2022 QCCQ 9760, 2022 QCCQ 9760

Reyes Vallespin c. Brossard Hyundai (9050-8391 Québec inc.) 2022 QCCQ 9760 COUR DU QUÉBEC « Division des petites créances » CANADA PROVINCE DE QUÉBEC DISTRICT DE LONGUEUIL « Chambre civile » N° : 505-32-037764-199 DATE : December 20th, 2022 ______________________________________________________________________ Presided by the HONORABLE DANIEL LÉVESQUE, J.C.Q. ______________________________________________________________________ CHARLIE REYES VALLESPIN Sr. Plaintiff c.

BROSSARD HYUNDAI (9050-8391 Québec inc.) Defendant ______________________________________________________________________ JUDGMENT ______________________________________________________________________ [ 1 ] Plaintiff is seeking reimbursement of amounts paid to defendant when he decided, approximately twenty days after purchase, to resell a vehicle to defendant bought from it and to acquire a different car from this same car dealership. [ 2 ] Plaintiff believes that this operation should be understood and treated as a cancellation of a previous purchase followed by the conclusion of a new purchase contract.

He states that he understood the transaction as such. [ 3 ] For this reason, he feels that he should not be forced to pay an amount that he perceives as a penalty of $19,433.60 for the “cancellation” of the initial contract. Context [ 4 ] Plaintiff states that the reason for returning the car was a result of the difficulty himself and his wife suffered in the context of daily use to sit in the car and to exit from it. [ 5 ] No explanation is provided to explain why this difficulty could not be suspected prior to purchase. Plaintiff does not contend that this would be a result of any defect affecting the vehicle.

Plaintiff ultimately admits that, in fact, the initial car was simply too small for his normal use and that he decided that a larger vehicle would be better suited to the couple’s needs. [ 6 ] It must also be noted that there is no demonstration of an agreement by defendant to cancel the initial purchase and plaintiff states no legal basis on which such a cancellation could have been sought or obtained. [ 7 ] Plaintiff states that he was promised, at the time where he decided to proceed, by a representative of defendant, that the differential amount to be paid in this context would be limited to a few thousand dollars. [ 8 ] Plaintiff, however, provides no satisfactory explanation of his agreement to sign a contract to execute the second purchase that contained provisions and involved expenses and losses that far exceed the allegedly expected consequences of the contract. [ 9 ] He recognizes that the second contract indicates rather than a cancellation of the initial sale an operation by which defendant was purchasing the first car and crediting an amount of $17,000 against purchase of the second. [ 10 ] He also fails to satisfactorily answer defendant’s argument that a delay elapsed between the moment where the parties concluded the promise to purchase for the new car and the moment when the actual purchase contract was signed upon delivery of the car. [ 11 ] Defendant states that had plaintiff not been satisfied with the term of the new contract, as it was described in some detail in the promise, he could have refused to sign the purchase contract or otherwise indicate this dissatisfaction with the terms proposed for this operation.

Plaintiff appears to have thus had a chance to fully assess and reflect upon the cost of the operation contemplated. [ 12 ] Defendant denies that its representative has made representation indicating that the consequences of the operation contemplated would be relatively minimal. It insists that the contract was fully discussed with its representative and that plaintiff understood its

consequence.

Legal principles [ 13 ] The court must appreciate in this context whether the result of the contract constitutes a situation of "lesion" as understood under the Consumer Protection Act and whether in such circumstances the obligation assumed by the consumer are so disproportionate that they constitute an abuse. [ 14 ] The court must also appreciate the proof proffered by defendant stating that plaintiff was strongly advised against completing the second purchase that he was notified of the very substantial cost to be incurred in this context and persisted in full awareness of the financial consequences of his decision. [ 15 ] Defendant states in addition that the financial consequences agreed to by plaintiff are not as dire as he describes them. [ 16 ] The consumer may demand the nullity of a contract or a reduction in his obligations thereunder where the disproportion between the respective obligations of the parties is so great as to amount to exploitation of the consumer or where the obligation of the consumer is excessive, harsh or unconscionable [1] . [ 17 ] In determining whether the consumer consented to the contract, the Court must consider the condition of the parties, the circumstances in which the contract was entered into and the benefits arising from the contract for the consumer [2] . [ 18 ] Failing such a demonstration a consumer must honour the contracts that he chooses to enter into and must assume the legal and financial consequences resulting from them.

Findings [ 19 ] Plaintiff does not provide the court with a legal basis upon which his decision to conclude the contract under dispute could be reversed. There is, here, no demonstration that defendant would have provided incorrect information or otherwise mislead plaintiffs to adopt his decision based on misleading statements. [ 20 ] There is indeed a difference of $18,217.46 between the amount initially financed in the second contract being $35,085.53 and that of the second transaction being 53,302.99.

This is in part explained by the difference in price of the two cars of $6,841.43 (tax considered) and the difference in the cost of the value protection in case of loss of $1,596.85 leaving a net difference of $9,779.18. [ 21 ] While this is a substantial amount, it is explained mostly by the difference between the sales price of the initial car of $25,837 (after tax and transport) against the amount of $17,000 paid by defendant to repurchase it for a loss of $8,837.71 on this issue. [ 22 ] There is no reason to believe that plaintiff was not aware of this adverse consequence of his decision to change a car so shortly after having purchased if.

He could assess and decide upon defendant offer and choose whether to agree to those terms. [ 23 ] Plaintiff allegation that a penalty of more than $19,000 was charged to him in this context is not substantiated and there is no demonstration of his allegation that the operation was a result of fraud or abuse. [ 24 ] In a situation similar to that under examination, where the balance on a prior purchase was continued at the time of second purchase while the first was far from paid-out, judge Daniel Bourgeois found that the consumer could understand the financial impact upon even a cursory review of the contract.

In that situation as in the present, the balance owing was plainly stated in the contract [3] . [ 25 ] Previous balance added to new car financing contract are a somewhat frequent problem for consumers as it may entail serious financial consequence that may warrant a duty of information by the vendor. [11] La demanderesse est pénalisée du fait qu’elle change de véhicule souvent avec un financement sur une longue période.

La valeur des véhicules donnés en échange étant inférieure au solde dû sur le financement, il en résulte une accumulation de soldes qui deviennent assez lourds [4] . [ 26 ] In the above-mentioned case, the court found that the consumer did not demonstrate a failure in this aspect of the vendor behaviour. [ 27 ] The proof as presented to this court predominantly indicates that the vendor attempted to advise plaintiff of negative financial consequences of the sale of such a recently acquired car and the cost of replacement.

These consequences were also somewhat self- evident and plaintiff should have perceived them upon review of the promise to purchase the second car and thus before signing the contract under dispute. [ 28 ] On this issue also plaintiff has not convinced the court that his consent to the second purchase contract was vitiated my fraud, false representation or unconscionable business practice by defendant. [ 29 ] A substantial part of plaintiff's difficulty and perception of an injustice rest upon his unfounded conviction that he is entitled to demand cancellation of any contract even some time after having consented to it.

In substance, he regretted the first contract and felt entitled to treat it as non-existent. Being now faced with the consequences of the second contract, he again would like to revert to the previous agreement, which would involve the return of a car that has been sold to a third party and the cancellation of a financing contract.

[ 30 ] The regrettable end result of those operations for plaintiff is not shown to be substantially based on the defendant's behaviour and plaintiff has not demonstrated the existence of facts and legal principles that could support his claim. [ 31 ] For these reasons the court : [ 32 ] Denies and rejects plaintiffs claim without cost. __________________________________ DANIEL LÉVESQUE, J.C.Q. Trial date: 12 December 2022