R. v. Gladue, 2011 QCCQ 1475

R. c. Palliser 2011 QCCQ 1475 COURT OF QUEBEC CANADA PROVINCE OF QUÉBEC DISTRICT OF ABITIBI TOWN OF INUKJUAK “Criminal division” N°: 605-01-007206-109 DATE: February 22, 2011 ______________________________________________________________________ BY THE HONOURABLE CLAUDE BIGUÉ, J.C.Q. ______________________________________________________________________ HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN Plaintiff v.

TOMMY COLIN PALLISER Accused ______________________________________________________________________ JUDGMENT ON SENTENCE (Delivered orally on January 18, 2011) ______________________________________________________________________ [ 1 ] The accused pleaded guilty to the following count: “On or about June 29, 2009, in Montréal, district of Montréal, did operate a motor vehicle in a manner that was dangerous to the public, having regard to all the circumstances, and thereby did cause the death of Kevin Ducharme, committing thereby the indictable offence provided by section 249(4) of the Criminal Code of Canada (C.C.C.).” [ 2 ] The type of dangerous driving in this case if commonly referred to as “car surfing”. [ 3 ] The accused asked for his file to be transferred from Montréal to Inukjuak, his home town, where the case was dealt by the itinerant Court in presence of numerous members of the family and of the community.

OBJECTIVE GRAVITY AND POSITION OF THE PARTIES: [ 4 ] An offender charged with dangerous operation of a vehicle causing death ( section 249(4) C.C.C. ) is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years. [ 5 ] The Crown attorney proposes 36 months of imprisonment followed by a one-year probation, also adding an order prohibiting the offender from operating a motor vehicle for a period of 5 years. [ 6 ] The defence counsel asserts that the present case would have been a perfect case for a conditional sentence order if the offence would have occurred before December 1, 2007.

Since this is no longer possible, he proposes an imprisonment of 10 months, taking into account

section 718.2

e) C.C.C. and its application in the master case of R. v. Gladue [1] concerning aboriginal offenders. THE FACTS: [ 7 ] The accused and the victim are cousins. At the time of the event, Mr. Palliser is 33 and Mr. Ducharme is also in his mid- thirties. Both are Inuit. [ 8 ] In June 2009, the accused and his family travel to Montréal where they are hosted at the victim’s house. [ 9 ] At the end of the evening of June 28, both decide to go to a bar in Montréal’s West Island, and they leave with Mr. Ducharme’s vehicle. [ 10 ] Shortly after 3:00 a.m. on the 29 th of June, Mr.

Palliser is driving his cousin’s vehicle and Mr. Ducharme is the passenger. They are on their way back home. Mr. Ducharme is quite intoxicated. [ 11 ] Suddenly, along the way, Mr. Ducharme decides to climb onto the roof of the vehicle, through the sun roof. First, he lies on his stomach, holding himself to the top of the car. Mr. Palliser keeps driving on.

[ 12 ] The vehicle stops at a red light at the corner of St-Jean Boulevard and Ernest Street. Witnesses see the victim now standing up on the vehicle’s roof and waving at people. [ 13 ] The light turns green and the accused resumes his driving. At this moment, the victim loses balance, tries to hold on to the vehicle’s nickel bars, but falls off. His head hits the pavement. Other drivers stop and provide assistance. The victim’s head is full of blood. [ 14 ] The accused drives on to Mr. Ducharme’s home and goes to bed. [ 15 ] He only worries for the victim the next morning, when he realizes that Mr.

Ducharme is not home. [ 16 ] Mr. Palliser searches unsuccessfully for his cousin. He is finally reached by the police and is arrested. [ 17 ] He then learns what happened to Mr. Ducharme, who is at the hospital, in a critical condition. Mr. Ducharme dies shortly after. THE ACCUSED: [ 18 ] Mr. Palliser, a 35 year-old Inuk, is the father of two children and the spouse of Mary Berthe. He works for the Kativik Regional Government (K.R.G.) as a Business Services Advisor for the whole Hudson’s Bay region. He is also Secretary-Treasurer of the Pituvik Landholding Corporation.

He is involved in non-profit organisations, acting as a treasurer for the Unaaq Men’s Association of Inukjuak and the Naturaliit Youth Committee of Inukjuak. We further note that Mr. Palliser is a very active member of the Municipal Housing Committee. [ 19 ] Mr. Palliser completed high school in Montréal where his father had been living and working for years. After completing college at John Abbott’s, he got a Bachelor of Commerce Degree at Concordia University. [ 20 ] Since the separation of his parents in 1993 when he was only 18, he has always taken care of his sick mother, financially and emotionally.

He then also became the new father figure for his siblings. [ 21 ] Very well-known and highly appreciated in his community and even in the whole of Nunavik, we can see that Mr. Palliser is one of the leaders of his community. He provided the Court with 16 letters of support signed by 28 persons involved in all the spheres of activities in Inukjuak: economic, social, health, educational, traditional activities, etc. Also one member of the community, his brother, and the mother of the victim testified in support of the accused. PRE-SENTENCE REPORT: [ 22 ] A pre-sentence report was ordered by the Court.

It was drafted on November 3, 2010. The probation officer is of the opinion that “the client’s social rehabilitation is realistic”, although the risk of reoffending is present because Mr. Palliser does not understand well enough the consequences of his own behaviour in the event that occurred on June 29, 2009. Mr. Palliser blames the victim more than himself. Again here, he is reported to be a responsible man and to be actively involved in his community. [ 23 ] The report provides the Tribunal with a good description of the offender and his environment, as a Nunavik Inuk.

AGGRAVATING FACTORS: [ 24 ] Here are the aggravating factors:

a) At the age of 33, the offender was no longer a young adult. This is indeed not the case of a youngster in his early twenties making a mistake. Being a mature person and said to be responsible, he behaved carelessly by continuing to drive a car with a passenger on the roof;

b) The dangerous operation of a vehicle causing the death of another person is liable to an imprisonment of 14 years, for which a conditional sentence order under

section 742.1 C.C.C. is not an available sanction;

c) When the offender realized that the victim was no longer on the top of the car, he kept driving instead of verifying what happened to his reckless passenger. However, there was a conditional stay on the count of failure to stop at the scene of an accident involving death ( section 252(1.3) C.C.C. ). MITIGATING FACTORS: [ 25 ] Here are now the mitigating factors:

a) The offender has no prior convictions;

b) The offender’s record as a driver does not reveal any prior convictions under the Québec Highway Safety Code, R.S.Q. c. C-24.2 . Hence he is not known as a person that infringes upon motor vehicle operation rules;

c) The offender made it clear, at the first opportunity, that he would plead guilty and avoid trial;

d) The offender gave a statement when first met by the police and collaborated in the procedures;

e) The offender is very dedicated to his family and to his community: he is actively supported by both;

f) The accused is one of very few Inuit to have obtained a university degree. He is the only one in Inukjuak. His community needs

and wants to rely on his competence;

g) The victim’s mother accompanied the offender during the whole hearing on sentence; she testified in favour of the offender and sat beside him holding openly his hand as a sign of full support;

h) Mr. Palliser is not the instigator of the “car surfing” activity; hence his accountability in the death of his cousin is mitigated because the victim is the one who suddenly decided to put his life at risk. But the accused made a mistake by deciding to continue driving while his passenger was on the roof of the vehicle. He should have stopped and made his cousin take to the passenger seat or get off the car if he did not want to come back home immediately. NEUTRAL FACTORS: [ 26 ] Other factors can be considered as neutral.

The probation officer provides the Court with a mitigated pre-sentence report, resulting from a mitigated collaboration. The probation officer refers to the offender having difficulty taking, his full share of responsibility for his actions, at least at first.

But the report states that the offender finally showed some openness to consider the situation as a learning opportunity and was ready to face the consequences. [ 27 ] This attitude, even if it came after a certain period of reflection, was confirmed at the hearing by the offender’s testimony when he was provided the opportunity by the judge to add something to what had already been said, pursuant to

section 726 C.C.C. His remorse was also confirmed by the three witnesses heard on sentence. Furthermore, Mr. Palliser told the Court that he has even fostered one of the victim’s children after the event, for a certain period of time. [ 28 ] Even though the offender did not express full remorse at first, and at the time he met with the probation officer for the preparation of the pre-sentence report, the Court is satisfied that Mr. Palliser now understands and recognizes his share of responsibility in the event and that he expresses sincere remorse about it. Hence the risk of reoffending is very little, if any.

And thus, it becomes a mitigating factor rather than a neutral one. [ 29 ] Another factor discussed by the lawyers was the fact that the offender had consumed some alcohol that night. The overall evidence is that even if Mr. Palliser had a few drinks that night, there is no evidence that the accused’s ability to drive was impaired. Alcohol was not a factor. None of the three eye witnesses referred to symptoms or noticeable signs of driving under the influence of alcohol. One of the witnesses specifies that the vehicle was circulating at 10 km/h when the victim fell.

OBJECTIVES: [ 30 ] Car surfing is reported by the Crown to be a new fashion in dangerous driving. As any form of dangerous driving, it has to be deterred because it endangers the life of other persons, in this case, the illegal passenger. Deterrence is aimed at preventing the accused from reoffending in similar matters, but also other persons from engaging in car surfing.

The Court must also keep in mind an objective of denunciation of dangerous driving actions, because a vehicle operated dangerously is a risk for the driver and his passengers’ life, and also for any person that happens to be in the vicinity (the public). However, in the present case, the only life at risk is that of a passenger who endangers his own life. [ 31 ] As mentioned in the pre-sentence report, and in many of the letters of support, the objective of assisting the offender to rehabilitate must also be set forth. The Tribunal will give significant weight to that objective. Mr.

Palliser needs to be actively reintegrated in his community, where he is mostly useful and wanted. But before reintegration, both parties realize in their recommendations that it will be necessary to separate the offender from society for a certain period of time. Imprisonment cannot be turned down for, as December 1, 2007, a conditional sentence order is no longer an option for this type of offence. An important issue then is to decide what term of imprisonment will apply. [ 32 ] A last very important sentencing principle will be considered with reference to

section 718.2

e) C.C.C. concerning aboriginal offenders, in a restorative justice perspective as exposed in the R. v. Gladue decision. [2] CASE LAW: [ 33 ] The Court was submitted many decisions rendered by the Canadian Courts in cases involving the dangerous operation of a vehicle causing the death of one or many persons. [ 34 ] The offender was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle pursuant to section 249(4) C.C.C. (liable to 14 years of imprisonment), not of one of the following accusations which generally involve heavier sentences: ➢ Criminal negligence causing death while driving a vehicle under

section 220

b) C.C.C. , (liable to imprisonment for life) [3] : there was a conditional stay on that count; ➢ Dangerous operation of a vehicle causing death while street racing, under

section 249.2 C.C.C. [4] , liable to imprisonment for life; ➢ Impaired driving causing death, under section 255(3) C.C.C. , also liable to imprisonment for life. [ 35 ] In Ferland v. R. [5] , the Québec Court of Appeal considers that the sentencing range for dangerous driving causing death is generally between one and three years of imprisonment, and that detention should be seriously considered with prevailing objectives of denunciation and deterrence. The Court of Appeal makes a review of 186 judgments, rendered between 2000 and 2009; the details are appended to the decision.

The Court of Appeal specifically refers to the decision of Olivier v. R. [6] , quoting that the sentencing range for this type of offence lies between one and three years of imprisonment, four years being considered as a severe sentence, but not abnormal. Some of these 186 judgments include criminal negligence, street racing, impaired driving causing death and leaving the scene of an accident.

[ 36 ] Both the Ferland and Olivie r judgments refer to Houle v.

R. [7] , containing a previous review of 158 decisions rendered by the Courts of Canada between 1985 and 1995, that supports the same range of sentencing. [ 37 ] More specifically, in Ferland , the Québec Court of Appeal refers to four decisions recently rendered, where the sentences range from 18 months to 3 years of imprisonment [8] , without excluding sentences below or above this range. [ 38 ] Another relevant part of the Ferland decision is when the Court of Appeal acknowledges that, when alcohol is not an issue, the length of imprisonment is two years or less in most cases. [9] [ 39 ] At the time of the decisions in Houle , Olivier and Ferland , between 1995 and 2009, section 249(4) C.C.C. would edict a maximum term of imprisonment of 14 years.

The same text applied when the Court of Appeal ordered a 12-month term of imprisonment for an offence under 249(4) C.C.C., in a 1993 decision less referred to these days but still relevant, the R. v. Blouin [10] decision. In other words, the maximum punishment decided by Parliament was upgraded to imprisonment for life in offences involving negligence, street racing or the use of alcohol; still the text of section 249(4) has not been modified for at least the past 20 years. [ 40 ] We will now review some other decisions referred to by the Québec Court of Appeal in the Ferland decision and others. [ 41 ] In R. v.

Gilbert [11] , the Court of Appeal quotes the R. v. Kelly decision where a survey of 70 judgments reveals that sentencing dangerous driving charges involving death range from 6 months to five years, specifying that they “generally range” from one to three years. In the R. v. Gilbert decision the sentence was modified to 24 months of imprisonment, for three counts: dangerous driving causing death, dangerous driving causing injuries, and failure to stop at scene of accident (3 victims). [ 42 ] In R. v.

Lévesque-Chaput [12] , an 18-month term of imprisonment was ordered for an offence relatively similar to the present situation, where the victim is still in coma, a vegetative situation that can be considered equivalent to death. No other offence is involved. The Court of Appeal confirms the range established in the Ferland and Hakim cases. [ 43 ] In Fortin v. R. [13] , the Court of Appeal maintains a 2-year imprisonment sentence on a count of dangerous driving involving a “street race”. The aggravating factors were that the driving was highly dangerous and lasted for quite a long period of time.

The accused’s vehicle had been modified to reach high performance and speeds noticeably exceeding the legal limits. The Court recognizes that 2 years less one day of imprisonment could also have been decided. [ 44 ] The well-known case of R. v. Proulx [14] , dealing with the dangerous operation of a vehicle, maintained an 18-month imprisonment term although it was decided that it would have to be served in prison and not in the community. The Proulx case involved two victims, one died and the other suffered severe bodily harm. Alcohol was involved.

The 18-month sentence of incarceration was considered a harsh sentence. [ 45 ] Recent decisions do not establish that 18 months is the “starting point” for every case. In Lévesque-Chaput , the Québec Court of Appeal confirms in 2010 the Ferland decision and specifies that the 18-month term then decided “was not the least harsh sentence applicable”. [15] [ 46 ] Consequently, the lower range to be generally considered is between 12 and 18 months of imprisonment, some served in jail, others in the community. The length of the conditional sentence must not be equivalent to the jail term imposed.

After reviewing the case law, I realize that the length of a conditional sentence order is rarely shorter, but sometimes longer than a jail term. As a trial judge, and as a sentencing judge, I also realize that, generally speaking, a conditional sentence order is considered a more clement sentence than imprisonment. That is confirmed by sections 718.2

d) and

e) C.C.C. Therefore, it leads the Court to consider the possibility of a jail sentence not exceeding 18 months in this case, which does not mean that some car surfing offences do not deserve longer terms of imprisonment in different circumstances. [ 47 ] Many cases quoted by the Crown attorney in volume 2 of her authorities involve impaired driving causing death, criminal negligence and street racing, with severe penalties.

Even then, the Court of Appeal considered that cases not favourable to the accused, involving more aggravating factors, would deserve between 18 months and 3 years. [16] [ 48 ] When alcohol is not a factor, the sentences are often, but not always, for a duration of two years and less [17] , that is, where no other offence is involved (for example, failure to stop at the scene of an accident), where the offender has a perfect driving record pursuant to the Highway Safety Code , and where the offender had no previous convictions under the Criminal Code in similar or related matters.

STREET RACES: [ 49 ] Lengthy sentences have also been rendered in cases involving street races which, as of December 2006, the Parliament set out as a specific crime punishable more severely than other forms of dangerous driving. CAR SURFING: [ 50 ] “Street racing” does not include “car surfing”. “Car surfing” is a relatively new form of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle. No specific

section of the Criminal Code provides a specific charge for that illegal activity. The counsels did not provide the Court with reported cases of sentencing for “car surfing” offences. [ 51 ] The only reported case using that expression is a recent decision rendered by my colleague judge Michel Dubois in LSPJA- 1036 [18] , where female teenagers entered into an activity of riding a car with passengers sitting on the hood, on the roof and on the trunk. The activity was seen as a game, but it turned into a tragedy, when one of the riders fell off the car and died.

However this case is under the Youth Criminal Justice Act and cannot be used for sentencing an adult. [ 52 ] In the instant case, the activity was defined as “car surfing” by the lawyers, but was not considered as such by the offender.

He never decided to drive with a passenger on the car’s body. Mr. Palliser got caught in such an activity when the passenger decided toclimb onto the roof during the drive. His passenger was intoxicated and did not really want to go back home right away. The accuseddecided to continue to drive instead of stopping, and there was his mistake. When he realized that the passenger was no longer on theroof, he inferred that Mr. Ducharme had stepped off the car to continue partying and celebrating.

One of the eye-witnesses writes in hisstatement that the driver did not realize that the passenger had fallen. [53] Hence the Tribunal will not consider these events as “street racing” and will consider cases in the lower range of sentencing,between 12 and 18 months of imprisonment. [54] The issue of ordering or not a conditional sentence, which was discussed in many cases reviewed, does not apply here.

Since2007, a conditional sentence order is no longer an option for a count of dangerous operation of a vehicle causing death. [55] For cases involving a count of dangerous driving causing death, with no or few aggravating factors, as in this case, manyjudgments considered sentences of 18 months or less. I refer to decisions rendered over the past 5 years.[19] [56] The Ferland decision of 2009, in the appended synopsis, includes 59 decisions out of 186, sentencing the offender to 18months or less of imprisonment. [57] In. R. v.

Nasogaluak[20], the Supreme Court had to deal with the issue of sentence reduction as a remedy to the breach of theaccused’s constitutional rights. The Court maintained a 12-month conditional discharge, being a reduction on counts that normallydeserve much more.

The decision mentions that the offender, 24 years old, was a male of Inuit and Dene descent. [58] The comments of the Court concerning the discretion of the sentencing judge to set out general ranges of sentence are asfollows: (43) “The language in ss. 718 to 718.2 of the Code is sufficiently general to ensure that sentencing judges enjoy a broad discretion tocraft a sentence that is tailored to the nature of the offence and the circumstances of the offender.

The determination of a “fit” sentenceis, subject to some specific statutory rules, an individualized process that requires the judge to weigh the objectives of sentencing in amanner that best reflects the circumstances of the case (R. v. Lyons, (1987) (SCC), 2 S.C.R. 309; M. (C.A.); R. v.Hamilton (2004), (ON CA), 72 O.R. (3d) 1 (C.A.)). No one sentencing objective trumps the others and it falls to thesentencing judge to determine which objective or objectives merit the greatest weight, given the particulars of the case.

The relativeimportance of any mitigating or aggravating factors will then push the sentence up or down the scale of appropriate sentences for similaroffences. The judge’s discretion to decide on the particular blend of sentencing goals and the relevant aggravating or mitigating factorsensures that each case is decided on its facts, subject to the overarching guidelines and principles in the Code and in the case law.

(44) The wide discretion granted to sentencing judges has limits. It is fettered in part by the case law that has set down, in somecircumstances, general ranges of sentences for particular offences, to encourage greater consistency between sentencing decisions inaccordance with the principle of parity enshrined in the Code. But it must be remembered that, while courts should pay heed to theseranges, they are guidelines rather than hard and fast rules. A judge can order a sentence outside that range as long as it is in accordancewith the principles and objectives of sentencing.

Thus, a sentence falling outside the regular range of appropriate sentences is notnecessarily unfit. Regard must be had to all the circumstances of the offence and the offender, and to the needs of the community inwhich the offence occurred.” [59] The Nasogaluak case strengthens the position of the Court to look for a sentence ranging between 12 and 18 months ofimprisonment, in order to meet with the lower range decided by the Québec Court of Appeal, considering the particular circumstances ofthis case. -

Section 718.2

e) of the Code: [60] The sentencing judge also has the duty to consider

section 718.2

e) C.C.C. when sentencing an aboriginal offender. If thiscase would have been submitted to the Court a few years ago, a conditional sentence would probably have been ordered by this Court, asmany judges then decided in cases similar to this one, and especially because the offender is aboriginal. [61] But since there is no other alternative to incarceration for this type of crime, the length of the term must be carefullyconsidered. This means that the jail term for an aboriginal offender may be less than the term imposed on a non-aboriginal for the sameoffence.

However this gap between aboriginal and non-aboriginal offenders would not be considered in presence of serious and violentcrimes, which is definitely not the case here.[21] [62] In Gladue, the Court would have been open to a new sentencing hearing in order for the sentencing judge to considerreducing the term of imprisonment.

But this was neither in the interest of justice nor of the offender, in the Gladue case, as the offenderhad already been granted full parole. [63] The Court of Appeal of British Columbia came to the same decision on an appeal for an 18-month term of imprisonmentimposed on a 26 year-old male aboriginal[22] of Horse Lake, B.C. The Court decided that it was not in the interest of Mr. Napesis toremit the matter to the sentencing judge, because he was already eligible to full parole.

But the Court shows a clear opening for sentencereduction. [64] Since a conditional sentence is not available here and where this case is not among the most serious, involving no violencefrom the offender, a reduction of the term of imprisonment has to be considered in view of

section 718.2

e) C.C.C. The next questionthen is: how much should the term be reduced? [65] This specific issue was addressed by the Court of Appeal of Québec in the situation of an aboriginal offender member of theViger Malecite First Nation[23]. The man was a repeat offender concerning alcohol-related driving.

Section 718.2

e) C.C.C. and theGladue decisions were not considered at all by the sentencing judge who did not know that Mr. Tremblay was an aboriginal. The Court

of Appeal modified a 42-month term of imprisonment to a 30-month term, that is, a subtraction of 12 months or nearly 30 % of the sentence. [ 66 ] In British Columbia, an aboriginal offender was convicted to a 90-day term of imprisonment (to be served intermittently) for a count of impaired driving causing bodily harm. The Court could have reasonably imposed a period of incarceration considerably longer, but it was taken into consideration that the offender was aboriginal and that there were mitigating factors related to the operation of a business located in the community.

He was supported by his native Band Council, as a resource person for his community. [24] The deterrence objective made the judge choose a term of imprisonment instead of a conditional sentence order. [ 67 ] In the province of Québec, judge Jacques Trudel of the Court of Québec had to deliver a sentence concerning a 21 year-old aboriginal, member of the Attikamek/Wemotaci community. The case concerns a count of impaired driving causing death (255(3) C.C.C. ) [25] . The accused was celebrating at a community Pow-Wow, drinking alcohol and driving his all-terrain vehicle around the community.

In the early morning, he hit two pedestrians, killing them both. [ 68 ] After reviewing many decisions proposed by both counsels, including the Olivier decision, judge Trudel also considered the support of the community. He also took into consideration the teachings of the Gladue ruling. At that time, a conditional sentence order of imprisonment was available. But the judge decided for imprisonment, choosing a reduced term compared to non-aboriginal offenders, as a mean to focus on restorative justice as taught in the Gladue decision.

The sentence was a 10-month term of imprisonment. [ 69 ] One can say that the case at bar is now almost 5 years old. First the circumstances of the offence are more serious in the Petiquay case than in the Palliser case: 2 deaths, blood/alcohol rate of 145 and 142 mg, but the offender was younger.

Second, there are very few driving offences causing death concerning aboriginal offenders in the case law. [ 70 ] As a judge of the Court of Québec working regularly with the itinerant Court, in the regions of Nunavik (the Inuit), James Bay (the Crees), and Abitibi and Temiscamingue (the Algonquins), I can confirm that many unwritten decisions concerning the sentencing of First Nation and Inuit people involve substituting conditional sentences of imprisonment to jail terms.

When a conditional sentence is not an available sanction, the Court regularly orders reduced jail terms for aboriginal offenders, compared to non-aboriginal offenders, when the crime is not “more serious and violent”, as stated in the Gladue decision [26] . [ 71 ] Hence my decision will be to accept the proposal of the defence counsel and to impose Mr. Palliser with 10 months of incarceration. [ 72 ] The probation order and the driving prohibition period shall be shorter than in R. v. Petiquay . A supervised probation of 12 months will apply after the imprisonment.

There will also be a 18-month driving prohibition order. [27] [ 73 ] FOR THESE REASONS: [ 74 ] Mr. Tommy Palliser is sentenced to an imprisonment of 10 months on the count of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing death ( s. 249(4) C.C.C. ). [ 75 ] After the term of imprisonment, a 12-month supervised probation of 12 months is ordered.

Besides the usual conditions, the following specific conditions will apply: 75.1 REPORT to the probation officer within five (5) days after your release from detention, and thereafter, whenever required by the probation officer and in the manner directed by the probation officer; 75.2 FOLLOW the instructions of the probation officer; 75.3 MEET with the Justice Committee of Inukjuak within 30 days after your release from detention, and thereafter, whenever required by the Justice Committee. 75.4 FOLLOW the instructions of the Justice Committee; 75.5 WRITE an

article in a local or regional newspaper or magazine on the detrimental effects of dangerous operation of motor vehicles OR GIVE A LECTURE in the community on the same topic. [ 76 ] The Court also PROHIBITS Mr. Palliser to drive a motor vehicle for a period of 18 months, pursuant to section 259(2) C.C.C. [ 77 ] The Court ORDERS that Mr. Palliser pay the surcharge fine within 12 months. [ 78 ] The Court PROHIBITS Mr. Palliser to have in his possession any firearms, ammunitions or explosive substances for a period of 10 years, pursuant to

section 109 of the Code; the application is granted for an exemption pursuant to

section 113, in order to allow the offender to practice traditional activities. __________________________________ CLAUDE BIGUÉ, J.C.Q. Me Lyly-Anne Ratelle Crown Prosecutor

Me Gérald LaHaye Counsel for the accused Dates of hearing: August 30 and November 16, 2010; January 18, 2011