R. v. Steer, 2023 BCPC 262

Citation: R. v. Steer 2023 BCPC 262 Date: 20231218 File No: 89213-1 Registry: Nanaimo IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA REX v. SCOTT STANLEY MATTHEW STEER REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE A. WOLF Counsel for the Crown: T. McFadgen Counsel for the Accused: A. Singleton Place of Hearing: Nanaimo , B.C. Dates of Hearing: August 29, 30, 31, 2023 Date of Judgment: December 18, 2023

INTRODUCTION [1] There has been a trial. These are my reasons for the decision in this matter.

CHARGES Information 89213 Count 1 [2] Scott Stanley Mathew Steer, between January 17, 2019 and April 8, 2021, inclusive, at or near Vancouver Island, in theProvince of British Columbia, having been convicted of two offences under the Fisheries Act, and who on September 12, 2016 wasordered to comply with an order made under s. 79.2 of the Fisheries Act, not to be on board any fishing vessel, not to possess or acquireany interest, legal or equitable, absolute or contingent in any such vessel or licenses, and not to own or possess any fishing gear of anykind, did contravene the said order by possessing or acquiring an interest in a fishing vessel, to wit: the vessel RG VIII, therebycommitting an offence contrary to s. 79.6 (

a) of the Fisheries Act. [3] There were two other charges but the Crown has chosen not to proceed with them. THE ORDER [4] There is a Supreme Court of British Columbia order of Justice Thomson made on Monday the 12th day of September 2016. Theorder is that Scott Steer is forbidden from applying for any lease or licence under the Fisheries Act, not able to be on board any fishingvessel, not able to possess or acquire any interest, legal or equitable, absolute or contingent in any such vessel and not allowed to own orpossess any fishing gear of any kind. The full order is Exhibit One in these proceedings.

THE ISSUE [5] Has the Crown proven beyond a reasonable doubt that between January 17, 2019 and April 8, 2021 that the accused possessed oracquired an interest in the fishing vessel RG VIII? THE BURDEN OF PROOF AND STANDARD OF PROOF [6] The Crown has the primary or ‘legal’ burden of proof throughout the trial and must prove all the elements of the actus reus andmens rea. When the main issue is credibility, I am particularly aware of the dangers of shifting any burden onto an accused.

I instructmyself that at no time does an accused person have to prove or disprove anything. [7] The accused is presumed innocent until the Crown proves guilt to the standard “beyond a reasonable doubt.” This standard ofproof applies to the evidence as a whole, but generally not to individual facts. [8] The test for reasonable doubt, which must be applied in every case, was stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. W. (D.), (SCC), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742: First, if [I do] believe the evidence of the accused, obviously [I] must acquit. There is limited defence evidence.

The accused has a right not to take the stand and in this case he has exercised that right. However, hisspouse took the stand. If I conclude that she has provided credible and reliable evidence that the accused did not have any interest in thefishing vessel RG VIII, then I must acquit him of the charge. Second, if [I] do not believe the testimony of the accused’s witness but [I am] left in reasonable doubt by it, [I] must acquit. In other words, even if for some reason I do not believe the defence witness, I must still consider whether the evidence raises areasonable doubt.

Third, even if [I am] not left in doubt by the evidence of the defence witness, [I] must ask myself whether, on the basis of the evidencewhich [I] do accept, [I am] convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by that evidence of the guilt of the accused. [9] I recognize that I must consider a number of related but separate principles. An accused’s lack of credibility does not prove his orher guilt. I may accept some of an accused’s testimony while disbelieving other parts.

I must consider all of the evidence in decidingwhether there is any reasonable doubt, and any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favour of the accused. [10] It is not a question of who is telling the truth. That is, I mean to say, it is not a credibility contest where I must choose betweentwo versions or different theories of what took place. [11] If I believe certain aspects of a person’s testimony, I should ask myself why I believe them on these points. Equally, if I, for somereason, do not believe them, I should also ask myself why. As well, does the evidence make sense?

Even if I believe certain aspects of aperson’s testimony, I still must be satisfied that the evidence is cogent and logical. [12] In R. v. C.W.H., (BC CA), 68 C.C.C. (3d) 146 (B.C.C.A.), the late Mr. Justice Wood said of assessingcredibility: If after a careful consideration of all the evidence, you are unable to decide whom to believe, you must acquit.

[13] There can also be a reasonable doubt based on the absence of evidence or a simple failure of evidence to persuade the judgebeyond a reasonable doubt. [14] In R. v. Parent, 2000 BCPC 11 , I consider to be an excellent guiding authority with respect to credibility. In that case,the Honourable Judge Rounthwaite of the Provincial Court of British Columbia writes at paragraphs 4 and 5 of that decision: In assessing credibility, courts have recognized a number of factors as helpful.

These include: 1. the witness' ability to observe the events, record them in memory, recall and describe them accurately; 2. the external consistency of the evidence. Is the testimony consistent with other, independent evidence, which is accepted? 3. its internal consistency. Does the witness' evidence change during direct examination and cross-examination? 4. the existence of prior inconsistent statements or previous occasions on which the witness has been untruthful; 5. the "sense" of the evidence. When weighed with common sense, does it seem impossible or unlikely?

Or does it "make sense"? 6. motives to lie or mislead the court: bias, prejudice, or advantage. To consider the obvious possible motive of every accusedperson to avoid conviction would place an accused at an unfair disadvantage. Equally, it is not lost on me that the main defence witnessis the spouse of the accused. I am equally mindful that she is bound by her oath or affirmation, as all witnesses are and I do not assumebecause she is related to the accused, that she would for some reason not take her oath seriously.

As a result, I do not consider thatpossible motive when assessing an accused's testimony; 7. the attitude and demeanour of the witness. Are they evasive or forthcoming, belligerent, co-operative, defensive or neutral? Inassessing demeanour a judge should consider all possible explanations for the witness' attitude, and be sensitive to individual andcultural factors, which may affect demeanour. Because of the danger of misinterpreting demeanour, I would not rely on this factor alone. CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE [15] This case is one based on circumstantial evidence. Many cases are.

There is guidance, and there are cautions when I considercircumstantial evidence. [16] There is much case law on circumstantial evidence. But I find that the best authority is R. v. Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33 ,a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada. I duplicate the passages from paragraphs 37 to 43 that states: [37] When assessing circumstantial evidence, the trier of fact should consider “other plausible theor[ies]” and “other reasonablepossibilities” which are inconsistent with guilt: R. v. Comba, (ON CA), [1938] O.R. 200 (C.A.), at pp. 205 and 211, perMiddleton J.A., aff’d (SCC), [1938] S.C.R. 396; R. v.

Baigent, 2013 BCCA 28 , 335 B.C.A.C. 11, at para. 20; R.v. Mitchell, [2008] QCA 394 (AustLII), at para. 35. I agree with the appellant that the Crown thus may need to negative these reasonablepossibilities, but certainly does not need to “negative every possible conjecture, no matter how irrational or fanciful, which might beconsistent with the innocence of the accused”: R. v.

Bagshaw, (SCC), [1972] S.C.R. 2, at p. 8. “Other plausible theories”or “other reasonable possibilities” must be based on logic and experience applied to the evidence or the absence of evidence, not onspeculation. [38] Of course, the line between a “plausible theory” and “speculation” is not always easy to draw.

But the basic question is whetherthe circumstantial evidence viewed logically and in light of human experience, is reasonably capable of supporting an inference otherthan that the accused is guilty. [39] I have found two particularly useful statements of this principle. [40] The first is from an old Australian case, Martin v. Osborne, 55 C.L.R. 367, at p. 375: In the inculpation of an accused person the evidentiary circumstances must bear no other reasonable explanation.

This means that,according to the common course of human affairs, the degree of probability that the occurrence of the facts proved would beaccompanied by the occurrence of the fact to be proved is so high that the contrary cannot reasonably be supposed. [Emphasis added.] [41] While this language is not appropriate for a jury instruction, I find the idea expressed in this passage — that to justify aconviction, the circumstantial evidence, assessed in light of human experience, should be such that it excludes any other reasonablealternative — a helpful way of describing the line between plausible theories and speculation. [42] The second is from R. v.

Dipnarine, 2014 ABCA 328 , 584 A.R. 138, at paras. 22 and 24-25. The court stated that“[c]ircumstantial evidence does not have to totally exclude other conceivable inferences;” that the trier of fact should not act onalternative

interpretations of the circumstances that it considers to be unreasonable; and that alternative inferences must be reasonable,not just possible. [43] Where the line is to be drawn between speculation and reasonable inferences in a particular case cannot be described with greaterclarity than it is in these passages. [17] The proper approach to prosecutions that rely on circumstantial evidence has been summarized as follows in R. v. Butler, 2007BCCA 526 at paragraph 13, quoting from R. v. Cooper: It is enough if it is made plain to the members of the jury that before basing a verdict of guilty on circumstantial evidence they must be

satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the guilt of the accused is the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the proven facts. [ 18 ] Circumstantial evidence is considered cumulatively. As the learned authors of The Law of Evidence in Canada , 2nd Edition, Markham, LexisNexis, 1999, have stated. [ 19 ] Each piece of evidence need not alone lead to the conclusions sought to be proved. Pieces of evidence, each by itself insufficient, may however, when combined, justify the inference that the fact exists. [ 20 ] I understand that at no time does a person accused of an offence have to take the stand.

Even though this is a regulatory prosecution, that rule still applies. To take a different approach might shift the onus on the accused. However, I agree with the Crown’s submission that where the actus reus of the interest is established, then the accused should show that he has taken all reasonable steps to have avoided acquiring such an interest.

Equally, where the number of incriminating facts each established by proof on a balance of probabilities reaches a certain threshold standing together, then an inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt will become irresistible. [ 21 ] As Justice Irving and Justice Clement concurring expressed it in R. v. Jenkins , [1908] B.C.J.

No. 52 , a decision of the Full Court: It is true that a man is not called upon to explain suspicious things, but there comes a time when, circumstantial evidence having enveloped a man in a strong and cogent net-work of inculpatory facts, that man is bound to make some explanation or stand condemned. [ 22 ] This quotation and approach were endorsed by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in R. v. Dae , [2010] B.C.J.

No. 2136 , a case in which a conviction based on circumstantial evidence was upheld. [ 23 ] In Dae , Justice Prowse for the court stated: The trial judge was aware that he could only find knowledge on the part of Mr. Dae if it was the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence. In his view, the evidence called by the Crown in this case was sufficiently compelling to invoke the principle from R. v.

Jenkins . . . [ 24 ] As in all prosecutions built on circumstantial evidence, the case at bar requires the court to be mindful of the distinction that exists between inferences drawn from proven facts and mere conjecture or speculation. An inference capable of satisfying a trial judge beyond a reasonable doubt that an accused committed an offence must rest upon and be drawn from a foundation of proven facts. By parity of reasoning, an inference inconsistent with guilt that is capable of raising a reasonable doubt must also rest upon and be drawn from a foundation of proven facts.

The Crown’s Position [ 25 ] The Crown very ably argues that the goal of the prohibition is to keep Mr. Steer out of the fishery business all together. They argue that the circumstantial evidence is that he has connected himself to a fishing vessel, and thus it can be inferred through these connections that he has acquired an interest in the vessel. They argue there is no other logical reason or explanation that can be drawn when one examines his actions. The Defence Position [ 26 ] The Defence argues that the Crown has simply not met their burden.

They argue that the circumstantial evidence is not strong enough to convict Mr. Steer of the offence for which he is charged. THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENCE [ 27 ] Between January 17, 2019 and April 8, 2021 there must be a vessel. Since the name of the vessel is particularized in the information, the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the vessel name is the RG VIII . The vessel must be a fishing vessel so the Crown must also prove that it was a fishing vessel. The Crown must also prove that Scott Steer acquired an interest in this vessel, during this time period.

IS THERE A VESSEL? [ 28 ] The court has heard testimony that there is an aluminium fishing vessel named the RG VIII (Roman numeral ‘8’). [ 29 ] The vessel in question is depicted in photographs 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 under tab 2 of the Crown’s Book of Documents. Under tab 4 there are 49 other photographs of the vessel. [ 30 ] A video was played of this boat being put in the water at a boat ramp. I note that the identifier RG VIII is visible on the hull of the boat. [ 31 ] Exhibit 6 photo 5 depicts a boat with an identification number “C11748B”.

The Crown submits that this boat is the same boat as the one that was being put in the water, but they say the previously visible RG VIII has been taken off the hull, with what may have been some sort of grinder. [ 32 ] In photograph 11 there is another identifier etched into the side of the boat that is “13K93317”.

A witness has explained to the court that this is an old identifier, and that a new identifier with the letter “C” would be associated to the boat. [ 33 ] There is an affidavit provided under the Canada Evidence Act by the acting co-manager and strategic advisor for the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. It confirms that in 2018 in the ordinary and usual course of business, the Department of Fisheries creates, keeps, stores and maintains records related to the issuance of commercial fishing licenses.

The document confirms at its Appendix “A” that as of May 14, 2018 a Kyle Walter Williams with an internal identification number C11748BC is the registered owner of the vessel named the RG VIII .

[ 34 ] The court has seen pictures of the vessel RG VIII . Fisheries Officers have testified how they located the vessel. There is testimony and pictures proving that the vessel existed during the appropriate time frame. The court heard in detail how the pictures were taken, where the boat was being stored, and how it was seized by Fishery authorities. [ 35 ] I easily reach the conclusion that there was a vessel called the RG VIII . IS IT A FISHING VESSEL? [ 36 ] I believe it is important to consider this question.

As it is my view, that if this was a pure pleasure craft it may be the case that the accused would be allowed to be on it, or even own it. In other words, it appears clear to me that the original order pronounced by Justice Thompson on September 2016 is clear in its intention. It states that the accused may not acquire any interest in a fishing vessel. The charge also alleges that he was in possession or had acquired an interest in a fishing vessel.

This is how the charge is framed, therefore, it seems clear that the prohibition was intended to deal with vessels and commercial interests, versus someone who might just like to go boating every now and then. [ 37 ] Robert Brownhill testified that he was the wharfinger (an archaic term for a person who is the keeper of the wharf) in Campbell River. He is very familiar with both commercial and private vessels. He watched the video of the RG VIII being put into the water. He was asked questions about the vessel. He pointed out that the boat had a “commercial plate”.

He also commented that the boat number identification was five digits, which is how commercial vessels are identified. He said it was a boat that was used for commercial fishing. He noted that pleasure vessel’s use a six or seven digit identifier. [ 38 ] He said that the company Advance Marine that launched the boat mostly just launched “commercial stuff”. [ 39 ] I have some experience with boats. I own two. I have lived on four floating homes for many years and thus have been surrounded by commercial and non-commercial vessels for many years. My homes have been registered, and insured as vessels.

I have been on large and small commercial fishing vessels. Based on my laypersons understanding of boats, when I look at the pictures of the aluminium vessel RG VIII , it looks like a fishing vessel to me. However, I think it would be dangerous to apply my layperson knowledge to support this conclusion, and I prefer to rely on those with more professional expertise, such as Mr. Brownhill, who has made it his business to take charge of commercial and non-commercial vessels for the purpose of mooring them at a dock, in a harbour. Based on Mr.

Brownhill’s evidence, I am satisfied that the RG VIII is a fishing vessel. I also have other evidence that supports this conclusion. [ 40 ] Ryan Moulder is a Fisheries Officer that testified. He has been a Fisheries Officer for about seven years. Prior to that he was a commercial fisherman for nearly 10 years. He was able to say that based on his observations of the RG VIII , he is of the view that it was a fishing vessel. He noted a number of features and characteristics of the boat that led him to the conclusion that it was a commercial fishing vessel.

I do not need to list them all here, but based on his evidence alone, once more I am satisfied that the RG VIII is and has always been, a commercial fishing vessel. [ 41 ] In addition to the other evidence supporting the inference that that vessel is a fishing vessel, the affidavit provided by the Department of Fisheries mentioned above also confirms a number of points. It not only confirms that Kyle Williams is the owner, but it also confirms that Kyle Williams has a fish registration number, and that he is an Aboriginal person.

I see that his status as an Aboriginal is confirmed through his status card identification, which includes his band number. The affidavit also confirms that the RG VIII is attached to a number of fishing licenses that were issued during the time frame in question. [ 42 ] Independent of the above comments, it was immediately visible in the video that there was an identification plate on the back of the boat that said “Fisheries Canada”. [ 43 ] There is no doubt, and I find as a matter of fact that the RG VIII was a fishing vessel during the periods covered in the information.

DID THE ACCUSED ACQUIRE AN INTEREST IN THE RG VIII ? [ 44 ] The real issue that needs to be analyzed is whether the Crown has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Steer ‘acquired an interest’ in the RG VIII . [ 45 ] This is not a case where it is alleged that the accused bought this fishing vessel. If he did, he would have acquired it as an asset. If the vessel had even a minimal value, then he would have an interest in it. For example, for more of an extreme illustration, if it was gifted to him and it had a value of $500, it does not matter whether it was ever going to make him money as a fishing vessel.

The fact that he had a $500 interest in it would be enough to convict him of this charge. This is a useful point to remember, as there has been evidence that this fishing vessel sat tied up to a dock for 17 months and never went out, and therefore there is a strong suggestion that it did not create any income from fishing. In point of fact, contrary to Defence counsel’s submission in her closing argument, it is not a question of whether he profited from the vessel being used as a fishing vessel. It does not matter that it was not sold. It would be enough if he acquired any interest in it.

I also agree with Crown counsel’s submission that a contingency interest never needs to vest. THE DEFENCE ARGUMENT [ 46 ] In its simplest form, the defence argument is this. They argue that the Crown has not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused acquired any interest in the boat. They argue that he may have been present when the boat was launched.

However, they argue that there is no proof that he paid for the moorage or that he is the one that posted the ad on Facebook. [ 47 ] The Crown argues that if the court finds he paid for the moorage, was present when it was put in the water, and posted an ad to sell the boat, then these are parts of a larger circumstantial case upon which the court can determine or infer as a matter of fact that the accused must have had an interest in the boat, otherwise, why would he do these things? [ 48 ] The defence argues that documents prove the vessel is owned by someone else and that there has not been any connection

between the accused and the registered owner. There is documentary evidence in the trial that does favour the conclusion that the vessel is owned by a Kyle Williams. [ 49 ] At one point in time, the vessel was taken out of the water and placed in a storage facility which is located on land. Mr. Keller, the manager of the storage facility testified that when the vessel was dropped off, Ms. Steer, Mr. Steer and a person who he came to know as ‘Sammy’ were present. Ms. Steer had told him that nobody was to access the boat without her permission.

He recalled that she even specifically said ‘Even my husband’, apparently referring to Mr. Steer. At first, it struck me as strange that a spouse would specifically mention that her husband was not allowed to access the boat. There might be many reasons for this, I do not know. However, in any event, it appears that Ms. Steer had some degree of apparent control over the vessel. For example, she was able to contract with the storage unit manager, and create a condition that forbid others from being around the boat. This one observation favours the idea that Mr.

Steer may not have had an overwhelming possessory interest in the boat, at least while it was in storage. [ 50 ] Once more, the defence asks the court to acquit on the basis that the Crown has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused acquired or possessed any interest in this fishing vessel. [ 51 ] In deciphering what an ‘interest’ is, I am referring to all forms of interest, which include, but are not limited to, ownership of any sort, or any benefit. For example, a number of people might be entitled to a ‘shared use’ of an item or thing, in which case they would have an interest in that item.

The interest might not be able to be monetized, but it would have some sort of value. [ 52 ] To me, for our purposes, if a person has a legal right to use, possess, sell or otherwise give away a thing these are indicators of ownership. One can have an ownership interest in a tangible item such as personal property or even an intangible thing, such as some other benefit that flows from the tangible item.

For example, in this case, the accused might not actually own the fishing vessel, but he might have a benefit attached to it, such as a portion of fish caught by its owner, or he might be entitled to a portion of the proceeds of sale if the vessel was to be sold. THE CROWN ARGUMENT The Timeline [ 53 ] The Crown submits that it is not a coincidence that in January 2019 the accused is present when the boat is being launched, is at some point present where the boat is being stored, and after that years later that this boat is being advertised on the accused’s Facebook account.

At Boat Launch [ 54 ] It is true that being present when the boat is launched is not overly probative. After all, the wharfinger was present, and obviously he does not seem to have acquired an interest in the vessel. There were also at least one or two others present. Mere presence in and of itself is only one factor to consider. To be clear, I do find as a matter of fact that he was present when the boat was being launched. I was in a position to view the video and compare the image to Mr. Steer in court. It seemed clear to me that it was the same person.

The video shows the accused walking around the boat, as if to inspect it. This viewing was not fleeting in time, but took place over a number of minutes. However, I do not rely solely on my viewing of Mr. Steer. In fact, I do not put much weight on my observations at all. The simple reason is, I do not know the accused. Nor did I know him when the boat was being launched. Nor do I need to rely on my observations. [ 55 ] It is Mr. Brownhill’s evidence that convinces me that the accused, Mr. Steer, was in fact present that day. While the meeting was brief, hands were shook and introductions were made.

I will discuss this interaction later in these reasons. Other than being present, what did he do when the boat was put into the water? Moorage [ 56 ] The court heard reliable testimony that it was the accused who went into the marina office and made arrangements to pay the boat moorage. The evidence was that the accused introduced himself as Scott Steer, pulled out a credit card, and provided all the information required of him. I acknowledge that Ms. Steer testified that Mr. Steer was not present when the boat was being put in the water.

I will also discuss her evidence later in these reasons. [ 57 ] I appreciate the defence position is that maybe it was not Mr. Steer that was there. However, Mr. Brownhill, the wharfinger, said “Scott Steer shook my hand, identified himself by name, gave me his address, phone number and contact information.” The witness was able to remember, recount and explain in clear terms this interaction. [ 58 ] Are these the actions of someone who has nothing to do with a boat? I conclude that they are not. There is some connection, but what is the connection?

And does the connection establish that he had an interest in the vessel? It does not make sense that a stranger with no connection to a boat would make arrangements to pay the significant moorage fees on a monthly basis, for about 17 months. I might be mistaken, but the moorage rate per foot on the vessel calculated on a monthly basis is a significant amount of money. It may well be that there is some innocent explanation. Perhaps he was simply helping a friend out, or it was his way of repaying a debt that he owed to someone, like the owner.

However, I am not able to simply speculate and make things up, I can only consider the evidence provided to me in the court. Even Mr. Brownhill, who is very experienced in these matters testified that “typically the owner of the boat pays the moorage.” I accept it was Mr. Steer who paid the moorage. But I pause to indicate that, without making direct inferences, I do not know why.

While it may be that it is usually the owner that pays for moorage, I note that the technical owner of the boat was a not a witness in this trial. [ 59 ] However, equally, it might be unfair to consider the act of being present while the boat is being launched and paying for the boat moorage without considering the rest of the evidence. The Storage Facility

[ 60 ] At some point in time, it appears the boat left the dock, and was taken to a storage facility. The manager of the storage facility, Mr. Keller, has worked there for about 10 years. He had a very good memory of his interactions with Ms. Steer and the logistics of storing the boat. He provided many details as to why he remembered the interactions and conversations. His testimony was credible and reliable. [ 61 ] He recalled that the boat depicted in the video and photographs was a ‘pretty large aluminium fishing boat’ and that it had a large fisheries license plate attached to it.

Interestingly, except through defence oral evidence, discussed later in these reasons, there is no other documentary evidence of who owns the boat trailer. It may have been useful to learn through documentary evidence who owned and insured the trailer and who it was registered to. Melissa Steer Connection [ 62 ] Mr. Keller recalled how a woman named Melissa Steer had come in and arranged for the boat to be stored there.

He remembered she pointed to a person she was with, and told him that the person was her husband, ‘Scott’. [ 63 ] If this is true, now the accused is connected to his spouse who could be indirectly paying for the boat storage. As well, he is physically present, where the boat is being stored. [ 64 ] It is true that Mr. Keller said he never got close to the person who Ms. Steer identified as her husband. He also said he never saw that individual again. I find it would be unlikely for Ms. Steer to identify a person named Scott as her husband, unless it was really her husband.

I find as a matter of fact that it was the accused who was present on the day, as described by Mr. Keller. Once more, however, merely being present while a boat is being delivered, in and by itself, may mean very little. As well, perhaps being associated by marriage to the person perhaps now paying for the fishing vessel’s storage means very little.

These points are part of the larger constellation of circumstantial evidence that need to be considered in their totality. [ 65 ] On the topic of the accused being present at the storage facility on July 31, 2020, which I have found as a matter of fact, was he with Sammy Williams? I note that we began this trial with three charges. Count 2 and 3 alleged that on July 31, 2020 the accused was away from his residence contrary to a house arrest condition. It is further alleged that he was having contact with Sammy Williams. Certainly Mr.

Keller the storage facility manager remembers interactions with the person who was with the accused and Ms. Steer when the boat was dropped off. He was clear in his recollection. He remembered asking them both if they were okay to park the boat. He remembered why he asked them this. It was because he was an experienced truck driver and would have offered to park the boat to reduce the risk of accidental damage to other vehicles being stored there. [ 66 ] He also remembered in detail that the person named ‘Sammy’ that was first present at the boat delivery, had come back to the boat a number of times.

He was told that ‘Sammy’ had Ms. Steer’s permission each time. Sometimes Sammy worked on the boat or picked things up from it. On one occasion, Sammy was using a grinder to grind the name of the boat and the numerical identifiers off its aluminium hull. He noted that this was the one and only time that Sammy did not check in with him before working on the boat. It was usually expected that a person would check in with someone if they were visiting their stored items. [ 67 ] I note that at first blush, it might seem strange that a person is grinding off identifiers from the boat.

For example, it appears to be the case that the name RG VIII was viewable on the bow port and starboard side of the vessel we are dealing with that was removed. There may be nothing untoward about this act. Sometimes boats get renamed. There are other reasons that one might do something like this to a boat as well. Repairs and painting come to mind. [ 68 ] It does seem a bit odd to erase the boats identifiers. The registration numbers on boats are required when they are registered. The numbers often reflect whether they are a commercial vessel or a pleasure craft.

On the other hand, it would be too far of a speculative leap to make the finding that the act of destroying or eradicating the identifiers is solely consistent with some illegal activity. I do not have enough information to make this finding. [ 69 ] At no time did Mr. Keller check Sammy’s identification. Mr. Keller did not seem to know his last name. While he could describe his interactions, comment on Sammy’s friendly and polite disposition, based on Mr.

Keller’s evidence alone, I have no way to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that it was “Sammy Williams” who was present with the accused when the boat was being placed into the storage lot. I think it is pretty suspicious that someone named Sammy bears so many similarities to a person named Sammy Williams, but I believe the doubt I have, as small as it is, must be given to the accused.

I note for the sake of clarity there was no witness in this trial by the name of Sammy Williams. [ 70 ] It may not matter one way or the other, as at the end of the Crown’s case they entered a stay of proceedings on count 2 and 3. Making this decision is at the Crown’s sole discretion, and they do not need to provide reasons why they do not wish to proceed with these two charges. I expect Mr. Keller’s inability to be one hundred per cent certain that he was interacting with Mr. Scott Steer and Mr. Sammy Williams on July 31, 2020 might have played a role in this decision. Ad To Sell The Boat [ 71 ] Mr.

Ken Chow is employed with Fisheries and Oceans Canada as an intelligence analyst. He explained that a Fishery Officer Stephano contacted him to investigate a Facebook post associated with a display name “HALI H CKR”. [ 72 ] The Crown alleges that there is a Facebook post that shows a picture of the RG VIII for sale. They submit that it is on a Facebook page that belongs to the accused. They invite the court to infer that if the accused is selling the boat, then he must have an interest in that boat.

They ask the court to not consider this ad separately, but rather consider it cumulatively with the other circumstantial evidence such as the storage and moorage information considered above. [ 73 ] Mr. Chow was able to describe how there are descriptors that can help the court conclude that the Facebook ad is found on an account that belongs to the accused. For example, a person named ‘Scotty’ was receiving a number of “happy birthday wishes” on a particular day over the course of two years. The date the birthday greetings were made coincides with the birthdate of the accused. There

are other factors that assist me in the conclusion that the Facebook account that contained the ad for selling the RG VIII is somehow associated with the accused. It appears that he may have been the creator of the account, and thus, would have the ability to post items and comments on it. Certainly others thought they could communicate with Scott Steer directly by posting messages on it to him. [ 74 ] Mr. Chow explained that if a person had a password, then they could probably post things on their Facebook page. They need not be the creator of the page.

Summary of Findings at this Stage [ 75 ] If I were to assess the evidence at this stage, I am left with a number of pieces of circumstantial evidence. [ 76 ] The accused is present at the launching of the boat. He is the one who paid the moorage fees. He is present at the storage facility where the boat was being stored. He has a connection to his wife, Ms. Steer who is also present at the launching and at the storage facility. An ad to sell the boat appeared on a Facebook account closely associated to the accused.

I conclude that there are certainly significant connectors between the accused and the RG VIII . [ 77 ] In my view, the evidence, while circumstantial, supports the conclusion that the accused had a connection to the boat but it may not have been as an owner and I am not certain what interest if any he had in it. [ 78 ] If the accused did not have an interest in the vessel, do the actions of the accused make sense? The Crown argues that it does not make sense that he would pay for the moorage without having an interest in it.

This is a compelling argument, but one that needs to be considered in the context of all the evidence in this trial, including the evidence of the accused. I appreciate that in concluding that it was in fact the accused who paid the moorage, I am preferring Mr. Brownhill’s evidence over the witness Ms. Steer, which again will be discussed later in these reasons. Has the Crown proven the case beyond a reasonable doubt? [ 79 ] However, before concluding the analysis I must consider the W.D. test. Specifically, since the accused has provided evidence on his behalf, I must complete the evidentiary analysis.

As mentioned at the beginning of these reasons, as per the directions in W.D. First, if [I do] believe the evidence of the accused, obviously [I] must acquit. [ 80 ] There is limited defence evidence. The accused has a right not to take the stand and in this case he has exercised that right. However, his spouse took the stand. If I conclude that she has provided credible and reliable evidence that the accused did not have any interest in the fishing vessel RG VIII , then I must acquit him of the charge. [ 81 ] Ms. Steer is adamant that the accused has nothing to do with the boat.

She says she co-owns a company with Sammy Williams, that Kyle and/or Sammy Williams is the boat owner, and that she in her capacity as a company owner, has spent monies on the boat and that her role as company owner has nothing to do with her husband’s finances or interests. For reasons below, I question how credible and reliable Ms. Steer’s evidence is and I am not in a position to believe her testimony on this point. Second, if [I] do not believe the testimony of the accused witness, but [I am] left in reasonable doubt by it, [I] must acquit. [ 82 ] Ms.

Steer provides some testimony on other points in this case. She says the accused was not present when the boat was being launched. She says he was not present with her at the storage facility. She says it is she, not him, who posted the Facebook ads to sell the boat. It is open for me to accept some of her evidence. For example, her evidence might give me some doubt as to whether the accused was present at the time of the boat being launched.

If so, then this might mean that I should not rely on that piece of circumstantial evidence, or at least question the weight it is accorded in the overall assessment of guilt. Equally, I might fully accept her evidence that he was not present at the launching of the boat, but disbelieve her with respect to her testimony about the storage facility. [ 83 ] In other words, even if for some reason I do not believe the defence witness, I must still consider whether the evidence raises a reasonable doubt.

Third, even if [I am] not left in doubt by the evidence of the accused, [I] must ask myself whether, on the basis of the evidence which [I] do accept, [I am] convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by that evidence of the guilt of the accused. [ 84 ] As I mentioned, without the defence evidence, I believe there is enough circumstantial evidence to establish some connection between the accused to the RG VIII . EVIDENCE OF MS. STEER [ 85 ] Ms. Steer is the spouse of the accused. As the Crown contends in their closing submission, this factor in itself raises the possibility of bias.

She provided evidence about her dealings with a number of things. She provided evidence with respect to the Facebook account, the ad that was posted, the time when the boat was launched at the Campbell River marina, and the time when she arranged for the storage fees for the boat. [ 86 ] She says that she had nothing to do with the RG VIII , other than paying for the storage fees. She also testified that the boat trailer used to put the vessel in the water belonged to her, although as mentioned earlier in these reasons, no documentary evidence has been provided to the court to support this claim.

As well, she told the court that the trailer that the boat was stored on belonged to her. The evidence is unclear on this point, but it may be the case that the same trailer was used to put the boat in the water and to transport the boat to the storage. She explained that Sammy Williams and her have known each other for about 13 years and that they became co- directors of a company that went from being a numbered company to having the incorporated name Alaskan Moon in 2019. Ms. Steer explained how it was hoped the company would make money, but ‘at most it made around $17,000 net one year’.

It appears the company hoped to gain benefit from fishery licenses that Sammy Williams had access to.

The Nature of a Corporation [ 87 ] Corporate entities are not personal entities. [ 88 ] If an asset is sold, and the value attaches to the company, it is possible that owners of the company can benefit from the income. But it is too far of a stretch then to say, Company A sold a boat for $1,000, this income was split between the two owners, owner X and Y. And because X and Y are responsible for their household and family expenses, all those that are in their particular household gain a benefit or interest that is somehow attached to the original asset.

This is an issue that I asked the Crown to assist me with in their closing argument. I am thankful to their efforts in answering this case. As well, I am thankful to how well organized the case was and the amount of preparation by counsel. [ 89 ] The Crown very creatively points to the fact that if Mr. and Ms. Steer were to separate, and Ms. Steer owned a corporation, then the value of that corporation could be considered an asset under family law. I suppose there is an argument to be made that if Mr. Steer knew Ms.

Steer had a company, and that company had an interest in a fishing vessel, then maybe he should have taken more reasonable steps to ensure that if there was a separation, he would not gain benefit from that interest. A prenuptial agreement might be one step he could have taken. However, I am of the view that trying to attach a link from the vessel to Mr. Steer through a hypothetical family law action is too speculative of a leap for me. [ 90 ] Of course, sometimes the connection between the corporate entity and personal entity become so closely entwined that it is hard to tell them apart.

In order to pierce the corporate veil here, much more evidence would need to be considered. For our purposes there is no direct link between the corporate entity and the ownership of the boat. In other words, there is a boat. On paper it is owned by Kyle Williams. Ms. Steer says she was told that Sammy Williams also owned the boat. If it is true that Sammy Williams, as an individual, owned the boat, it does not necessarily follow that the company had an interest in the boat, just because Sammy Williams also happened to be an owner of the corporation.

In simple terms, individuals can own assets independent of corporations they might also own. Tracking the Money [ 91 ] If I were to believe Ms. Steer, the company made some money, but not a lot. She tells me that she was the bookkeeper and did a lot of the paperwork. She has explained how as a result of her corporate relationship with Sammy Williams as co-owners of the company, she took care of certain expenses. [ 92 ] Why did she pay the mechanics fees, which included putting the boat in the water? Who was really responsible for the moorage fees?

Why did she pay for a hotel for the two people who dropped off the boat? Was this a personal favour or do the corporate books show it as a business expense? It is obvious to me that the line between Ms. Steer’s personal finances and the corporate expenditures seems to be a bit blurred. However, I am not the one that audit’s her personal income tax or the corporation’s financial books. That is the job of Revenue Canada, and I will leave that decision with them. The Directing Mind of the Company [ 93 ] Ms. Steer says it was her company. She was never shaken on this concept. She said it “was my company”.

There was a truck that belonged to “my company”. I did the bookkeeping for “our company” (referring to her and Sammy Williams). [ 94 ] I noticed that in cross-examination I learned more about the “company”. In its original form it was Alaskan Moon Seafood , and the president of the company was the accused. In 2019 Ms. Steer said that she was the one that took over the company name and it became her company. Of course, two companies, involving many of the same individuals, same business purposes and type of transactions raises some red flags. [ 95 ] I acknowledge an obvious point. Ms.

Steer and the accused are married. They have eight children together and have been together for many years. The Alaskan Moon Seafood company was once a name used by Mr. Steer. Indeed, a Facebook account created by Mr. Steer proclaims that his title in 2010 was “president”. [ 96 ] It can be the case that in marriage, the union of two people creates the union of finances, both income and expenditures. However, in this case, Ms. Steer is clear that there are no joint accounts. She acknowledges that she is essentially the sole provider for the household.

Part of the reason seems to be that the accused is under ‘house arrest’ and not able to work. I do not know why the accused is under house arrest but I am told that it has nothing to do with this case. [ 97 ] I do not have enough information for me to conclude that the accused is really the directing mind of the corporate entity. Perhaps an audit and information from Sammy Williams might have been helpful, but I should not consider matters not in evidence, I simply make this comment. There is no evidence at all to support the conclusion that Mr. Steer ever told Ms.

Steer what to do with respect to the company or boat. I appreciate however, that the closeness of these people and their claims to be so distant in their dealings is very suspicious, to the point of being nearly far-fetched. [ 98 ] All in all Ms. Steer’s testimony, at first, seemed clear, consistent and concise. The court was told that the things that she did, such as pay the storage and moorage fee, was because Sammy Williams did not have a credit card and he asked her to do it.

I understood that she hoped to have these costs returned to her if the boat ever sold or made a profit from fishing. [ 99 ] There was one scenario put to her that created a glaring inconsistency. Present When Boat Launched [ 100 ] A video of a gold SUV was on the screen in the Campbell River marina parking lot. She confirmed it was her vehicle. She confirmed that she was at all times in the driver’s seat. She confirmed that nobody got into that vehicle with her and that nobody got into the driver’s seat of that vehicle.

[ 101 ] She was given an opportunity to say that she may be mistaken. She was adamant that she was not. [ 102 ] She viewed part of the video that showed a male figure in a dark coat walk up towards the vehicle. She was asked if she recognized the person. In fairness, to the audience watching the camera view, we only saw the back of the individual and would not be able to identify him. Her answer struck me as unusual. Rather than say ‘I could not tell you who that was’, she said “he was behind the vehicle so I don’t know”.

I immediately sensed she was being untruthful or misunderstood the question and the question was put back to her. She said she did not know who the person was, and added ‘maybe it was Sammy’. [ 103 ] It was suggested to her that the person was the accused, her husband. She gave a number of reasons why she was adamant that it was not. She said it could have been Sammy, she could not remember ‘if Sammy had been there that day’. [ 104 ] She was given an opportunity to say that she may be mistaken. She was adamant that she was not. [ 105 ] The individual opened the door and got into the driver’s seat. Ms.

Steer now changed her testimony and said it must have been ‘Sammy’. In doing so, she is admitting that she was not always in the driver’s seat, and that someone else actually did get into the driver’s seat. She is also at this point telling the court that Sammy was the one that got into the vehicle. [ 106 ] The Crown suggested again that it was Scott Steer, the accused and her husband, who opened the door and got in. Ms. Steer said “No. He was at home that day.

He did not come with me that day and that he was taking care of the children that day.” She explained how she remembered the day, the weather, and how she did not feel like going, but that she did anyways, and that she was alone. [ 107 ] She was given an opportunity to say that she may be mistaken. She was adamant that she was not. [ 108 ] A second video was shown to Ms. Steer. This video showed the Advance Marine boat company driving up with the RG VIII in tow. This took place the same day that Ms. Steer just said she was sitting in the gold coloured SUV. Ms.

Steer confirmed she was not immediately present when the boat landed in the parking lot, near the wharfinger’s office. In fact, at that point in time she said, ‘see that’s me driving in’, commenting on the gold SUV that we saw in the earlier footage. The vehicle went slightly off screen and a person identically dressed to the person that was seen entering the driver’s seat walked on screen. [ 109 ] Ms. Steer was asked, ‘do you know who this is?’ She said no.

She confirmed that even though she previously testified that this person who got in her vehicle earlier was ‘Sammy’, now it did not look like Sammy. [ 110 ] The video was paused and we could see the person, previously described as being the driver of the SUV, and previously described as the person known as ‘Sammy’. The person was mid-screen. Ms. Steer was asked, ‘Do you know who this is?’ She said, well the picture is a bit blurry, ‘I can’t tell’. In fairness, she was right. At that point of the pausing of the video, the image was from a bit of a distance and blurry.

It was suggested that it was her husband, and that he in fact was present at the marina with her on the day in question. She adamantly disagreed. [ 111 ] The Crown zoomed in on the person and the face was clearly recognizable. The Crown again suggested that the person was the accused. [ 112 ] Ms. Steer immediately agreed. She said her husband was not at home watching the kids. That the accused was actually with her that day. She confirmed that it was her husband that got into the driver’s seat of the vehicle, not ‘Sammy’. [ 113 ] This is a huge discrepancy.

The inconsistencies are glaring, problematic, and need to be addressed. Respectfully, I do not agree with Defence counsel’s submission that Ms. Steer eventually was truthful. [ 114 ] The real question is, do these inconsistent statements cause me enough concern to discard all parts of her testimony? The Crown argues that it does. Ms. Steer blatantly lied. She kept the lie alive until the video footage proved her wrong. I am not in charge of approving charges, nor is it my place to recommend whether charges should be laid or not. I would say that her testimony is consistent with a person who is in contempt.

Her testimony is consistent with a person who takes the stand and affirms to tell the truth and intentionally does not. [ 115 ] To put it another way, but for the video footage, Ms. Steer would have led the court to believe that Mr. Steer was at home watching the kids, never at the marina, not having anything to do with the boat being launched, never in the driver’s seat of the SUV and certainly not even in Campbell River with her that day. Obviously these are all untrue statements. Were they made to assist in an attempt to acquit her husband?

Or were they made to partially severe the tie that might exist between the boat and her husband? Or was there another reason? Perhaps I will never know. [ 116 ] I acknowledge that my comments are harsh, judgmental, and could one day be used against Ms. Steer if she were to provide evidence on her husband’s behalf at any future proceedings. I make this observation, which will not bind any other judges in other proceedings. Judges have a special talent when deciding credibility issues in their cases in a manner consistent with the evidence in those cases. In any event, I do wish to make this statement clear.

I conclude Ms. Steer intentionally lied while on the witness stand. [ 117 ] With respect to the accused being present when the boat was launched, I do not believe the initial testimony of Ms. Steer that the accused was not present. I accept her testimony from cross-examination that he was present. [ 118 ] On the topic of the boat launching. I do not accept Ms. Steer’s testimony that it was a person named Ryan who paid for the moorage. As mentioned earlier in these reasons, there is credible and reliable evidence from Mr. Brownhill that convince me that it was the accused who made those arrangements.

Certainly, I have doubts about Ms. Steer’s recollection or recounting of any of the events that took place at the marina on the day when the boat was launched. Her Claim that He has No Interest in the Vessel

[ 119 ] Even though I do not believe Ms. Steer’s account of events at the time of the boat launch, does her other evidence raise a reasonable doubt about whether the accused had an interest in the RG VIII ? She said he did not. She explained that it was not owned by the corporation. She explained who she thought the two owners were. She explained that she had nothing to do with the boat. In reality, her position is based on the information she knows. There is a world of possibility that Mr. Steer had some arrangement with Sammy or Kyle Williams.

A silent partnership, based on a handshake that if the boat sold, he would get a share of the sales. However, there is not enough evidence to come to this conclusion. I know nothing about the registered owner’s relationships, contractually or otherwise, that might exist with the accused. Once more, I note that neither of the two individuals said to be the boat owners were witnesses in this trial. [ 120 ] Ms. Steer explained to the court that in loaning her trailer to Sammy and Kyle Williams, she lost revenue. She acknowledged that monies were spent on mechanic bills, a hotel, and some storage fees.

I will go a step further and add that either she or the company paid moorage fees. Ms. Steer said that if the boat did sell, she had hoped that she and the company might get some sort of money reimbursing expenses or for what we could call a ‘trailer rental’. In fact, the boat was seized before it was sold. [ 121 ] I cannot simply take Ms. Steer’s word that her husband did not have an interest in the RG VIII . Ms. Steer’s credibility has been severely damaged by her dishonesty on the stand. I am still left to consider other pieces of the circumstantial case.

The Facebook Post to Sell Boat [ 122 ] With respect to the Facebook post there are two competing theories. The Crown contends that the accused had access to the account, and either put the ‘boat for sale’ ad up himself or asked Ms. Steer to do it. Ms. Steer says that at no time did that happen, but Sammy gave her the info, she then drafted the ad and placed it on Facebook. [ 123 ] She explained details about the account that only someone with access to it would know.

For example, she was able to identify why the account had such an unusual name, where the photos came from, and why there were identifiers of the creators of the account. [ 124 ] She described her actions, which seem fairly consistent with the evidence of the Fisheries Officer that made contact with the account holder. For example, she said she received some inquiries, that it took a few days for Sammy to get back to her, when he did he had just sent some pictures, which she in turn forwarded to the person making the inquiry. I have significant concerns over anything that Ms. Steer testified about.

However, her testimony with respect to interacting with individuals who responded to the ad is consistent with the officer’s testimony, which I do accept. [ 125 ] It is not a far-fetched idea that Ms. Steer put the ad up. She explained that she wanted the boat off her trailer, so she could rent the trailer out. She explained if the boat sold, she or her company might get some money. She explained her connection to the boat owner, and why she put the ad up. [ 126 ] I do not know which to believe, the theory of the Crown that it was the accused who is responsible for the ad being placed, or the evidence of Ms.

Steer on this point. I err on the side of believing that Ms. Steer put the ad up. I understand that in doing so, I am accepting a part of her testimony, even though her credibility is severely damaged by other parts of her testimony. However, the way she explained how the ad was created, put on different accounts and the way she responded to inquires seemed logical and made sense to me. I accept that Ms. Steer placed the ads on the Facebook account.

I note that even if she did this, and it was not the accused, I still must consider the whole of the evidence in order to determine whether the accused still at some point in time acquired an interest in the RG VIII . After all, it could be that Mr. and Ms. Steer both knew the ad was up, and perhaps they both hoped the vessel would sell.

CONCLUSION [ 127 ] When I consider the totality of the evidence and each piece of circumstantial evidence am I convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by that evidence of the guilt of the accused? [ 128 ] I am comfortable in concluding that there is a reasonable chance that the accused had acquired some interest in the vessel RG VIII . I would even say there is a good probability. There is certainly evidence that shows a connection. [ 129 ] I conclude he was present when it was put in the water. He arranged the moorage and his wife paid the mechanics expenses that was around $300 to $600.

It is probably not a coincidence that the ad to sell the boat was on a site that both the accused and his wife could access. [ 130 ] I am comfortable in concluding that if the boat sold, there is a chance that Ms. Steer or her company might get some sort of monies. As she was the sole provider that paid all the bills for the family home, no doubt Mr. Steer would indirectly benefit from the sale.

For example, if the money paid for rent, then obviously the accused is gaining a benefit that a portion of his rent was paid. [ 131 ] In the course of these proceedings, I have become familiar with a number of cases involving this accused. I think it is important for me to point out that I am aware of these published cases. [ 132 ] In R. v. Steer, 2013 BCPC 323 the Honourable Judge Gouge sentenced this accused on offences to do with being the master of a vessel. The court wrote “In my view, Mr.

Steer represents a threat to the health of the fishery, and should be prohibited from participating in it for an extended period of time.” He is described to have “deliberately infringed the rules in pursuit of his scheme to defraud the vessel owners and crew.” His conduct towards some of the parties in that case was described as “particularly shocking”. Mr. Steer is said to have cheated the vessel owners and crew members. He is described to have committed acts of “moral bankruptcy.” Judge Gouge concluded at paragraph 30 that “Shortly put, Mr.

Steer is a dishonest man, with no respect for the rights of others and no regard for the sustainability of the fishery.” The court wrote “I do not think that any sentence which I impose will have much effect on Mr. Steer’s rehabilitation … because he displayed such a shocking lack of conscience and human decency that I doubt he has any insight into his own behaviour.” [ 133 ] Significant penalties, including a prohibition from owning fishing vessels or even fishing gear of any kind was imposed.

[ 134 ] In R. v. Steer , 2016 BCSC 1641 , the Honourable Justice Sharma found the accused guilty of a number of charges. In that case the court determined that his account was not credible, implausible and inconceivable. When sentenced, Justice Sharma made these observations. Lengthy and significant bans and penalties were imposed and the court said: I hope you realize that if you continue to breach these court orders under the Fisheries Act, if you continue to, as I have found, treat those orders casually, you are going to be subjected to more serious, longer jail terms. I want you to think very hard about that.

I want you to think about what it will do to you and your family. … You do not want to find yourself in your 40s and 50s going in and out of jail. What will your kids do? What will your spouse do? [ 135 ] In R. v. Steer, 2021 BCSC 2404 , the Honourable Justice Edelmann sentenced Mr. Scott Steer for a number of offences under the Fisheries Act . In that case, the Crown submitted that Mr. Steer was “among the worst offenders”. Justice Edelmann confirmed that Mr. Steer has been warned several times about his conduct in relation to the fishery. The court commented that in that case “Mr.

Steer was subject to multiple court orders”, and “showed remarkable disregard for the safety of officers and other users of a busy commercial harbour.” The decision summarizes some other case histories involving Mr. Steer. [ 136 ] I point out that I am aware of these prior interactions with the justice system. I do so because I believe it is important for the public to know that trial judges do not operate in a vacuum. We may be aware of the history of some individuals that are before us.

We may be aware that other judges have concluded that those persons have character flaws, or otherwise have been dishonest or deceitful. [ 137 ] However, as I mentioned at the beginning of these reasons.

All people, no matter what their history, when charged with an offence, are innocent until the Crown proves beyond a reasonable doubt that they are guilty of the charges. [ 138 ] After considering the totality of the circumstantial evidence in this case, I conclude that the Crown has not proven beyond any reasonable doubt that this accused, in the course of his dealings with the vessel RG VIII acquired any particular, or quantifiable interest in the vessel. [ 139 ] I acquit the accused. _____________________________ The Honourable Judge A. Wolf Provincial Court of British Columbia