R. v. D.W. Date:, 2014 BCPC 36

Citation: R. v. D.W. Date: 20140228 2014 BCPC 0036 File No: 90307-1 Registry: Port Coquitlam IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA REGINA v. D.W. REASONS FOR SENTENCE OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE T. S. WOODS BAN ON PUBLICATION Pursuant to s. 486.5(1) and 486.5(2) Criminal Code of Canada Publication of any information that could identify the victim or the offender in this proceeding shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way.

Counsel for the Crown: P.W. Hogg Counsel for the Defendant: G. J. Harris, Q.C. Place of Hearing: Port Coquitlam , B.C. Date of Hearing: December 23, 2013 Date of Judgment: February 28, 2014 IntroductION [ 1 ] The offender, D.W., is before the court for sentencing on Count 1 of Information 90307-1, sworn March 18, 2013. That count charges him with the offence of assault. The offence dates are February 1-2, 2013 and the victim is D.W.’s daughter, R.H., then 11 years of age. The Crown has proceeded against D.W summarily. [ 2 ] On May 13, 2013, D.W. entered his plea of guilty to Count 1.

Counts 2 and 3 were stayed by the Crown on that same date. [ 3 ] On March 18, 2013—the date of D.W.’s his first appearance—three applications for publication bans were heard and granted. The first application, brought pursuant to s. 517(1) of the Criminal Code , restrained publication of information emanating from D.W.’s show cause hearing.

The second and third bans, imposed pursuant to ss. 486.5(1) and 486.5(2) respectively, prohibit publication of any information that could identify the victim, R.H., or the offender, D.W. [ 4 ] R.H. was born in 2002 of a relationship—a very brief one—which D.W. had with her mother. That relationship did not persist. D.W. and R.H.’s mother never lived together. Their dealings with one another following R.H.’s birth have been fraught.

However, as is his duty, D.W. has paid child support to R.H.’s mother from the outset. [ 5 ] Importantly, after pursuing contested family court proceedings in which he was eventually granted access (as it was then known), D.W. has taken an active role in cultivating and maintaining a father/daughter relationship with R.H. Access began when she was a toddler. The father/daughter relationship has revolved largely around activities, many of them sporting activities, in which the two participate together on alternating weekends. To all accounts the relationship has been mutually beneficial for D.W. and R.H.

Naturally, however, their interactions came to an end when D.W. was placed on an undertaking to have no contact with R.H. following his first appearance on his charges under Information 90307-1. Circumstances of the Offence [ 6 ] The assault against R.H. to which D.W. has entered his plea of guilty occurred in the course of a misguided attempt on D.W.’s part to administer discipline to R.H. [ 7 ] Prior to the commencement of one of his bi-weekly weekend parenting time sessions in February, 2013, R.H.’s mother advised D.W. of some behaviour problems that had been cropping up with R.H.

That first instalment of worrisome information was somewhat limited and was supplemented by a second, more detailed, instalment a short time later. [ 8 ] One thing that was reported to D.W. by R.H.’s mother in the first instalment of information was the fact that R.H. had precipitously withdrawn from the school wrestling team without advising anyone, perhaps because of poor attendance and perhaps because her behaviour had made her generally unwelcome there.

Another revelation was that R.H. had begun consorting with a “bad crowd” of older friends before and after school and had recently been involved in stealing another customer’s coffee at a Starbucks outlet. Upon hearing these reports, D.W. became very concerned. He determined that he was going to discipline R.H. for her misbehaviour through the use of corporal punishment.

There is nothing before me to suggest that he sought input from R.H.’s mother or anyone else regarding this plan. [ 9 ] After picking R.H. up for his weekend parenting time with her on February 1st and taking her to his home, D.W. summoned her from her room and told her that she must be punished for the above-mentioned misbehaviours. He directed her to stand in a particular location, bend over and touch her toes. While directing her to take up that position he struck her twice with an open hand on the side of her head.

Once she had assumed the position he had directed her to assume, D.W. struck her once on her clothed buttocks with a belt. After that took place he questioned R.H. as to whether she had engaged in any other problematic behaviour. He was assured by her that she had not. [ 10 ] That summarises the first relevant disciplinary incident which, as I have indicated, came on the heels of the first instalment of information received by D.W. about behaviour of concern on R.H.’s part. [ 11 ] Later in the evening of February 1 st , D.W. received a second instalment of worrisome information.

It reached him in an e-mail from R.H.’s mother. She expanded upon what she had first told D.W. and also advised him that R.H. had recently purchased a pocket

knife and had used it to threaten another child at school by holding it to that child’s throat. [12] D.W. determined that these new revelations called for a second round of corporal punishment. [13] Early in the morning of February 2nd, D.W. woke R.H. up and directed her back to the location in his home where he hadadministered the first blow with the belt.

Then, in essentially the same manner—but without (this time) striking her on the side of thehead—D.W. struck R.H. on her clothed buttocks again, this time with two strokes of the belt instead of one. [14] The fact that D.W. had used these methods for disciplining R.H. came to the attention of school officials on February 4th. R.H.had gotten herself into some kind of trouble at school. She took refuge in the school bathroom. When found there, she was crying. Itlater came out in a discussion with the school counselor that R.H. had been struck by D.W. with a belt a number of times the precedingweekend.

Two lateral bruises to R.H.’s lower back confirmed her account. (I pause parenthetically to note that no mention has beenmade of any markings associated with the two blows to R.H.’s head and so I proceed on the footing that the force of those blows was, bycomparison to the force of the blows inflicted by the belt, comparatively light.) The school counsellor accordingly advised the Ministryof Children and Family Development (the “Ministry”) of what R.H. had disclosed, which report, in turn, triggered an investigation thatled, eventually, to police involvement. [15] In due course, charges were laid against D.W. [16] As I shall explain in greater detail later, D.W. is a very high-ranking police official who, at the time he “disciplined” R.H., helda significant administrative position with the police in the community where he resides.

He continues as a very high-ranking policeofficial to this day, although his assignments have been somewhat curtailed on an interim basis. Internal disciplinary measures arepending and his career will remain, in some degree, in a holding pattern until all of the fallout from his actions vis à vis R.H.—bothresulting from the present prosecution and the internal disciplinary process—is fully known. [17] The fact that the Ministry had become involved came to D.W.’s attention during the evening of February 4th.

D.W. spoke withR.H.’s mother by telephone and learned that the Ministry had directed her to have R.H. examined medically. D.W. told R.H.’s motherthen that he stood by his belief that he had acted lawfully when he had spanked his daughter, and even mentioned something he recalledabout an important court decision having been given that had upheld a parent’s right to administer spankings. This, he wrongly believed,was a court decision that supported his actions. [18] The fact that the Ministry was investigating the incident nevertheless led D.W. to second-guess himself to some degree.

He didsome Internet searching on his home computer and, ultimately, located discussion there of the decision of the Supreme Court of Canadain Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 SCC 4 , [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76.

In what he read he learned that the use of an object, like a belt, as a tool for administering corporal punishment lies outside the ambit ofwhat constitutes reasonable force in disciplining children for the purposes of s. 43 of the Code. (I note, again parenthetically, that themajority judgment in Canadian Foundation also specifically provides, at para. 40, that “Discipline by the use of objects or blows orslaps to the head is unreasonable.”) Upon identifying the error in his understanding of the law, D.W. wrote a two-page e-mail to seniorcolleagues in the force.

That e-mail was filed during the course of sentencing submissions. In it D.W. provided his superiors with a“heads up” regarding what he termed a “personnel matter” which he believed “may or may not become an issue” for the force. Effect of the Offence on the Victim [19] No victim impact statement was obtained from R.H. for the purpose of D.W.’s sentencing hearing.

While the pre-sentencereport prepared in this matter contains some victim information, it did not come from R.H. herself but, rather, from R.H.’s mother—anindividual with whom D.W. has found himself in significant conflict over the years. [20] This is to be regretted. I must approach that “victim information”—coming as it does from a person who, herself, is nostranger to conflict with D.W.—with a measure of caution. [21] The pre-sentence report records that R.H.’s self esteem has diminished since the occurrence of the incidents forming the subjectmatter of D.W.’s charges.

She is said to feel less worthy and important, and to be less outgoing. R.H. is also reported to feel somelingering embarrassment and fear. [22] I believe that I can reasonably infer that the experience of being struck on the side of the head with an open hand twice, andstruck three times on the buttocks with a belt after being told to adopt a submissive posture by D.W., were both painful and humiliatingexperiences for R.H.

The fact that considerable force was used in applying the belt strokes is borne out by the bruises that were inevidence on the Monday following the Friday/Saturday when the strokes were administered. [23] All of that said, the pre-sentence report also confirms that R.H. has expressed a desire to resume contact with D.W. and fearsthat the cessation of contact with him may be “all her fault”. Circumstances of the Offender [24] D.W. is 53.

He was at the time of the offence, as I have already mentioned, a very high-ranking police official, and he remainsone today. [25] As a young man, D.W. grew up in a large family where physical discipline was commonly used, both at home and at school. This has been invoked in submissions to explain, though not excuse, his recourse to inappropriate corporal measures with R.H. [26] D.W. came close to completing a university degree with majors in mathematics and special education, but left university in1981 to pursue his police career. He has no criminal record.

The pre-sentence report confirms that neither does he have any physical ormental health problems.

[27] D.W.’s police work over more than 30 years has never brought him into contact with criminal charges laid against anyindividuals in connection with actions taken by way of disciplining their children.

He therefore approached the disciplining of R.H. onFebruary 1-2, 2013, without any special knowledge, gained through his own work as a policeman, about the limits that define whichdisciplinary measures are acceptable and which are unacceptable for use with children or pre-teens. [28] As is evidenced by the large number of testimonials and letters of support filed on his behalf in relation to his sentencing in thismatter, D.W. is held in very high regard by his colleagues and many prominent members of his local community.

Mitigating Factors [29] D.W. entered his guilty plea at a very early stage of the prosecution of the charges against him, thus sparing R.H. the need toundergo the traumatic experience of having to give Crown evidence against her father. His early guilty plea also spared the Crown, thecourt and the other witnesses who would have testified at trial the expense and inconvenience associated with the running of a trial.

Thisis a mitigating factor, as is the fact that D.W. has cooperated throughout with police, Ministry and all other authorities who have taken ahand in dealing with this unfortunate situation. [30] I have mentioned earlier that D.W. lacks a criminal record of any kind. That is a mitigating factor and I treat it as such. [31] I believe that D.W. feels remorse regarding the assaults he committed against R.H. and the effects that they have had upon her,both physically and psychologically. He is now, I believe, at a low risk of offending again.

These, too, are mitigating factors. [32] D.W. has been unusually proactive in the wake of being charged with assaulting his daughter, R.H. For example, he has writtena letter of apology to her that he looks forward to delivering once the no-contact restrictions in his undertaking are lifted. D.W. has alsotaken courses in remedial parenting. He has taken it upon himself to read broadly in the area of parental discipline in order to improvehis understanding of the appropriate techniques to employ when setting limits and then enforcing them with children.

That reading hasfocused to some degree upon corporal punishment, the reasons why parents should be slow to resort to it and the limits that divideappropriate and lawful disciplinary measures from those that are inappropriate and unlawful. [33] D.W. has also taken counselling sessions, some of them from Ministry representatives. And he has maintained a written recordof the lessons he has learned as he has proceeded to improve his parenting-related knowledge and skills.

All of this proactive effort onD.W.’s part operates in mitigation of sentence. [34] Much was said in the course of defence submissions about the professional consequences, within the force, that D.W. hasalready suffered, and those that may befall him in the future, as a result of his assault of R.H. Following the laying of charges, D.W. wasgiven different administrative duties and a different assignment with many fewer officers and staff reporting to him.

As I have noted,internal discipline has yet to be imposed but is pending. [35] I believe that these points were advanced by defence counsel for the purpose of acquainting me with the fact that D.W. hasalready suffered extra-judicial consequences for using unlawful means to discipline his daughter and that further, potentially seriousextra-judicial consequences may follow. [36] While these facts carry some mitigating force—particularly in a case of this kind where the conduct complained of is the off-duty conduct of a police officer—I also respectfully agree with the proposition that “… sentencing courts cannot be held hostage to whatemployers might do … Employers have the right to make decisions about employment; courts have a duty to impose an appropriatesentence”: See R. v.

Mand, [1999] A.J. No. 1671 (Prov. Ct.) at para. 5 and, more generally, the discussion in R. v. Lepine, 2010 ABPC374 , [2010] A.J. No. 1344 (Prov. Ct.) at paras. 25-27. Aggravating Factors [37] While there are factors that operate in mitigation of sentence in the present case—and I have just enumerated them—there areaggravating factors on foot here as well. They are a source of considerable concern to me as I seek to craft an appropriate sentence forD.W. [38] I turn first to the statutory aggravating factors. [39]

Section 718.2(a)(ii.1) of the Code identifies abuse of a person under the age of 18 as an aggravating factor. That

section isclearly engaged by the facts of this case. R.H. was only 11 when, in a misguided effort at disciplining her, D.W. subjected her to fiveseparate assaultive contacts (two open-handed blows to the head and three blows from a belt). [40]

Section 718.2(a)(iii) of the Code identifies the abuse of a position of trust or authority in relation to a victim as an aggravatingfactor. Here, again, the facts of this case engage the section. It is precisely because he is a parent and in a position of trust that D.W. hadthe authority to exercise disciplinary control over R.H. on February 1-2, 2013. He was required to employ his parental authority in amoderate way—a way that falls clearly within the limits imposed by law and, in particular, with s. 43 of the Code. He did not do so.

That is an aggravating factor. [41] I also consider that the fact that D.W. is a police officer to be aggravating factor for the purposes of s. 718.2(a)(iii) of the Code. Police officers—by reason of their special powers and status in society—stand in a position of trust or authority relative to society atlarge and each of its members, including (in this case) R.H., D.W.’s own daughter. If I am wrong in that view, I still believe it is

appropriate for me to consider D.W.’s status as a police officer as an aggravating factor at common law. [42] To be sure, D.W. committed the subject assaults while he was off duty. I have not lost sight of that fact. But, for the reasons Igave in R. v. Tsui, [2008] B.C.J. No. 1096 (Prov. Ct.), I believe that even while off-duty, police officers can and must be held to a higherstandard than would ordinary members of the public in the same circumstances.

My opinions in this regard are summarised in paragraph39 of Tsui: “… [M]embers of certain privileged callings (including policing) who have special powers and authority do not live their on-duty andoff-duty lives in airtight compartments; rather, the benefits and responsibilities that are associated with their authority and statustranscend to some degree the hours when they are directly engaged in their day-to-day work.

Thus a lawyer is still a lawyer when shewrites a letter to the editor of a newspaper, or carries out fundraising activities on behalf of a non-profit society, or when she consumesalcoholic drinks at a hotel lounge or in her car. Similarly a police constable is still a police constable when he coaches his son's soccerteam, or speaks at a town meeting, or when he meets with his friends to socialise at a restaurant.

If the conduct that the individual withspecial status displays on these occasions attracts scrutiny and is found ultimately to be wanting, I can see no principled basis forexcluding the individual's special status from the analysis simply because what happened, happened on off hours.” [43] The principles reflected in this reasoning in Tsui were approved by Dillon J. in R. v. Robinson, [2012] B.C.J. No. 1578 (S.C.) atpara. 14. See also, generally, R. v. Cusack, (NS CA), [1978] N.S.J. No. 538 (N.S.S.C.-A.D.), R. v. Messer, [2012]N.B.J. No. 367 (Q.B.), R. v. Gillan, [2009] B.C.J. No. 1528 (Prov. Ct.), R. v.

D.E.D., [2007] A.J. No. 1531 (Q.B.) and R. v. Wallator,[1994] A.J. No. 194 (Prov. Ct.). [44] While, at common law, the use of violence when committing an offence is treated as an aggravating factor, the use of violenceby D.W. against R.H. constitutes the essence of the offence to which D.W. has entered his guilty plea.

I do not therefore consider itappropriate to invoke violence per se under the rubric of aggravating factors because the entire sentencing process upon which I haveembarked is concerned, in the round, with the commission of a violent offence by D.W. against his daughter. [45] At common law, the use of a weapon when committing an offence is treated as an aggravating factor. I appreciate that D.W.has pleaded guilty to the offence of what used to be known as “common assault” and not assault with a weapon.

I have indeed beenadvised by Crown counsel that the two charges of assault with a weapon have previously been stayed. I am thus quite clear that I amnow sentencing D.W. for assault simpliciter. But the fact that he employed a belt to administer three of the five blows which haveattracted criminal charges takes D.W.’s case outside the boundaries of what the Supreme Court of Canada in the Canadian Foundationcase identified as acceptable child discipline. As was Judge Stevens-Guile in R. v. L.E.Z., [2010] A.J. No. 1516 (Prov. Ct.), aff’d onother grounds, [2012] A.J.

No. 72 (C.A.), I am satisfied that the use of a belt by D.W. in a humiliating disciplinary encounter with R.H.that has been prosecuted under s. 266 as assault simpliciter can be viewed as an aggravating factor at common law. I treat it as such forthe purpose of sentencing D.W. [46] Planning and premeditation of a criminal offence is considered an aggravating factor at common law.

The Crown has submittedthat consciously choosing to rely upon such a primitive and ill-considered method of violent discipline as striking a child on the headwith an open hand and on the buttocks with a belt brings the notions of planning and premeditation into play. Counsel for D.W. takes adifferent view. He was careful to convey to the court the fact that in using certain corporal means for disciplining R.H.—that is, blows tothe buttocks with a belt—D.W. was not acting in the heat of the moment but was, rather, applying a “calculated approach” that wasprogressive in nature.

Indeed, he likened D.W.’s conception of how physical discipline can properly escalate—where the number ofblows increases as more, or more serious, problematical behaviours came to light—to the step principle that some mistakenly believeguides sentencing judges in passing sentence in all situations: cf. R. v.

McPherson, 2013 BCCA 551 at para. 16. [47] I will say here that I have difficulty with the general thrust of those defence submissions. [48] While I would not go so far as to say that by proceeding quite intentionally to apply an entirely inappropriate, uninformed andmisguided approach to disciplining one’s child (as D.W. did here), an offender necessarily brings into play planning and premeditationas an aggravating factor, neither do I believe that it would be a stretch to view a matter like this one in that way.

A momentary lapse bya parent who struggles to manage an unruly temper when under provocation as a parent is not necessarily more troubling, for sentencingpurposes, than is the purposeful choice of a manifestly inappropriate display of violence toward a child that is predicated upon amisconceived and untested view of which disciplinary measures are lawful and which are not. Depending upon the circumstances, themomentary lapse could be seen as being less troubling: see, in this regard, the reasoning found at para. 27ff of R. v. Marks, (NL CA), [1994] N.J. No. 241 (C.A.) cited with approval in R. v.

M.G.J., [2012] B.C.J. No. 1920 (S.C.). Crown Position on Sentence [49] The Crown submits that the appropriate sanction for the court to impose upon D.W. in the circumstances of this case would bea three-month conditional sentence order with relatively skeletal substantive terms—that is, a requirement that D.W. undertake furthercounselling and that his reintroduction to R.H. be supervised during the initial sessions. No probation period to follow the conditionalsentence order was recommended. Crown counsel handed up a brief of some 15 authorities accompanied by a

summary sheet for me toconsider. I have read all of those cases. They are: R. v. N.E. 2010 ONCJ 513 , [2010] O.J. No. 4745 (S.C.J.) R. v. M.R. [1996] O.J. No. 1725 (Prov. Ct.) R. v. Dupperon, [1984] S.J. No. 939 (Sask. C.A.)

R. v. Grant, [1986] B.C.J. No. 384 (C.A.) R. v. Smith, [2010] N.B.J. No. 44 (Q.B.) R. v. Meyers, [1995] P.E.I.J. No. 180 (Prov. Ct.) R. v. Bielenik [1999] O.J. No. 4104 (Prov. Ct.) R. v. Young, 2007 NLTD 96 , [2007] N.J. No. 185 (S.C.-T.D.) R. v. L.E.Z., [2010] A.J. No. 1516 (Prov. Ct.) R. v. Harris, [2011] A.J. No. 93 (C.A.) R. v. Messer, [2012] N.B.J. No. 367 (Q.B.) R. v. Cusack, (NS CA), [1978] N.S.J. No. 538 (S.C.-A.D.) R. v. Gillan, [2009] B.C.J. No. 1528 (Prov. Ct.) R. v. Tsui, [2008] B.C.J. No. 1096 (Prov. Ct.) R. v. D.E.D. , [2007] A.J.

No. 1531 (Q.B.) [50] Crown counsel acknowledged that his position on sentence was influenced by the voluminous materials filed on D.W.’s behalfshowing the level of community support he has received; he also acknowledged D.W.’s extensive, proactive efforts to enlarge hisknowledge in the area of child discipline.

Defence Position on Sentence [51] Counsel for D.W. argues that his client is a proper candidate for a conditional discharge, contending that the substantive termsby which he should be bound over the course of a 12-month probation order should include a requirement that reintegration of D.W. withR.H. be coordinated by D.W.’s probation officer and that D.W. should, perhaps, write a report about what he has learned from thisexperience for the benefit of other police officers. [52] No defence authorities were provided; however, counsel for D.W. drew my attention to ways in which a number of the casesfound in the Crown’s brief could be distinguished from the case at bar.

Purposes, Objectives and Principles of Sentencing [53] In R. v. Pommer, [2008] B.C.J. No. 1056 (S.C.), D.M. Smith J. (as she then was) provided a remarkably concise butnevertheless comprehensive, two-paragraph

summary of the purposes, objectives and principles of sentencing as set out in ss. 718, 718.1and 718.2 of the Code which I respectfully adopt for present purposes. The

summary is found in paras. 42-43 and reads as follows: “The "normative" principles of sentence are set out in ss. 718, 718.1, and 718.2 of the Criminal Code (see R. v. L.M., 2008 SCC 31).

Thefundamental purpose of sentencing is to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance ofa just and peaceful society by imposing fair sanctions that reflect the objectives of sentencing as identified in s. 718 of the CriminalCode: to denounce unlawful conduct; to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences; to separate offenders fromsociety, where necessary; to assist in rehabilitating offenders; to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and topromote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgement of the harm done to victims and to the community.

Section 718.1 sets out the fundamental principle that a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree ofresponsibility of the offender.

Section 718.2 lists other sentencing principles to be considered including aggravating or mitigatingcircumstances relating to the offence or the offender, evidence that the offender in committing the offence abused the offender's spouseor a position of trust in relation to the victim; that a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similaroffences committed in similar circumstances; an offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may beappropriate in the circumstances; and all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should beconsidered.” Is a Conditional Discharge an Appropriate Sentence for D.W.? [54] Crown counsel has argued against the proposition that D.W. be conditionally discharged, stating that he believes that theplanned and deliberate nature of D.W.’s offences against R.H. tips the balance away from a discharge and toward a conditional sentenceorder.

He also emphasised, however, that the range of sanctions is broad in the cases he tendered to the court and he volunteered that hebelieves a conditional discharge is available in a case of this kind. [55] Insofar as ss. 718.2(

d) and 718.2(e), respectively, provide that an offender ought not to be deprived of liberty if less restrictivesanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances, and that all available sanctions other than imprisonment should be considered for alloffenders, I believe that the analysis I undertake here should first focus upon the least restrictive alternative sentencing option with whichI have been presented—the conditional discharge.

That option, urged upon me by D.W.’s counsel, is one that, unlike any form ofimprisonment—including a term of imprisonment served in the community—would not deprive D.W. of his liberty and, thus, should beutilised if “appropriate in the circumstances”. [56] D.W. is an individual, not an organisation, and the minimum punishment for assault simpliciter is not 14 years or more. Thus,on the language of s. 730(1) of the Code—provided I consider it to be in the best interests of D.W., and not contrary to the public interest

—there is no statutory impediment to my discharging him conditionally as his counsel bids me do. In proceeding with the analysis inrespect of those latter factors, I am guided by the decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in R. v. Fallofield (1973), (BC CA), 13 C.C.C. (2d) 450 (B.C.C.A.), the many decisions that have followed in its wake and the cases which arespecifically on point and to which I shall shortly make reference. Would a Discharge Serve D.W.’s Interests? [57] There is little room for argument that D.W.’s interests would be served by being discharged as opposed to convicted ofassaulting R.H.

That much is quite clear. As the materials filed on his behalf show, D.W. is a person of demonstrable good characterwithout any previous convictions. He represents a low risk for reoffending and probationary conditions would be sufficient to addresshis needs for specific deterrence and rehabilitation. Thus, a conviction is not required to serve either of those sentencing objectives. Iam also persuaded that the entry of a conviction against D.W. could produce serious, adverse repercussions for him.

Would a Discharge be Contrary to the Public Interest? [58] The more vexing question—here, as in most cases—is whether a decision to sentence D.W. with a discharge would be contraryto the public interest. [59] I commence my analysis with a statement of principle, found in binding authority, which speaks to the general approach to betaken by courts in this province to offences involving violence against children.

The statement can be found in the decision of AndersonJ.A. (Taggart J.A. concurring) in Grant who held, at p. 4 (Quicklaw pagination) as follows: “... [A]s a general rule in cases involving violence to children, the principles relating to general deterrence must apply and a period ofincarceration will be imposed. Defenceless children must be protected by the courts.” [60] This reasoning has been invoked in a number of subsequent cases. Though it flows out of a decision given over 25 years ago, itstill retains some of its general application: see, for example, R. v. J.S., [1993] B.C.J. No. 202 (S.C.), R. v.

D.P.J., [2004] B.C.J. No.2909 (S.C.), R. v. Smythe, [1989] B.C.J. No. 1592 (C.A.), R. v. D.L.M., [2001] B.C.J. No. 1053 (C.A.), R. v. A.M., 2000 BCSC 803, [2000] B.C.J. No. 1325 (S.C.) and R. v. Chaulk, [1995] N.J. No. 129 (Nfld. S.C.-T.D.). However, the subsequent case lawnoted above also acknowledges that the disciplinary spankings and other physical assaults administered by the accused in Grant were—though they did not cause fractures or other internal injuries—nevertheless particularly heavy-handed, leaving the child with “very, veryextensive” bruising and requiring that she be hospitalised (see p. 2).

Though some have involved more egregious parental misconduct,not all sentencing cases that have come along since Grant in which child mistreatment has been at issue, including the case at bar,resemble that aspect of the Grant facts. Moreover, as Truscott J. noted in D.P.J., Grant predated the incorporation of conditionalsentence order provisions into the Code and should not, therefore, be read in more modern times as necessarily precluding lessersanctions than “real jail”.

All of this requires that in considering the general rule associated with Grant, sentencing judges must take anuanced, fact-sensitive approach when dealing with offenders like D.W. [61] Having regard to the jurisprudence overall, including that which invokes the general rule articulated in Grant, I recognise that inpractice—while the courts continue to display an inclination to incarcerate those who commit violent offences against children in order toserve adequately the objectives of denunciation and deterrence—the cases also show that other sanctions, including conditional sentenceorders and discharges, have been and continue to be imposed in such cases in appropriate circumstances. [62] I have already observed, above, that—notwithstanding that in this case I am sentencing D.W. for assault simpliciter—I doconsider the fact that he used a belt to administer three of the five blows he administered to R.H. to be an aggravating factor.

Otherjudges have done so: see L.E.Z. That said, a number of the Crown authorities regarding excessive disciplinary measures used by parentsthat were presented to me flow out of cases where the offence for which the offenders were being sentenced was assault with a weapon. They include N.E., M.R., and Harris. That alone, coupled with the fact that the extent of the injuries in those cases was generally moresevere, renders those decisions distinguishable from the case at bar. I do note, however, that of the three latter-mentioned assault with aweapon cases, only one led to a sentence of “real jail”.

Another led to a conditional sentence order and the third led to a suspendedsentence. [63] Similarly, Crown authorities like Grant and Smith—decided as they were in relation to assault causing bodily harm offences—are also distinguishable from the case at bar on that and other grounds. [64] While Gillan involved an assault simpliciter committed by an off-duty police officer, it is factually distinguishable in a numberof important ways that limit its applicability here.

The assault in question in Gillan was a gratuitous one committed against a civilian bythe accused and two-off duty colleagues, all of them intoxicated, who “purported to arrest [the complainant] using police powers andtechniques”. The victim suffered soft tissue injuries to many areas of his body. [65] Dupperon is an assault simpliciter case decided in 1984 in which the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal upheld a sentence of a$400 fine plus 18 months of probation for the father of a 13-year-old boy with emotional difficulties.

The offender in that case struck hisson with a belt on the bare buttocks approximately 10 times, leaving four or five large bruises. The Court of Appeal viewed thedisciplinary action of the father as amounting to a “severe beating” (para. 32) that went well beyond what could be justified under s. 43 ofthe Code. This sets Dupperon apart from the case at bar on its facts, as does the offender’s prior record of violent crime including aconviction for assault causing bodily harm. [66] In Young, the charge was also assault simpliciter.

The offender before the court for sentencing struck his daughter once with anopen hand on the buttocks (after ripping her nightclothes off) and once with a belt. Both of these assaults were imposed, inexplicably, asdisciplinary consequences for bed wetting. Neither caused “significant physical harm” to the victim and the offender’s conduct overallwas characterised as falling at the “lower end of the range of physical assaults” (para. 7).

The offender in Young—who (unlike D.W.)had a lengthy criminal record including a prior conviction for assault—received a two-month conditional sentence order and two years ofprobation for assaulting his daughter. The controversy between Crown and defence in Young appears to have been limited largely to thequestion of whether the offender should be incarcerated conventionally or in the community. Nor surprisingly, given the offender’s

lengthy record, the court does not appear to have been asked to consider the possibility of a discharge. [ 67 ] L.E.Z. is another assault simpliciter case in which both of the 14-year-old victim’s parents participated in striking her on the buttocks with a belt. The facts in that case are rather unusual. After having been grabbed by the hair and conducted to her room, the daughter was forced into a lying position, presumably on the bed or the floor, whereupon the father held her legs over her head while the mother administered at least three blows to her “exposed bottom” with a belt.

The court treated this particular method of disciplining a 14-year-old as an aggravating circumstance, describing it as “degrading”. [ 68 ] Noting, among other things, that the father in L.E.Z. showed no remorse, the sentencing judge rejected a submission that the parents should be discharged, saying that to do so would not be in the public interest, given the facts. In the result, both parents received a time-served sentence. Three days in actual custody was, on a two-for-one basis, credited as a week in jail.

It does appear that, before being dismissed, the offenders’ counsel had expressed an intention to make submissions in favour of a conditional discharge (see para. 25). However, as can be seen, that was not the outcome. I nevertheless infer that the court had that option in mind, but rejected it, in imposing the time served sentence it did in L.E.Z. No analysis with respect to the rejection of the discharge option was presented. [ 69 ] L.E.Z. bears some similarities to the case at bar.

While less “degrading,” I do not think it unfair to describe the manner in which D.W. disciplined R.H.—by manoeuvring her into position twice, once with open-handed blows to the side of the head and once without, and then requiring her to touch her toes so her buttocks could be struck with a belt—as being, if not degrading, then, at least humiliating. But, the contrasting elements are the more salient ones.

Unlike the father, particularly, in L.E.Z. , in the case at bar D.W. is demonstrably remorseful and has gone to extraordinary lengths to address his need for counselling and the deficiencies in his knowledge of proper methods of child discipline. [ 70 ] One of the cases cited to me in the Crown’s authorities has been of particular assistance to me in answering the central question on this sentencing, that question being: Would it be contrary to the public interest to discharge D.W. on the facts of this case? That case is D.E.D.

While each of the other cases has acknowledged similarities to the case at bar, each also has striking distinguishing features and none truly grapple with the public interest aspect of the test for granting a conditional discharge in a sufficiently comparable context to offer much guidance. [ 71 ] D.E.D. is a decision of Rooke J. of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench sitting on an appeal of a Provincial Court sentencing decision. D.E.D. is closer, factually, to the case at bar than many of the other cases cited to me.

The offender there was a police officer of long standing and good reputation who pleaded guilty to assaulting his daughter and uttering a threat to one of her friends. The assaults against the daughter consisted first of a “cuff” to the head. The sentencing judge defined a “cuff” as a “blow, strength undetermined, by a hand or arm usually to the side of the head or some fashion” (para 11).

The cuff to the head was followed, later, by the offender taking hold of his daughter’s neck and pushing her back onto a blanket on the bed where she was sitting and holding her there for a period of a few seconds (without restricting her breathing). While clearly inappropriate, these actions were viewed by the court in D.E.D. on the evidence as falling near the low end of the continuum of assaultive behaviours that come before the courts. [ 72 ] Rooke J. vacated the conditional sentence order made by the sentencing judge in D.E.D. and substituted a one-year conditional discharge in its place.

In doing so, his Lordship recognised the line of authority that acknowledges that for the purposes of assessing the suitability of a discharge, “public interest” is not cognate with “public concern” and that in serving the public interest, a sentencing judge is called upon to look beyond denunciation and general deterrence. I respectfully agree with that analysis. [ 73 ] The reasoning of Rooke J. in D.E.D. also contains a caution against placing excessive emphasis upon the offender’s status as a police officer as an aggravating factor: see paras. 67-68 and 82-84 particularly.

And there is also a caution against placing insufficient emphasis upon the impact that a sentence will have on an offender’s career: see paras. 71-73. These are both, in my respectful opinion, salutary cautions that I mean to heed in sentencing D.W. [ 74 ] The court in D.E.D. was unquestionably influenced by the fact that the offender in that case had, of his own motion, sought out counselling shortly after the incident and had profited from the sessions he had taken: see para. 93.

This same factor is present for my consideration in the case at bar. [ 75 ] I find myself in respectful agreement with the approach taken overall by Rooke J. in D.E.D. and I consider that I can take substantial guidance from it for present purposes. [ 76 ] I have also found, in the decision of Nemirsky, P.C.J. in R. v. A.G. , [2005] A.J. No. 1226 (Prov. Ct.) , some very helpful guidance. [ 77 ] A.G. is not, of course, on all fours with the case at bar. No case is.

It differs in certain respects from the present case but, like D.E.D. , it resembles it rather closely in others. [ 78 ] Importantly, the court in A.G. was faced, as am I, with a police officer who pleaded guilty to committing assault simpliciter against a member of his family during an argument. The officer was off duty and his victim was his wife. [ 79 ] The assaultive behaviour of the offender in A.G. were unquestionably more egregious than were those of D.W. toward R.H.

After throwing a bar stool onto the floor and threatening to upend a kitchen table, the offender in A.G. took his wife by the hair, bent her head backward and struck her on the face. This all occurred in the presence of their infant daughter. [ 80 ] Like D.W., the offender in A.G. had no criminal record, pleaded guilty to the charge against him and was held in very high esteem by his police employers and by his community.

And like D.W., by the time sentencing took place the offender had made extraordinary proactive efforts to get counselling and assistance with his anger management and relationship issues. [ 81 ] Unlike D.W. in the case at bar, the offender in A.G. acted impulsively and in the heat of the moment. D.W., it will be recalled, calculated to cause his daughter to suffer pain out of an ill-informed and misguided understanding of what constitutes proper and lawful child discipline.

[ 82 ] In A.G. , by the time of sentencing the offender and his spouse had reconciled, in part because of the progress the offender had made as a result of the counselling and training he had undertaken. While there is no direct factual parallel with the reconciliation aspect in the case at bar, I do note that everyone in the present case envisions a gradual reintroduction of D.W. to R.H. once sentencing has been completed.

That consensus has been made possible by the progress D.W. has made in the past months, and (as the pre-sentence report confirms) R.H.—though somewhat wary—wants reconciliation to happen. [ 83 ] In A.G. , Nemirsky P.C.J. was faced with Crown and defence submissions in which counsel agreed that a 12 to 15-month probation order was appropriate but in which Crown urged the court to impose a suspended sentence and defence urged the imposition of a conditional discharge.

Much of the reasoning in the decision is focused upon the question of whether the granting of a conditional discharge in the circumstances of that case would be contrary to the public interest. [ 84 ] In coming, after anxious consideration, to the conclusion that a conditional discharge was appropriate, the court in A.G. acknowledged the prevalence of spousal assaults in society and their serious nature. (I digress to say that instances of physical abuse of children may not be as prevalent as spousal assaults but they are treated every bit as seriously, as the presumptive position stated in Grant plainly shows.) Nevertheless, while recognising that having committed such an offence, the offender in A.G. had made himself an “unlikely candidate for a discharge short of some exceptional circumstances being shown,” (para. 374), Nemirsky P.C.J. ultimately concluded that exceptional circumstances had been shown in the case before him.

In this regard, his Honour said this about the offender before him: “But of greatest import in my view is the fact that almost immediately after committing the assault he arranged for and took and continues to take counseling for his anger management issues and as well and together with his wife, couples’ counseling. He appears to have put legitimate effort into the counseling given the positive reports by his wife and one of his therapist as to his progress.

Reports that one would not expect had the counseling been undertaken on anything less than a bonafide basis.” (at para. 379) [ 85 ] One cannot but see a parallel between what was acknowledged in the court’s reasoning about the offender in A.G. in that passage and what is stated near the end of D.W.’s pre-sentence report: “With respect to the offence [D.W.] has accepted responsibility for his actions and expressed remorse for his behavior. He has attended two parenting programs and read several books on discipline.

He has been attending counseling twice a month with [a psychologist], through his work benefits, and plans to continue. He has asked three of his friends to act as peer mentors so he can go to them with any parenting concerns he may have. He is prepared to offer the same services to his daughter if she wants counseling. He would like to be able to see his daughter again. [D.W.]’s daughter [R.H.] has expressed a desire to be able to see her father but is apprehensive about her first visit.

Her mother agrees it would be a good idea if she had a few individual sessions with [D.H.]s counselor and then some joint sessions before their visits resume. Considering the effort that [D.W.] has put into addressing his parenting issues the court may wish to consider a period of community supervision …” [ 86 ] I believe that, like the offender sentenced by Nemirsky P.C.J. in A.G. , and the offender sentenced by Rooke J. in D.E.D. , D.W. requires exceptional circumstances to be established before I can be satisfied that it would not be contrary to the public interest to discharge him conditionally.

But, for the reasons I have given above, I also believe that D.W. has been shown—largely through his prompt and diligent efforts to get to the root of the underlying problem of his having an almost unimaginably primitive understanding of child disciplinary procedures—to have proven himself to be worthy, exceptionally, of being sentenced by way of a conditional discharge for having committed an offence that involved the use of violence against a child.

This, in other words, is one of those cases in which I believe that the general rule in Grant must yield in the face of unique circumstances. [ 87 ] In reaching that conclusion I have, inter alia , been mindful of the serious but comparatively less severe nature of the assaults committed by D.W. and the potential professional implications that a conviction for that off-duty conduct could have for him. I have also been mindful, without over-emphasising it, of D.W.’s status as a police officer and the special duties and obligations that govern him both when he is on duty and off duty.

After analysing these and all of the other considerations to which I have referred above I have come to the conclusion that a conditional discharge linked to a properly crafted, 14-month probation order would be proportionate to the gravity of D.W.’s offending conduct and to his considerable degree of responsibility for it.

I hasten to say that the probation order is a key feature of this sentence; the potential it has to further the important rehabilitative steps that D.W. has already taken furnishes an important reason why I prefer the conditional discharge sanction over a three-month conditional sentence order with no probation as recommended by the Crown. [ 88 ] Being cognisant of the requirement that I make use of a less restrictive sanction and avoid imposing a custodial sentence if, in the circumstances, a less restrictive sanction would be appropriate, I have also concluded for the reasons given above that a conditional discharge linked to a properly crafted, 14-month probation order for D.W. would: (

a) fulfill the purpose for sentencing prescribed by Parliament in s. 718; (

b) adequately denounce D.W.’s assaultive conduct; (

c) serve to deter both D.W. and others from assaulting their children in the course of pursuing misguided disciplinary tactics with them; (

d) promote a better and higher understanding on D.W.’s part of appropriate child discipline techniques and the legal and other limits that govern them (a rehabilitative objective); and (

e) be broadly consistent with the sentencing approach taken in other cases that are most clearly comparable, on their facts, to this case involving D.W. [ 89 ] Accordingly, I now turn to the conditions that will govern during the course of D.W.’s 14-month period of discharge-related

probation. TERMS OF PROBATION ORDER [ 90 ] The following conditions will govern during the 14 months when D.W. will be on probation. If D.W. complies fully with those conditions, then at the conclusion of the probationary period, his discharge will be perfected. After outlining the terms, I will provide some further information about the rationales that have guided me to impose certain of them. 1. You must keep the peace and be of good behavior and report to court as and when you are required to do so. 2.

Forthwith upon attending at the court registry to sign your probation order, you must report to a probation officer at 2610 Mary Hill Road, Port Coquitlam, and then you must report thereafter as, when and in the manner directed by your probation officer. 3. You must provide your probation officer with your residential address and telephone number and not change either without obtaining the written consent of your probation officer. 4.

You shall enroll in, participate in and complete to the satisfaction of your instructors and probation officer such further training and instruction, including training and instruction in effective behavior management and disciplinary methods, as your probation officer directs.

This further training and instruction shall include, at minimum, one comprehensive and detailed, one-semester college/university level credit course which is aimed at equipping participants with an in-depth, practical grasp of effective strategies and techniques which are appropriate for setting and enforcing reasonable behavioural limits for challenging teenagers and youth. 5. You shall enroll in, participate in and complete to the satisfaction of your probation officer such further counselling as your probation officer directs. 6.

Prior to resuming parenting time with R.H., you shall devise a reconciliation plan to guide the gradual resumption of that parenting time with R.H. That plan shall be devised in consultation with R.H.’s mother and a Ministry representative. It must in turn be approved in writing by the Ministry and your probation officer prior to its implementation. 7. You must, by July 2, 2014, write and deliver to your probation officer, two copies of a fully researched and carefully written

article of a minimum length of 1,500 words entitled, “The Off-duty Conduct of Police Officers: What Every Canadian Constable Should Know”. The

article shall comprehensively review and analyse the Canadian cases that speak to and rule upon criminal offences committed by off- duty police officers, the range of sanctions imposed for those offences and the standards to which police officers are held when they are sentenced for the off-duty offences they commit. One copy of the

article is for retention by your probation officer in your probation file and the other copy is for forwarding to the Provincial Court at Port Coquitlam, marked to the attention of your sentencing judge. In the event that you choose to otherwise disseminate or publish the

article (and I make no order or direction requiring you to do so), you shall first obtain legal advice confirming that, in the course of disseminating or publishing your

article or both, no information that could identify R.H. or yourself is published, broadcast or transmitted in any way. [ 91 ] The rationale behind these probationary terms is, in most respects, plainly self-evident.

I will, however, make a few comments about certain of those terms. [ 92 ] While D.W. has already taken some proactive steps to obtain counselling and instruction with regard to dealing appropriately and effectively with behavioural challenges in children, I do believe that there is a need for more and, in particular, more that focuses upon the challenges that teenagers and youth present to their parents in terms of limit-setting and enforcement. R.H. is growing into her teenage years and there are already some signs to suggest that she may in future require particularly skilled handling.

I wish to do all I can in a probation order to ensure that, as challenges of new kinds and dimensions arise, D.W. is equipped as best he can be to fully overcome the ignorance and bad judgment that led him to strike R.H. twice on the head with an open hand and then administer three blows to her buttocks with a belt on February 1-2, 2013. [ 93 ] I will also say—without meaning to take anything away from the considerable efforts D.W. has made to date—that some of the materials placed before me in connection with his sentencing have left me with a lingering concern about the depth of D.W.’s insight into the offence he committed.

Even as late as when he was being interviewed by the pre-sentence report writer he was harkening back to his own childhood and the outmoded and primitive practices that were current then and to which he was made subject within his own family. He invoked those practices, I believe, as partial justification for his own actions in disciplining R.H. in the way he did. For example, at page 4 of that report, D.W.’s probation officer wrote: “When he [D.W.] thinks back about the way he was brought up he felt it was okay to spank and he had heard that case law said it was okay for a parent to spank their child.

He just was not aware you could not have something in your hand when spanking.” [ 94 ] D.W. was brought up in the 1960s. It is evident to most citizens of his generation, I believe, that in terms of child discipline the world has turned quite a few times on its axis since then. It is, frankly, difficult to understand how more enlightened thinking about child discipline can have escaped his notice, for all the years that have passed between his childhood in the 1960s and early 2013. But, somehow, it did, even though D.W. has been a policeman since 1981 and a parent since 2002.

It was and remains incumbent upon D.W. to be more attentive to the ways in which things have changed in the world of parenting than, apparently he was and, perhaps, still is— first because he is a parent and second because, as a police officer, he is duty bound to know and uphold the law, not only while on the job but in all areas of his quotidian life.

The fact that tactics that are widely seen as unacceptable today may have been seldom questioned in days gone by does not excuse a person for employing those unacceptable tactics today out of rank ignorance. [ 95 ] It is also worth emphasising that this case is also not solely focused upon D.W.’s use of a belt to strike his daughter.

That is a very important fact indeed but his approach overall—beginning with fashioning a corporal punishment plan for use on R.H. premised on outmoded thinking and without satisfying himself of the appropriateness or the lawfulness of the plan—is what has come in for sanction in these proceedings. If D.W. had been following the evolution of contemporary thinking about managing challenging child behaviour —which (I add) has been a very public and visible evolution—he would not have done what he did to R.H. on February 1-2, 2013. If he

had read the Canadian Foundation case before proceeding instead of just relying upon a faulty memory of what it stands for he would have quickly discovered that not only did the court disapprove the use of objects like belts as disciplinary weapons; it also acknowledged the wide consensus among experts that “[c]orporal punishment should never involve a slap or blow to the head” (at para. 17). [ 96 ] Even after he knew trouble was brewing when the incident with R.H. came to the attention of the Ministry, D.W. seems (at first at least) to have been more inclined to defend and try to justify his actions than reflect upon and revisit his outlook regarding child discipline. [ 97 ] This is a matter of some concern. [ 98 ] I note, for example, that there is little apparent self-doubt or contrition in the e-mail he sent on February 5, 2013 to his superiors to “give [them] a heads up on a personnel matter that may or may not become an issue [at the police department]” (underlining in original).

In that e-mail he advised his superiors that he “did not take the decision to spank [his] daughter lightly” (at p. 1) and reported that, when he was told by R.H.’s mother that she had been directed by the Ministry to have R.H. examined medically, he said this: “… I told her I stood by my decision to discipline my daughter, as I believed from the news story, that corporal punishment is acceptable and recently upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada … I was NOT aware that in the decision a Justice outlined that spanking with a bare hand is acceptable but spanking with a belt is not.

I am not sure I see the difference but I certainly would not have used a belt had I known about the specifics of the ruling …” (at p. 2, capitalising and underlining in original) [ 99 ] D.W.’s probation officer also notes on page 4 of her pre-sentence report that: “[D.W.] never would have done it if he knew it was illegal as it was a career ending decision. [D.W.] reports he would never intentionally hurt his daughter .” (emphasis added) [ 100 ] D.W. cannot be faulted for taking steps to address underlying issues with one eye to the implications such steps may have for the sentencing process and for the preservation of his career.

But the materials I have quoted above, including the reference to a “career ending decision” to discipline R.H. with a belt, has raised a concern in my mind that D.W.’s regrets and concerns about the implications of this unhappy situation for him personally and professionally may be more in the foreground of his thinking than they should be. And, as to whether he would ever intentionally hurt his daughter, of course he intended on February 2 nd and then on February 3 rd to cause pain to his daughter.

The spankings were clearly intended by him to be corporally punitive and thereby motivate R.H. to change her behaviour to avoid more such spankings. [ 101 ] All of this tells me, notwithstanding all the work he has done to date, that D.W. will gain from having still better insight into himself, his instincts and the limitations (past and present) of his parenting skills and knowledge. He will also benefit from having a broader repertoire of disciplinary options to draw upon in the future.

It is to be hoped and expected that such counselling and further instruction will equip him with a more progressive and enlightened perspective concerning what are now regarded as rather primitive and outmoded approaches to child discipline—approaches which are based on the intentional infliction of pain.

This is important, especially given the greater challenges that likely lie ahead as R.H. enters adolescence. [ 102 ] It is for all of these reasons that I have stipulated that the considerable work that D.W. has done already to obtain counselling and upgrade himself in the child discipline area needs to continue throughout the time when his 14-month probationary order is in effect. [ 103 ] Lastly, I have stipulated that D.W. prepare an

article that surveys the law regarding off-duty, criminal conduct on the part of police officers because I believe he will benefit directly, and R.H. will benefit indirectly, if he brings his knowledge up to a high level on that subject.

The process of researching the law and then analysing it and setting it down in an organised and coherent way should— along with the counselling gains and the learning that D.W. will continue to do in the areas of child and youth discipline—equip him with a reliable platform of relevant knowledge and insight from which he can then operate effectively and humanely in the years ahead. CONCLUDING COMMENTS [ 104 ] I will close these reasons for sentence by saying that I have every hope and, indeed, every expectation that this will be the last time D.W. appears before a criminal court as an accused for any reason.

If I believed there was any meaningful risk that he might reoffend in any way similar to the way he offended on February 1 st and 2nd, I would not have discharged him. [ 105 ] I urge him to embark on his term of probation, and in particular on the counselling and learning tasks that are built into it, with his mind open to the rehabilitative potential of his probationary order and with a will to apply his new learning in the coming years— years that will undoubtedly present new parenting challenges but that can also be fulfilling for D.W. and R.H. as they work together to restore their relationship and move past this unhappy

chapter in their lives. [ 106 ] Those are my reasons for sentence. _________________________ Thomas S. Woods, P.C.J.