2013 QCCA 9, 2013 QCCA 9
Opinion
Poplawski c. McGill University Non-Academic Certified Association (MUNACA) 2013 QCCA 9 COURT OF APPEAL CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC REGISTRY OF MONTREAL No: 500-09-023074-123 (500-17-061419-100) DATE: January 7, 2013 THE HONOURABLE YVES-MARIE MORISSETTE, J.A. slawomir poplawski PETITIONER – Defendant v. McGILL UNIVERSITY NON-ACADEMIC CERTIFIED ASSOCIATION (M.U.N.A.C.A.) RESPONDENT – Plaintiff JUDGMENT [ 1 ] The petitioner is self-represented, as he was in the Superior Court.
On July 5, 2012, the Honourable Madam Justice Sophie Picard of the Superior Court, district of Montreal, rendered judgment on the respondent’s motion of October 15, 2010, “to introduce proceedings in damages and to declare the defendant [Poplawski] a vexatious litigant”. On September 12, 2012, Madam Justice Picard, proceeding under
article 475 C.c.p. , issued a corrected version of this same judgment [1] . The declaration and orders contained in this judgment are self-explanatory: [56] DECLARES Mr Slawomir Poplawski as being a vexatious litigant, subject to the prior authorization process provided under
Article 84 of the Rules of Practice of the Superior Court of Québec in Civil Matters , with respect to Plaintiffs; [57]
a) PROHIBITS Mr Slawomir Poplawski from instituting, directly or indirectly, any action, motion or application, in any pending or future file, before the Superior Court, involving, directly or indirectly, McGill University Non-Academic Certified Association (M.U.N.A.C.A.) or Public Service Alliance of Canada (PSAC) , without having first obtained prior judicial authorization from the Chief Justice of the Superior Court or the judge designated by him;
b) PROHIBITS Mr Slawomir Poplawski from instituting, directly or indirectly, any action, motion or application, in any pending or future file, before the Court of Québec, involving, directly or indirectly, McGill University Non-Academic Certified Association (M.U.N.A.C.A.) or Public Service Alliance of Canada (PSAC) , without having first obtained prior judicial authorization from the Chief Justice of the Court of Québec or the judge designated by her;
c) PROHIBITS Mr Slawomir Poplawski from instituting, directly or indirectly, any action, motion or application, in any pending or future file, before the Commission des relations du travail or any administrative tribunal, involving, directly or indirectly, McGill University Non-Academic Certified Association (M.U.N.A.C.A.) or Public Service Alliance of Canada (PSAC) , without having first obtained prior authorization from the President of said administrative tribunal or the member of said tribunal designated by the President; [58] ORDERS that the court clerks and other justice officers of the Superior Court, Court of Québec, Commission des relations du travail , or any administrative tribunal, refrain from accepting, recording, registering in file records or listing on any roles of hearings any procedure from Mr Slawomir Poplawski involving, directly or indirectly, McGill University Non-Academic Certified Association (M.U.N.A.C.A.) or Public Service Alliance of Canada (PSAC) , unless a prior authorization from the Chief Justice of the Superior Court (or the judge designated by him), the Chief Justice of the Court of Québec (or the judge designated by her) or the President of the administrative tribunal (or the member of said tribunal designated by the President), as the case may be, appears on the procedure; [59] ORDERS that this judgment does not apply to the hearing of the 5 th complaint (Exhibit P-15d) before the Commission des relations du travail , which has been scheduled to continue on September 5, 2012; [60] CONDEMNS the Defendant to pay $10,264.21 to McGill University Non-Academic Certified Association (M.U.N.A.C.A.) , with the legal interest and additional indemnity, as of the date of this judgment; […] [ 2 ] Confining myself to the main steps taken by the parties in this case, I note that, chronologically, the file evolved as follows: ― On November 10, 2010, Mr.
Justice de Grandpré ordered the parties to abide by the timetable they had signed and filed on that same day in the court record. ― On January 9, 2012, Madam Justice Hallée held a pre-trial conference which had been scheduled for that date on the preceding
October 24 and she rendered a decision which states in part : Considérant que l’objectif de la Conférence préparatoire est pour évaluer la durée de la preuve de la
partie défenderesse laquelle demande entre 24 et 30 heures d’audition, et voudrait faire entendre 12 témoins; […] Considérant que [la
partie défenderesse] déclare aujourd’hui ne pas être prête à procéder; […] LE TRIBUNAL: REPORTE la Conférence préparatoire au 5 mars 2012, à 14h30, en salle 2.13; ORDONNE au défendeur, M.
Slawomir Poplawski de compléter la déclaration commune de dossier complet; ORDONNE d’avoir avec lui le 5 mars 2012 sa liste de 12 témoins et de préciser pour chaque témoin quel sera l’objet du témoignage ainsi que la durée de l’interrogatoire de chaque témoin, laissant ainsi au tribunal la décision, d’abord d’identifier le témoin, de vérifier la pertinence du témoin et la durée du témoignage de chaque témoin; ― On March 5 2012, Mr.
Justice Guibault heard the parties and rendered the following judgment: The Court orders the Defendant to present himself on Wednesday, March 7, 2012 at 3:00 pm with the list of witnesses to be submitted to the Court and the time required for each testimony; Upon default of doing so, the Defendant will be barred from presenting any witness on the motion for declaring Defendant a vexatious litigant; The recusation asked by the Defendant is refused as there are no grounds for such a request. ― On March 7, Mr.
Justice Guibault referred the file to the Associate Chief Justice of the Superior Court “to finalize the preparation of the file for hearing” and he requested that the parties, who were present or, in the case of the respondent, represented before him, meet immediately with the Associate Chief Justice to set a date for a further pre-trial conference. ― The next day, March 8, Associate Chief Justice Wery heard the parties and noted in his reasons for judgment that, once again, Mr. Poplawski had asserted what he believed to be his right not to disclose his list of witnesses.
Before scheduling the hearing of the Association’s motion for June 13, he stated in his decision: The undersigned is convinced that Mr. Poplawski is trying to abuse the judicial system in order to avoid the presentation of the Motion to declare him a vexatious litigant; He seems ready to say anything to avoid the outcome of the motion to declare him vexatious; He then reiterated Mr. Justice Guibault’s declaration that Mr. Poplawski was barred from presenting witnesses on June 13. ― On June 13, Madam Justice Picard first entertained and dismissed a request for postponement which Mr.
Poplawski had emailed to the Court earlier that week. At 11:19, in the absence of Mr. Poplawski, she proceeded to hear the motion and the two witnesses called by the Association. At 16:54, the hearing was continued to the next day. On June 14, at the end of the hearing, she took the case under advisement. In her judgment filed on July 5,she explains her reasons for granting the Association’s motion. ― On August 29, Mr. Justice de Grandpré dismissed Mr.
Poplawski motion for revocation of Madam Justice Picard judgment rejecting his request of June 13 for a postponement of the hearing. ― On September 12, Madam Justice Picard, who in the meantime had been designated by the Chief Justice of the Superior Court as the judge mentioned in paragraph 57
a) of the judgment of July 5, released a corrected version of this judgment. In addition, she rejected Mr. Poplawski’s request for a postponement, dismissed is oral motion for recusation and dismissed his motion for revocation of the judgment of July 5. ― On September 28, Mme Justice Picard dismissed Mr. Poplawski renewed oral motion for recusation and dismissed for want of jurisdiction his motion for leave to appeal from the judgment of July 5. ― On December 6, my colleague Mr. Justice Fournier dismissed Mr. Poplawski’s motion for leave to appeal from Mr.
Justice de Grandpré’s judgment of August 29 [2] . ― On December 21, my colleague Mr. Justice Léger dismissed Mr. Poplawski’s motions for leave to appeal against the judgments of September 28 dismissing his request for a postponement, his motion for recusation and his motion for revocation of judgment [3] . ― Also on December 21, I heard Mr.
Poplawski as he presented his motion, quoted in full below. [ 3 ] In the reasons which follow, I will deal only with the motion argued before me on December 21. * * * * * [ 4 ] Before I address the contents of this motion, however, I must summarize the judgment rendered on July 5 and corrected on
September 12. [ 5 ] Until November 2010, and for many years before, Mr. Poplawski (hereinafter “the petitioner”) had been a laboratory technician at McGill University, represented by M.U.N.A.C.A. as the employees’ certified association (hereinafter “the respondent”). In 2007, the petitioner was twice suspended by his employer, first for two days and later for five days. He wanted to have the respondent file a grievance against the employer but for various reasons the respondent declined to do so. [ 6 ] The petitioner therefore filed a first complaint with the Commission des relations du travail (hereinafter “the CRT”), in April 2007, against the respondent and under
section 47.2 of the Labour Code [4] . This complaint was heard and dismissed by CRT. The petitioner then unsuccessfully applied for a review of the decision under
section 127 of the Code . [ 7 ] The petitioner brought a second complaint to the CRT in December 2008, alleging once more that the respondent had failed to abide by its duty of fair representation. The complaint was dismissed by the CRT in November 2009 (with lengthy reasons [5] ). The petitioner’s motion for a review of this decision was dismissed in May 2010. [ 8 ] The petitioner brought a third and similar complaint in September 2009, which was summarily dismissed in November. A new motion for review met with the same fate in May 2010. [ 9 ] A fourth complaint against the respondent, still under
section 47.2 of the Code , was filed by the petitioner in March 2010. This complaint was dismissed in June 2011, as was the petitioner’s motion for review in February of the following year. [ 10 ] The petitioner’s fifth complaint concerned the respondent’s refusal to grieve over the petitioner’s dismissal from the University in November 2010. A hearing took place in July, September and December of 2011. When Madam Justice Picard rendered judgment on July 5, 2012, the hearing of this complaint was still pending before the CRT. [ 11 ] In June 2011, the petitioner filed a sixth complaint against the respondent, again under
section 47.2 of the Code ; this sixth complaint was summarily dismissed on the ground that it was premature, no decision having yet been rendered on the respondent’s failure to grieve the petitioner’s dismissal of November 2010. [ 12 ] In the course of these proceedings, the petitioner also made various incidental motions for postponement and motions for recusation. [ 13 ] Finally, the petitioner filed an application for judicial review against three of the CRT decisions described in the preceding paragraphs. [ 14 ] Madam Justice Picard concludes that this succession of complaints on the part of the petitioner evinces a clear pattern of vexatious behaviour.
Among other findings of fact, she writes (footnotes omitted): [42] His procedures are often directed against commissioners or judges, personally. He almost systematically requests their recusation, on the basis of their being partial. These requests were all dismissed as being clearly unfounded. [43] Moreover, he is repeatedly filing the same recourses against the Association, claiming without reason that he is not being treated equally and fairly regarding the so-called psychological harassment from the University. [44] The arguments put forward by Mr.
Poplawski cannot be considered rational; he is motivated by purely ideological purposes and his only goal is to harass the Association and have it spend time, energy and money to defend itself. He constantly files motions to review the decisions of the Commission and has just filed a motion for judicial review of some of these decisions. [45] Obviously, he will never accept the decisions which dismissed his complaints against the Association; he will tirelessly file new complaints, followed by motions for review, motions for judicial review and eventually appeals.
It is on this basis that Madam Justice Picard makes the orders already quoted above in paragraph [1]. * * * * * [ 15 ] I will now reproduce verbatim, exactly as it is written and formatted (though I will omit the petitioner’s residential address), the petitioner’s motion, which he filed in the Court of Appeal on October 29, 2012, and which I heard on the December 21. NUMÉRO DE DOSSIER : 500-17-061419-100 500-09-023074-123 Court of Appeal NOM DES PARTIES : Slawomir Poplawski c. McGill University Non-Academic Certified Association (MUNACA) MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL September [6]
October 28 For judgement of September 12 , 2012 (Articles 2, 20, 26, 29, 46, 494 and 511 of C.C.P.) ( Sections 23 , 24 and 35 of Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms as Sections 15, 24 of Canadian Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms) TO ONE OF THE HONOURABLE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEAL, The applicant respectfully submits : 1. On 28.09.12, the Hon. Sophie Picard of the Superior Court, District of Montreal in Civil Division dismissed the Applicant’s “motion for leave to appeal of the July 5 th , 2012 judgment as appears in the judgment attached to this proceeding (
Schedule 1 ). 2. The Applicant received this judgement on October 3, 2012. 3. The inquiry and hearing lasted 15 minutes. 4. The rendered decision was issued by the same judge (S.Picard) that was hearing the same case in June 2012 and violated basic rights of Applicant as fundamental laws of Canada and Quebec. 5. It means that we deal with the issue representing a matter of principle ( Sections 23, 24 and 35 of Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms as Sections 15, 24 of Canadian Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms). 6.
The applicant instead of dealing with fair judicial system experiences biased treatment, unlawful procedures and abuse of power by the court representatives. 7.
The Applicant presented his motion for leave to appeal of the July 5 th , 2012 judgment on 03.08.12 after obtaining in the Superior Court’s submission office information (in his file it was marked also on the computerized system a key role of the Chief Justice as monitoring each court action) that in his special case the motion must be firstly seen by the Chief Judge and only after it will be sent internally to the Court of Appeal instead of submitting it directly in this institution. 8.
However, the Applicant noticed that his previous as the latest motions for revocation as later for leave to appeal were not registered (plumitif) what forced him to write between July 24 – August 9 2013 six letters directly to Hon. Rolland (
Schedule 2a-f ). 9. The applicant received two answers (
Schedule 3 a-
b) confirming that Hon. Rolland knew the Applicant’s both motions and accepted as properly submitted with a final statement that his each appealing concerning the 05.07.12 decision do not need special permission as in the judgement was not mentioned “provisional execution notwithstanding any appeal”. 10. Unfortunately, Hon. Rolland personally interfered with the Applicant’s file when ordering the Hon. Judge S.
Picard to hear his motion for revocation on 12.09.12 (contested in the 12.10.12 application to the Court of Appeal) and the same happened on 28.09.12 what represents abuse of power as psychological harassment of the Applicant. 11. On 12.09.12 Hon. Rolland directly ordered Hon. Picard to decide about her previous case when on 28.09.12 was directly involved a lawyer/manager in charge of room 2.16 announcing at about 9.20 am that this case will be heard in room 2:13. 12. The Applicant, experiencing before brutal treatments, wrote recently a few complaint letters to the Chief Justice that were not answered (
Schedule 4a ) and he anticipated use of the same abusive/illegal methods in the Superior Court on 28.09.12. 13. It explains the Applicant’s fast responds with clearly and loudly addressed question to the ‘administrator’ choosing room 2.13 for this case: “ What is the name of the judge in this room?” with a brief explanation about his previous problems concerning judges. 14. This person in charge of room 2.16 responded: “ I do not know ” what was not true as the Applicant learned it later in his office. 15.
There were many witnesses/lawyers hearing this untrue answer (besides recording) as staying in the room and the Applicant can provide their names after analyzing a list on the roll for this day and contacting those with numbers over 32 (it was 122 + 7 cases for this day) what after subtracting 32 gives many potential witnesses remembering my loudly articulated objections. 16. The Applicant went immediately to the room 2.13 and discovered that suspected/anticipated by him Hon. Picard was there with many clients before him what meant long waiting. 17.
In this situation the Applicant decided to email immediately his already prepared letter to the Chief Justice (
Schedule 4b ) from the nearest legal office with the added information confirming that the Hon. Picard will one more time deal with his case. 18. Hon. Rolland had over 2 hours to respond/interfere, but he did not and the Applicant after waiting 1h40min for his response prepared a written request for recusation of this judge. 19. He provided the original recusation’s request (
Schedule 5 ) to Hon. Picard, with a photocopy of this handwritten request given to the Respondent, immediately at the beginning of hearing – after not hearing the expected statement about transferring the case to another judge following the ordered break just before hearing his case. 20. Hon. Picard dismissed this request as the Applicant’s oral appeal from her decision and also ignored his correction when she was dictating untrue statement: “Poplawski’s verbal demand for recusation” because it was submitted in the written form (
Schedule 3b ). 21. Hon. Picard in the decision of 28.09.12 quoted only her own words from the 05.07.12 judgment about need of presenting by the
Applicant “the authorization of the chief justice of the Superior Court in order to present such notion”, but purposely omitted placed in the file a letter of 07.08.12 signed by Hon. Rolland stating: “since that judgment didn’t have the mention <provisional execution notwithstanding any appeal>” that contradicts with her decision. 22. At the end of her decision Hon. Picard states “ the Superior Court cannot hear appeals of it’s decisions ” and acts as a very biased/hostile judge ordering even the cost for administrative mistreatment of the Applicant’s motion. 23.
A very similar situation concerning a mistake about the proper court’s hearing took place on 17.09.12, but the judge did not act so aggressively and advised for the Applicant correction without cost (
Schedule 6 ). 24. Hon. Picard ignored need to investigate or ask about reasons for seeing this case in the same Superior Court as analyzing her role in hearing the same case and already finished. 25. Hon. Picard only attacked the Defendant by unverified accusation for his alleged administrative mistakes and denied his rights for fair trials with ability to provide explanations. 26.
In this situation the Applicant was not able to present facts concerning all circumstances about the submitted motion for leave to appeal as described in point 7 – the Applicant tried to submit his motion for leave to appeal on July 31, 2012 after receiving an ambiguous letter from Hon. Rolland (30.07.12) but it was refused when the clerk’s checked the file on his computer indicating the Chief Justice’s key role as the only evaluator with his final approval before sending it later internally to the Appeal Court. 27.
The Applicant was feeling disoriented and rearranged his Motion on August 3, 2012 with also added points 39-40 to convince the clerk for accepting the motion in the light of big ambiguity as the letter of 30.07.12 was not precise – the previously submitted “ Motion in Revocation of 05.07.12 Judgment ” approved by Hon. Rolland as proper (with not mentioning the Court of Appeal as supposedly sent later internally according to the clerk’s previous explanation) and not answered letters of 31.07.12/03.08.12. 28. It is essential to notice that during the hearing of 28.09.12 Hon.
Picard totally ignored the Applicant’s “Ammedment to a previously submitted Motion/Application for Leave to Appeal of July 5, 2012 decision” (
Schedule 7 ). 29. Hon. Picard pretended that this motion was not submitted and when the Applicant asked the PSAC/MUNACA’s lawyer if she received it 11 days earlier and wanted to show a stamp confirming its submission to the court, the judge started to dictate her decision. 30. This questionable treatment of the Applicant is not acceptable and in the final conclusion the Applicant will repeat his request from the 17.09.12 Amendment requesting a judicial investigation concerning such brutal treatment of the Applicant by some representatives of the Superior Court. 31.
This Motion for Leave to Appeal the decision of 28.09.12 is well founded in law representing the best interest of justice and causes no prejudice to the respondent. 32. The Applicant presented well documented evidences demonstrating that the judge was biased, hide already submitted documents as blocked submission of other evidences and refused to hear the Applicant’s clarifications. 33. Hon. Piccard did not analyze the Applicant’s properly submitted on 03.08.12 Motion for Leave to Appeal (
Schedule 8 ) that is now attached to the present Motion with request of admitting it as the integral part appealing together erred in law decision of 05.07.12.
THE APPLICANT WILL ASK THE COURT OF APPEAL TO: GRANT the present Appeal/Motion for Leave to Appeal; SET ASIDE the judgments of June 13-14, 2012 and July 5, 2012 in file No : 500-17-061419-100 ORDER all testimonies/documents submitted without the presence of Applicant on those hearings of June 13-14, 2012 and containing untrue statements to be removed from the file no: 500-17-061419-100 and close/annul this case that should be recognized as a mistrial after introducing presented above serious judicial errors. CONDEMN a decision that Applicant will pay costs both at the first instance and in appeal.
GRANT investigation of the present judicial irregularities harming the Applicant TO AUTHORIZE the Applicant to institute an appeal from the judgment rendered on 28.09.12 by the Honourable Sophie Picard of the Superior Court District of Montreal, in file: 500-17-061419-100 Signed at Montreal on this 29day of October 2012 (signature) Slawomir Poplawski (Applicant) [ 16 ] A document which the petitioner relied on during the argument, and which he submitted to me at the end of the hearing on his motion, is entitled “NOTES IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL For all judgments since June 13, 2012”. [ 17 ] I note first that it is difficult to determine from the materials submitted by the petitioner which is the judgment , among the several rendered in his case, in respect of which he now purports to seek leave to appeal.
Quite obviously, and for reasons which are too plain to deserve any elaboration here, he cannot now seek leave to appeal from “all judgments since June 13” (even though that seems to be is mistaken understanding in the document I quoted above, in paragraph [16]). In his motion, which I reproduced in full in paragraph
[15] above, the heading contains a handwritten addition from which one may form the impression that the judgment from which the petitioner wishes to appeal is that of September 28. If however one turns to the relief sought in that motion, one sees that the second conclusion states: “ [TO] SET ASIDE the judgments of June 13-14, 2012 and July 5, 2012 in file No : 500-17-061419-100 ” – something which of course could not form part of a judgment of the Court disposing of an appeal I would allow to proceed by granting the application for leave before me.
But the petitioner also writes what follows at the very end of the same motion; “ TO AUTHORIZE the Applicant to institute an appeal from the judgment rendered on 28.09.12 by the Honourable Sophie Picard of the Superior Court District of Montreal, in file: 500-17-061419-100 ”. I should add that, although the petitioner was given close to an hour of court time to argue his motion before me, and was asked more than once to clarify the matter I consider in this paragraph, he offered no useful explanation.
I will therefore proceed on my understanding of the materials before me and assume that the motion for leave to appeal is indeed aimed at the judgment(
s) of September 28 last. [ 18 ] Basing myself on the minute of the hearing held on September 28, I note the following. Technically, on that day, and as between the parties now before me, Madam Justice Picard rendered two judgments: she, in that order, (
i) dismissed the petitioner’s “verbal demand for recusation” and (ii) dismissed the petitioner’s “motion/application for leave to appeal”. [ 19 ] I need not concern myself with the judgment dismissing the petitioner’s motion for recusation for it is self-evident that no judge of the Superior Court would have had jurisdiction to grant a “motion/application for leave to appeal” against one of that court’s own judgments. The reasons recorded in the minute of the hearing held on September 28 state, inter alia : Considering the fact that Mr.
Poplawski is now presenting a motion for leave to appeal said judgment that was rendered on July 5, 2012; Considering the fact that Mr. Poplawski has not obtained the authorization of the Chief Justice of the Superior Court in order to present such motion; Considering the fact that the Superior Court cannot hear appeals of its decisions; [ 20 ] I interpret these reasons as follows. [ 21 ] The petitioner, who besieges the courts with correspondence and with pleadings worded as if the rules of civil procedure did not exist, wished to challenge the judgment of July 5.
He therefore attempted, on parallel courses and apparently at different times, to have that judgment revoked, and to obtain leave to appeal from it. That explains, in my view, the following passage of Mr.
Justice de Granpré’s reasons for judgment on August 29: Considering that the judgment rendered on July 5 th , 2012, by Mme Justice Picard jcs on the merit of the Plaintiff’s motion is presently (or apparently) in appeal; “Presently (or apparently)” well expresses the perplexity one feels when reading the petitioner’s pleadings, large parts of which are barely intelligible and in the nature of inchoate rants. [ 22 ] It appears, however, that at some point after July 5 the petitioner did move for a revocation of the judgment rendered on that date.
Given paragraph [58] of the judgment of July 5, I do not see how such a motion could have been entertained, let alone presented in court, without a prior authorization of the Chief Justice or his delegate. That, I believe, explains the passage in the judgment of September 28 which reads “Considering the fact that Mr.
Poplawski has not obtained the authorization of the Chief Justice of the Superior Court in order to present such motion”. [ 23 ] Regarding the “motion/application for leave to appeal”, the next passage in the judgment of September 28 (“Considering the fact that the Superior Court cannot hear appeals of its decisions”) conclusively disposes of it. No one who is familiar with the workings of articles 26 and 29 C.c.p. would think that there can be such a motion under the rules of civil procedure currently in force.
All the petitioner needed to do against the judgment of July 5 was to file an inscription pursuant to art. 495 C.c.p. He did not do so and no motion for leave to appeal can remedy this omission. Furthermore, it is now too late to file a fresh inscription. [ 24 ] The judgment of September 28 could also be seen as a judgment granting a declinatory exception ratione materiae . To the extent that this characterisation is accurate, this judgment, at least in theory, would be appealable as of right. But I have no doubt that, if met with a motion to dismiss under
article 501 C.c.p. , such an appeal would indeed be dismissed by the Court. [ 25 ] It follows that the petitioner’s motion serves no purpose. [ 26 ] The motion is therefore dismissed, with costs. YVES-MARIE MORISSETTE, J.A. Mr. Slawomir Poplawski In person Mtre Marie-Claude St-Amant MELANÇON MARCEAU GRENIER & SCIORTINO For the Respondent Date of hearing: December 21, 2012
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