R. v. C. F. Date:, 2016 BCPC 389

Citation: R. v. C. F. Date: 20161027 2016 BCPC 389 File Nos: 362-2; 362-3-C Registry: Valemount IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Youth Division REGINA v. C. F. REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE M. A. GRAY BAN ON PUBLICATION PURSUANT TO

SECTION 118 YCJA BAN ON PUBLICATION PURSUANT TO

SECTION 110 YCJA

Counsel for the Crown: G. McDonald Counsel for the Defendant: S. Buckley Place of Hearing: Prince George , B.C. Date of Hearing: October 27, 2016 Date of Judgment: October 27, 2016 [ 1 ] THE COURT: Yes, Mr. F., we had these matters develop, of course, over the course of our days of trial and we adjourned through to August. We had those submissions in August and then I reserved and am now able to provide my reasons. [ 2 ] I am just going to refer to, firstly, the incident itself, dealing with the matter that developed in the McBride/Valemount area and then, of course, the additional matter is, Mr.

Buckley has the application regarding delay -- that there has been too much delay and it is unreasonable, and therefore there should be a stay of proceedings, rather a stopping of the proceeding all together. [ 3 ] Just going back to the incident itself and the evidence that I have heard, and of course, I am dealing with Information 362-C-3, from the Valemount Registry.

Now, in that Information, of course, the charge is that there was, under the Criminal Code , an allegation made that you, on those dates in 2013, between May and July, caused unnecessary pain, suffering and injury to an animal, and then specified 'gophers'. [ 4 ] Of course, the evidence developed around what did take place between you and Mr. C. during that time in 2013. The evidence, of course, came forward through the several witnesses. [ 5 ] We had the testimony from Ms. Ammond, and her testimony was that during discussions and she was acting, as I viewed it, as a mentor and somewhat as a counsellor.

During those discussions on one particular meeting you described that you had some concerns and that there were animal activities where -- whence you skinned alive an animal and removed the feet while they were still alive. Those are the comments that she noted and recorded. [ 6 ] That was, of course, subject to some concern, as Mr. Buckley raised, that what was her role?

I made a determination and I made a ruling that she was not a person in authority and that the statements were admissible on the basis of just standard comments made to someone, perhaps in a different position, but not that much dissimilar from being a family member or a person that you trusted. [ 7 ] Now, the case really developed around Mr. C.'s evidence. He testified on those dates in June, June 9th, he described what he observed and how he interacted with you and what took place during those times. As he testified, he was 15 years of age, but he described incidents that took place when he was twelve.

So, of course, there were concerns about his ability to recall, remember, and properly describe those incidents three years later, roughly. [ 8 ] The cross-examination by Mr. Buckley was extensive and it was thorough, as he went backwards and forwards with the different items that Mr. C. had commented on. And, of course, Mr. C. had provided a statement to the police and that was subject to cross-examination and was of concern. [ 9 ] Now Mr.

C., in his testimony, I viewed it as fairly strong testimony, although he had the time that had lapsed causing some difficulties, he remembered, in fairly stark terms, what took place. In other words: “I did see these actions by Mr. F. I saw him do these things. He used wire cutters.” He provided a fair amount of detail about what took place. [ 10 ] In the cross-examination certainly he did not recall details that were perhaps on the periphery, as I viewed it, or not as stark as watching and observing what took place with those gophers. He did at times, as he was confronted by Mr.

Buckley, in my view, remain insistent about the incidents that happened. In other words, he did not resile or retire from how he recalled matters. In my view, he, as a young person at age 15, had some difficulty in testifying in a courtroom setting and being in the witness box, and taking on that very, in my view, adult responsibility of telling the truth and providing an account. [ 11 ] At one point he was confronted, in his cross-examination, and he actually said that there was nothing wrong in the statement he gave “except what he had observed” and I will return to that.

It did confirm for me that he had a somewhat limited understanding of the court process and statements and how he needed to explain what he saw and explain what he set out in his statement. [ 12 ] He did indicate in the testimony, that yes, he had seen the feet cut off and that he did have some difficulty recalling some things.

Of course, the statement to the police provided perhaps a better account because it was more recent in time than his testimony in June of 2016. [ 13 ] As I viewed his testimony and I made notes as he was testifying, I was satisfied that he was quite careful in replying to the questions and that at times he, in fact, asked for the question to be rephrased or reworded, so that he could better understand it. [ 14 ] He did say, for instance, at one point, that he did not have a concrete memory and that was the word he used, "I have no concrete memory of going from school to home to checking the traps".

The reference was to a Day Three, one of the third occasions when the two of you were looking at the gopher traps. In my view, again, he was being forthright about: “I do not remember that type of detail but I do remember going to the traps. I do not remember the detail of going from my school to the home, and to making my way to the field where the traps were.” As I say, he was forthright in recognizing and acknowledging that he had that limitation. [ 15 ] It was a case where he did not attempt to provide details where he could not recall. In other words, he did not try to fill in the

gaps. He just would simply say, I cannot remember, I do not recall. As I say, he did remember the stark incident and details such as wire cutters and how the animals were being treated. [ 16 ] As I viewed his testimony, he was following along with a natural response. When questions were posed to him, there would be the inference that in some ways, in his own mind, he had failed to provide an answer, that he was not a good witness. So there was some undermining, perhaps, of his confidence as the cross-examination went on, but as I say, throughout most of that he remained firm and confident in his answers.

But, as the testimony developed in the cross-examination it was apparent to me that he wanted to be careful, but he also was a little concerned about being able to provide answers when basically he was drawing a blank, so that, as I saw it, he was losing confidence in his ability to respond to the questions. [ 17 ] He was asking for clarification of some questions. He also asked -- his own choice of words were ‘to be careful'; in my view he wanted to be very clear as he testified.

But, again and again he would describe what took place in those incidents when the two of you were trying to snare gophers. [ 18 ] He said, for instance, that in the time when the feet or paws were cut off - he used the word "paws" - he said you could hear the animals, the gophers squeal. So he could account to that level of experience and memory. He did say that, yes, the snare was around the neck but you could still hear the squeals. So, he was being confronted in the cross-examination but he was, as I say, strong in his response.

He remained with that same response and did not back away from that type of answer. [ 19 ] He tried to do his best to estimate, for instance, time. He estimated that, yes, the animals died within ten to 15 seconds. He did try to provide as much detail as he could about the animals, sticks being used, rocks being thrown where the animals were.

So, throughout the trial he, in my view, responded in a direct way and was able to acknowledge, as I say, when he remembered and when he did not. [ 20 ] There was some examination in the cross-examination about a knife and the stabbing of an animal and stabbing the animal to a tree and he, again, he remained firm in that depiction. There was some questioning of the practicality or the reality of that all happening, but he did not, again, resile from that.

He remained strong in his response. [ 21 ] He talked about the animals being suffocated, again, questioned about how would that be possible; a Ziploc bag, and he said he remembered it. He said, "I remember it like that". Of course, the question was asked, "Well, the bag does not make sense. It was a Ziploc bag". And he simply responds, "I was not the one doing it. I was not the one using the bag". [ 22 ] So, he was not able to give that detail but he was being, in some ways in his response, trying to indicate to the audience that there is only so much that he observed.

He did indicate that he does not have a memory. As he said, "I do not have a memory of the gopher being suffocated", but it was, as I have noted, it was at a point where he asked for clarification to the question. Still, he was able to say in effect, I remember the strong points and I do not have a memory of some of the surrounding details or peripheral details. [ 23 ] He did state that he did not recall the details.

He said it was too long ago for me, when asked about specific details and there was a fair extensive exploration of details such as the height of the grass and where these animals were located and directions. All of that, he was questioned on and having to respond to. [ 24 ] He did have some difficulty with the statement. He said there were times when he said things, as he reviewed it, in the statement and he simply answered, "I know I said those things but I have no current recall of saying those things".

Then he acknowledged that some of those things were told to him by C. and that became a point of submission that this person was relying on perhaps you, who, as you acknowledge, you like to tell your own stories. [ 25 ] He was confronted. "You make up stories and spread stories about C.". He said, no, and he still wanted to be truthful throughout his statement. [ 26 ] Now, as I say, at one point he did say that he was being questioned, and as I say, he responded in a way that, "Yes, the statement that I gave to the police, it was correct.

The only thing wrong in that statement is what I saw C. do" -- which, in my view, was an interesting response by this young man to say there was, as he viewed the question in his plain reading, plain presentation, what is wrong in that statement, he simply said, "What I observed. What took place." [ 27 ] Now, his testimony was fairly, as I say, extensive and I have noted that the examination in chief took about 14 minutes and then Mr. Buckley, as I say, in a thorough cross-examination that went into the afternoon of June the 9th of 2016.

I have estimated it to be about two hours and 45 minutes into the afternoon, a short testimony, and then into the afternoon. As I say, I view that as fairly extensive testimony. [ 28 ] He also did continue with the testimony on June the 10th and I have that continuing from 12:10 to the break, 20 minutes, and then carrying from roughly 2:00 o'clock through to the end of his testimony or cross-examination, which was before the break. So, a fairly extensive cross-examination in many, many details, which as I say, he did not resile from.

He maintained the gist of the details. [ 29 ] Now, in terms of the other evidence, it was you testifying. So we had the two witnesses from Crown and then you testified. Then, of course, you testified on June the 10th at 3:00 o'clock, fairly limited testimony, as I viewed it because we were into submissions by about 3:20. So, roughly 20 minutes of testimony. The examination in chief, as we call it, or chief, was fairly limited, talking about your conversation with Ms. Almond and that you stated, "I cannot remember the words. I cannot possibly, three years ago".

So you were fairly adamant yourself about your inability to remember. "I have no recollection of saying words to the worker, Ms. Almond". [ 30 ] Of course, indicating, "I used to lie a lot. I did that to get attention". And then when asked, it was, "I vaguely recall speaking of gophers and hardship of foster care. No good memory of that, but it is not true. No recall at all of sticking a gopher to a tree or using a stick, or suffocating a gopher. I never absolutely did not do that.

The words that were said were a lie". [ 31 ] Now, in the cross-examination you said, "I do say things that get attention and for a variety of reasons I say positive and

negative things, trying to get attention no matter what". And that you say that, "I cannot remember the lies. It is not part of my memory", was one of your answers. You said that, "Yes, I talked about torturing gophers a couple of times", and that you acknowledge Ms. Almond never lied to you and that you - but you did not talk to her too much. [ 32 ] Then you carried on, "I do not remember saying that you tortured animals. I would have been lying, but I have no recall. I never showed things to Mr. C. He is fabricating.

I did not actually do these things". [ 33 ] Now, the test, of course, for the court is to examine all the evidence and to determine at the end of the day, beyond a reasonable doubt, if the Crown has proven their case. I have looked carefully at your evidence and in my view, it has ended up being just a simple denial, a bald assertion that that did not happen, but you say you do not have any recall, so it, in my view, contradicts itself by saying that it did not happen but I have no recall. [ 34 ] So I cannot put any weight in that evidence, that your testimony, in itself, does not raise a reasonable doubt.

Looking at the evidence all together, and of course, when I say that, I am looking at Mr. C.'s evidence, it was my view that he did deal with it in a very forthright way. I found his evidence strong and that he acknowledged places where he had a weak memory. He acknowledged that he did not have a clear recollection of details, but throughout the examination, as I say, fairly extensive, he maintained that he saw those things. Of course, coupled with the statement that came forward, admission by you, that came forward through Ms.

Almond, in my view, it is supported to that extent, as well. [ 35 ] So there is independent evidence, as I view it, of you providing an admission to Ms. Almond, independent of Mr. C.'s testimony. [ 36 ] As I say, in terms of your testimony, I am not able to place any weight on it because of what I view as a contradictory response, a terse response, almost not engaging in any background detail. As you say, "I have no recollection", but at the same time you say, "I did not do it".

As I view it, those are two contradictory things and I cannot rely on the fact of your denial. [ 37 ] Now, at the end of the matter it was my determination when we had our last court session in August, that I had made a decision that you were guilty of this offence and because of that decision, of course, I find you guilty of the offence. I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the Crown's case is made out and that you are guilty of the charge of the Criminal Code s. 445.1, of causing pain or suffering to an animal. [ 38 ] The other issue is the stay of proceedings. In terms of that Mr.

Buckley prepared two sets of materials, which I have been able to review. But, of course, as I say, the issue is the Charter of Rights , and the issue is somebody is entitled to be tried within a reasonable time and if there is unreasonable delay then the court should intervene and have a stay of proceedings as the remedy, that the matter should not go forward. [ 39 ] The application for that issue came forward. Mr. Buckley filed his documents May of 2015, so last year, in the spring. At that point he was arguing there was even at that point the unreasonable delay.

The test for all of that now has been revised to a large extent because of that decision that Mr. Buckley referred, R. v. Jordan [phonetic], but for our purposes the Information was sworn in July of 2014. Of course the incident, as we know, is October 10 of 2013, or that time period as set out in the Information. So, some delay before the Information came forward, but nonetheless, the Information came forward in July. The matters proceeded into court. There were some steps taken at the court in that fall. [ 40 ] Of course, in October of 2014 there was a court session here in Prince George.

Bail was granted on October the 9th in 2014, and then matters proceeded further. As Mr. Buckley indicated in his materials, he was seeking disclosure. He wanted to understand the extent of the case against you that the Crown was bringing forward, and he also, of course, wanted to better advise you of that. Of course, that was not in hand by the time the arraignment was completed and that was January of 2015. Nonetheless, as Mr.

Buckley said, he continued on without the disclosure and made the arraignment and set the pleas, and we are looking for trial dates. [ 41 ] Now, there were steps taken in the intervening period but the trial date was fairly quickly set for that October date. So the matter was in hand to the extent that the October 29th date was set and the matter was coming forward. [ 42 ] There were discussions and we do have the variety of proceedings of those court attendances. Again, Mr. Buckley, in part of his materials, has provided the transcripts from those court proceedings.

I just wish to refer to the one, which was in March of 2013. So, at that point, matters were proceeding. There had been the arraignment in January and this matter proceeded before Regional Administrative Judge Brecknell on March the 5th, and there was discussion. Both Mr. McDonald, on behalf of the Crown, and Mr. Buckley raised the issue about time and the fact that this particular matter, and perhaps another matter, required a full day.

Of course, both experienced with the courts at Valemount/McBride, they were expressing their concern that the matter would not be able to proceed completely on that day and they asked for the court to consider that there be a special sitting, additional time set aside so this matter could be completed. [ 43 ] The comments in that discussion with the court, was on that basis that a special sitting really is a sensible approach.

The court indicated and, of course, to understand that this is our Regional Administrative Judge Brecknell speaking, he commented, yes, we know we have a trial date, October 29th, and the two of you basically are asking that we have a special sitting for this particular matter because of, of course, concerns about any typical court day in Valemount or McBride, there are other matters, of course, on the list and can we actually get a full day in court? [ 44 ] He indicated at line - I am at page 1 of the matter - he indicated that, yes, if we need a full day he was not going to give that direction at that time.

He had to consult with the judicial case managers and that he would rely on the October date, but he did note that good reason to give it some urgency. It is a youth matter and that he indicated that it is coming up to two years old. He made that comment in March of 2015, and that he expected that there would be some discussion to take place. [ 45 ] Of course, the concern was that there was another matter that you were involved in. There should be some special days, maybe, for both matters, but not at the same time because, as Mr. Buckley acknowledged, it may be preferable to have two different judges hear

the two different matters. So that would maybe require additional time.

There was some reluctance to do that. [ 46 ] Regional Administrative Judge Brecknell indicated, at page 2, he was going to speak about the matter to the staff and perhaps they could find court time, and that he was going to then review the matter, and that they were going to review the matter, not only with the JCM responsible for Valemount/McBride, but also the JCMs or judicial case managers at Prince George, and the matter was to come back. [ 47 ] Now, nothing did develop in terms of a special sitting and I will come back to that because that is a large issue that both Crown, Mr. McDonald, and Mr.

Buckley have dealt with on a number of occasions when I have been sitting at Valemount and McBride. [ 48 ] But just going back to the principles surrounding the question of unreasonable delay, with that time frame that we know in terms of how matters developed for your case here, in our Northern Region and, of course, at McBride and Valemount, the case of R. v.

Jordan talks about the question of delay, very extensive coverage, and they also talk about the fact that now there are some new rules about a presumption that once the Provincial Court matter exceeds 18 months, then it is unreasonable and there is too much delay and the matter then has to be assessed, but it is really resting with the Crown, having the burden to come forward and say, this delay has occurred, but these are the reasons for it. [ 49 ] So there is this presumptive ceiling, as it is described, and then, of course, at all times the ultimate remedy is the stay of proceedings.

The Crown can come forward and show exceptional circumstances and I will come back to that, but because of the matter having been in the midst of this application, there is comment in the case of R. v.

Jordan of transition, so that because this case has been in process, this new rule should be modified perhaps, for these types of cases. [ 50 ] At that comment the Supreme Court of Canada simply said that it is only to be modified to the extent that both parties, in other words both Crown and Defence, rely on a state of affairs or a certain framework that had developed this delay, and if that was the case, then that would be seen as an exception. [ 51 ] It is my finding that there was no reliance, and as Mr. Buckley said, he had filed his application about delay that much earlier.

So, it was on the table, as it were. It was an issue that he was anxious to pursue. [ 52 ] Now, in terms of the analysis, there are cases, of course, surrounding Jordan and I have had the advantage of reviewing the cases that were presented. I will just make brief reference to the decision of R. v. Curry . [ 53 ] That is a decision from our B.C. Supreme Court, a decision of Madam Justice Holmes, and it is cited at 2016 BCSC 1435 . It is, in my view, very instructive, certainly for courts at my level, Provincial Court level. She makes reference to the

summary, the headnote, at the outset of her decision. So she takes from Jordan the

summary and places that in her decision at paragraph 4, and she says: I can do no better than to quote from the

summary. I will not quote it, but it sets out, as I say, my overview that there is this presumption, there is this rule of 18 months at our court level, and that there is a question of exceptional circumstances. But, as she states, the exceptional circumstances are ones only that lie outside the Crown's control and that they are reasonably unforeseen or reasonably unavoidable. Then, too, they cannot really be remedied. That would be the only qualification to exceeding that 18-month limit. [ 54 ] And then there are some examples that were given in the

summary about what was suitable to be treated as a delay that was exceptional, in which case then the time that took place for the entire trial would have that particular portion deducted from it. [ 55 ] In her analysis in her trial, it is at paragraph 152 at page 21, where she speaks of exceptional circumstances that relate to her particular case and she stated that in that case she would deduct four months for events that occurred that she treated as exceptional. So in other words, she made a finding of fact that there were exceptional circumstances.

One was where she was restricted because she was still on a jury trial. She could not attend court on the date that had been scheduled and that there was a further delay that one of the participants had a due date -- was pregnant, and there was some delay there. [ 56 ] Those were treated as exceptional circumstances and four months was deducted from the overall delay. [ 57 ] The other case, of course, that Mr. Buckley presented was the R. v. Williamson , which followed along on the same date as Jordan. Jordan is cited at 2016 SCC 27 , and Williamson is cited at 2016 SCC 28 .

So the Supreme Court of Canada issued both those judgments dealing with the question of undue delay in setting forth new rules. [ 58 ] As I have viewed it, the Jordan decision does go into some detail about the exceptional circumstances. I make reference to paragraph 71 through 74, and they talk about, as we mentioned, this reasonably unavoidable, at paragraph 69. Of course, is there something, some steps that Crown could have taken to reasonably remedy the delay? [ 59 ] In these circumstances, in my view, Crown could not have done anything more than they did.

In fact, I should mention now that over the course of this case and other occasions, Mr. McDonald, perhaps in tandem with Mr. Buckley, have raised the issue of not enough court time at McBride and at Valemount. They have discussed that in some detail with the administration and the Regional Administrative Judge here at Prince George, of course, Prince George being the administrative centre for McBride and Valemount. [ 60 ] It is my view that perhaps Crown at large, beyond Mr.

McDonald, the Crown at large can be criticized for not taking steps to remedy what are now viewed as institutional delays that may not be acceptable, but certainly both counsel here today have taken steps to deal with the question of delay. [ 61 ] For my purposes, I do accept that the circuit court is a unique court. It is set, of course, in remote locations, not only in

Valemount/McBride, but throughout British Columbia, and it has unique characteristics and difficulties. In my view, it should come well within the question of exceptional circumstances, as Jordan described it. [ 62 ] Before me today, I do not have evidence properly to assess that issue. In other words, in this particular case, I do not have the necessary detail and Jordan was quite careful to direct that the courts pay attention to the context, the circumstances surrounding a particular case as they tried to determine exceptional circumstances.

As they said, the door is not closed on what may be suitable factors for the courts to consider. But in my view, I do not have the ability today to make that proper assessment. [ 63 ] I should note, for the record, that these concerns, as I say, have been voiced on many occasions when I have been at the Valemount/McBride sittings. It is to be noted that those sittings are a mixed list, that they are not only criminal, but family and small claims. They also have case conferences and settlement conference.

So, a variety of matters are dealt with on circuit. [ 64 ] The information that I understand for this year is there are six sessions at McBride/Valemount. In other words, one day at McBride and one day at Valemount. So Valemount receives six days of court time in 2016. The information that I have gained for 2015, were that the six were supplemented by three more, so a total of nine days were provided to Valemount. [ 65 ] As you can see, the institution has allocated six days this year as they saw the caseload develop, as they saw the needs at Valemount.

It should be noted, August 24th was a separate date that was pulled from the Prince George scheduling so that we could conclude matters. At that point the application was before the court regarding delay. [ 66 ] So that was an additional date, perhaps, that was added to accommodate in 2016, the particular issue of having the matter resolved.

It should be remembered that the time runs from the time of the Information being sworn till the trial is concluded, which is sentence and conviction, so in effect, is today, that the time has been running and that matters are concluded. [ 67 ] It also should be noted that, as I understand it, it traditionally has been six sessions a year. In other words, every other month has been a court session. So, all of that, in my view, places the circuit court in a far different environment than perhaps what we encounter in other locations.

Of course, the case in Supreme Court we are dealing with in part dealt with a Surrey Court in the lower mainland, and a far different environment than we have up here in the Northern Region. [ 68 ] Now, despite that, and I would say there have been not only comments made in court by counsel but there have been meetings and attempts to have some restructuring of court time at McBride and Valemount.

Of course, with the allocation of resources perhaps and the broader view that is taken from Prince George, in terms of how a judge's time is to be allocated, or court time is to be allocated, the answer has been, as I read it, certainly in 2016 that that area, that McBride and Valemount have suitable or appropriate amount of resources when they get six sessions a year. [ 69 ] It should be remembered that Jordan has now provided us with the framework and a template to be used well into the future.

Although there is perhaps strong disagreement from the Supreme Court of Canada - it was a five/four decision - and we note in Justice Cromwell's comments that the difficulties now, the vagaries and difficulties of making an estimate and analysis now have been maybe moved into the arena of determining exceptional circumstances. So, there is some reservation as to how far we have accomplished matters. [ 70 ] As we look at the decision and the last comment of the majority decision made reference to the complacency and a culture of complacency that has taken place in our courts.

It is important that steps be taken to resolve matters so that ultimately justice operates on the basis that it is timely and the results are timely. [ 71 ] Now, as I view the matter, there was a further comment that Mr. Buckley made about the question of youth and that was reinforced by the case precedent from Ontario Court of Appeal from 1991. Perhaps somewhat dated here, but still, in my view an important case for the courts to remember, R. v.

M(G.C.) 1991 from the Ontario Court of Appeal, in which they say that youth matters need to be dealt with in a far different way in terms of adult, and that they should be brought forward in a much more expeditious manner. They set a time limit of much shorter than 18 months, obviously, for youth matters, on the basis that youths are in the process of growth and need direction and support and the longer the delay takes place, there is not timely resolution.

There also are not the opportunities for resources, perhaps, to be brought forward to assist. [ 72 ] So, they are asking, again, for the court to be mindful of the nature of the youth matter. [ 73 ] The other aspect that should be noted is that is a relatively straightforward trial. It is a simple trial in terms of the evidence.

We had the three witnesses in a Voir Dire perhaps that took a bit of time, but nothing untoward in terms of how the case proceeded. [ 74 ] As I say, in my view the transition provisions do not apply to this particular case, as outlined by Jordan , and I am satisfied that I must resolve the matter on the basis of, have exceptional circumstances been established by the Crown, as they have the burden to bring forward that information?

Of course, we do not have all the necessary information to determine exceptional circumstances, but in my view something in the order of two to four months might be a suitable way to estimate a delay that is accepted because of circuit court activities. In other words, one session or two sessions before the matter is somehow resolved and moved on.

But, as I say, I am not prepared to make any firm conclusion or finding on that basis because I do not have the information. [ 75 ] As I have looked at the matter in its entirety, I am satisfied that the extent of the matter, from the time of the Information to now is 27 months and in my view that is not acceptable and does breach your rights for the matter to be resolved in a reasonable time. [ 76 ] Therefore, there is the breach under our

section of the Charter of Rights , of s. 11(b) , and for our purposes then, although as I say, you stand convicted of that matter, I am entering a stay of proceedings on the matter now. [ 77 ] It will not proceed any further and I do not know if there were any ongoing conditions but I should make the comment, Mr. F., just to reinforce the fact that although prejudice and seriousness are not to be considered in our matters anymore, in terms of delay because of Jordan , I do note that you have been on restrictions and you have been in a group home with, as we understood, some curfew

restrictions. So I am not sure if those things are going to change now as a result of the stay of proceedings. I hope that you do not have those binding you anymore. (REASONS FOR SENTENCE CONCLUDED)