R. v. Walkus, 2020 BCPC 242

Citation: R. v. Walkus 2020 BCPC 242 Date: 20201218 File Nos: 17451-1 17329-B-2 17451-A-2 Registry: Port Hardy IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA REGINA v. DOROTHY HELENA WALKUS REASONS FOR SENTENCE OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE FLEWELLING Counsel for the Crown: W. Silliker Counsel for the Defendant: S. Runyon Place of Hearing: Port Hardy , B.C. Date of Hearing: September 9, 2020 Date of Judgment: December 18, 2020

Introduction: [ 1 ] On September 8, 2020, Ms. Walkus pleaded guilty to the following charges under the Criminal Code : • January 1 to 18, 2019: Possession of forged documents, contrary to s. 368 (1)(b); • June 28, 2019: Fail to report to a probation officer, contrary to s. 733.1; • November 26, 2019: Fail to attend court, contrary to s. 145 (2)(b). [ 2 ] Crown counsel seeks a global suspended sentence for all offences with probation, which is to include fourty hours of community work service. Upon completion of the work service hours, the probation order can be terminated.

Crown counsel is candid that the primary purpose of the condition for community work is punitive and to allow Ms. Walkus to gain insight into her offending, take responsibility for her crimes and pay back the community. [ 3 ] Defence counsel agrees that, in relation to the substantive offence of possession of forged documents, sentencing principles in addition to rehabilitation apply. As I understand the position, she agrees that a suspended sentence with probation is appropriate but she proposes a community work service order that can be crafted in such a way that will allow Ms.

Walkus to successfully complete those hours without the need for ongoing reporting to a probation officer, a condition which has been particularly challenging for Ms. Walkus. [ 4 ] Counsel for Ms. Walkus seeks an absolute discharge in relation to the two administrative offences of failing to report and attend court. Circumstances of the Offences: [ 5 ] I will deal first with Information 17451-1. Between January 1 and 18, 2019, a video recording at the Scotiabank ATM machine showed Ms. Walkus deposit eight envelopes and withdraw $100.00 cash each time. The envelopes were empty and Ms.

Walkus received a total of $800.00. It appears that Ms. Walkus was not the primary instigator in this offence, hence the plea to the lesser offence under s. 368. [ 6 ] The second offence - Information 17329-2-B - relates to breach of a probation order made by this Court on February 12, 2019. On that day, following a conviction for a theft under $5,000, a suspended sentence and probation for six months was imposed. The probation order included a condition that Ms. Walkus report to a probation officer on February 13, 2019, and, thereafter, as directed by the probation officer.

It also included a condition that she complete fourty community work service hours under the guidance of Ms. Sukow and Ada’Ka Restorative Justice. [ 7 ] I am advised that Ms. Walkus reported to her probation officer on February 13, 2019. Her probation officer directed Ms. Walkus to report every two weeks, which, I understand, she generally did. However, Ms. Walkus failed to report by telephone on June 28, 2019, as directed and was charged for a failure to comply with the reporting requirement. I am advised that Ms.

Walkus failed to complete the fourty community work service hours, although that charge was stayed during the sentencing hearing. [ 8 ] The last of the charges is set out in Information 17481-2-A. Ms. Walkus was required to appear in court on November 26, 2019, on the substantive offence – Information 17481-1. There had been a number of missed court appearances prior to that time and finally, on November 26, 2019, an unendorsed bench warrant was issued for her arrest and she was charged with the subject offence. [ 9 ] By way of further background, as a result of the unendorsed bench warrant, Ms.

Walkus was arrested on December 20, 2019. On December 23, 2019, she was released on a Release Order with a financial obligation in the amount of $2,000 (no deposit and no surety required) with a condition that she report to a bail supervisor. Ms. Walkus: [ 10 ] I reviewed a pre-sentence report prepared on June 20, 2016. Although quite dated, it provided some history and insight into Ms. Walkus’ personal circumstances. [ 11 ] She is a member of the Gwa-Sala-‘Nakwaxda’xw community and is thirty-seven years old. She gave birth to her first child when she was about seventeen years of age and has six children.

She dropped out of school in Grade 9 when she became pregnant but has obtained a variety of training certificates including her Small Vessel Operators Ticket and First Aid. She has been employed sporadically. [ 12 ] Her childhood was marked by trauma, neglect, abuse, poverty and instability. Both parents struggled with alcoholism. Ms. Walkus started drinking alcohol when she was nine years old and by the age of ten, was smoking cannabis. She struggles mightily with alcohol and recognizes this is related to her offending, and that involvement in the criminal justice system has negatively impacted her life.

Another significant impact was the removal of her children by the Ministry of Children and Family Development. [ 13 ] She has taken drug and alcohol counselling and it has been suggested that a program to address historical trauma will also assist her. [ 14 ] During the sentencing hearing, I heard from Ms. Salla Sukow, a respected member of the Gwa’Sala-‘Nakwaxda’xw nation. She has known Ms. Walkus all her life. She has seen substantial changes in Ms. Walkus during the past several months which she attributes to Ms. Walkus having a stable home for the first time in years and a supportive partner. Ms.

Walkus lives in a separate unit of her brother’s house and looks after his children and home while he is away performing his duties as a Guardian Watchman for the community or while away working on a commercial fishing boat. [ 15 ] Ms. Sukow says that Ms. Walkus is also helping her community by allowing her brother to protect the community’s valuable fisheries and, in addition, brings home food fish for them. Ms. Sukow said:

….(Ms. Walkus) is actually in a place in her life where I think she’s finally seeing the value in change and the value in moving forward every single day,… [ 16 ] Further evidence of her positive and improved circumstances is that Ms. Walkus now has daily access visits with two younger children and has her two eldest children living with her. Criminal Record: [ 17 ] Ms. Walkus’ criminal record reflects the challenges she has faced throughout her life. Those offences are related to her substance use, poverty and mental health issues.

Her substantive offences are enumerated below: • July 26, 2001 Break and Enter • January 1 2002 Break and Enter • January 10, 2002 Break and Enter • February 12, 2002 Break and Enter • February 12, 2002 Theft over $5,000 • May 30, 2003 Impaired operation of vehicle (over .08) • October 5, 2003 Operating motor vehicle while disqualified Theft $5,000 or under Theft $5,000 or under • January 4, 2004 Theft $5,000 or under Operations of motor vehicle while disqualified Care or control vehicle while impaired • March 19, 2009 Assault of a Peace Officer • May 3, 2014 Care/control of vehicle over .08 • September 4, 2014 Take/occupy vehicle or vessel w/o consent Mischief $5,000 or under Care/control of vehicle while impaired Mischief $5,000 or under Mischief $5,000 or under • September 12, 2018 Theft $5,000 or under [ 18 ] In addition, Ms.

Walkus has amassed twenty three convictions for breach of an undertaking or a probation order plus two convictions for being unlawfully at large contrary to s. 145 (1)(b): a total of twenty five convictions for offences against the administration of justice. [ 19 ] Since her first offence on July 26, 2001, to the present time, she has spent almost five years under supervision pursuant to conditions of probation or a conditional sentence order.

It may actually be more because in calculating that time, I have assumed that many of those orders were served concurrently, rather than consecutively. [ 20 ] Most recently, she has been under supervision with reporting requirements since February 12, 2019 - almost two years. Position of Counsel: Information 17451-1 – Possession of Forged Documents [ 21 ] Both counsel agree that a suspended sentence is appropriate. The disagreement relates to the conditions that should be imposed during the probationary period. [ 22 ] Crown counsel asks that I impose a condition that Ms.

Walkus complete fourty community work service hours to the satisfaction of her probation officer. This would require a condition that Ms. Walkus report to a probation officer and not to Ms. Sukow as suggested by counsel for Ms. Walkus. He emphasises that, although Ms. Sukow is a tremendous and valuable resource to the court, the Crown and the community, she is not an officer of the State and is not an employee of Community Corrections.

He raises concerns about the enforceability of such a probation order condition and says that to allow the court to enforce its own orders, supervision in this instance must be by the probation office, which would allow the sanction of a criminal charge for non-compliance.

Information 17329-2-B (Fail to Report) and 1748102-A (Fail to Attend Court) [ 23 ] In relation to the offences of failing to report and failing to attend court, crown counsel emphasizes that it is important for the court to uphold its own integrity and authority by indicating to an accused person that when a court order is breached, there will be actual sanctions. He asserts that Ms. Walkus has a significant record and, to paraphrase, is familiar with how the system works but, in spite of that, took those actions - not to appear in court or report to a probation officer. [ 24 ] In response, counsel for Ms.

Walkus characterizes the effect of these types of administrative court orders as perpetuating governmental control over Indigenous people: The Indigenous occupation of a lower social stratum is reinforced by the constant state surveillance resulting from reporting and residency requirements. These conditions, a routine component of administrative court orders, produce and perpetuate social distinction. They are the medium through which discriminatory animus continues to infiltrate our criminal justice system and that was not the intended effect of Gladue and Ipeelee . The Legal Framework:

[25] In the criminal justice system, a fit and just sentence must be informed by the objectives set out in the Criminal Code. Theoverarching purpose of those objectives is to reduce offending, enhance public safety and promote public confidence in theadministration of justice. [26] Those objectives are said to be achieved through deterrence, rehabilitation and, where necessary, separation of an offender fromthe community through incarceration. Probation Orders: [27] Probation is primarily a rehabilitative tool and, while it may have negative consequences, is not meant to be a form ofpunishment: R. v.

Proulx, 2000 SCC 5 , 2000 S.C.J. No. 6, para. 32 – 34. At least in theory, probation contributes to theprotection and safety of the public by assisting an offender to turn their lives around and become healthy, contributing members of thecommunity. [28] Turning the sections of the Criminal Code dealing with probation, Parliament enacted s. 731, which allows a court to impose aprobation order while being guided by a consideration of the age and character of the offender, the nature of the offence and thecircumstances surrounding the commission of the offence.

Under s. 732.1 (2) there are compulsory conditions that must be included in aprobation order but they are minimal: keep the peace and be of good behaviour, appear before the court when required to do so andnotify the court or the probation officer of changes of name, address, employment or occupation.

Very rarely does this court seeprobation orders that contain only these conditions. [29] Under s. 732.1 (3), the court may impose additional conditions including reporting to a probation officer, “no contact”conditions, geographic restrictions, community work service hours, abstention conditions, treatment programs (with the consent of theaccused), or any other reasonable conditions the court considers desirable for protecting society and for facilitating the offender’ssuccessful reintegration into the community. They are numerous.

Frequently, many of these optional conditions are added to probationorders without an analysis of the individual circumstances referred to in s. 731 as, for example, the need for a reporting condition or anabstention condition. [30] The British Columbia Court of Appeal recently considered the application of these provisions in R. v. Reimer, 2020 BCCA 102: [84] In R. v.

Shoker, 2006 SCC 44, the Court described the general scope allowed for probation conditions, saying: [13] Before discussing the issue that arises in this case, I wish to make a few general comments about the power to impose optionalconditions under s. 732.1(3). The residual power under s. 732.1(3)(

h) speaks of “other reasonable conditions” imposed “for protectingsociety and for facilitating the offender’s successful reintegration into the community”. Such language is instructive, not only in respectof conditions crafted under this residual power, but in respect of the optional conditions listed under s. 732.1(3): before a condition can beimposed, it must be “reasonable” in the circumstances and must be ordered for the purpose of protecting society and facilitating theparticular offender’s successful reintegration into the community.

Reasonable conditions will generally be linked to the particularoffence but need not be. What is required is a nexus between the offender, the protection of the community and his reintegration into thecommunity…. [14] The residual power to craft individualized conditions of probation is very broad. It constitutes an important sentencing tool. Thepurpose and principles of sentencing set out in ss. 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code make it clear that sentencing is an individualizedprocess that must take into account both the circumstances of the offence and of the offender.

It would be impossible for Parliament tospell out every possible condition of probation that can meet these sentence objectives. The sentencing judge is well placed to craftconditions that are tailored to the particular offender to assist in his rehabilitation and protect society. However, the residual power toimpose individualized conditions is not unlimited. [31] Probation, as in any sentence, must be individualized and this approach requires a consideration of the person’s ability to complywith conditions of probation.

A condition cannot be “reasonable in the circumstances” if the accused will not be able to comply with it.Nor can it be said that such a condition will facilitate a successful reintegration into the community. [32] Probation commonly includes a condition that a person report regularly to a probation officer. Typically, the frequency ofreporting is in the discretion of the probation officer, not the judge who imposed the condition. More recently, at least in my courtroom, Ihave observed that people are being required to report every two weeks.

This, and indeed even monthly reporting, can be an onerous taskfor many people with busy lives along with family, community and employment obligations. A reporting condition is even more difficultwhen the person required to regularly report struggles with homelessness, substance use disorder, mental health and/or cognitivechallenges and extreme poverty. [33] Charges and prosecutions for breaches of court orders have been increasing as have the numbers of people being held in pre-trialdetention due to compliance related offences: R. v. Zora, 2020 SCC 14, para 60 and 61.

These offences are frequently referred to asoffences against the administration of justice. As in this case, offences against the administration of justice typically do not involveviolence or direct harm to the public or a victim. [34] Zora is a recent case in which the Supreme Court of Canada considered the mental element, or mens rea, respecting breaches ofrelease (bail) orders. The Court recognized that all participants in the justice system have an obligation to release individuals on the leastonerous and restrictive conditions of bail.

The majority stated that this policy is reflected in the recent amendments to the releaseprovisions of the Criminal Code.

Furthermore, the court was clear that Parliament intended prosecutions for breach of bail conditions tobe a last resort and that bail review under ss. 520 (review brought by the accused) and 521 (bail review brought by the prosecutor), thejudicial referral mechanism pursuant to s. 523.1, or a bail revocation hearing under s. 524, are the pathways intended to address concernsabout release conditions, including compliance. [35] The judicial referral provisions can be triggered at the request of a prosecutor if there has been a failure to comply with a releaseorder or to attend court or a charge has been laid respecting either.

The court can assess a person’s risk factors, the appropriateness of the

conditions or the status of the person’s release. Under s. 523.1, the judge may take no action, may cancel a release document and make arelease order or may detain the person. After making a decision, the judge is required to dismiss any charges laid respecting non-compliance. [36] A breach of a probation order does not have the same legislative mechanism to invoke a judicial referral hearing under s. 523.1.However, a process under s. 732.2 (3) allows the offender, a probation officer or a prosecutor, to request and hold a hearing before ajudge to review the optional conditions in a probation order.

The court may change optional conditions that are advisable or desirabledue to a change in circumstances since the conditions were imposed, or may relieve the offender of compliance with optional conditions,or decrease the length of the probation order. In my view, this is similar to purpose of the judicial referral process for release orders,although the s. 523.1 hearing is commenced only upon the request of a prosecutor. The other difference is that the current wording of s.732.2 (3) (

a) imports a requirement for a change in circumstances to allow a court to make changes to the optional conditions in aprobation order. [37] While Zora is a case that deals with the bail system, the concern expressed by the court about the increasing charge, convictionand incarceration rates related to non-compliance offences generally applies, in my view, to the system of probation. In busy courtrooms,it is frequently very easy to add optional conditions without adequate consideration and inquiries regarding the need for an optionalcondition and the ability of the individual to comply with the condition.

Before optional conditions are proposed or imposed, meaningfulconsideration should be given to whether the condition is required to advance the person’s rehabilitation and reintegration into thecommunity and is one that can reasonably be complied with. [38] As with the bail process, there is a mechanism for review of a probation order that allows a court to assess the optionalconditions in the context of the circumstances of the offender -which can include difficulty with compliance - and to make any changesthat are required to advance the goals of a probation order.

Therefore, it may not be necessary to charge someone with a subsequentcriminal offence if concerns about non-compliance are addressed under the provisions of s. 732.2 (3). [39] At paragraph 57, the court in Zora recognized and discussed the fact that typical bail conditions have a disproportionally negativeimpact upon Indigenous people and other vulnerable marginalized people who struggle with substance use, poverty and mental healthchallenges: People with addictions, disabilities, or insecure housing may have criminal records with breach convictions in the double digits.Convictions for failure to comply offences can therefore lead to a vicious cycle where increasingly numerous and onerous conditions ofbail are imposed upon conviction, which will be harder to comply with, leading to the accused accumulating more breach charges, andever more restrictive conditions of bail or, eventually, pre-trial detention. [40] The same concerns apply in relation to conditions of probation.

Missing an appointment with a probation officer may result inadditional and new criminal charges leading to arrest, incarceration while awaiting a bail hearing and, if released, additional bailconditions that may be even more onerous. Ultimately, a conviction for breaching a reporting condition while on probation may wellresult in a jail sentence or an additional period of supervision under probation with more onerous conditions. [41] Breaches of probation orders have other significant consequences. Failure to comply with a probation order is an offence under s.733.1.

Crown may proceed by indictment or summarily, with a maximum penalty of four years or two years less a day respectively. [42] Individuals with a lengthy history of breaching probation orders may face more difficulty securing their release on bail and, ifgranted bail, or they plead guilty, will commonly face more of the same types of conditions, including a reporting requirement. This isthe proverbial “revolving door”. [43] With this framework and discussion in mind, I turn now to consider Ms.

Walkus’ position that she should be granted an absolutedischarge for failing to report to her probation officer on June 28, 2019 and for failing to attend court on November 26, 2019. The Test for a Discharge: [44] The common law test for granting a discharge was established in R. v.

Fallofield, (BC CA): • The discharge must be in the best interests of the accused; and • A discharge must not be contrary to the public interest. [45] This is reflected in the language of s. 730 (1) of the Criminal Code. [46] It is also clear that discharges are not restricted to a particular type of offence and are not limited to trivial or technical offences. Best Interests of the Accused: [47] The first branch of the test is usually very easy to establish. I accept that it is Ms. Walkus’ best interests that she not accrueadditional criminal charges.

Not Contrary to the Public Interest: [48] The second branch of this test is not always easy to articulate. In Fallofield, the only reference to what might be consideredcontrary to the public interest is contained at para. 21: [21]

(6) In the context of the second condition the public interest in the deterrence of others, while it must be given due weight, does notpreclude the judicious use of the discharge provisions. [49] The public interest should be construed broadly and not just focus on deterrence. Other factors in assessing what is contrary to

the public interest include the individual circumstances of the accused such as an Indigenous background, the nature of the offence, whether a discharge would undermine safety of the public, and the importance of upholding the principles and objectives of sentencing: R . v. J.S . , 2020 BCPC 213 , para. 50 . [ 50 ] Ms. Walkus has received a variety of sentences in the past for breaching probation orders: fines (ranging from $100 to $600), jail (ranging from one day to twenty-one days) and suspended sentences (with probation up to one year).

The last conviction for breach of a probation order related to an offence date of January 3, 2017, for which she received a fine of $250.00. [ 51 ] Likewise, Ms. Walkus has also received numerous sentences for breaching release conditions: conditional sentence orders of three months and jail (ranging from 1 day to 30 days). Although she is not charged with breach of a release order in the offences before me. I mention this to highlight the real consequences of administrative offences to Ms. Walkus and others in similar situations and backgrounds. [ 52 ] What all these convictions establish, is that Ms.

Walkus has longstanding significant difficulties complying with conditions that likely relate, at least in part, to reporting conditions.

This record must be placed in the context of a serious substance use problem overlaid with other significant challenges, including poverty and extreme past trauma, that have negatively impacted her ability to lead a healthy, normal life. [ 53 ] In these circumstances, is granting a discharge for a reporting breach and failure to attend court contrary to the public interest in general deterrence and confidence in the administration of justice? [ 54 ] In relation to the failing to report charge, I consider Ms. Walkus’ challenges managing her life, let alone reporting regularly to a probation officer and on time.

I have also taken into account her history as an Indigenous woman, which is inexorably tied to the underlying reasons for her offending. I also consider that she was reporting primarily for the purpose of completing community work service hours and not for the protection of the community from a violent offence. [ 55 ] I also believe that all justice participants must be aware of the challenges that many people have even carrying out basic activities of daily living and also that travelling to court is not easy. Many people do not have reliable transportation if they have it at all.

In this case, I reviewed the Record of Proceedings. The Information was sworn on April 15, 2019. Ms. Walkus appeared by agent on July 16, 2019 and appeared personally on August 20, 2019. Her case was adjourned to September 17, 2019 and she did not appear. Her case was adjourned again, this time to October 1, 2019 and she appeared personally.

After several more adjournments to other dates in the initial appearance court, including the one for which an unendorsed bench warrant was issued on November 26, 2019, nothing substantive was done until June 17, 2020 when an indicated guilty plea was recorded and the case was scheduled for plea and sentence. [ 56 ] Of course, at that time court operations had been drastically reduced due to the pandemic but I feel compelled to express my concern that too many people are being asked to attend too many court appearances during which nothing occurs but another adjournment.

I ask that we all think carefully about the need for and the timing of adjournments. Court appearances during which nothing is accomplished takes up court time, requires a judicial officer, court clerks, sheriffs and counsel to be in attendance and, perhaps most importantly, is a frustrating experience for people who are able to make their way to court in very challenging circumstances only to be told to come back again without the case being moved forward in a meaningful way. [ 57 ] In all the circumstances before me, I conclude that it is not contrary to the public interest to grant Ms.

Walkus an absolute discharge for the offence of failing to report to her probation officer. [ 58 ] In relation to the failing to appear in court charge, while I am sympathetic to Ms. Walkus’ circumstances and history, I have concluded that a discharge is contrary to the public interest. It is critical that individuals attend court to deal with charges. Ms. Walkus was given many opportunities to appear in court and, finally, the presiding judicial officer was left with no choice but to issue an unendorsed bench warrant for Ms. Walkus’ arrest.

I agree that, in all the circumstances, there should be some consequence. [ 59 ] However, the sentences I impose, must take into account the various factors and circumstances I have already summarized.

I agree that she is affected by all the Gladue factors that I must take into account in imposing a fit and just sentence. [ 60 ] In those circumstances relating to the offence of failing to appear in court, I impose a fine of $1.00. [ 61 ] Similarly, the sentence I impose for possession of forged documents between January 1 to January 18, 2019, reflects her history and her individual circumstances. [ 62 ] I agree that, as with conditions of bail, conditions of probation can disproportionately negatively impact Indigenous people and others similarly plagued by substance use, poverty, homelessness and mental health issues.

It can be difficult to complete community work service hours for someone in the active throes of addiction. I also recognize that it is difficult for such individuals to keep track of dates of next reporting appointments. Ms. Walkus’ conviction certainly history reflects that struggle. [ 63 ] The offences before the court do not involve violence. Ms. Walkus has been doing very well over the past year, has stable housing and is seeing her younger children regularly. She is contributing to her family and her community.

Supporting her progress is imperative because that is what will end her involvement with the criminal justice system. [ 64 ] Counsel agree that a suspended sentence is appropriate but disagree on the conditions as they relate to reporting and community work service hours. Crown counsel was candid in saying that the purpose of community work hours was intended to be punitive and to provide a mechanism to give her insight and give back to her community. [ 65 ] I accept that Ms.

Walkus has been providing valuable work for her brother, a single father, that is over and above the work for which she is financially compensated. Her brother is, at times, away overnight when he is fishing requiring Ms. Walkus to be a full time, 24-hour, caregiver for his three children aged eight, five and six. I accept that this work has been extensive, time consuming and far exceeds the $600.00 per month stipend she has received for childcare duties.

[ 66 ] Ms. Walkus told the court that she has been trying to get her life together over the past year and said for the first time she has a freezer full of food and her house is clean. She does have insight into her circumstances and the relationship between her substance use, criminal charges and convictions. [ 67 ] A sentence must be just. It must be fair. In these circumstances, a sentence ought not to place roadblocks in front of Ms. Walkus which could undermine her progress and I will not do so today.

I have also considered the principles of specific and general deterrence and conclude that the process of being charged criminally, subjected to arrest and responding to those charges is, in and of itself, a deterrent. [ 68 ] Furthermore, Ms. Walkus’ moral blameworthiness is attenuated by her background and the consequences of past trauma and substance use. [ 69 ] I am also mindful that Ms. Walkus’ longstanding struggles will not magically disappear and I expect there will be times when life is not going so well for her.

If she commits further criminal offences, she will end up back in the criminal justice system. I hope for her sake, that does not happen. [ 70 ] I impose a suspended sentence. There will be a period of probation. Taking into account Ms. Walkus’ age and circumstances, that the offence was not one of violence and that she was not the primary instigator, she will be placed on probation for three months with the statutory condition. [ 71 ] I decline to impose any additional conditions including community work service hours.

Conclusion: [ 72 ] On Information 17481-1, Count 3, possession of forged documents between January 1 to 18, 2019, the sentence is suspended and Ms. Walkus is subject to a period of probation for three months with conditions to keep the peace and be of good behaviour, to appear in court when required to do so and to notify the court or the probation officer in advance of any change of name, address, employment or occupation. [ 73 ] On Information 17329-1, Count 2, failing to report to a probation officer on June 28, 2019, I grant Ms.

Walkus an absolute discharge. [ 74 ] On Information 17451-A-2, Count 1, failing to attend court on November 26, 2019, the sentence a fine of $1.00. [ 75 ] The victim fine surcharge is waived on Information 17451-A-2 based on my conclusion that to impose one would cause substantial financial hardship to Ms. Walkus. _____________________________ The Honourable Judge B. Flewelling Provincial Court of British Columbia