His Majesty the King - v. -, 2023 SKPC 58

IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF SASKATCHEWAN Citation: 2023 SKPC 58 Date: November 29, 2023 Information: 991201993 Location: Prince Albert _____________________________________________________________________________ Between: His Majesty the King - and - Carrie Dawn Bellerose Appearing: M r. Brent Slobodian For the Crown Mr. Ian Goldberg For the Accused DECISION ON CHARTER VOIR DIRE S.D. S CHIEFNER, J [ 1 ] In the summer of 2022, police agencies began receiving information from confidential informants that Carrie Dawn Bellerose was selling methamphetamine in large quantities in the Prince Albert area.

Two different informants provided information to two different officers. The information received from the informants was similar – that Ms. Bellerose lived at a specific address, that she was selling drugs, and that she delivered those drugs in the City of Prince Albert on a mountain bike. On July 7, 2022, one of the informants provided updated information - that Ms. Bellerose was still in possession of and selling drugs, that she was still living at the same address, that she was wearing specific clothing that day, and that her mountain bike was red in colour.

Members of the Prince Albert Police Service confirmed that Ms. Bellerose lived at the address indicated (which was a shelter for woman needing assistance). Police established surveillance outside the building where Ms. Bellerose’s apartment was located. Officers observed her leave her building wearing clothing matching the description provided by the informant and sit on a bench near the building. Soon after she did so, a taxi pulled into the adjacent parking lot. After a brief conversation with a male passenger in the taxi, the man gave Ms.

Bellerose a chainsaw, which she then slipped into her building through a window. Soon after this transaction, Ms. Bellerose was observed leaving her building on a red mountain bike.

[ 2 ] On the strength of the tips received, together with the information the officers gathered while they had Ms. Bellerose’s building under surveillance, including the “transaction” with the passenger in the taxi, the police decided to arrest Ms. Bellerose on charges of possession for the purpose of trafficking. Incidental to her arrest, she was searched and found to be in possession of 99.7 grams of methamphetamine. [ 3 ] Believing that her arrest on July 7, 2022 was unlawful, Ms. Bellerose filed a Charter application. In her application, Ms.

Bellerose alleges that her detention was arbitrary and that the search to which she was subjected was unreasonable based on the limited information available to the officers at the time. The gravamen of Ms. Bellerose’s argument is that the information the police officers had (suggesting that she was involved in the illicit sale of drugs) was ambiguous and could have been based on mere speculation by the informants. Simply put, Ms.

Bellerose argues that the officers did not have reasonable grounds to believe that she was in possession of a controlled substance on July 7, 2022 and thus her arrest was not Charter compliant. Ms. Bellerose asked that all evidence obtained as a result of her arrest be excluded. Finally, Ms. Bellerose sought an answer to her Charter application prior to her decision to call evidence. [ 4 ] On October 12, 2023, I dismissed Ms. Bellerose’s Charter application with brief oral reasons.

It was my finding that the officers had compelling reasons to arrest her on July 7, 2022 and that those reasons were objectively reasonable in all the circumstances. Contrary to Ms. Bellerose’s assertions, I found that collectively the informants were credible (one being credible and the other being unproven but corroborative). I found that the information provided by the informants was reliable and compelling (because it was timely, detailed and specific). Finally, I was satisfied that the information from the informants was corroborated at many levels and in many different ways, including Ms.

Bellerose’s own conduct on July 7, 2022. In dismissing Ms. Bellerose’s Charter application, I indicated that I would provide detailed reasons for my decision. The following are those reasons. THE EVIDENCE : [ 5 ] The trial began on April 25, 2023. I heard testimony from four witnesses. The Crown called three officers from the Prince Albert Police Service, namely: Constable Travis Jordan, Constable Jonathan Wilde, and Constable Brennan MacDonald.

The Crown also called Constable Mischa Shewchudk of the RCMP and qualified him as an expert on the distribution, pricing, packaging, trafficking, consumption of, and paraphernalia and jargon associated with, methamphetamine. [ 6 ] The Crown called all of its evidence during the Charter voir dire , including evidence relevant to the trial. In these reasons for decision, I will only review the evidence that is relevant and probative to the Charter issues I must decide. Evidence of Constable Jonathan Wilde : [ 7 ] Officer Wilde has been a member of the Prince Albert Police Service since January of 2014.

Since 2018, Officer Wilde has worked in various enforcement units - all with the laudable goal of getting drugs, guns and gangs off our city streets. In so doing, Constable Wilde has been involved in approximately 150 to 200 drug investigations, with about 50% of those involving the drug, methamphetamine (meth). [ 8 ] Part of Officer Wilde’s work has involved cultivating and handling confidential informants – persons who provide information to the police about drug activities in and around the City of Prince Albert. The officer testified that he has worked with approximately 50 confidential informants.

One of these informants (Informant #1) provided information to Officer Wilde about Carrie Bellerose on two occasions. On both occasions, Informant #1 indicated that Ms. Bellerose was selling meth in Prince Albert, Saskatchewan and that she lived on Brannon Drive. [ 9 ] Officer Wilde testified that Informant #1 had been providing him with information since 2016, and that this person’s information had been used on three previous occasions to obtain judicial authorizations (warrants of one kind or another).

The officer also indicated that this person’s motivation to provide information in the past had been financial compensation and that was his/her motivation in providing information about Ms. Bellerose. The officer indicated that Informant #1 continues to provide information to police. Officer Wilde was not aware of any occasion when this person had provided false information to the police. [ 10 ] The first time Informant #1 provided information about Ms. Bellerose was July 2, 2022. At this time, the informant indicated that Ms.

Bellerose lived on Brannon drive, that she was selling meth, and that she was holding approximately nine ounces. The second time, this informant provided information about Ms. Bellerose was on July 7 th . At this time, the Informant indicated that Ms. Bellerose still had several ounces of meth, that she was wearing a green shirt and shorts, and that she was delivering the drugs on a red mountain bike. [ 11 ] Officer Wilde testified that the officers involved in crime reduction units like his share information about suspected drug trafficking activities in the surrounding area.

Presumably through this sharing process, Officer Wilde was informed that Officer Cloutier of the RCMP had received information from a different person (Informant #2) that Ms. Bellerose was selling drugs at the ounce level and that she was delivering these drugs on a bike. Officer Wilde was informed that Officer Cloutier had received information on three occasions from Informant #2 about Ms. Bellerose; on June 21 st , June 30 th and July 2 nd . Officer Wilde was satisfied that Informant #2 was not the same person as his informant.

Officer Wilde also understood that Informant #2 had not previously provided information to the police and thus was “unproven”. [ 12 ] Officer Wilde searched his police records and learned that Ms. Bellerose lived at 110 – 1101 Brannon Drive in Prince Albert (confirming part of the information provided by Informant #1). Ms.

Bellerose was living at an apartment sponsored by “Homeward Bound” – a program operated through the YWCA in Prince Albert to provide emergency shelter for people who are chronically homeless, as well as to provide housing options for people struggling to acquire and maintain housing, who might otherwise be homeless.

[ 13 ] On the strength of the information provided by two informants, coupled with the officer’s knowledge that Ms. Bellerose had been previously convicted of drug trafficking in the past, Constable Wilde decided that Ms. Bellerose’s residence should be placed under surveillance. Later that day - July 7, 2022 - Constable Wilde, Constable MacDonald and Constable Jordan each drove to Brannon Drive and each began observing the building in which Ms. Bellerose’s apartment was located. After setting up surveillance, the officers observed Ms. Bellerose arrive at and enter the apartment building at 4:00 p.m.

At approximately, 5:00 p.m., Ms. Bellerose exited the building and sat on a bench on the south side of the building. Ms. Bellerose was observed wearing a green shirt and shorts (confirming part of the information provided by Information #1). Approximately two minutes after Ms. Bellerose began sitting on the bench, a taxi van drove into a parking lot adjacent to where Ms. Bellerose was sitting. Ms. Bellerose walked to the van and the passenger door of the van opened. A male passenger was observed in the back of the taxi. Ms. Bellerose spoke with the man – he remained in the van during their conversation.

The man gave Ms. Bellerose a chainsaw. Moments later, the van door closed, and the van drove away. Ms. Bellerose walked back to her building with the chainsaw. She placed the chainsaw near a window and walked inside the building. Moments later, the window opened, and Ms. Bellerose reached out, grabbed the chainsaw, and brought it in through the window. Officer Wilde was asked and confirmed that neither he nor any of the other officers conducting that surveillance observed Ms. Bellerose give anything to the man in the van. [ 14 ] Soon thereafter, Ms. Bellerose was observed leaving her building.

She was seen riding a red mountain bike (confirming another part of the information provided by Informant #1). Constable Wilde testified that a decision was made to arrest Ms. Bellerose (for possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking). The officer testified that this decision was based on the information that had been received from the two informants – some of which had been confirmed by their observations (her address, her clothing, and her means of transportation), the short duration meeting which was observed (which Officer Wilde believed was consistent with a drug transaction); the fact that Ms.

Bellerose received something of value during that short meeting (which was also believed to be consistent with a drug transaction), and the fact that Officer Wilde was aware that Ms. Bellerose had a previous conviction for possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking. [ 15 ] Ms. Bellerose was arrested by Constable Wilde and Constable McDonald a short distance away from her home at 5:45 p.m. on July 7, 2022. When she was arrested, Ms. Bellerose had a purse. In the purse was a cell phone and a wallet. In the wallet was $555.00 of Canadian currency and $20.00 of US currency. No drugs were found at the scene.

Constable Wilde’s observations were that Ms. Bellerose was sober when she was arrested. Evidence of Constable MacDonald : [ 16 ] Constable MacDonald was part of the team monitoring Ms. Bellerose’s apartment on July 7, 2022. This officer’s observations regarding Ms. Bellerose’s actions on that day were consistent with the observation of Constable Wilde. [ 17 ] Constable MacDonald assisted in the arrest of Ms. Bellerose. After a decision was made that she should be arrested, the officer drove his vehicle up beside Ms. Bellerose’s bike as she was riding, he exited his vehicle, and he told Ms.

Bellerose that he was a police officer. Officer MacDonald told Ms. Bellerose that she was under arrest. The officer then advised Ms. Bellerose of her Charter rights and gave her the standard police caution. Ms. Bellerose indicated that she understood her rights and told the officer that she wanted to speak with a lawyer. Ms. Bellerose was then placed in handcuffs and transported to the police station by Officer MacDonald. The officer did not recall if she was searched at the scene before transport. [ 18 ] At the police station, Ms. Bellerose was taken to the admitting desk and her handcuffs were removed.

While in the admitting area, Officer MacDonald advised Ms. Bellerose that she would be searched by a female police officer before being placed in a holding cell. Constable MacDonald testified that, at this point, he was not searching for evidence. Rather, the officer indicated that all persons being placed into a holding cell are searched to ensure they do not have any weapons, or anything with which they could harm themselves or that could present a risk to police officers.

It was also standard practice that females are searched by a female officer - not by a male officer. [ 19 ] Constable MacDonald indicated that, after Ms. Bellerose was told she would be searched, she said “don’t bother”. She reached into her bra and pulled out a bag containing what appeared to be a large quantity of crystal meth. The officer testified that he kept the bag in his personal possession until he gave it to Constable Jordan, who was in charge of all exhibits related to Ms. Bellerose’s arrest. [ 20 ] Finally, Constable MacDonald’s observations were that Ms. Bellerose was sober when she was arrested.

Constable Jordan’s Evidence : [ 21 ] Constable Jordan was also part of the team monitoring Ms. Bellerose’s apartment. The officer’s observations regarding Ms. Bellerose’s actions on July 7, 2022 were consistent with the observations of the other two officers. [ 22 ] Officer Jordan arrived at the scene soon after Ms. Bellerose was arrested by Officers MacDonald and Wilde. His responsibly was the security and continuity of all exhibits associated with her arrest. When Ms. Bellerose was arrested, the following items were seized; a cell phone found in Ms.

Bellerose’s purse, and a wallet contained cash ($555.00 CDN and $20.00 US). At the police station, a large bag of drugs was seized. The bag contained three smaller, tied bags of drugs, together with a quantity of loose drugs in the larger bag. The bags were photographed, weighed, and samples were extracted for testing at a Health Canada laboratory. Testing confirmed that each of the bags contained methamphetamine. The quantities were as follows: Small bag #1: 29.4 grams Small bag #2: 29.3 grams

Small bag #3 29.6 grams Large bag: 11.4 grams. Total: 99.7 grams of methamphetamine Evidence of Constable Shewchudk: [23] Constable Mischa Shewchudk is a member of the RCMP. After hearing his qualifications and training, I accepted him as anexpert on the distribution, pricing, packaging, trafficking, consumption of, and paraphernalia and jargon associated with,methamphetamine. While Officer Shewchudk’s evidence will be relevant at trial, it is not relevant to the determination of Ms. Bellerose’sCharter application. Defense Evidence: [24] The defence elected to call no evidence on the Charter application.

ARGUMENT: [25] As noted, Ms. Bellerose took the position that Officers Wilde and MacDonald did not have reasonable grounds to arrest her onJuly 7, 2022 at 5:45 p.m. The gravamen of Ms. Bellerose’s argument was that the information the police officers relied upon (suggestingthat she was involved in the illicit sale of drugs) was ambiguous and could have been the subject of mere speculation by the informants.Simply put, Ms. Bellerose argued that the officers did not have reasonable grounds to believe that she was in possession of a controlledsubstance on July 7, 2022, and thus her arrest was not Charter compliant.

As a corollary, Ms. Bellerose says that, because her arrest wasunreasonable, the search to which she was subjected was unlawful. Ms. Bellerose asked that all evidence obtained as a result of her arrestbe excluded. [26] During argument, Ms. Bellerose’s counsel correctly noted that the leading case on the lawfulness of a warrantless searchbased on information from one or more confidential informants is the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Debot, (SCC), [1989] 2 SCR 1140 [Debot].

Counsel reviewed the three factors used by the Court in Debot to analyze thereasonableness of a warrantless search [the “Debot factors”]. First, Ms. Bellerose argued that the information that the police received wasnot compelling and, other than the allegations about drugs, would have been commonly known in the community, including her address,means of transportation and the kind and colour of clothing she was wearing. Counsel noted that a mere acquaintance may have beenable to gather this much information. Second, Ms.

Bellerose argued that the information that the police provided did not establish thatthe informants were credible. Finally, Ms. Bellerose’s counsel noted that the police did not observe his client engaged in any illicitactivity. Counsel noted that chainsaws are not unusual in northern Saskatchewan and little significance ought to be attached to the factthat someone gave one to Ms. Bellerose. The police did not observe Ms. Bellerose give anything to anyone. Finally, police did notobserve Ms. Bellerose “deliver” anything on her mountain bike. Ms.

Bellerose argued that each piece of evidence that the officers reliedupon was either innocent or plausible explanations existed for that evidence – explanations other than the sale of drugs.

SUMMARY OF THE LAW: [27] Ms. Bellerose was arrested pursuant to s. 495(1)(

a) of the Criminal Code [Code]. This provision allows a police officer toarrest a person without warrant if that officer has reasonable grounds to believe that person has committed or is about to commit anindictable offence. In order to justify a warrantless arrest pursuant to s. 495(1)(

a) of the Code, the arresting officer must have thesubjective belief that the individual arrested had committed or was about to commit an indictable offence, and that belief must beobjectively reasonable. To be objectively reasonable, the Crown must establish that a reasonable person, standing in the shoes of thepolice officer, would have believed that reasonable and probable grounds existed to make the arrest. See: R v Storrey, (SCC), [1990] 1 SCR 241 at paras 16-17. The requirements were further summarized in Storrey in this way: [16] There is an additional safeguard against arbitrary arrest.

It is not sufficient for the police officer to personally believe that he orshe has reasonable and probable grounds to make an arrest. Rather, it must be objectively established that those reasonable and probablegrounds did in fact exist. That is to say a reasonable person, standing in the shoes of the police officer, would have believed thatreasonable and probable grounds existed to make the arrest. See R v Brown (1987), (NS CA), 33 CCC (3d) 54(N.S.C.A.), at p. 66; Liversidge v. Anderson, [1942] A.C. 206 (H.L.) at p. 228. [17] In

summary, then, the Criminal Code requires that an arresting officer must subjectively have reasonable and probable groundson which to base the arrest. Those grounds must, in addition, be justifiable from an objective point of view. That is to say, a reasonableperson placed in the position of the officer must be able to conclude that there were indeed reasonable and probable grounds for thearrest. On the other hand, the police need not demonstrate anything more than reasonable and probable grounds. Specifically, they are

not required to establish a prima facie case for conviction before making the arrest. [28] Ms. Bellerose was arrested on the strength of information given to police officers by two confidential informants. TheSaskatchewan Court of Appeal has dealt with this situation in three recent decisions that I find instructive. In each of these cases, theCourt reviewed the Debot factors in some depth.

These decisions are R v Pavlik, 2019 SKCA 107, 380 CCC (3d) 417 [Pavlik], R vDawad, 2019 SKCA 125, 381 CCC (3d) 557 [Dawad], and R v Protz, 2020 SKCA 115, 393 CCC (3d) 438 [Protz]. [29] In Pavlik, the Court was called upon to determine whether objectively reasonable grounds existed for officers to arrest twoindividuals (Mr. Pavlik and his girlfriend) on the basis of a tip received from a confidential informant.

While the tip was detailed andcontained specific information about the subjects and their involvement in illicit activities (the sale of drugs), the officer handling thetipster did not testify during the trial. The officer who made the arrest (and who did testify at the trial) had not questioned the handlerabout the tipster’s credibility. The arresting officer was merely assured by the officer handling the informant that the subject of the tipwas “arrestable”. The testifying officer could not elaborate on the basis upon which the handler believed that the informant was credibleand his/her information reliable.

All the Court had when it came time to assess the credibility of the informant was a bald statementimplying that the source was credible. During surveillance, the officers confirmed the non-illicit information predicted by the tip, butsaw no evidence of, or activity consistent with, the illegal activities predicted by the confidential informant. [30] Pavlik stands for the proposition that more evidence than a bald assertion of credibility by an informant’s handler is requiredto establish that an informant is credible.

However, the Court noted that the Crown can rely on “other evidence” to show that a tipster iscredible. See: Pavlik at para 43. In addition, the Court also noted that a weakness in one of the Debot factors (such as a lack of evidenceupon which to assess credibility) can be overcome by strong evidence in the other two factors. For example, the Court noted that theweakness could have been overcome if the arresting officers had independent knowledge supporting the belief that the subjects wereinvolved in the illicit activity or had prior dealings with the subjects for similar offences. See: Pavlik at para 32.

By way of furtherexample, although an arresting officer is not always required to corroborate criminal activity, in this particular case (because of the lackof ability to assess the credibility of the informant and lack of any background or reputational knowledge linking the subjects to the typeof criminal activity anticipated by the tip) the Court found that a critical weakness was that the police were unable to corroborate anycriminal activity, or any activity that, although not illegal, could be viewed as reasonably anticipatory to illegal activity on the part of thesubjects.

See: Pavlik at para 37. [31] In Dawad, police officers received information from a confidential informant sufficient that the officers decided to establishsurveillance at a property in Prince Albert. The police observed three males and a female in a truck matching the description provided bythe informant at the residence. Further information from the informant indicated that the subjects would be traveling to a remote northerncommunity in Saskatchewan (Beauval) to sell illicit drugs.

The officer followed the truck and, when the vehicle turned onto a highwayleading to certain northern communities, including Beauval, stopped the truck and arrested the occupants. As was the case in Pavik, thepolice did not observe the subjects engaging in illicit activities. However, in upholding the objective reasonableness of the arrest, theCourt noted that the totality of the circumstances provides an important contextual basis for determining whether an otherwise neutralactivity may tend to be “suspicious” in a different context.

See: Dawad at para 57. [32] In Protz, three different confidential informants gave information to two different police officers alleging that Mr. Protz wasselling cocaine. Two of the informants were personally known to the arresting officer. One of the informants was handled by anotherofficer, who relayed the information he/she received from this tipster to the arresting officer, together with information about thatofficer’s relationship with that informant. The court confirmed that, while desirable, it is not necessary for the handling officer to testifyto establish the credibility of an informant.

The court found that the credibility of an informant can be established on the basis of hearsayinformation, if necessary. The weight to be given to such evidence depends on the informant’s prior dealings with the police. See: Protzat para 80. [33] In rendering the decision on behalf of the Court in Protz, Mr. Justice Ottenbreit gave a fulsome review of the law relating towhat constitutes reasonable grounds based on a tip from a confidential informant, beginning with the proper application of the Debotfactors.

See: Protz at paras 43 to 59: [43] Where a decision to arrest is based on information provided by confidential informants, courts must explore three lines ofinquiry: the compelling nature of the information, the credibility of the informant, and the corroboration of the information provided[Debot factors] Justice Wilson explained this inquiry as follows in Debot at 1168: In my view, there are at least three concerns to be addressed in weighing evidence relied on by the police to justify a warrantless search.First, was the information predicting the commission of a criminal offence compelling?

Second, where that information was based on a“tip” originating from a source outside the police, was that source credible? Finally, was the information corroborated by policeinvestigation prior to making the decision to conduct the search? I do not suggest that each of these factors forms a separate test. Rather, Iconcur with Martin J.A.’s view that the “totality of the circumstances” must meet the standard of reasonableness. Weaknesses in one areamay, to some extent, be compensated by strengths in the other two. [44] The persuasive weight of source information will vary depending upon the Debot factors.

The Debot factors are not to beexamined in isolation and the test is not to be applied formulaically (R v Garofoli, (SCC), [1990] 2 SCR 1421 at 1457).It is the totality of the circumstances that determines whether the information substantiates reasonable grounds for arrest: “it is notnecessary that all three conditions of the Debot test be entirely satisfied, as a weakness in one component can be overborne by strengthsin others” (R v M. (M.R.), (SCC), [1998] 3 SCR 393 at para 84).

The totality of the circumstances provides theimportant contextual information as “what is suspicious in one context may tend to be neutral or exculpatory in a different setting” (R vDawad, 2019 SKCA 125 at para 57, 381 CCC (3d) 557 [Dawad]). [45] The first Debot factor concerns the compelling nature of the information. The court will look at the level of detail and precisionof the tip: “the degree to which a confidential tip is compelling is a function of its detail” (Dawad at para 59).

[46] The “more detail a tip includes the more compelling it will be, and this is particularly so if the tip includes information notpublicly known” (Steve Coughlan & Glen Luther, Detention and Arrest, 2d ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2017) at 106 [Detention andArrest]).

This factor also involves an examination of how the informant purports to have acquired the information; that is whether theinformation was obtained first-hand or through hearsay (R v Pavlik, 2019 SKCA 107 at para 29, 380 CCC (3d) 417 [Pavlik]). [47] The information cannot simply be in the form of “bald conclusory statements” and must be more than “mere rumour or gossip”(Debot at 1168–69).

However, this does not mean that the Crown is “required to show that the detail and precision of a tip ‘excludes’ or‘rules out’ the possibility of mere rumour or gossip or of coincidence” (Pavlik at para 32, emphasis in original). [48] Dated information is less compelling, as is more general information (R v Holmes, 2019 BCCA 138 at para 38 [Holmes]) andinformation in the public domain (R v Chioros, 2019 ONCA 388 at para 19, 436 CRR (2d) 104). [49] No individual piece of information may be compelling, but the information looked at in totality may meet the “compelling”criterion (Holmes at para 38). [50] The second Debot factor concerns credibility.

An assessment of this factor involves scrutiny of the informant. The informant’scriminal record, particularly if this involves perjury or crimes of dishonesty, is a relevant consideration as is the existence of outstandingcharges or investigations pending against the informant (Pavlik at para 43). [51] The history of the informant’s tips is also relevant in assessing credibility, such as whether these previous tips had containedreliable information (R v Lowe, 2018 ONCA 110 at para 55, 358 CCC (3d) 423).

The length of the relationship between the informantand the police officer involved can enhance credibility as can the volume of tips provided during the relevant period (Dawad at para 60).Further, a tipster’s credibility is increased if the previous tips related to the same type of offence as the current information (R v Whyte,2011 ONCA 24 at paras 21–22, 266 CCC (3d) 5). [52] The informant’s reason or motivation for offering the tip is also relevant (Detention and Arrest at 107). [53] Credibility must be established either on the testimony of the officer dealing with the informant or some other evidence (Pavlikat para 43). [54] The lack of evidence about an untried informant can be overcome on the balance of the Debot test if the information provided inthe tip is sufficiently precise and corroborated (R v Dhillon, 2016 ONCA 308at para 33, 335 CCC (3d) 144). [55] The third Debot factor concerns corroboration.

This factor does not require the police to substantiate each aspect of the tip intheir subsequent investigation and surveillance “so long as the sequence of events actually observed conforms sufficiently to theanticipated pattern to remove the possibility of innocent coincidence” (Debot at 1172). [56] Corroboration evidence need not confirm illegal activities (R v Caissey, 2008 SCC 65, [2008] 3 SCR 451, affirming 2007 ABCA380, 227 CCC (3d) 322; and R v Lewis (1998), (ON CA), 122 CCC (3d) 481 at para 22 (WL) (Ont CA)).

However,while there is no general requirement “to corroborate any criminal activity, or any activity that, although not illegal, could be viewed asreasonably anticipatory to illegal activity”, a lack of this evidence can, depending on the totality of the circumstances, undermine thecase for an objectively reasonable grounds for arrest (Pavlik at para 37). [57] The criminal record of a suspect can often provide corroboration, although “the cogency of the criminal record depends on itssimilarity to the criminal activity alleged by the tipster and the age of the record” (R v MacDonald, 2012 ONCA 244 at para 23, 290OAC 21). [58] Corroboration may, depending on the circumstances, be provided from “confirmation of neutral data” (R v Al-Amiri, 2015NLCA 37 at para 29, 328 CCC (3d) 266). [59] Information from multiple informants can be corroborative inter se (R v Saunders, 2003 NLCA 63 at para 15, 181 CCC (3d) 268,aff’d 2004 SCC 70, [2004] 3 SCR 505). [Emphasis added] APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THE FACTS: [34] As noted, to justify a warrantless arrest pursuant to s. 495(1)(

a) of the Code, the arresting officer must subjectively believethat the individual arrested had committed or was about to commit an indictable offence, and that belief must be objectively reasonable. Did the arresting officers subjectively believe that Ms. Bellerose was arrestable on July 7, 2022? [35] Having heard the testimony of the officers, I am satisfied that Officers Wilde, MacDonald and Jordan individually andcollectively believed they had sufficient grounds to arrest Ms. Bellerose.

The basis of this belief was articulated by Constable Wilde whostated that they relied on the information that had been received from the two informants – some of which had been confirmed by theirobservations (her address, her clothing and her means of transportation), the short duration meeting which was observed (which OfficerWilde believed was consistent with a drug transaction); the fact that Ms. Bellerose received something of value during that short meeting(which was also believed to be consistent with a drug transaction), and the fact that Officer Wilde was aware that Ms.

Bellerose had aprevious conviction for possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking.

Was the belief of the arresting officers objectively reasonable? [ 36 ] To answer this question, I will review the Debot factors. In doing so, I will review the persuasive weight of the source information the officers acted upon, together with the knowledge that the arresting officers had in their possession at the time Ms. Bellerose was arrested (at 5:45 p.m. on July 7, 2022). Were the informants credible ? [ 37 ] The police received information from two informants. Officer Wilde was the handler for Informant #1. Officer Cloutier of the RCMP was the handler for Information #2.

Officer Wilde testified and provided a fulsome history of his relationship with Informant #1. This tipster was one of approximately 50 informants cultivated by the officer. Information from this tipster had been used by the officer on three occasions prior to the information provided about Ms. Bellerose. On these three prior occasions, Officer Wilde used the information from this person to obtain judicial authorizations (in one form or another). While the motivation of Informant #1 was money, the officer was not aware of any occasion when this tipster had provided false information.

Informant #1 provided information about Ms. Bellerose on two occasions – July 2, 2022 and July 7, 2022. On both occasions, Officer Wilde understood the informant’s motivation to be financial. [ 38 ] Officer Cloutier did not testify in these proceedings. However, Officer Wilde obtained information from Officer Cloutier about Informant #2 and communicated that information to Court during his testimony. After his discussion with Officer Cloutier, Officer Wilde was satisfied that Informant #2 was a different person than his tipster.

The officer also learned that Informant #2 had not previously provided information to Officer Cloutier and that officer considered this tipster to be “unproven”. [ 39 ] Based on Officer Wilde’s lengthy history with Informant #1 – a history that included the prior provision of useful information – I find that this informant was credible and that it was objectively reasonable for Officer Wilde to consider information from this person to be reliable. The situation is a little different with respect to Informant #2.

While Officer Cloutier did not testify, credibility of an informant can be established by the hearsay evidence of Officer Wilde. See: Pavlik at para 43 and Protz at para 80 . Informant #2 was an unproven informant at the time. As a result, the weight that can be given to this tipster’s information is reduced - not as low as an anonymous tip but less persuasive than the information coming from Informant #1. [ 40 ] In

summary, it would have been reasonable for Officer Wilde to consider Informant #1 to be credible, and it would have been reasonable to assume that information from this source would be reliable. However, Informant #2 was unproven, and the persuasive weight of his/her information must therefore be less. Was the information provided to the officers compelling ? [ 41 ] As noted, two different officers received information from two different informants. The information from Informant #1 was sufficiently detailed to indicate that tipster had personal interactions with Ms.

Bellerose sufficient to accurately predict the clothing she was wearing on July 7, 2022. In addition, this person knew Ms. Bellerose's address and her means of transportation. With respect to illicit activities, the informant told the officer that Ms. Bellerose’s involvement in the drug trade involved her delivering drugs on her bike and that she was in possession of several ounces on July 7, 2022. It is unlikely that someone with this level of detail was merely repeating gossip.

To the contrary, the information was recent and sufficiently detailed to make it compelling. [ 42 ] The information from Informant #2 predated the information from Informant #1. This tipster provided information about Ms. Bellerose on three occasions. While this information was not as recent or as detailed, it was similar to the information provided by Informant #1. On its own, the information from Informant #2 was considerably less compelling than the information from Informant #2. However, collectively, the information from these two informants would have been very compelling.

Was the source information sufficiently corroborated ? [ 43 ] The information provided by the informants was corroborated in multiple ways. First, although not particularly compelling on its own, the information from Informant #2 clearly corroborates the information provided by Informant #1. Information from multiple sources can be corroborative inter se . See: R v Saunders , 2003 NLCA 63 at para 15 , 181 CCC (3d) 268. Second, Constable Wilde confirmed that Ms. Bellerose was a resident at the address predicted by the informants. Third, the allegation that Ms.

Bellerose was engaged in the illicit trafficking of a controlled substance was corroborated by Officer Wilde’s personal knowledge that Ms. Bellerose had a previous conviction for drug trafficking. Fourth, during their surveillance, the arresting officers confirmed that Ms. Bellerose was wearing the clothing predicted by Informant #1. They also confirmed that Ms. Bellerose was using the means of transportation predicted by both informants and that bike was red in colour. [ 44 ] Finally, during their surveillance, the officers observed Ms.

Bellerose engaged in a short duration meeting with someone, whereat she received something of value (a chainsaw). While it is not illegal to possess a chainsaw, it is unusual that someone residing in an apartment would need one. Similarly, it is suspicious that Ms. Bellerose felt the need to sneak the chainsaw into her apartment surreptitiously though a window rather than carrying it in through the door. Finally, it is suspicious that Ms. Bellerose began riding her mountain bike soon after receiving something of value.

This was one of those situations where things that would normally be neutral in most contexts (such as possessing a chainsaw and riding a bike) become suspicious in this particular context. See: Dawad at para 57 . [ 45 ] While the arresting officers did not observe Ms. Bellerose engage in any illicit activities, it was not necessary that they do so. The sequence of events observed by the arresting officers was sufficiently consistent with the pattern of behavior predicted by the source information so as to make the possibility of innocent coincidence very unlikely.

CONCLUSION: [ 46 ] After considering the Debot factors, I am satisfied that there were reasonable and probable grounds to arrest Ms. Bellerose on July 7, 2022. Based on the information known to the officers at the time of her arrest, it was objectively reasonable to believe that Ms. Bellerose was in possession of a large quantity of a controlled substance and that she intended to deliver those drugs somewhere in the City of Prince Albert. The facts in this case satisfy me that the officers were not just acting on a hunch or mere suspicions.

To the contrary, the information known to the officers was very compelling. [ 47 ] Collectively, the confidential informants used by the arresting officers were credible (one being credible and the other being unproven but corroborative). I am also satisfied that the information provided by these informants was reliable and compelling (because it was timely, detailed and specific). Finally, I was satisfied that the information from these informants was corroborated at many levels and in many different ways, including Ms.

Bellerose’s own suspicious conduct on July 7, 2022. [ 48 ] There simply is no basis to conclude that Ms. Bellerose’s Charter rights were violated or that her arrest was unlawful. All evidence obtained by the arresting officers, together with the bags of methamphetamine seized by Constable MacDonald, was lawfully obtained. For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Bellerose’s Charter application is dismissed in its entirely. [ 49 ] All evidence received by this Court during the Charter voir dire shall be applied to the trial proper.

Dated this 29 th day of November, 2023, at Prince Albert, in the Province of Saskatchewan. __________________________ S.D. SCHIEFNER, J