Olenga v. British Columbia, 2015 BCSC 1050

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: Olenga v.

British Columbia, 2015 BCSC 1050 Date: 20150618 Docket: S149959 Registry: Vancouver Between: A ‘O’ A AKA JMO, AZO, KLO and AIME OLENGA AND Al Plaintiffs And HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, as represented by the PROVINCE OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, and HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, as represented by the BRITISH COLUMBIAN PREMIER OFFICE OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, and HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, as represented by the MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETYand SOLICITOR GENERAL OF BRITISH COLUMBIA; and HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, as represented by the MINISTER OF JUSTICE and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF BRITISH COLUMBIA; HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, as represented by the MINISTER OF COMMUNITY, FAMILY AND CHILDREN DEVELOPMENT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, and HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, as represented by the DIRECTOR of THE MINISTRY OF COMMUNITY, FAMILY AND CHILDREN’S SERVICES OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, and HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, as represented by the MINISTER OF HEALTH AND LONG-TERM CARE and HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, as represented by the VITAL STATISTIC OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, and HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, as represented by the ATTORNEY GENERAL OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, and HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, as represented by the BURNABY HOSPITAL, and HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, as represented by the PROVIDENCE SAINT PAUL HOSPITAL, and HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, as represented by the VANCOUVER GENERAL HOSPITAL, and HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, as represented by BRITISH COLUMBIA WOMEN’S and CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL; and the HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, as represented by CITY OF VANCOUVER, and HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, as represented by the VANCOUVER POLICE DEPARTMENT; YWCA / SHEWAY/CRABTREE, LEGAL AID SERVICES, MS.

VILLAREAL, MS. WEREMCHUCK, MS. ANDREA L. THORPE. MS. L. HAWES, MS. ASSUNTA S. De CIANTIS, MR. STANLEY FOO, MS. IRIS L. TURAGLIO, MS JOY O’DWYER, MR. PAUL WINN DR. BLANK, DR. LEE., MS. LINDA PENFOLD, MS. CORA GORING, BERHE GUILBOT, MR. GARETH GRIFFIN, MR. MATTHEW BROWN, MS. JEANNE POOLE, MS JANAINA ESTADIO, MS DEBIE SONIA, MS. SUE HASSARD, MS.LAURA JONES, MS. LUCY CHI, MS. GOUANDOLYN, MS. UN MIAO. MR. IAN SHARMA, MS. ROBEN, MR. JACK SHWECHUK , DR. JEROME LEE, DR BRIEN MCGOWEN, DR. ROSLEY, MS. LUO NURSE, DR. PIETR KLAKOWIZK, DR. DANIEL LIN, MR. COLIN. A. CAMPBELL, DR. ANNA S. NAZIL, DR.

SHANNON O’DONNELL, TWO UNNAMED VGH. DRS. and DR. MARK LEVY, And UNNAMED a NURSE and a SECRETARY of YWCA/CRABTREE, DR. MYLES K. BLANC, HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, as represented by the CITY OF VANCOUVER, and HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, as represented by the VANCOUVER POLICE DEPARTMENT, and HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, as represented by the CITY OF BURNABY, and HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, as represented by the BURNABY RCMP and Al. Defendants Before: The Honourable Mr. Justice Baird Reasons for Judgment The plaintiff A.

Olenga Self-represented: Counsel for Her Majesty the Queen in right of the Province of British Columbia: D. Suntjens Counsel for the A. Thorpe and L. Hawes: G. Somers, S. Thorpe Counsel for the Health Authorities and Hospitals: D.J. Bell and L. McGivern Counsel for the Minister of Justice of British Columbia: M. Huculak Counsel for N. Villareal, C. Campbell, S. Foo, M. Weremchuck, I. Turaglio, A. De Ciantis T. Wong Counsel for YWCA/Crabtree and a Secretary of YWCA/Crabtree S. Sangha and D. Fostey Counsel for the City of Burnaby: A.D.C. Kask Counsel for Dr. Blank D.W.

Pilley Place and Date of Hearing: Vancouver, B.C. February 24, March 04 and June 12, 2015

Place and Date of Judgment: Vancouver, B.C.

June 18, 2015 INTRODUCTION [ 1 ] On December 22, 2014, the plaintiff filed the present Notice of Civil Claim which various defendants now apply to strike in its entirety under Rule 9-5(1) on the basis that: a. it discloses no reasonable claim, b. it is unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, c. it may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial or hearing of the proceeding, or d. it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. [ 2 ] The defendants also say that the claimant has failed to comply with Rule 3-1(2) which stipulates that a Notice of Civil Claim must set out a concise statement of the material facts giving rise to the claim, the relief sought by the plaintiff against each named defendant, and a concise

summary of the legal basis for the relief sought. [ 3 ] For the reasons that follow, the application is allowed and the claim is struck. BACKGROUND [ 4 ] The claimant is no stranger to our court system. He has represented himself in a number of reported cases: see Olenga v. I.C.B.C., 2005 BCJ 1494 ; Olenga v. I.C.B.C., 2007 BCCA 87 ; Olenga v. I.C.B.C., 2007 BCCA 256 ; Olenga v. Sisett & Co., 2010 BCSC 271 ; Olenga v. Sisett & Co., 2010 BCCA 456 .

He has also been a participant in family litigation and multiple Provincial Court child protection proceedings involving his three daughters, who are named as co-plaintiffs in the present lawsuit and identified by their intials A O’ A, AZO and KLO. Each child has a different mother. All of them have been apprehended or dealt with at various times by government social workers acting on authority of the Child, Family and Community Service Act RSBC 1996 c. 46. [ 5 ] The eldest child, KLO, seems to have spent most of her childhood in the care of her mother and grandmother.

The material before me indicates that the claimant and KLO’s mother were engaged in litigation early on in KLO’s life over custody and access issues. These were complicated by an allegation made by KLO’s mother that the claimant had abused KLO. Because of this allegation, the child protection authorities became involved, and the matter went at least as far as a proposed mediation involving child protection officials. It is not clear on the evidence if the claimant accepted the invitation to mediate or how parenting arrangements for KLO were configured thereafter.

KLO is now an adult, aged 21. [ 6 ] The middle child, AZO, now aged 16, was the subject of a continuing custody application brought by the Director of Child, Family and Community Service (“the Director”) in September 2011, upon which AZO engaged her own lawyer and successfully argued that she should remain in the care of the Director over the objections of her mother and with the consent of the claimant.

This order had been preceded by a number of temporary custody orders in favour of the Director, in the midst of which there was at least one mediation agreement signed by the claimant governing access terms for AZO’s parents. On December 14, 2014, the claimant applied in Provincial Court to have the continuing custody order set aside. This application has not yet been heard. [ 7 ] The youngest child, A O’ A, is two years old. In January 2013 she was apprehended by the Director, who was granted a temporary custody order shortly thereafter.

A mediation agreement followed under which A O’ A’s mother was afforded increasing access and parenting time as long as she complied with certain conditions devised to ensure the child’s safety and protection. This mediation agreement was signed by the claimant. There was a renewal of the temporary custody order to which the claimant consented in March 2013 giving him reasonable access to A O’ A. In June 2013, A O’ A was returned to her mother on a supervision order which has now expired. The child continues to live with her mother without any supervision by the Director.

The claimant and A O’ A’s mother are estranged. The claimant has applied for parenting time with A O’ A which her mother opposes unless the visits are supervised by someone acceptable to her.

A contested hearing on this issue has not yet been heard. [ 8 ] The claimant’s pleadings in the case before me are focussed on these past events involving his children, and, as discussed below, involve sweeping allegations of conspiracy, collusion, racism, and other forms of misconduct against a host of defendants. [ 9 ] When the present hearing first convened on the morning of February 23, 2015, the claimant told me that he required an adjournment because, intellectually speaking, he is unable to function before lunchtime. This is because he takes narcotic medication every morning.

These so severely impair his faculties, he said, that he is unable to perform even routine tasks until afternoon. He made this claim in a previous lawsuit without adducing adequate proof: Olenga v. Sisett & Co. (BCSC) at paras. 39 to 48. [ 10 ] In his response to the present application, the claimant has included a “Medical Certificate” of the sort referred to in this previous lawsuit. It is dated March 15, 2010 and is signed by the claimant’s family doctor.

It says, quite simply: I am writing on behalf of [the claimant] to confirm that he has complex [sic] medical history, and that he takes a number of medications that cause drowsiness and poor concentration in the morning. He functions better in the afternoon, and for this reason his court sessions should be scheduled in the late afternoon (after 3 p.m.). The materials before me do not make the claimant’s medical challenges any clearer than this, and I do not have a finely honed sense of

the true scope of his cognitive deficits. He certainly seemed properly oriented and fully capable of marshalling his thoughts and expressing himself in his appearances before me. Out of caution, however, I granted a brief adjournment to March 4, 2015 so that an afternoon sitting could be arranged. On that date I heard submissions from no fewer than eight lawyers representing multiple defendants, followed, on the afternoon of June 12, 2015, by a lengthy submission from the claimant. THE PLEADINGS [ 11 ] It is obvious, first of all, that the claimant has no right to name his children in this lawsuit.

KLO is an adult who has not consented to be joined, and AZO and A ‘O’ A are minors who cannot participate other than by a litigation guardian acting through counsel, which is not the case here.

Also, various defendants before me have argued that this lawsuit, as it relates to them, and to the extent that any clear intention, purpose or lawful grounds can be discerned from the pleadings, appears to be an attempt to re-litigate issues concerning the claimant’s children that have already been judicially determined, or refers to disputes that are barred by operation of the Limitation Act SBC 2012 c. 13, or both. [ 12 ] These are substantial objections, of course, but I propose to focus primarily on what I consider to be the fatal defects in the substance of the claimant’s pleadings.

Far from setting out a concise statement of the material facts giving rise to the claim, the pleadings consist of a lengthy screed or diatribe in which bald and wholly unsubstantiated accusations of racism, conspiracy, collusion, blackmail, and harassment are made against a multitude of defendants. Various defendants, including unidentified defendants, are referred to in the style of cause without any factual reference being made to them in the pleadings.

No attempt has been made to set out legally admissible or sufficient forms of relief sought against each or indeed any defendant. [ 13 ] Under the heading “RELIEF CLAIMED” the following paragraphs appear in the pleadings, reproduced verbatim: 60.

The Plaintiffs’ Olenga, on behalf of their children’s pain and suffering plus their family destruction; and their self pain and suffering; claim vicarious liability damages to all these agencies that foster policies against minorities parents, for 3 illegal removals added to one wrongful removal, and the silent and illegal participation of the city of Vancouver Police and the City of Bumaby RCMP and other Ministries in that respect. The Plaintiffs family claim negligence, discrimination, wrongful removal, illegal removal, coercion, collusion and more damages against these crown’s agencies: (

a) General damages in the amount of $30,000,000.00 CAD (

b) Special damages in the amount of $45,000,000.00 CAD (

c) Emotional damages in the amount of $15,000,000.00 CAD (

d) Punitive damages in the amount of $20,000,000.00 CAD (

e) Aggravated damages in the amount of $25,000,000.00 CAD (

f) Pre-judgment and post judgment interest pursuant to the Court of Justice Act. (

g) Cost of this action on substantial indemnity basis, and (

h) And such further and other relief this Honorable Court may deem just. 61. The Olenga’s Plaintiffs as representative of Olenga destroyed family’s security, potential income, and enjoyment of life, health, good life and their coursed financial and economical ability of the said family. Forced onto misery and suffering and subsequently failing to achieve their family’s goal due to MFCD civil servant unlawful interferences, continuous harassment with their subsidiaries of the 3 levels government: Federal, Provincial and Municipal; their unjust supports and interference into Mr. Olenga’s family; they claims to the individuals defendants: (

a) general damages in the amount of $3, 000,000.00 CAD (

b) special damages in the amount of $4,000,000.00 CAD (

c) emotional damages in the amount of $6,000,000.00 CAD (

d) punitive damages in the amount of $8,000,000.00 CAD (

e) aggravated damages in the amount of $10,000,000.00 CAD (

f) Pre-judgment and post judgment interest pursuant to the Court of Justice Act. (

g) Cost of this action on substantial indemnity basis, and (

h) and such further and other relief this Honorable Court may deem just. [ 14 ] The legal basis for the claim is equally incoherent and includes the Constitution Act , the Charter of Rights and Freedoms , the Canadian Bill of Rights , as well as general reference to a number of statutes, including from Ontario, and case authorities that do not obviously relate to the litany of conclusory statements set out in the pleadings.

These are followed by a repetition of various forms of malfeasance referred to earlier in the pleadings, such as child abduction, conspiracy, collusion, and professional misconduct, as well as transgressions not previously alleged, such as torture, “Abuse of Service”, “segregation”, defamation, assault causing bodily harm and “Use of Ministerial muscle, authority and power to abuse and oppress minorities.” [ 15 ] The following paragraph in the Notice of Civil Claim is illustrative of the general tenor of the pleadings, which is comprised of

22 single spaced pages of like prose: This is a case of crown corporations getting together, and using their actual position to further hateful agenda against minorities groups.They discriminate people of other ethnic groups, stigmatize them, stereotype them to fit nasty slur made upon them, racism, hatredpropaganda, stereotyping, racial profiling, racial targeting, segregation, discrimination, slander, assassination of character, labeling,fabrication of evidence, falsification of evidence, perjury, false allegation, false accusation, framing innocent colored people performingsecret surveillance without a court order or warrant; systematic abuse of power, abuse of office and abuse of process over weak and poorpeople. [16] Later on, the claimant asserts that the Child, Family and Community Service Act is little more than a state-sponsored means ofchild abduction targeting minority and poor families, alleging, along the way, that the Director is politically enabled in this “greatscheme” by a public mania for safety “in a world where nuclear weapons and terrorism fueled by hatred are prominent risks.” He allegesthat governments and unspecified “special interests” profit from these fears, and are assisted in their “lucrative business opportunities” bya conspiracy involving the police, the court system, hospitals and “their other subsidiaries”, including doctors, lawyers, nurses,counsellors, social workers, therapists, and, for some reason, the YWCA, all of whom meekly fall in line with the objectives of theconspiracy because they “seldom bite the hands that feeds them.” He also claims that his “fundamental rights and that [sic] of hischildren have been completely ignored by a heartless establishment that sees only their interests.

Our Constitutional rights have beenignored based on allegations set in biased legislation that allows white supremacists inside British Columbian civil servants community[sic] and the government to get away with it. So they try to impose their culture and language as they once did again right here in BritishColumbia in the 1880s.” STRIKING PLEADINGS [17] The test under Rule 9-5(1)(

a) is whether it is “plain and obvious” that the plaintiff’s claim discloses no reasonable cause ofaction: Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc., (SCC), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959 at 980. On such an application, no evidence isadmissible and the pleadings are assumed to be true except in respect of allegations that are based on assumptions and speculation orfacts alleged that are incapable of proof: McDaniel v. McDaniel, 2009 BCCA 53; Drummond v. Moore, 2012 BCSC 496; Pleadings willbe struck out where they do not establish a cause of action, do not advance a claim known in law, or are groundless and fanciful:Dempsey et al v.

Envision Credit Union et al, 2006 BCSC 750. [18] In my view it is plain and obvious and beyond any doubt that the pleadings in this case disclose no reasonable cause of actionagainst any of the defendants. The Notice of Civil Claim is more a disjointed polemic than a legal document. The claimant railsincandescently against the government, the courts, the police, hospitals and others involved in child protection. He lashes out at doctors,nurses, emergency shelter providers, duty counsel, and lawyers who have represented his estranged spouses.

He has named a teemingmultitude of defendants in an apparent effort to capture anyone and everyone conceivably involved, however tangentially, in any of theprocesses that led to the apprehension of his children, whether or not such persons owe him a duty of care. [19] I have already remarked that, as it concerns KLO, the claimant’s dispute was mostly with the child’s mother, and mattersconcerning her were dealt with almost twenty years ago; that AZO continues in the custody of the Director because that is her wish andthe claimant consented to it; and that A O’ A was only briefly in the Director’s care before being returned to her mother, with whom theclaimant is engaged in family litigation presently before the Provincial Court.

In these circumstances, it is rather hard to understand whythe claimant fulminates against our child protection establishment when he might better contemplate his own life and relationships. Inany event it is well established that there is no duty of care owed to the claimant by Ministry social workers or the Director, whose onlyduty is to his children: D.L.H. v. M.J.M., 2011 BCSC 1228 at paragraph 59, citing Syl Apps Secure Treatment Centre v.

B.D., 2007 SCC38 , [2007] 3 S.C.R. 83. [20] Leaving all of that aside, I haven’t the slightest hesitation in saying that the claimant’s pleadings fail comprehensively to satisfythe basic purposes set out in the Rules of Court, which are, of course, to ensure that lawsuits are orderly, measured, fair andproportionate. The court safeguards its own procedures, where necessary, by weeding out frivolous claims and inhibiting vexatiouslitigants — people who waste the court’s resources and other people’s time, money and effort. [21] Pleadings alleging conspiracy must be as specific as possible.

The statement of claim should describe who the several parties tothe conspiracy are, and their relationship with each other. It should allege the object of the unlawful conspiracy between the defendants,giving the best particulars it can of the dates when or dates between which the unlawful conspiracy was entered into or continued. Itshould state precisely the objects and means of the alleged conspiracy and the overt acts which are alleged to have been done by each ofthe alleged conspirators in furtherance of it.

It should detail the precise nature of the injury and damage occasioned to the plaintiff: Can-Dive Services Ltd v. Pacific Coast Energy Corp. 1993 BCJ 2958 at paragraphs 8-9. The sweeping, superficial allegations of conspiracy inthe present pleadings fail comprehensively to meet these requirements. They do not come close to achieving the level of specificity,clarity or asserted factual content required by the Rules of Court. [22] Rule 9-5 contains a number of adjectives describing bad pleadings and I do not intend to show how each of them is appositehere.

I will content myself by saying that the claimant’s pleadings fail to define issues of fact and law, to provide a concise statement ofmaterial facts substantiating the allegations made, or to specify which allegations are being made against whom. They are withoutsubstance, groundless, fanciful or a waste of time: Jerry Rose Jr. v. The University of British Columbia, 2008 BCSC 1661. They do notestablish a proper cause of action. For all of these reasons they are by definition frivolous, vexatious and unnecessary: see, generally,Dempsey et al v.

Envision Credit Union et al., 2006 BCSC 750. [23] Furthermore, the pleadings are embarrassing both to the defendants and the court in that they are the prolix, confusing andunintelligible. A reasoned and concise response from any named defendant would be impossible. Neither a defendant nor the courtshould have to parse through a notice of civil claim and either cobble together what it might intend or speculate about what cause ofaction is being advanced against which defendant: Sahyoun v.

Ho, 2013 BCSC 1143. [24] A number of named defendants are referred to only in the style of cause without any corresponding allegations in the pleadings.

It is clear to me, having listened to the claimant’s oral submissions, that he does not know or care that to bring a lawsuit against a person without any articulable cause is abusive and wrong. He seems to think that he can sue people without grounds and then use the discovery processes of this court to determine if a case might eventually be made.

He has no concept of the stress, anxiety and expense to which such persons may be put by his carelessness. [ 25 ] The pleadings also name individuals and entities such as medical and health care practitioners, social workers, hospitals, the YWCA, the City of Burnaby, and lawyers representing his former spouses, parties who never had any relationship at all with the claimant, owed him no duty of care, or bore no vicarious responsibility for any acts or omissions of other defendants named by the claimant.

To this extent, the pleadings are prejudicial, abusive and oppressive. [ 26 ] Finally, the pleadings are an abuse of process. They amount to a collateral attack on previous Provincial Court orders respecting the claimant’s children, some entered as long ago as 1995 and others with the claimant’s consent, and to a formless jeremiad against this province’s child protection system in the inadmissible guise of a lawsuit which has caused needless anxiety and expense to a large contingent of blameless defendants. [ 27 ] As a reading of the Olenga v. I.C.B.C . decisions makes clear, this is not the first time Mr.

Olenga has appeared before this court making wild and baseless allegations of conspiracy and collusion and had his pleadings struck. His conduct in the present litigation is not a case of innocent misadventure. He is a repeat abuser of the court system and his activities must be stopped in the public interest. He has shown that he is not capable of composing proper pleadings and nothing will be gained by granting him leave to try again. DISPOSITION [ 28 ] Accordingly, the pleadings herein are struck in their entirety with no leave to amend.

I hereby order that the claimant is prohibited from filing further pleadings in this proceeding, period, or in any other proceeding against the same defendants without leave of the court: Gill v. Canada, 2013 BCSC 1703 . [ 29 ] Each defendant who participated in the present application is entitled to costs on Scale B. “Baird J.”