vues et préférences de l’enfant ne sont qu’un des facteurs à prendre encompte pour déterminer l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant.

Ces vues et préférences peuvent être présentées à la Cour soit par l’entremised’un rapport sur la parole de l’enfant établi par un conseiller ou un psychologue qui a une certaine expertise dans le domaine soit, danscertains cas, par des observations présentées par l’avocat au nom de l’enfant.

Le rôle de l’avocat comme porte-parole a fait l’objet dedébats théoriques et d’observations judiciaires, puisque, à défaut de directives législatives, les opinions divergent à cet égard. [29] Lorsque l’affaire dont nous sommes saisis a été entendue, ce sont les art. 7 et 7.1 de la Loi qui régissaient ladésignation d’un avocat pour les enfants. Lorsque le ministre est

partie à l’instance et que la cour estime qu’il y a lieu que les intérêts etpréoccupations de l’enfant soient exposés, le juge informe le procureur général que, à son avis, un avocat ou porte-parole responsabledevrait être disponible à cette fin. [30] En application de l’art. 7.1, avant de faire une telle demande, la cour doit tenir compte des facteurs suivants :

a) si l’enfant est âgé de plus de douze ans;

b) si les vœux de l’enfant, qui peut les exprimer, ont été pris en considération;

c) si le ministrepeut déterminer les vœux de l’enfant;

d) si les intérêts et les préoccupations de l’enfant et ceux du ministre diffèrent;

e) si un avocat estmieux placé pour déterminer les intérêts et les préoccupations de l’enfant; et

f) tous autres facteurs qu’elle estime pertinents. Toutefois,comme le juge l’a indiqué dans la décision de première instance dans V.C. et J.C., observation à laquelle notre Cour a souscrit, c’est à lacour de prendre la décision pour les enfants et non aux enfants eux-mêmes (par. 33). Les vues et préférences des enfants qui sont d’unâge auquel ces vues peuvent être exprimées ne sont qu’un facteur à prendre en compte. [31] En l’espèce, malgré l’opposition de la ministre, une avocate a été désignée pour représenter les enfants et elle aparticipé pleinement au procès.

Elle a interrogé et contre-interrogé les divers témoins, elle a résumé la preuve et elle a présenté sesrecommandations. [32] La ministre prétend que la Loi ne précise pas le rôle de l’avocat des enfants dans des instances de ce genre. Je souscris à cet avis. Dans J.D. c. ministre des Services familiaux et communautaires, 2001 NBCA 43, 238 R.N.-B. (2e) 201, notre Couravait à donner des directives quant au rôle de l’avocat des enfants dans le cadre d’audiences portant sur la protection d’un enfant.L’article 7.1 de la Loi a été adopté à la suite de cette décision.

Comme nous l’avons mentionné, cette disposition énonce les facteurs àprendre en compte pour la désignation d’un avocat pour des enfants, mais elle ne définit pas son rôle exact. La Cour d’appel du Québec a cité J.D. dans la décision qu’elle a rendue

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