2022 NBCA 47, 2022 NBCA 47

COURT OF APPEAL OF COUR D’APPEL DU NEW BRUNSWICK NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK 135-21-CA ROBERT TOUCHIE APPELLANT ROBERT TOUCHIE APPELANT - and - - et - MICHAEL TOUCHIE, EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF MARILYN CAROL HIRTLE, DECEASED RESPONDENT MICHAEL TOUCHIE, EXÉCUTEUR DE LA SUCCESSION DE FEUE MARILYN CAROL HIRTLE INTIMÉ Touchie v. Touchie, Executor of the Estate of Marilyn Carol Hirtle, Deceased, 2022 NBCA 47 CORAM: The Honourable Justice Quigg The Honourable Justice French The Honourable Justice LeBlond Touchie c.

Touchie, exécuteur de la succession de feue Marilyn Carol Hirtle, 2022 NBCA 47 CORAM : l’honorable juge Quigg l’honorable juge French l’honorable juge LeBlond Appeal from a decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench: November 29, 2021 Appel d’une décision de la Cour du Banc de la Reine : le 29 novembre 2021 History of Case: Historique de la cause : Decision under appeal: 2021 NBQB 250 Décision frappée d’appel : 2021 NBBR 250 Preliminary or incidental proceedings: None Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires : aucune Appeal heard: May 26, 2022 Appel entendu : le 26 mai 2022 Judgment rendered: August 25, 2022 Jugement rendu : le 25 août 2022

Reasons for judgment: The Honourable Justice LeBlond Concurred in by: The Honourable Justice Quigg The Honourable Justice French Counsel at hearing: For the appellant: David H. Dunsmuir For the respondent: No one appeared Motifs de jugement : l’honorable juge LeBlond Souscrivent aux motifs : l’honorable juge Quigg l’honorable juge French Avocats à l’audience : Pour l’appelant : David H. Dunsmuir Pour l’intimé : personne n’a comparu THE COURT The appeal is allowed in part and the order of the probate judge is varied as indicated. The remainder of the appeal is otherwise dismissed without costs. LA COUR L’appel est accueilli en

partie et l’ordonnance de la juge de la Cour des successions est modifiée comme il est indiqué. Le reste de l’appel est par ailleurs rejeté sans dépens. The judgment of the Court was delivered by LEBLOND, J.A. I. Introduction [ 1 ] This appeal concerns a decision of a judge of the Probate Court wherein she ordered payment of two thirds of solicitor-client costs incurred for a passing of accounts against the appellant, Robert Touchie, one of the beneficiaries of the estate of Marilyn Carol Hirtle. The probate judge made the order because she found Mr.

Touchie’s conduct to be reprehensible during the executor’s administration of the estate which needlessly forced him to pass accounts. The judge ordered payment of these costs be deducted from Robert Touchie’s share of the distribution of the estate. [ 2 ] The grounds raised on appeal were initially limited to the costs award. As a result, pursuant to Rule 62.03(1) (

b) of the Rules of Court , Mr. Touchie required leave to appeal in this circumstance and did not obtain it. His counsel argued that, because the probate judge exceeded her jurisdiction in making this award, she committed an error of law and, as a result, the appeal could proceed as of right without leave. [ 3 ] As this preliminary matter was being argued before us, it became apparent the probate judge’s order contained errors in the calculation of the funds to be distributed. As a result, counsel was granted leave to amend the Notice of Appeal to raise these errors, which therefore permitted the appeal to proceed on all issues as of right.

[ 4 ] An award of solicitor-client costs, assuming that option was open to the probate judge in this case, requires an exercise of discretion which depends largely upon the conduct of the parties. As a result, the history of the case must be closely examined to determine if that discretion was properly exercised and whether appellate intervention is warranted. [ 5 ] For the reasons that follow, I would allow the appeal in part to correct the clerical errors. I would otherwise dismiss the other grounds of appeal.

Because some of the parties or others involved in this matter bear the same last name, I will at times refer to them by only their first name. In doing so, I mean no disrespect. II. Factual Context [ 6 ] A great deal of animosity prevailed throughout the administration of the estate between Robert Touchie and his brother Dr. Michael Touchie, the estate’s executor named in Mrs. Hirtle’s Last Will and Testament. Although the source of the conflict is not entirely clear from the record, Robert seems to have disagreed with the fulfillment of Mrs.

Hirtle’s funeral arrangements. [ 7 ] Michael Touchie practices medicine in Ottawa and is affiliated with the Ottawa Hospital. He conducted most of the administration of his mother’s estate from Ottawa, although he travelled to New Brunswick on a few occasions to deal with certain matters. Michael, Robert and another brother, John, were the children of Marilyn Hirtle from her first marriage. After her marriage ended, she married her second husband, who had two sons from a previous marriage, Stephen and Scott Hirtle.

As will be seen, John, Stephen and Scott had no issues whatsoever with Michael’s administration of Mrs. Hirtle’s estate and were highly complimentary of his efforts to bring matters to a close. Regrettably, Robert had his own view of the matter and chose to conduct himself in a manner which the probate judge determined was needlessly obstructive and, in the end, one which would be very costly. [ 8 ] The record discloses the estate was relatively straightforward. Its estimated value was approximately $500,000. Mrs.

Hirtle’s last will made specific bequests to Robert, which consisted of her car, the proceeds from her group life insurance through the New Brunswick Teachers’ Federation, and all of the funds contained in a tax-free savings account (TFSA) held at the Bank of Nova Scotia. The car had a value of approximately $8,000, the TFSA account totalled approximately $57,000, and the life insurance proceeds were $15,000.

None of the other beneficiaries received specific bequests and all of them, including Robert, were to equally share in the residue of the estate after payment of all expenses and taxes, including Michael’s executor’s fees, which the will set at $10,000. Mrs. Hirtle passed away on March 26, 2019. The car was transferred to Robert on May 2, 2019, he received the TSFA funds on May 3, 2019, and the life insurance proceeds shortly after May 8, 2019.

Clearly, notwithstanding his protestations, Robert received his bequests in a timely manner. [ 9 ] A close review of the exchanges between Robert and Michael, or through their counsel, is required to determine if the judge properly exercised her discretion. The first relevant piece of communication between Michael and Robert was an email sent by Michael on March 24, 2019, two days before Mrs. Hirtle passed away, advising Robert that her apartment had been cleaned out and a number of personal items would be sent to Robert with a request that he make arrangements to pick up the larger ones.

The email is written in a friendly tone and asks Robert to advise of his preference for delivery and pickup. Michael clearly anticipated issues with Robert as he suggested Robert communicate his preferences to John if he preferred not to deal with him directly. He assured Robert he would not get in his way and would respect his wishes if he preferred not to speak to him. [ 10 ] Rather than accepting the olive branch extended to him, Robert adopted a confrontational approach in his email reply to Michael on March 25, 2019.

He wrote: “I’m not interested in receiving the scraps leftover from non family members picking through mom’s belongings like scavengers.” That would set the stage for the following events. He followed up with another harsh email to Michael, inquiring about items he had just indicated were of no interest to him. Since Michael did not immediately respond, later that day, Robert emailed him again threatening to hire a lawyer if his questions were not answered.

In an email sent the next day, Robert warned Michael by writing, “Don’t push it.” [ 11 ] On March 26, Michael emailed a lawyer in Saint John with whom he had previously dealt. He stated having just read Robert’s three harsh emails and asked for a recommendation for an estate litigation counsel as he anticipated trouble. This led to the retainer of solicitor Michael McCluskey. [ 12 ] On March 27, John advised Robert by email that, if he were in Michael’s situation, he would only deal with Robert through legal counsel given the tone of his communications.

[ 13 ] On April 5, at 11:18 p.m., Robert emailed Michael asking for a copy of Mrs. Hirtle’s will and the name of the lawyer who had done the last update. He alleged he was not being kept informed. [ 14 ] With the assistance of Mr. McCluskey, Letters Probate were issued to Michael on April 15, 2019. [ 15 ] On April 17, Mr. McCluskey issued his first account to Michael for his services. It totalled $3,500 plus HST for all the work done, including preparing the application for letters probate and the order, and securing the application through court attendance. [ 16 ] On April 24, Robert emailed Mr.

McCluskey and accused him of “attempting to obstruct the transfer of the car and to make the transfer as difficult and as onerous as you possibly can.” Nothing in the record supports this accusation. Robert incessantly contacted Mr. McCluskey’s office and was advised to retain counsel if he had any concerns. He retained solicitor John Henderson. On May 15, Mr. Henderson provided Robert with the documents he had requested. [ 17 ] On May 17, at 5:31 a.m., Robert again emailed Mr.

McCluskey directly, writing, “It appears you have been hired by the executor to make my family’s dealings in the matter of my mother’s estate difficult and onerous for my family. You’ve succeeded in that effort and we have evidence of that.” Again, nothing in the record supports this accusation. He then threatened to file a complaint against Mr. McCluskey with the Law Society. [ 18 ] On May 17, at 11:33 a.m., Mr. McCluskey wrote to Mr.

Henderson attaching a copy of Robert’s latest email to him and confirmed he had advised Robert not to contact his office under any circumstances and he would not deal with him directly. He also advised he had taken steps to block Robert’s email address and all communications should be directed through Mr. Henderson’s office. Two hours later, Mr. Henderson responded to Mr. McCluskey by acknowledging receipt with thanks. [ 19 ] On May 29, 2019, Mr. McCluskey issued his second account, for $1,833 plus HST.

It covered the time spent responding to Robert’s numerous calls, the work done to transfer the car, and other sundry matters leading up to his notification for Robert not to contact his office anymore. [ 20 ] One of Michael’s biggest challenges as executor was obtaining the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) clearance certificate for his mother’s estate. The delays for issuance of the certificate became particularly lengthy in 2020 because of the COVID- 19 pandemic. On December 1, 2019, Michael provided a full update of his administration to all five beneficiaries.

He expressed his intention to release the amount of $10,000 to each of them in December as a preliminary distribution with the remainder to be paid once the taxes were settled and all expenses paid, which he hoped would occur by the late spring or early summer of 2020. In anticipation of this proposed course of action, he asked each beneficiary to confirm: 1. That they were not disputing his authority as executor to proceed with this plan; 2. That the amounts shown on the reconciliation of accounts he had provided were reasonable; and 3.

That the addresses he had for each of them were still valid. [ 21 ] John, Stephen and Scott all immediately replied to Michael to confirm and expressed their appreciation for all the work he had done. On December 23, 2019, Robert sent Michael an email at 6:20 a.m. advising the latter’s email report of December 1st had made its way into his junk mailbox and he was only reading it now. Michael had used the address he had always used. Robert asked why money was being distributed now and whether any money had been released without his approval.

He wanted better particulars of Michael’s administration including “a better understanding of the status and facts before commenting.” He did not answer any of Michael’s three questions. [ 22 ] While Michael continued to wait for the CRA clearance certificate, Robert emailed him again on June 9, 2020,

to follow up on his inquiries. On August 28 of that year, Michael confirmed by email to Mr. McCluskey that he had finally heard back from the CRA and now knew the tax balances owing for his mother’s personal account and the estate account. He asked Mr. McCluskey to issue his final account so he could proceed with the final distribution. That account was issued on September 4 for $697.50 plus HST. Mr.

McCluskey advised that, if Michael wanted him to prepare final releases for distribution, his fee for this service would be a further $800 plus HST. [ 23 ] On September 5 th , at 2:43 p.m., Robert emailed Michael to advise he had retained a new solicitor and accused Michael of “acting illegally.” He wrote: In short, you are attempting to be punitive for whatever reason to myself and my family. […] I will let you know that I will be in touch with the governing CMA [Canadian Medical Association] if this nonsense does not stop immediately-over what I perceive as ethics issues related to civility that are covered in your code of ethics as a physician. […] You have been anything but civil.

In fact, incivility has reigned. And if this behaviour and treatment continues in the matter of mother’s estate, I will be pursuing discussion with the CMA aggressively. There is nothing in the record to indicate what could have prompted this tirade. [ 24 ] Later that day, at 3:25 p.m., Robert issued another missive to Michael, this time threatening to copy his complaint to the Canadian Medical Association, the 26 members of the Ottawa Hospital’s leadership team, and the 21 members of its Board of Governors. [ 25 ] On October 20, William Walker, Robert’s third lawyer on record, advised Mr.

McCluskey he was now representing Robert. He asked for an update on the administration of the estate. Mr. McCluskey directed him to Michael as he was no longer retained, having issued his final account the previous month. [ 26 ] On December 10, Mr. Walker emailed Michael advising that Robert was concerned he had not been informed of the progress of Michael’s administration and asked for an interim report and accounting. He confirmed his instructions from Robert were to hold Michael to “scrupulous management.” [ 27 ] On January 4, 2021, Michael reported to all beneficiaries.

He reprised his earlier report with updated information including the tax situation. The email contains a handwritten marginal note indicating the tax returns had been prepared by a professional accountant at no charge. Michael reported that, although he had intended a complete payout of the distribution in the late spring or early summer of 2020, COVID restrictions had prevented it. In fact, he still did not have the final CRA clearance certificate but, as soon as it arrived, he would have Mr. McCluskey send releases to the beneficiaries to be signed in exchange for each payout.

He confirmed the balance of the estate account stood at that time at $359,126.58, less the executor’s fees and the legal costs incurred for the preparation of the releases. He estimated each net share at $75,665.40 less any advances paid in December 2019. He concluded by stating he was trying to keep legal fees to a minimum to maximize the distribution. He asked that each beneficiary respond to the three questions he had raised prior to the December 2019 distribution. Again, John, Stephen and Scott replied in the affirmative, but Robert did not respond. [ 28 ] It was not until February 9, 2021, that Mr.

Walker advised Mr. McCluskey the accounting details provided by Michael in his last report were insufficient and, until he received better particulars, he could not advise Robert to confirm the three questions. He states he advised Robert of his right to have accounts passed but hoped that would not be necessary. He also advised Robert wanted his share of the early distribution. After receiving this email, Mr. McCluskey advised Michael he needed to retain counsel with more experience in estate litigation. On March 10, Mr. Jack Blackier, of Cox & Palmer, informed Mr. Walker he had been retained.

He attached a full accounting of Michael’s administration and confirmed three of the five beneficiaries (Stephen, Scott and Michael) had received the $10,000 payment in December 2019. John had postponed this payment pending arrangements he was making to have the funds deposited in his account in Australia. Mr. Blackier advised he could send Robert his $10,000 payment in exchange for an interim release from him.

Finally, he confirmed Michael was still awaiting receipt of the final CRA clearance certificate, and he expressed the hope that a formal passing of accounts would not become necessary. [ 29 ] On March 22, Mr. Walker emailed Mr. Blackier to advise Robert was in the process of reviewing the information and the $10,000 cheque should be sent to his attention with the interim release. Mr. Blackier forwarded the interim release to Mr. Walker by email and advised that, as soon as he received the signed release, he would forward the cheque.

Unfortunately, the interim release inadvertently reflected the amount of Robert’s full distribution as opposed to the $10,000, and this was later corrected.

[ 30 ] On April 13, 2021, Mr. Blackier issued his first account to Michael for $3,200 plus HST, which reflected his work in reviewing all documentation to date and his preliminary dealings with Mr. Walker. [ 31 ] By April 14, not having heard from Mr. Walker, Mr. Blackier emailed him to ask for Robert’s response. He advised, if a response was not forthcoming, he would have to proceed with a formal passing of accounts, which he considered entirely unnecessary as Robert had all the information he needed.

He noted, if formal passing of accounts had to occur, he would argue the cost associated with that should come from Robert’s share as all other beneficiaries were consenting to the proposed distribution. [ 32 ] On May 4, Mr. Blackier confirmed to Mr. Walker the CRA had finally provided the clearance certificate, and his client could now make the final distribution and Robert’s $10,000 payment. [ 33 ] The same day, Mr. Walker emailed Mr. Blackier to advise Robert had changed his mind and preferred to postpone payment of his interim $10,000 advance and take his entire share in one payment.

He further confirmed the draft release for the full distribution was acceptable and stated he was aiming for completion by May 25, failing which he indicated Michael would need to proceed with the formal passing of accounts. Later that day, Mr. Blackier emailed Mr. Walker and attached the following: 1. Confirmation of the funds available for distribution; 2. A distribution

schedule showing the names of the beneficiaries and the amounts paid/owing to each; 2. A consent and approval form of the estate’s accounts to be signed by each beneficiary; and 4. Final releases [ 34 ] Mr. Blackier confirmed that upon receipt of the signed documents, he would send each beneficiary a cheque for $74,705.40. Through a simple clerical error, the distribution

schedule showed Robert as having already received the $10,000 advance. That amount should have been entered under Stephen’s name, as the

schedule showed he had not received his advance when, in fact, he had. Unfortunately, that error was not corrected before the

schedule became part of the probate judge’s order, hence the error of fact which became the new ground of appeal as noted above. [ 35 ] By May 6, Mr. Blackier had still not heard from Mr. Walker, and he emailed him that day proposing a hard deadline to finalize matters by 12 noon on May 14, 2021. [ 36 ] Later on May 6, Mr. Walker emailed Mr. Blackier to advise that Robert agreed the estate’s distribution needed to be settled. He advised he would send Robert’s signed release provided he received Robert’s cheque in the amount of $74,705.40 by May 28. Mr.

Blackier immediately confirmed he had requested the cheque and would await Robert’s release. Evidently, both counsel forgot to address their minds to the $10,000 early advance which Robert had not received. The record discloses the cheque from the estate in the amount of $74,705.40 drawn on its Bank of Nova Scotia account payable to Robert was prepared May 14, 2021. What should have been a simple transaction to conclude became mired in finger pointing and a complete absence of cooperation and common sense. [ 37 ] On May 11, 2021, Mr. Walker emailed Mr. Blackier to advise he and Robert would attend at Mr.

Blackier’s office before the deadline to provide Robert’s release in exchange for his cheque. Otherwise, the matter would need to proceed to a passing of accounts. He confirmed Robert had signed the release. Later that day, Mr. Blackier replied scheduling issues might prevent the exchange by May 14 and, in that case, he suggested closing on May 18th. [ 38 ] On May 13, at 8:29 a.m., Mr. Blackier emailed Mr. Walker to confirm he had Robert’s cheque for delivery to him. However, his plans had changed, and he would no longer be available on the 14th or the 17th. He proposed two options:

1. Mr. Walker could send him the release and he would send him the cheque; or 2. Mr. Walker could meet Mr. Blackier at his office on the 18th for the exchange. [ 39 ] A flurry of emails followed that day. At 11:08 a.m., Mr. Walker advised his client had selected option two, but he now wanted his cheque certified or drawn on Cox & Palmer’s trust account. [ 40 ] At 11:32 a.m., Mr. Blackier emailed Mr. Walker to complain there had never been a request for a certified cheque before. Cox & Palmer did not have any funds in trust to pay Robert, and he would have to seek further instructions. [ 41 ] At 12:13 p.m., Mr.

Walker emailed Mr. Blackier stating his earlier email had requested payment in “cash equivalent” which in his view meant a certified cheque or bank draft or, alternatively, a trust cheque from the firm. He suggested Mr. Blackier get the executor to have a bank draft sent to Cox & Palmer by May 18th. [ 42 ] At 12:25 p.m., Mr. Blackier confirmed to Mr. Walker he had asked for the bank draft to be deposited in his firm’s trust account. [ 43 ] On May 17, at 11:37 a.m., Mr. Blackier emailed Mr.

Walker to advise he expected to have the trust cheque payable to Robert on May 18, which he would exchange for his signed release and signed approval form for the estate’s accounts and that, if this were not acceptable, there would be no closing and his client would proceed with the formal passing of accounts and request all costs associated with the process be paid from Robert’s share. [ 44 ] At 12:36 p.m., Robert sent an email to Mr. Blackier, with a copy to Mr. Walker, inexplicably confirming his instructions to Mr. Walker to proceed with the passing of accounts. Mr.

Blackier responded at 12:50 p.m. that he would do that. However, at 1:12 p.m., Mr. Blackier emailed Mr. Walker to confirm he had $74,705.40 in his firm’s trust account and was again prepared to close. [ 45 ] Robert’s next email to Mr. Blackier, with a copy to Mr. Walker, was sent at 1:46 p.m. He wrote: “Your message this morning was demanding and unreasonable” without any explanation. He went on: “To hear you make demands of what is expected in that first message is not reasonable.” He then gave his ultimatum. He told Mr.

Blackier to provide a certified cheque, which would need to be verified by his banker as legitimate. He wrote: “Once that is done, you can have my signature. […] There is a trust issue here and [your] communications here today, less than 24 hours before the sign-off, only heightens my concerns.” [ 46 ] Later that day, at 1:52 p.m., Mr. Blackier confirmed to Robert and his counsel the funds were in his trust account. He wrote: “I am not preparing a certified cheque […], the funds in our trust were paid by way of a bank draft […] that’s as good as a certified cheque.

Your concerns should now be fully satisfied.” [ 47 ] Robert replied to Mr. Blackier at 2:19 p.m., saying his earlier email said the funds were not in his trust account and now they were. That “raises flags. […] Given my past experiences, it creates serious concerns and questions to say the least.” He advised he was awaiting a call from his banker. [ 48 ] The level of distrust would rise again. At 2:39 p.m., Robert emailed Mr. Blackier requesting a photograph of the cheque for his banker to examine. His banker also happened to be with the Bank of Nova Scotia. [ 49 ] At 3:13 p.m., Mr. Walker emailed Mr.

Blackier only, advising Robert would deposit his cheque at the Bank of Nova Scotia and the Bank might place a hold on the trust cheque. This could easily be avoided by having the trust cheque certified. Mr. Walker still planned to travel to Mr. Blackier’s office in Saint John the next day with Robert.

[ 50 ] At 3:39 p.m., Mr. Blackier sent Mr. Walker and Robert a copy of the bank draft. At 3:42 p.m., Robert emailed Mr Blackier to advise he had just met with his banker, who told him a bank draft is not the same as a certified cheque. Robert asked why it was a problem for Cox & Palmer to provide a certified trust cheque. He offered to pay the $10 certification fee. He again asked for a photograph of the cheque to be sent to Mr. Walker before he travelled to Saint John the next day. He then asked to meet two days later rather than the next day because of a scheduling conflict. [ 51 ] At 3:45 p.m., Mr.

Blackier stated the new date and time were acceptable and he would have the cheque certified. At 5:19 p.m., Robert again asked that a photograph of the certified cheque be sent to Mr. Walker; otherwise, he would not be attending the closing. [ 52 ] On May 18, at 7:49 p.m., Mr. Walker emailed Mr. Blackier with a copy to Robert, advising Robert had “re- examined” the estate accounts with an accountant and identified several items “which may be questionable.” The concerns were mostly over legal fees and some of the executor’s expenses. The “questionable” items totalled $6,955.13.

He advised that, in exchange for a certified cheque payable to Robert for that amount (and not to the estate) in addition to the $74,705.40 on May 20, he would agree to conclude the transaction. He asked for confirmation of acceptance of this new proposal by 2 p.m. on May 19 together with a photograph of the additional cheque. [ 53 ] Later that day, Mr. Blackier advised by email he would seek instructions but expressed dismay at these eleventh-hour “concerns” given the accounts had been in Robert’s possession for quite some time. [ 54 ] On May 19, Mr. Blackier emailed Mr.

Walker and asked him to tell Robert to stop communicating with him directly. [ 55 ] The matter did not conclude pending receipt of Michael’s response to Robert’s “concerns.” Michael responded on May 30, confirming all beneficiaries were paying an equal share of legal fees although Robert had caused most of them to be incurred. Again, he confirmed having done everything possible to minimize legal costs. He stated Robert was responsible for his own lawyers’ fees. According to Michael, Mr.

Walker was the seventh lawyer mentioned in Robert’s emails who had been involved in representing him. [ 56 ] Later, on May 30, Mr. Blackier emailed Michael suggesting that, given Robert’s previous conduct, they would likely never be able to satisfy him and should simply proceed with the passing of accounts. [ 57 ] On June 2, Robert emailed Mr. Blackier, ignoring instructions not to do so, with a copy to Mr. Walker to continue his complaints about the legal fees and how his mother would not have approved spending money on lawyers. He repeated an earlier desire not to go through a formal passing of accounts.

He offered to go to Mr. Blackier’s office and sign off on the release in exchange for a certified trust cheque for the $74,705.40. There was no mention of the additional $6,955.13. He stated that, if the executor still wished to pass accounts, he should pay the associated legal costs. [ 58 ] On June 11, Mr. Walker emailed Mr. Blackier to confirm the claim for the additional $6,955 had been rejected by the executor. He asked why a formal passing should proceed given Robert’s latest proposal, which was essentially an acceptance of the executor’s May 19 th proposal.

He stated proceeding with the passing of accounts would be frivolous, disproportionate, expensive and time consuming. [ 59 ] In his June 14 th reply, Mr. Blackier indicated that, notwithstanding Robert’s professed intention to sign the release, he had said that before and later reneged. Mr. Blackier advised the June 11 th email was discussed with the executor, who provided instructions to proceed with the application for the passing, and the application would not be withdrawn.

The executor’s final offer to avoid a hearing was for the five beneficiaries to sign a Consent Order which would provide all legal costs associated with Mr. Blackier’s representation to be paid from Robert’s share of the distribution. Otherwise, the application would proceed. [ 60 ] On June 14, Mr. Blackier issued his third account in the amount of $6,560 plus HST and disbursements for the period from June 1 to 14. On that day, the probate judge signed the Notice of Appointment to pass accounts and set the hearing for September 16, 2021. The documentation was served on Mr. Walker on June 17.

[ 61 ] On June 22, Mr. Walker emailed Mr. Blackier advising he wished to discuss the proposed consent order with Robert and inquired about the legal fees incurred to date. Later that day, Mr. Blackier replied the fees for the period from mid-April to June 11 stood at $17,500, of which approximately $15,000, in his estimation, were related to Robert’s conduct. He further noted 60% of the $15,000 related to preparing the application, updating the accounts, and preparing and finalizing Michael’s affidavit to be used in support of the application.

The other 40% related to preparation of a brief on law including the law on the costs issue. [ 62 ] On June 23, Robert emailed Mr. Blackier with a copy to Mr. Walker. He now took the position that the executor, not him, had elected to proceed with the application and that Mr. Walker had advised against it. He stated feeling no more responsible for theses fees than the other beneficiaries and believed the executor was particularly responsible for them. He expressed surprise with the amount of the fees, believing they should have been more in the range of $5,000-$7,000.

He was prepared to pay one fifth of that or $1,200, and any additional fees incurred would be for the account of the executor. [ 63 ] On June 24, Mr. Blackier emailed Robert to remind him he would not respond to him directly. The next day, Mr. Walker emailed Mr. Blackier to advise he was no longer representing Robert and would have no further communication with him. [ 64 ] On July 11, Robert emailed Mr. Blackier and Mr. Walker with a copy to the Law Society. The email engaged in a long, meandering diatribe rehashing the history of the file from his perspective. He threatened to file complaints against both Mr.

Blackier and Mr. Walker unless the matter was settled on his terms. He raised an allegation of conflict of interest against Mr. Blackier, for which there is no support in the record. He claimed Mr. Walker’s communications with Mr. Blackier had “hurt [his] leverage and position in the matter of [his] mother’s estate […] to an extreme and seemingly with intent.” He accused Mr. Walker of accusing him (Robert) of conduct having given rise to what now formed the basis of Robert’s allegations and stated Mr. Walker had confirmed this with Mr. Blackier. Robert wrote: “This is defaming and false.

Some of this commentary and the actions and comments by both lawyers raise questions of possible collusion-to extend the matter out, seemingly to increase billing.” [ 65 ] The email then lists a litany of complaints first against Mr. Walker and then against Mr. Blackier. Finally, he threatened to go to the “media.” [ 66 ] On July 14, Mr. Blackier sent Robert copies of his three statements of account at the latter’s request. On July 16, Mr.

Blackier returned the trust cheque for the $74,705.40, which was intended to pay Robert’s share back to Michael to be placed back into the estate’s account. [ 67 ] On July 17, Mr. Blackier provided Robert with his time dockets for the three accounts and confirmed service on him of all documents relating to the passing. He also sent him Mr. Walker’s complete file as the latter had refused to send it directly to Robert and had routed it through Mr. Blackier’s office. Finally, Mr. Blackier advised he would not take any calls or respond to any further emails from Robert. [ 68 ] On July 27, Mr.

Blackier confirmed to Robert the outstanding fees were $17,762.63, which represented the second and third accounts. [ 69 ] On August 31, 2021, Robert swore an affidavit opposing the application. His oath was taken by Mr. Dunsmuir, the solicitor who represented him before the probate judge and before us on appeal. The affidavit argues what the fees ought to have been under the Tariff in Appendix B of the Probate Rules , N.B. Reg. 84-9 , under the Probate Court Act , S.N.B. 1982, c. P-17.1 . The affidavit further argues the fees for the grant of testamentary letters should have been $5,000 at most. It notes Mr.

McCluskey’s fees totalled $9,487.39 and the Cox & Palmer accounts totalled $21,378.63, of which $5,600 were incurred after May 4 for the passing of accounts, which Mr. McCluskey had estimated would be $800. The affidavit picks from the Cox & Palmer accounts an amount of $11,800 for the work related to the passing, which the Tariff in Appendix B sets at $2,621.14. The affidavit takes exception to the total fees of $30,866.02 between Mr. McCluskey’s and Mr.

Blackier’s accounts and asks they be limited to the tariff amounts. [ 70 ] Cox & Palmer issued a further account on September 13, 2021, for $8,760 plus HST and disbursements for the final work relating to the hearing of the application for the period from June 15 to September 10. The account notes the second and third accounts remained outstanding. [ 71 ] As will be seen, the appendix attached to the probate judge’s order of December 15, 2021, following the hearing of the application, reflects further fees of $4,575.30 from Cox & Palmer for the period from September 10 to November 9 plus

estimated fees of $2,760 anticipated to complete the matter for work done between November 9 and November 29. A. The probate judge’s decision [ 72 ] On the strength of the evidentiary record summarized above, the probate judge had no hesitation in finding the necessity to pass accounts was largely precipitated by Robert’s conduct. Based on the evidence, she made a number of findings of fact on this issue. I note the following: 1. “Given the aggressive and accusatory nature of all of the Objector’s (Robert’

s) communications, I find that the Executor had no choice but to proceed to a formal passing of the accounts” (par. 49); 2. “It is apparent on the evidence before me that nothing would satisfy the Objector with respect to the management and distribution of the Estate.

Settlement was not possible in the context” (par. 51); 3. “I am satisfied that all steps taken by the Executor and his counsel were necessary and reasonable in the context of this case and were primarily caused by the unreasonable behaviour of the Objector” (par. 54); 4. “I conclude that legal fees incurred from May 18, 2021 […] to November 9, 2021 […] were incurred as a result of the unreasonable actions and behaviours of the Objector” (par. 63); and 5. “I acknowledge that solicitor/client cost awards are rare and are warranted only in exceptional cases.

I find that in the matter before me, this is such a case” (par. 67). [ 73 ] All these findings were fully supported by the evidence before the judge, and none is the product of palpable and overriding error. There is no basis for appellate intervention in that respect. [ 74 ] Against this evidentiary background, the probate judge ruled two thirds of solicitor-client costs relating to the Cox & Palmer accounts incurred both before the passing of accounts and for the application and hearing be borne by Robert and deducted from his share of the estate’s distribution.

In addition, she ruled he was responsible for all the legal costs he had incurred on his own. [ 75 ] Once she apportioned the solicitor-client costs, the first issue for her determination was whether Cox & Palmer’s accounts were reasonable. She found they were. The second issue was whether she had jurisdiction under the Act to make such an award of costs. She determined she did. III.

Grounds of Appeal [ 76 ] Robert Touchie raised two issues in his Notice of Appeal: 1) Did the probate judge have jurisdiction to award solicitor-client costs? and 2) Did the probate judge make an appropriate determination of the reasonableness of the legal fees charged by Cox & Palmer to the executor? [ 77 ] During the hearing of the appeal, it became apparent that errors were made in the calculation of the payments. As noted, leave was granted to allow the appellant to amend his Notice of Appeal to add a third ground seeking correction of these errors.

The issue is whether the Court should correct the obvious error, on the face of the judge’s disposition order, relating to the $10,000 advance payment which was not made to Robert and make the consequential changes to the order without remitting the matter back to the judge.

IV. Standards of Review [ 78 ] The probate judge’s jurisdiction relating to her award of costs is a pure question of law reviewable on the standard of correctness. [ 79 ] Her determination of the reasonableness of the costs at issue is a question of mixed fact and law and will withstand scrutiny on appeal if no palpable and overriding error was committed in conducting the assessment. [ 80 ] The third ground raises a matter of proportionality and expediency, factors which authorize the Court, in the interest of justice, to correct simple clerical errors rather than remit the matter back to the probate judge. V.

Analysis A. The jurisdiction to award solicitor-client costs [ 81 ] The probate judge relied on a number of authorities, including from this Court, in determining she had jurisdiction to make the award of solicitor-client costs. The analysis, however, begins with the language of the Probate Court Act and Probate Rules to determine whether a probate judge may make such an award. While Robert’s counsel argued the legislation precludes it, his written submission to the Court states otherwise.

Indeed, the probate judge has discretion to depart from the Tariff prescribed in Appendix B in assessing fees allowable to a solicitor. [ 82 ] First, s. 3 of the Act confers on Probate Court judges the same jurisdiction as that of Court of Queen’s Bench judges.

Section 8 states the practice and procedure of the Queen’s Bench apply to the Probate Court with the ability to exercise all powers of Queen’s Bench judges. Paragraph 3(2)(

c) gives Probate Court judges exclusive jurisdiction and authority to make “ any ” orders in connection with the passing of accounts (emphasis added). [ 83 ] While Rule 4.02 of the Probate Rules generally establishes the tariff of applicable fees for probate matters, it specifically states Probate Court judges may depart from the tariff up to the first passing of accounts depending upon the complexity of an estate. This is the first indication of discretion conferred on these judges.

However, Rule 4.04 broadens this discretion by providing that the Rules of Court apply to “ any matter ” not provided for in the Act or Probate Rules (emphasis added).

And should there be any doubt about a Probate Court judge’s ability to exercise discretion in making a costs award, the Tariff in Appendix B itself concludes with the following: The above scale of fees is to be applied in estates of average complexity, subject to increase or decrease when warranted, in the discretion of the Court. [Emphasis added.] [ 84 ] It is against this legislative and regulatory backdrop that the Court’s leading case on the issue of a probate judge’s jurisdiction to award costs must be understood. In Breau v. The Estate of Ernest St.

Onge, et al. , 2009 NBCA 36 , 345 N.B.R. (2d) 101, the Court upheld a trial judge’s party-and-party costs award against the appellant in favour of the administrators of the estate. The appellant argued the “traditional costs rule” in estate litigation entitles all litigants, including unsuccessful ones, to full or partial reimbursement of their costs from the estate. The Court determined that “rule” is incorrect because the common law rule is to the contrary. Simply stated, the Court ruled costs follow the event in all cases, including in estate litigation.

Although the case at bar dealt with a passing of accounts, and not with typical estate litigation challenging the validity of a will or testamentary capacity, there is no principled reason to treat the issue of costs differently where they are incurred to force the passing of accounts because of a beneficiary’s unacceptable conduct as opposed to where a party exhibits unacceptable conduct in vexatiously challenging the validity of a will or is found guilty of duress or undue influence against a testator.

It is all conduct deserving of costs sanctions. [ 85 ] Robertson and Quigg JJ.A., writing for the Court in Breau , referred to Mitchell v. Gard (1863) 164 E.R. 1280 , a leading English authority on the matter of costs in estate litigation which stands for the proposition that probate costs are at the discretion of the court and, again, generally follow the event. The Court highlighted the two exceptions recognized in Mitchell allowing for, although not mandating, the payment of costs by the estate:

1. If the litigation is the fault of the testator or a residual beneficiary; and 2. If there is a sufficient and reasonable basis to challenge testamentary capacity ( Breau , paras. 55-56 ). [ 86 ] Although this matter might belong to the first exception as a dispute that takes its origin in the fault of a residual beneficiary, Breau makes clear a costs award requires discretion be exercised on a case-by-case basis. The law has never allowed needless litigation to escape sanction by way of an appropriate award of costs ( Breau , at para. 56 ).

Even if the case should fall into one of the two exceptions, the unsuccessful litigant would still need to show the litigation was pursued on reasonable and sufficient grounds (para. 70). [ 87 ] As the Court noted in Breau the Ontario High Court astutely observed in Logan et al. v.

Herring et al. (1900), 19 P.R. 168 , that a rule allowing all parties to recover their costs from the estate “is simply an incentive to encourage unmeritorious litigation” (at par. 58). [ 88 ] The Court then canvassed appellate decisions across Canada which support the rule that costs follow the event and that only in exceptional circumstances can an unsuccessful litigant recover costs from the estate. The current approach involves scrutinizing the litigation to follow the cost rules applicable to civil litigation generally unless one of the two policy considerations above are in play.

Even if that were the case, a party who forces litigation without any substantial merit is personally responsible for the payment of the successful party’s costs (para. 63). [ 89 ] The Court went on to observe it must guard against “the pursuit of unfounded or dubious litigation. […] But once again it is important to appreciate that regardless of which costs rule is applied, the trial judge retains the discretion to award costs based on the circumstances of each case and in accordance with established principles” (para. 68).

I note the Court made no mention of having to default to the tariff. [ 90 ] The Court agreed the appellant did not have reasonable grounds for pursuing the litigation, stating, “it cannot be said that […] the litigation was reasonably necessary for the proper administration of the estate. In our view, the factual findings of the probate court judge and his assessment of the weight to be given to the appellant’s testimony and that of his wife are fatal to the appellant’s claim to indemnification (full or partial) out of the respondent estate” (para. 76).

The rule remains that costs follow the event. [ 91 ] In the later decision of Estate of Jarvis Hayward Estabrooks et al. v. Barry et al. and Macey , 2016 NBCA 55 , 452 N.B.R. (2d) 296, the Court dealt with another cost-focused appeal. The testator had unintentionally destroyed his will, but the evidence established he was unconcerned because his lawyer had a copy. The challenge of the validity of this will at trial resulted in a party-and-party cost award in favour of the losing party to be paid by the estate.

The appeal was launched on the basis that the decision was contrary to the principles which had been confirmed in Breau . Moreover, the appellant sought solicitor-client costs on the basis that the opposing party had pursued a meritless claim and the judge had fettered his discretion in awarding only party-and-party costs. [ 92 ] Baird J.A. in Estabrooks , writing for the Court, determined costs awards are owed deference unless the trial judge erred in principle, and the public policy rationale is that estates should not bear the costs of unmeritorious litigation.

The Court held that, while there might have been sufficient reasons to initially challenge the will, they were dispelled before the trial and the matter should not have been pursued. However, quoting from Doucet and Dauphinee v. Spielo Manufacturing Incorporated and Manship , 2011 NBCA 44 , 372 N.B.R. (2d) 1, leave to appeal to the S.C.C. refused, [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 317 (QL), the Court emphasized solicitor-client costs are reserved for situations where there has been “reprehensible, scandalous or outrageous conduct” ( Doucet , at para. 117, quoted in Estabrooks , at para. 46).

The Court also reiterated the guidance it gave in Calvy v. Calvy , 2015 NBCA 53 , 440 N.B.R. (2d) 85, that an appellate court will not interfere with a trial judge’s award of costs unless it is patently wrong ( Estabrooks , para. 47). [ 93 ] In Estabrooks , the Court concluded the impugned conduct did not rise to the level contemplated in the jurisprudence to warrant an award of solicitor-client costs and there was therefore no basis to depart from the deference owed the trial judge.

The same deference applies to the award made in the case at bar as well as to the judge’s finding the impugned conduct rose to the level requiring such an award. [ 94 ] In Patterson v. Patterson , 2019 NBQB 238 , [2019] N.B.J. No. 306 (QL), an application to pass accounts was held several years after large distributions were made in a complex estate. The court held the delays were partly attributable to the

negligence of the executor and ordered 25% of the legal fees incurred by the beneficiaries to be paid by the executor and 75% by theestate. [95] In the earlier decision of Scott Estate, Re (1998), (NB BR), 205 N.B.R. (2d) 280, [1998]N.B.J. No. 366 (QL), the Court of Queen’s Bench dealt with the passing of accounts in a modest estate valued at $33,500. The legal feesincurred would have left only $1,500 for the sole beneficiary. The many claims against the estate resulted in solicitor’s fees of $11,512for the estate or 38% of the estate’s value.

In assessing the appropriate level of fees, the court referred to the tariff and the discretion itprovides. Referring to the decision of the Probate Court in O’Rourke Estate, Re (1997), (NB BR), 186 N.B.R. (2d) 1,[1997] N.B.J.

No. 49 (QL), the judge quoted from Macdonell, Sheard and Hull, Probate Practice, 3rd ed. (p. 417): The determining of the appropriate fee in these latter cases should be arrived at by applying the considerations normally applied in taxinga solicitor’s account, being the amount and character of the services rendered, the labour, time and trouble involved, the character andimportance of the services rendered, the amount of money or value of the estate, the professional skill and experience called for, thecharacter and standing in the profession of the solicitors involved, the results obtained and the ability of the clients to pay. [para. 15] [96] The judge went on to hold that “fairness” is an important consideration.

In the final analysis, he held the feeswere excessive in the circumstances but should not be limited to the tariff. He allowed an amount of $3,500 instead of the tariff amountof $394.38, or almost nine times the tariff rate. B. Reasonableness of Cox & Palmer accounts [97] In the case at bar, the probate judge determined the legal fees and disbursements set out in the Cox & Palmeraccounts rendered to the executor were reasonably incurred. They totalled $40,197.47.

While Robert’s counsel attempted to parse theaccounts to argue some entries and charges were unrelated to his client’s conduct, there is no reason to depart from the deference owedto the probate judge’s exercise of discretion. Her findings of fact relating to these entries are supported by the evidence. There being nopalpable and overriding error in this respect, there is no principled basis for appellate intervention. She ordered the estate pay one third ofthis amount which, divided ratably amongst the five beneficiaries, came to $2,679.83 each.

The other two thirds, $26,798.83 was orderedpaid by Robert in addition to his portion of the one third, for a total payable by him of $29,568.66. C. Correction of clerical errors in distribution

schedule [98] On December 15, 2021, the probate judge made her final distribution order. The result was a distribution of$61,933.18 to each of the four other beneficiaries net of their liability for the fees and disbursements and $41,187.28 for Robert, whichwas net of his two thirds share of these costs in addition to his ratable share with the other beneficiaries. Unfortunately, as noted above,the

schedule attached to the distribution order incorrectly reflected an early advance payment of $10,000 to Robert which had not beenmade. [99] Moreover, the

schedule attached to the final distribution order deducts the $10,000 advances made to the threeother beneficiaries from funds on hand for final distribution before doing the accounting amongst the beneficiaries for their respectiveshares of the legal accounts. As a result, Robert and John became liable for a ratable share of the $30,000 in advances paid to the otherbeneficiaries. These clerical errors must be corrected, and we are as well positioned as the probate judge to do so. There is no need toremit the matter back to her for this purpose.

I would therefore order the following: Funds available for distribution before advances and cost award: $345,501.48 less executor’s fees ($10,000) less estate expenses($414.17) = $335,087.31 or five equal shares of $67,017.46. Michael John Robert Scott Stephen $67,017.46 $67,017.46 $67,017.46 $67,017.46 $67,017.461/3 Costs ($ 2,679.83) ($ 2,679.83) ($ 2,679.83) ($ 2,679.83) ($ 2,679.83)2/3 Costs ($26,798.30) Advance ($10,000) ($10,000) ($10,000)Final $54,337.63 $64,337.63 $37,539.33 $54,337.63 $54,337.63

[ 100 ] One final matter must be addressed before the disposition of the appeal. The executor did not make any submissions on appeal, either in writing or orally before the Court. Counsel for the estate advised the Registrar’s office on March 31, 2022, that, in accordance with the final order of the probate judge, the executor was proceeding to pay out the funds as ordered and would thereafter be discharged, again in accordance with the order. According to the record, the executor’s counsel was served with the appellant’s submission on March 31.

On April 12, counsel for the Estate further advised distribution had been made as no stay of the judge’s order had been obtained pending the outcome of the appeal. Based on the appellant’s submission, counsel for the executor would have been aware of the clerical errors outlined above. They were clearly spelled out in the written submission filed on Robert’s behalf. [ 101 ] On behalf of the estate, Mr. Blackier took the position in his email correspondence that, because of the executor’s discharge, the estate no longer had a representative before the Court and, pursuant to Rule 10.02(1)(

b) of the Rules of Court , a litigation administrator ought to have been appointed in order for the appeal to proceed. He took the further position that, under Rule 10.03(5), no further steps could be taken until an administrator was appointed. Being uncertain of his future status as previous counsel for the estate, as an officer of the Court, he asked for directions and, in particular, for a case management conference. [ 102 ] A case management conference was held before the Chief Justice of New Brunswick. The parties were advised the appeal would proceed. However, as noted, the executor and Mr.

Blackier neither appeared, nor made any submissions. VI. Disposition [ 103 ] I would allow the appeal in part and vary the probate judge’s order to adjust each beneficiary’s share in accordance with the above calculations. In all other respects, I would dismiss the appeal without costs given the non-participation of the executor in the appeal. Version française de la décision de la Cour rendue par LE JUGE LEBLOND II.

Introduction [1] Le présent appel concerne la décision d’une juge de la Cour des successions par laquelle elle a ordonné que deux tiers des frais entre avocat et client contractés pour une approbation des comptes soient payés par l’appelant, Robert Touchie, un des bénéficiaires de la succession de Marilyn Carol Hirtle. La juge de la Cour des successions a rendu l’ordonnance parce qu’elle a conclu que la conduite de M.

Touchie avait été répréhensible durant l’administration de la succession par l’exécuteur testamentaire, ce qui avait forcé ce dernier à demander l’approbation des comptes, une démarche qui, autrement, n’aurait pas été nécessaire. La juge a ordonné que le montant de ces frais soit déduit de la part qui revenait à Robert Touchie dans le cadre de la distribution de l’actif. [2] Au départ, les moyens d’appel ne portaient que sur l’adjudication des dépens. Dans les circonstances, comme le prévoit la règle 62.03(1)

b) des Règles de procédure , M. Touchie devait obtenir l’autorisation d’interjeter appel, mais il ne l’a pas obtenue.

Son avocat a prétendu que, comme la juge de la Cour des successions avait outrepassé sa compétence en rendant l’ordonnance en cause, elle avait commis une erreur de droit et, en conséquence, l’appel pouvait avoir lieu de plein droit, sans qu’il soit nécessaire d’obtenir une autorisation. [3] Pendant que cette question préliminaire était plaidée devant nous, il est devenu évident que l’ordonnance de la juge de la Cour des successions contenait des erreurs dans le calcul des fonds devant être distribués.

Par conséquent, l’avocat a obtenu l’autorisation de modifier son avis d’appel pour y soulever ces erreurs, et l’appel a donc pu procéder de plein droit relativement à toutes les questions.

[4] L’adjudication des dépens établis sur la base des frais entre avocat et client, en tenant pour acquis que la juge de la Cour des successions pouvait rendre une telle ordonnance dans la présente cause, requiert l’exercice d’un pouvoir discrétionnaire qui dépend largement de la conduite des parties. Il importe donc d’examiner minutieusement l’historique de la cause pour décider si ce pouvoir discrétionnaire a été exercé judicieusement et s’il est justifié d’intervenir en appel. [5] Pour les motifs qui suivent, j’accueillerais l’appel en

partie pour corriger les erreurs d’écriture. En revanche, je rejetterais les autres moyens d’appel. Puisque certaines des parties ou des autres personnes en cause dans la présente affaire portent le même nom de famille, je ferai parfois référence à eux en utilisant uniquement leur prénom. Ce faisant, je ne veux d’aucune manière leur manquer de respect. II. Contexte factuel [6] Tout au long de l’administration de la succession, une grande animosité a régné entre Robert Touchie et son frère, le D r Michael Touchie, l’exécuteur testamentaire nommé dans le testament de M me Hirtle.

Même si le dossier ne donne pas un éclairage complet quant à la source du conflit, Robert semble avoir été en désaccord avec la mise en œuvre des arrangements funéraires de M me Hirtle. [7] Michael Touchie pratique la médecine à Ottawa et est affilié à l’Hôpital d’Ottawa. Il s’est acquitté de la majorité de l’administration de la succession de sa mère à partir de cette ville, bien qu’il ait fait le déplacement au Nouveau-Brunswick à quelques occasions pour traiter certaines questions. Michael, Robert et un autre frère, John, étaient les enfants de Marilyn Hirtle issus de son premier mariage.

Après la fin de celui-ci, elle a épousé son deuxième mari, qui avait deux fils d’un précédent mariage, Stephen et Scott Hirtle. Comme nous le verrons, John, Stephen et Scott n’ont rien eu à redire de l’administration de la succession de M me Hirtle par Michael et ils ont été très élogieux à l’égard des efforts qu’il a déployés pour mettre un terme à l’affaire.

Malheureusement, Robert avait sa propre opinion de la question et il a choisi d’adopter un comportement que la juge de la Cour des successions a qualifié d’inutilement clivant et qui finirait par coûter très cher. [8] Le dossier révèle que la succession était relativement simple. Sa valeur estimée était de l’ordre de 500 000 $.

Le dernier testament de M me Hirtle faisait des legs spécifiques à Robert, soit sa voiture, le produit de l’assurance-vie collective qu’elle avait souscrite par l’intermédiaire de la Fédération des enseignants du Nouveau-Brunswick, ainsi que tous les fonds investis dans un compte d’épargne libre d’impôt (CELI) détenu à la Banque de Nouvelle-Écosse. La voiture valait environ 8 000 $, le CELI contenait au total quelque 57 000 $ et le produit de l’assurance-vie s’élevait à 15 000 $.

Aucun des autres bénéficiaires n’a reçu de legs spécifiques et l’ensemble d’entre eux, y compris Robert, devaient se partager en parts égales le reliquat de la succession après le paiement de toutes les dépenses et de tous impôts, y compris les honoraires d’exécuteur de Michael, que le testament fixait à 10 000 $. M me Hirtle est décédée le 26 mars 2019. La voiture a été transférée à Robert le 2 mai 2019, il a reçu les fonds du CELI le 3 mai 2019, et le produit de l’assurance-vie peu après le 8 mai 2019.

Manifestement, en dépit de ses protestations, Robert a reçu les biens qui lui avaient été légués en temps utile. [9] Il faut examiner minutieusement les échanges qui ont eu lieu entre Robert et Michael, ou par l’intermédiaire de leurs avocats, pour décider si la juge a exercé son pouvoir discrétionnaire judicieusement.

Le premier échange pertinent entre les deux frères a été un courriel envoyé par Michael le 24 mars 2019, deux jours avant le décès de M me Hirtle, informant Robert que l’appartement de leur mère avait été nettoyé et que de nombreux effets personnels lui seraient expédiés, et lui demandant de prendre les mesures nécessaires pour aller chercher ceux qui étaient volumineux. Le courriel est rédigé sur un ton amical et demande à Robert de donner sa préférence quant à la livraison et à la collecte des effets.

Manifestement, Michael s’attendait à ce qu’il y ait des frictions avec Robert, puisqu’il lui a suggéré de communiquer ses préférences à John s’il préférait ne pas faire affaire avec lui directement. Il a assuré Robert qu’il ne se mettrait pas sur son chemin et qu’il respecterait son souhait s’il préférait ne pas lui parler. [10] Plutôt que d’accepter la branche d’olivier qui lui était tendue, Robert a été hostile dans son courriel de réponse à Michael le 25 mars 2019. Il a écrit : [TRADUCTION] « Je ne souhaite pas recevoir les vieilleries qu’ont laissées des gens qui ne font pas

partie de la famille après être passés à travers les choses de maman comme des rapaces. » Voilà qui préparait le terrain pour la suite des événements. Il a ensuite envoyé un autre courriel agressif à Michael, posant des questions à propos d’objets dont il venait juste de dire qu’ils ne l’intéressaient pas. Comme Michael n’a pas répondu immédiatement, plus tard ce jour-là, Robert lui a fait parvenir un autre courriel le menaçant de retenir les services d’un avocat s’il n’obtenait pas de réponse à ses questions.

Dans un courriel envoyé le lendemain, Robert a mis Michael en garde par écrit : [TRADUCTION] « Ne me force pas. » [11] Le 26 mars, Michael a envoyé un courriel à un avocat de Saint John avec qui il avait déjà fait affaire. Il a

indiqué qu’il venait de lire les trois courriels agressifs de Robert et qu’il souhaitait une recommandation pour un avocat spécialisé en droit des successions parce qu’il s’attendait à ce que la situation dégénère.

C’est par suite de cette démarche qu’il a retenu les services de l’avocat Michael McCluskey. [12] Le 27 mars, John a informé Robert par courriel que, s’il était dans la situation de Michael, il ne traiterait avec Robert que par l’intermédiaire d’un conseiller juridique étant donné le ton de ses messages. [13] Le 5 avril, à 23 h 18, Robert a envoyé un courriel à Michael demandant une copie du testament de M me Hirtle ainsi que le nom de l’avocat qui s’était occupé de la dernière mise à jour.

Il a allégué ne pas être tenu informé. [14] Grâce à l’aide de M e McCluskey, les lettres d’homologation ont été délivrées à Michael le 15 avril 2019. [15] Le 17 avril, M e McCluskey a envoyé une première facture à Michael pour ses services.

Elle s’élevait à 3 500 $ plus la TVH pour tout le travail accompli, y compris la préparation de la demande des lettres d’homologation et de l’ordonnance, ainsi que la présentation de la demande par comparution au tribunal. [16] Le 24 avril, Robert a envoyé un courriel à M e McCluskey et l’a accusé de [TRADUCTION] « tenter d’empêcher le transfert de la voiture et de rendre ce transfert aussi difficile et coûteux que vous le pouvez ». Rien dans le dossier n’appuie cette accusation.

Robert contactait sans arrêt le cabinet de M e McCluskey et il lui a été conseillé de retenir les services d’un avocat s’il avait des préoccupations. Il a retenu les services de l’avocat John Henderson. Le 15 mai, ce dernier a remis à Robert les documents qu’il avait demandés. [17] Le 17 mai, à 5 h 31, Robert a de nouveau envoyé un courriel directement à M e McCluskey dans lequel il a écrit : [TRADUCTION] « Il semble que vos services ont été retenus par l’exécuteur testamentaire pour compliquer les choses concernant la succession de ma mère et pour rendre les démarches coûteuses pour ma famille.

Vos efforts ont porté des fruits, et nous en avons la preuve. » Une fois de plus, rien dans le dossier n’appuie cette accusation. Il a ensuite menacé de déposer une plainte contre M e McCluskey auprès du Barreau. [18] Le 17 mai, à 11 h 33, M e McCluskey a écrit à M e Henderson. Il a joint le dernier courriel de Robert à son message et a confirmé qu’il avait demandé à Robert de ne contacter son cabinet dans aucune circonstance et qu’il l’avait informé qu’il ne traiterait pas avec lui directement.

M e McCluskey a également indiqué à son collègue qu’il avait pris des mesures pour bloquer l’adresse courriel de Robert et que toutes communications devraient passer par le cabinet de M e Henderson. Deux heures plus tard, ce dernier a répondu à M e McCluskey en accusant réception de son message et en le remerciant. [19] Le 29 mai 2019, M e McCluskey a envoyé une deuxième facture, pour un montant de 1 833 $ plus la TVH.

Elle couvrait le temps consacré à répondre aux nombreux appels de Robert, le travail lié au transfert de la voiture, et diverses démarches qui ont mené à l’avertissement donné à Robert de ne plus entrer en contact avec son cabinet. [20] L’obtention du certificat de décharge de l’Agence du revenu du Canada (ARC) pour la succession de sa mère a été un des défis les plus importants auxquels Michael a été confronté à

titre d’exécuteur testamentaire. Les délais pour la délivrance du certificat sont devenus particulièrement longs en 2020 en raison de la pandémie de la COVID-19. Le 1 er décembre 2019, Michael a fourni une mise à jour complète de son administration aux cinq bénéficiaires. Il a exprimé son intention de verser un montant de 10 000 $ à chacun d’entre eux en décembre à

titre de distribution préliminaire, et de verser le reste une fois les impôts réglés et toutes les dépenses payées, ce qui, espérait-il, se produirait à la fin du printemps ou au début de l’été de 2020. En prévision de la mise en œuvre de cette marche à suivre, il a demandé que chaque bénéficiaire confirme : 1. qu’il ne contestait pas son autorité à

titre d’exécuteur pour aller de l’avant avec ce plan; 2. que les montants figurant sur le rapprochement des comptes qu’il avait fourni étaient raisonnables;

3. que l’adresse qu’il possédait pour chacun d’entre eux était encore valide. [21] John, Stephen et Scott ont tous répondu immédiatement à Michael pour lui donner les confirmations qu’il avait demandées et lui exprimer leur reconnaissance pour tout le travail qu’il avait accompli. Le 23 décembre 2019, Robert a envoyé un courriel à Michael à 6 h 20 pour l’informer que le message qu’il avait envoyé le 1 er décembre et contenant son rapport s’était retrouvé dans son courrier indésirable et qu’il n’en prenait connaissance qu’à ce moment-là. Michael s’était servi de l’adresse qu’il avait toujours utilisée.

Robert a demandé pourquoi de l’argent était distribué à ce moment-là et si des montants avaient été versés sans son consentement. Il souhaitait avoir plus de détails quant à l’administration de Michael, y compris [TRADUCTION] « une meilleure compréhension de l’état de l’administration et des faits avant de formuler des commentaires ». Il n’a répondu à aucune des trois questions de Michael. [22] Pendant que Michael continuait à attendre le certificat de décharge de l’ARC, Robert lui a envoyé un autre courriel le 9 juin 2020 pour obtenir un suivi quant à ses demandes.

Le 28 août de la même année, Michael a confirmé par courriel à M e McCluskey qu’il avait finalement eu des nouvelles de l’ARC et qu’il était maintenant au courant des soldes d’impôts à payer pour sa mère à

titre personnel et pour la succession de cette dernière. Il a demandé à M e McCluskey d’émettre sa dernière facture afin de pouvoir procéder à la distribution définitive. Cette facture a été émise le 4 septembre pour un montant de 697,50 $ plus la TVH.

M e McCluskey a indiqué que, si Michael voulait qu’il prépare les quittances définitives pour la distribution, ses honoraires pour ce service seraient de 800 $ supplémentaires plus la TVH. [23] Le 5 septembre, à 14 h 43, Robert a envoyé un courriel à Michael pour l’informer qu’il avait retenu les services d’un nouvel avocat et pour l’accuser [TRADUCTION] « d’agir illégalement ».

Il a écrit : [TRADUCTION] Bref, tu essaies de nous punir, ma famille et moi, pour je ne sais quelle raison. […] Sache que je vais être en contact avec les autorités de l’AMC [Association médicale canadienne] si ces folies n’arrêtent pas immédiatement à propos de ce que je perçois comme des questions déontologiques liées à la civilité qui sont visées par ton code de déontologie comme médecin. […] Tu as été tout sauf civilisé. En fait, c’est l’incivilité qui a régné. Et si ce comportement et ce traitement continuent dans le contexte de la succession de maman, je vais discuter vertement avec l’AMC.

Rien dans le dossier n’indique ce qui aurait pu donner lieu à cette diatribe. [24] Plus tard ce jour-là, à 15 h 25, Robert a envoyé un autre message à Michael, le menaçant cette fois de faire parvenir une copie de sa plainte à l’Association médicale canadienne, aux 26 membres de la haute direction de l’Hôpital d’Ottawa, et aux 21 membres de son Conseil des gouverneurs. [25] Le 20 octobre, William Walker, le troisième avocat commis au dossier de Robert, a informé M e McCluskey qu’il représentait désormais Robert. Il a demandé une mise à jour quant à l’administration de la succession.

M e McCluskey l’a invité à contacter Michael, qu’il ne représentait plus, puisqu’il avait émis sa dernière facture le mois précédent. [26] Le 10 décembre, M e Walker a envoyé un courriel à Michael l’informant que Robert était inquiet de ne pas avoir été tenu informé des progrès de l’administration de Michael et lui demandant de lui faire parvenir un rapport provisoire et une reddition de compte. Il a confirmé avoir reçu comme instruction de Robert d’exiger de Michael une [TRADUCTION] « gestion méticuleuse ». [27] Le 4 janvier 2021, Michael a fait rapport à tous les bénéficiaires.

Il a repris son rapport précédent en y ajoutant des renseignements mis à jour, y compris concernant la situation fiscale. Le courriel contenait une note marginale écrite à la main selon laquelle les déclarations de revenus avaient été préparées gratuitement par un comptable. Michael a rapporté que, même s’il avait eu l’intention de finaliser la distribution vers la fin du printemps ou le début de l’été de 2020, les restrictions liées à la COVID l’avaient empêché de le faire.

En fait, il ne disposait toujours pas des certificats de décharge définitifs de l’ACR, mais, dès qu’ils lui parviendraient, il donnerait instruction à M e McCluskey d’expédier les quittances définitives aux bénéficiaires pour qu’ils les signent en échange de chacune des remises d’argent. Il a confirmé que, à cette date, le solde du compte de la succession s’élevait à 359 126,58 $, moins les honoraires de l’exécuteur testamentaire et les honoraires d’avocat qui découleraient de la préparation des quittances

définitives. Il a estimé que la part nette de chacun s’élevait à 75 665,40 $, moins les avances versées en décembre 2019. Il a conclu en affirmant qu’il tentait de réduire autant que possible les honoraires d’avocat pour maximiser le montant à distribuer. Il a demandé à chaque bénéficiaire de répondre aux trois questions qu’il leur avait posées avant la distribution de décembre 2019.

Une fois de plus, John, Stephen et Scott ont répondu par l’affirmative, et Robert n’a pas répondu. [28] Ce n’est que le 9 février 2021 que M e Walker a informé M e McCluskey que l’information comptable fournie par Michael dans son dernier rapport était insuffisante et que, tant qu’il ne recevrait pas des renseignements plus détaillés, il ne serait pas en mesure de conseiller à Robert de répondre par l’affirmative aux trois questions. Il a affirmé avoir informé Robert de son droit d’obtenir l’approbation des comptes, mais espérer que cela ne serait pas nécessaire.

Il a aussi déclaré que Robert voulait sa part de la distribution anticipée. Après avoir reçu ce courriel, M e McCluskey a informé Michael qu’il devait retenir les services d’un avocat avec plus d’expérience en litiges successoraux. Le 10 mars, M e Jack Blackier, du cabinet Cox & Palmer, a informé M e Walker que ses services avaient été retenus. Il a joint à son message une comptabilité complète de l’administration de Michael et confirmé que trois des cinq bénéficiaires (Stephen, Scott et Michael) avaient reçu le paiement de 10 000 $ en décembre 2019.

John avait souhaité le report de ce paiement pendant qu’il prenait les mesures pour que les fonds soient déposés dans son compte en Australie. M e Blackier a indiqué qu’il pourrait expédier le paiement de 10 000 $ à Robert en échange d’une quittance provisoire de sa part.

Finalement, il a confirmé que Michael attendait encore les certificats de décharge définitifs de l’ARC, et il a indiqué qu’il espérait qu’il ne deviendrait pas nécessaire de procéder à une approbation officielle des comptes. [29] Le 22 mars, M e Walker a envoyé un courriel à M e Blackier pour l’informer que Robert était à revoir l’information et que le chèque de 10 000 $ devrait être envoyé à son attention accompagné de la quittance provisoire. M e Blackier a fait parvenir la quittance provisoire à M e Walker par courriel et l’a informé que, dès qu’il recevrait cette quittance signée, il lui enverrait le chèque.

Malheureusement, la quittance provisoire faisait état, par inadvertance, du montant de la distribution complète qui serait faite à Robert plutôt que du montant de 10 000 $, ce qui a été corrigé ultérieurement. [30] Le 13 avril 2021, M e Blackier a émis une première facture à l’intention de Michael, d’un montant de 3 200 $ plus la TVH, pour son travail d’examen de toute la documentation existante à ce jour et ses échanges préliminaires avec M e Walker. [31] En date du 14 avril, n’ayant pas eu de nouvelles de M e Walker, M e Blakier lui a envoyé un courriel pour demander la réponse de Robert.

Il a affirmé que, s’il ne recevait pas de réponse sous peu, il n’aurait d’autre choix que de procéder à une approbation officielle des comptes, ce qu’il jugeait parfaitement inutile puisque Robert disposait de tous les renseignements dont il avait besoin.

Il a noté que, s’il fallait procéder à une telle approbation des comptes, il ferait valoir que les frais associés à cette démarche devraient être payés à même la part de Robert puisque tous les autres bénéficiaires consentaient à la distribution proposée. [32] Le 4 mai, M e Blackier a confirmé à M e Walker que l’ARC avait finalement fourni les certificats de décharge et que son client pouvait maintenant procéder à la distribution définitive ainsi qu’au paiement de 10 000 $ à Robert. [33] Le même jour, M e Walker a répondu par courriel à M e Blackier pour l’informer que Robert avait changé d’idée et qu’il préférait que le paiement de son avance provisoire de 10 000 $ soit reporté et que la totalité de sa

part lui soit versée en un paiement. Il a confirmé en outre que le projet de quittance pour la distribution complète était acceptable et affirmé qu’il espérait pouvoir conclure le tout au plus tard le 25 mai, sans quoi Michael allait devoir demander l’approbation officielle des comptes.

Plus tard le même jour, M e Blackier a expédié un courriel à M e Walker et a joint à son message : 1. la confirmation du montant des fonds à distribuer; 2. un tableau relatif à la distribution où figurent les noms des bénéficiaires ainsi que les montants payés/dus à chacun; 2. un formulaire de consentement et d’approbation des comptes de la succession à être signé par chacun des bénéficiaires; 4. les quittances définitives.

[34] M e Blackier a confirmé que, lorsqu’il recevrait les documents signés, il enverrait à chaque bénéficiaire un chèque d’un montant de 74 705,40 $. En raison d’une simple erreur d’écriture, le tableau relatif à la distribution indiquait que Robert avait déjà reçu l’avance de 10 000 $. Ce montant aurait dû être inscrit sous le nom de Stephen puisque, selon le document, celui-ci n’avait pas reçu l’avance même si, dans les faits, il l’avait reçue.

Malheureusement, l’erreur n’a pas été corrigée avant que le tableau soit incorporé à l’ordonnance de la juge de la Cour des successions, d’où l’erreur de fait qui a donné lieu au nouveau moyen d’appel dont il a été question précédemment. [35] En date du 6 mai, M e Blackier n’avait toujours pas eu de nouvelles de M e Walker et il lui a fait parvenir un courriel ce jour-là proposant une échéance ferme pour mettre un terme au dossier, soit 12 h (midi) le 14 mai 2021. [36] Plus tard le 6 mai, M e Walker a envoyé un courriel à M e Blackier pour l’informer que Robert convenait qu’il fallait régler la distribution de la succession.

Il a déclaré qu’il enverrait la quittance signée par Robert à la condition qu’il reçoive le chèque de Robert d’un montant de 74 705,40 $ au plus tard le 28 mai. M e Blackier a immédiatement confirmé qu’il avait demandé que le chèque soit préparé et qu’il attendrait la quittance de Robert. Manifestement, les deux avocats ont oublié de se pencher sur l’avance de 10 000 $ que Robert n’avait pas reçue. Le dossier révèle que le chèque d’un montant de 74 705,40 $ tiré du compte de la succession à la Banque de Nouvelle-Écosse et libellé à l’ordre de Robert avait été préparé le 14 mai 2021.

Ce qui aurait dû être une transaction facile à conclure s’est enlisé dans des accusations et une absence totale de coopération et de bon sens. [37] Le 11 mai 2021, M e Walker a écrit un courriel à M e Blackier pour l’informer que Robert et lui se rendraient au cabinet de M e Blackier avant l’échéance pour remettre la quittance de Robert en échange du chèque qui revenait à ce dernier. Autrement, il faudrait procéder à une approbation des comptes. Il a confirmé que Robert avait signé la quittance.

Plus tard le même jour, M e Blackier a répondu qu’un problème d’horaires pourrait empêcher que l’échange ait lieu au plus tard le 14 mai et, dans les circonstances, il a proposé que le dossier soit réglé le 18 mai. [38] Le 13 mai, à 8 h 29, M e Blackier a envoyé un courriel à M e Walker pour lui confirmer qu’il avait en sa possession le chèque à remettre à Robert. Cependant, ses plans avaient changé et il n’était plus en mesure de les rencontrer le 14 ou le 17. Il a proposé deux options : 1. M e Walker pourrait lui faire parvenir la quittance et il lui enverrait le chèque; 2.

M e Walker pourrait rencontrer M e Blackier à son bureau le 18 pour procéder à l’échange. [39] Une série de courriels ont ensuite été échangés ce jour-là. À 11 h 8, M e Walker a informé son collègue que son client avait choisi la seconde option, mais qu’il voulait maintenant que son chèque soit certifié ou qu’il s’agisse d’un chèque en fiducie du cabinet Cox & Palmer. [40] À 11 h 32, M e Blackier a écrit un courriel à M e Walker pour se plaindre qu’il n’avait jamais été question auparavant d’un chèque certifié.

Il a ajouté que le cabinet Cox & Palmer ne disposait pas de fonds en fiducie pour payer Robert et qu’il allait devoir demander à son client de lui donner des directives supplémentaires. [41] À 12 h 13, M e Walker a expédié un courriel à M e Blackier et déclaré que, dans son courriel antérieur, il avait demandé que le paiement soit effectué par un moyen [TRADUCTION] « équivalent à du comptant », ce qui, selon lui, voulait dire un chèque certifié ou une traite bancaire ou, subsidiairement, un chèque en fiducie du cabinet.

Il a suggéré que M e Blackier demande à l’exécuteur testamentaire de faire parvenir une traite bancaire au cabinet Cox & Palmer

[…]