2018 QCCA 317, 2018 QCCA 317

Gutin c. Cenfood International Inc. 2018 QCCA 317 COURT OF APPEAL CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC REGISTRY OF MONTREAL No: 500-09-025881-160 (500-17-073528-120) DATE: FEBRUARY 28, 2018 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE MARIE-FRANCE BICH, J.A. MANON SAVARD, J.A. ROBERT M. MAINVILLE, J.A. ANATOLI GUTIN APPELLANT / INCIDENTAL RESPONDENT – Plaintiff v. CENFOOD INTERNATIONAL INC.

RESPONDENT / INCIDENTAL APPELLANT – Defendant JUDGMENT [ 1 ] On appeal and incidental appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court, District of Montreal (the Honourable Madam Justice Francine Nantel), rendered on January 11, 2016, dismissing the appellant’s claim, partially granting the respondent’s cross-application and ordering the former to pay $200,000 in compensatory damages to the latter, with costs including expert fees in the amount of $6,650; [ 2 ] For the reasons of Bich, J.A., with which Savard and Mainville, JJ.A. agree, THE COURT: [ 3 ] allows the appeal, with legal costs owed to the respondent, for the sole purpose of replacing para. 117 of the judgment of the Superior Court with the following: [117] AVEC DÉPENS contre Anatoli Gutin, excluant les frais d’expert. [ 4 ] DISMISSES the incidental appeal, with legal costs.

MARIE-FRANCE BICH, J.A. MANON SAVARD, J.A. ROBERT M. MAINVILLE, J.A. Mtre Charles Gelber CHARLES GELBER ATTORNEY For the appellant – incidental respondent Mtre Paul V. Marcil MARCIL & COOPER For the respondent – incidental appellant Date of hearing: September 14, 2017 REASONS OF BICH, J.A.

I. C ontext [ 5 ] In March 2009, the respondent, which specializes in international food trading, hired the appellant, who was entrusted with the task of developing the firm’s Russian market and that of its neighbouring regions.

The appellant, himself of Russian origin, was very successful in this endeavour and he rapidly built an important Russian-speaking clientele, which he was able to serve in its own language, establishing a privileged relationship with his counterparts. [ 6 ] In January 2012, the appellant abruptly resigned and immediately started working for 8087164 Canada inc., doing business as “Alimentations Vican Foods”. This company was formally incorporated on January 23, 2012, but the appellant had carefully planned its set-up, with two associates, while he was still employed by the respondent.

At trial, one of these associates described their arrangement in the following manner: A. He [the appellant] had offered me basically a turnkey solution where he had a book of business, he had a system to manage his own files. He was going to bring with him a ... an individual named Octavio Escobar who was his logistics coordinator. He was ... and then there was a plan to bring on more staff as time went on. So he was basically delivering me a turnkey business, as long as we kept it financed and housed. Q. Okay. And when you say like a turnkey business, what does that mean? A.

It means that as long as we inject the capital and give a legitimate place to work for him, that he had the ... both the producers and the consumers for the product. And he would handle all the logistics and the management of the business. My responsibility was to manage the accounting. [1] [ 7 ] When the appellant thus departed, he brought with him his former employer’s database, containing a variety of information, most of which was confidential, as well as administrative documents (forms, invoices, contracts, etc.) that he would later use or copy in his new position at Vican.

He also solicited the respondent’s clients (particularly, but not exclusively, its Russian clients), again with great success since he was privy to all the information – conveniently stored in the respondent’s database – regarding their profiles, requirements, preferences, order records and accounts, as well as the regulatory and tax framework of each country in which they were doing business, etc. [ 8 ] In April 2012, Mr. Octavio Escobar, until then a logistics coordinator at the respondent’s firm, joined Vican in a similar capacity. In June, Ms. Xialoi Xhang, a trader, also left the respondent for Vican.

Both used the respondent’s database, forms, etc., as adapted for Vican’s purposes and placed at their disposal by the appellant. [ 9 ] In August 2012, the appellant instituted proceedings against the respondent, claiming $105,977.99 in allegedly unpaid commissions. In turn, the respondent, who denied owing anything to the appellant, claimed $2,500,000 in damages, by way of cross- application, alleging that the appellant had misappropriated its confidential information, copied its models, lured its clients, suppliers and employees away and generally tried to harm its reputation.

This claim was later reduced to $483,642, plus $50,000 in punitive damages. [ 10 ] The trial took place in October 2015, and judgment was rendered on January 11, 2016, [2] dismissing the appellant’s claim, partially granting the respondent’s cross-application and ordering the former to pay $200,000 in compensatory damages to the latter, with costs including expert fees in the amount of $6,650. No punitive damages were awarded. [ 11 ] According to the appellant, the trial judge erred in dismissing his claim and granting the respondent’s cross-application.

Basically, he disputes each and every one of her factual determinations and contends that she misconstrued art. 2088 C.C.Q . and thus erred in law. He also argues that the legal costs awarded against him should have excluded all expert fees. [ 12 ] For its part, the respondent, by way of an incidental appeal, argues that the judge should have allowed its claim for punitive damages. II. Analysis A. Principal appeal [ 13 ] The principal appeal raises three questions: is the appellant entitled to the commissions that he claims from the respondent? Should he be relieved from the order to pay damages?

Did the judge mistakenly include the expert fees in the legal costs awarded to the respondent? 1. Commissions [ 14 ] With regard to the commissions, the appellant’s theory of the case, which has fluctuated since he instituted his action against the respondent, is now the following: the parties, at the time of his hiring, entered into a verbal agreement according to which he would be remunerated on the basis of a 20% commission on the profits generated by all transactions concluded through his agency every year, subject to a minimum wage floor.

The respondent denies the existence of such verbal agreement and relies on the written contract of employment signed by the parties, which makes no mention of a right to a commission. The respondent concedes that, at times, he gave his employees, including the appellant, discretionary bonuses and other gratuities, but nothing akin to a commission and nothing near the amount claimed. [ 15 ] The trial judge preferred the version of the respondent to that of the appellant. In so concluding, did she commit a reviewable error?

[ 16 ] She did not. [ 17 ] The testimonies of the various witnesses, including the appellant and the respondent’s officers (and directing minds), are contradictory.

The exhibits, however, tend to support the respondent’s assertions. [ 18 ] First of all, the contract of employment signed by the parties on April 1, 2009, [3] shortly after the appellant was hired, does not indicate or imply that he will receive commissions, but simply states that “Cenfood agrees to pay Anatoli Gutin gross salary of 30,000.00 per year which after 6 month of employment will be increased to 35,000.00 if Cenfood International is satisfied with working performance of Anatoli Gutin.” [4] Of course, during the course of the employment relationship, the parties could have changed the terms of their contract and verbally agreed to the payment of commissions to the appellant – which the respondent strongly denies.

Considering the substantial amounts at stake, however, one cannot but be surprised by the fact that such an agreement, if any, would not have been committed to writing. [ 19 ] Furthermore, letters sent by the respondent to financial institutions, at the appellant’s request (who needed them in order to obtain a loan), do mention his salary of $35,000, but say nothing of commissions. Another letter addressed to the Local Employment Centre that temporarily subsidized the appellant’s employment is also silent on the matter.

Finally, cheques issued to the appellant in addition to his salary bore the mention “bonus”, and not “commission”. [ 20 ] The sole reference to any “commission” is to be found in exhibit P-3, and it does not support the appellant’s position, as it relates to commissions paid to third parties involved in business transactions between the respondent (through its employees) and its suppliers or clients. [ 21 ] Yet the appellant – and this is his main contention – argues that exhibit AC-4, [5] in and of itself, substantiates his claim.

The trial judge did not give much weight to this document, and understandably so, since it remains largely indecipherable. The appellant testified about the meaning of this exhibit and tried to demonstrate that the numbers and calculations typed or handwritten thereon refer to his 20% commission for 2009 and part of 2010. His explanations, however, are specious and, regrettably, they appear to be a fabrication intended to give the document, after the fact, a meaning that it does not have.

The respondent’s explanations, although not entirely satisfactory, are clearer (exhibit AC-4 was prepared in order to evaluate the appellant’s work performance and was annotated during the discussion that took place at the time between him and his superior) and the judge obviously found them more plausible. [ 22 ] In the end, the trial judge did not believe the appellant, for the following reasons: [36] L’ensemble de la preuve rend plus improbable la position de Gutin et voici pourquoi : • le seul document en preuve a été subtilisé par Gutin; • Gutin présente différentes versions de l'entente qu'il dit être intervenue : dans la première demande de Gutin, du 18 juillet 2012, ainsi que celle à son recours initial du 29 août 2012 ne correspondent pas à l’entente alléguée au paragraphe 2 de sa procédure amendée à l’audience; • il affirme que les commissions devaient lui être payées à la fin de l’année suivante alors que dans son courriel du 18 juillet 2012, il écrit le contraire; • le même courriel fait référence à une entente intervenue avant qu’il commence à travailler alors qu’à l’audience, il reconnaît qu’il n’y avait aucune entente au moment de la signature du contrat d’emploi; • le 7 mars 2011, il affirme que sa rencontre avec Cencora s’est tenue à l’extérieur par une belle journée ensoleillée alors que la preuve démontre que le mercure indiquait entre [moins] 8.5 et 10 Celsius avec flocons de neige.

La rencontre s’est plutôt tenue dans la salle de conférence, comme en témoigne Cencora. • les chèques remis par Cenfood mentionnent clairement : « bonus »; • les témoignages de Cencora, de Mikutra et de Caron corroborent l'absence d’entente sur les commissions; • les lettres destinées aux banques ne mentionnent pas de commissions à être versées; • la preuve soumise, tant documentaire que testimoniale, relative à la date à laquelle Gutin a commencé à travailler contredit son témoignage lequel est invraisemblable.

Sa crédibilité est sérieusement entachée. [All references omitted] [ 23 ] Therefore, she concluded that “ Gutin ne réussit pas à établir qu'une entente est intervenue pour des commissions à lui être versées .” [6] [ 24 ] The appellant fails to demonstrate any palpable and overriding error of fact in this conclusion, which rests on the trial judge’s appreciation of the evidence and, in particular, of the credibility of the witnesses.

Neither does he demonstrate the existence of any error of law and the argument that he attempts to make on the basis of art. 1434 C.C.Q. (a provision entirely irrelevant to the discussion) is futile on its face. [ 25 ] Certainly, as Morissette J.A. wrote in Softmedical inc. v. Daabous : [7] [47] Cela dit, il est des cas où une erreur de perception peut fausser de manière fondamentale toute l’appréciation de la preuve et obliger la Cour à se demander si le juge a « jugé à partir des bons faits » [reference omitted]. Comme l’écrivait une formation unanime de la Cour dans l’arrêt Ford du Canada Ltée c.

Automobiles Duclos inc. [reference omitted]:

[128] Le haut degré de déférence due au juge de première instance en matière d'évaluation de la preuve, principe maintes fois énoncé par la Cour suprême, ne peut faire obstacle à l’intervention d'une cour d'appel lorsqu'une analyse du dossier révèle que l'évaluation du juge de première instance s'est faite à travers un prisme qui doit être écarté et qui a clairement eu un effet déformant. [ 26 ] In the present case, however, I can see no such “ erreur de perception ” in the judgment, and the mistakes that the appellant draws our attention to are few and inconsequential (for instance, the judge attributed to one witness words of little importance that were in reality those of another).

Nothing indicates that the trial judge was in a state of mind that would have had the effect of a distorting prism. [ 27 ] In short, in the face of contradictory evidence, the trial judge, canvassing the various exhibits and diverging testimonies, and assessing their weight and credibility, concluded that the appellant did not establish the facts on which his claim is based (art. 2803 C.C.Q. ), on a balance of probabilities (art. 2804 C.C.Q. ). Considering the standard of appellate review, [8] there is no reason for this Court to intervene. 2.

Breach of art. 2088 C.C.Q. and damages [ 28 ] The same conclusion must be reached with respect to the damages that the appellant was ordered to pay to the respondent. [ 29 ] According to the trial judge, the appellant breached his post-contractual duty of loyalty and confidentiality towards the respondent, as per art. 2088 C.C.Q. That breach resulted in a direct injury to the respondent (art. 1607 C.C.Q. ), which sustained a financial loss and was deprived of profits that went to Vican (art. 1611 and 1613 C.C.Q. ). Damages were established at $200,000. [ 30 ] The appellant disagrees.

He submits that the trial judge misapplied art. 2088 C.C.Q. by concluding that he had breached his duty of loyalty and confidentiality. The information that he kept when he left the respondent’s firm was neither confidential nor privileged, but rather generic in nature; it had a very limited purpose and could easily be reconstructed. Moreover, in his appellate brief, he maintains that: 90 Clientele belongs to no one and therefore a former employee is free to divert it to his or her new business except for confidential client lists stolen from the former employer.

However, not all client lists are confidential (even stolen ones) or necessarily lead to a violation or breach of

article 2088 c.c.q . Thus, if a client list can be reconstituted using a phone book, catalogue produced by a trade association or, other similar means, the employee will not be prevented from soliciting business. [ 31 ] I can find no error of law in the judgment, which is entirely respectful of the applicable provisions and of the case law.

As well, there is no palpable and overriding error of fact that would justify the Court’s intervention. [ 32 ] The evidence is unequivocal, indeed, and shows beyond the balance of probabilities required by art. 2804 C.C.Q. that, upon resigning, the appellant appropriated the respondent’s database, which contained a substantial amount of information (confidential and non-confidential) relevant to its business. It also shows that he used this information in the course of his activities at Vican, actively soliciting his former employer’s clientele and letting other Vican employees do the same.

As well, when he left the respondent’s firm, he brought with him other administrative documents (purchase orders, invoices, contracts, etc.) that would serve as templates and that he adapted to Vican’s needs or simply copied (even reproducing a mistake found on one of the respondent’s original forms) [9] . [ 33 ] According to the trial judge, this conduct violated art. 2088 C.C.Q. , and more specifically its second paragraph: 2088.

Le salarié, outre qu’il est tenu d’exécuter son travail avec prudence et diligence, doit agir avec loyauté et honnêteté et ne pas faire usage de l’information à caractère confidentiel qu’il obtient dans l’exécution ou à l’occasion de son travail. 2088. The employee is bound not only to perform his work with prudence and diligence, but also to act faithfully and honestly and not use any confidential information he obtains in the performance or in the course of his work.

Ces obligations survivent pendant un délai raisonnable après cessation du contrat, et survivent en tout temps lorsque l’information réfère à la réputation et à la vie privée d’autrui . These obligations continue for a reasonable time after the contract terminates and permanently where the information concerns the reputation and privacy of others . [Emphasis added] [ 34 ] We find in Concentrés scientifiques Belisle inc. v. Lyrco Nutrition inc. [10] a

summary of the principal aspects of the rule set out in the second paragraph of this provision: [42] Par ailleurs, le second alinéa de l'

article 2088 C.c.Q. fait perdurer le devoir de loyauté au-delà de la rupture du contrat de travail. Le cadre et le contenu obligationnel de ce devoir de loyauté postcontractuel font l'objet d'une jurisprudence abondante, dont on peut résumer comme suit les enseignements : - Le second alinéa de l'

article 2088 C.c.Q. et le devoir de loyauté qu'il énonce doivent être interprétés de façon restrictive, la survie d'une obligation contractuelle au-delà de la terminaison du contrat qui y a donné naissance étant exorbitante du droit commun. Cette interprétation restrictive se justifie également par le fait que, dans l'organisation de notre société, la concurrence, en affaires, est la règle. - Le devoir de loyauté postcontractuel est un devoir atténué, qui n'a ni l'ampleur ni la rigueur de l'obligation telle qu'elle existe pendant la durée du contrat.

Ce devoir de loyauté postcontractuel ne saurait par ailleurs imposer au salarié des restrictions équivalentes à celles d'une clause de non-concurrence. - En l'absence d'une clause de non-concurrence, l'ex-salarié peut en principe concurrencer son ex-employeur (soit en trouvant un

nouvel emploi chez un concurrent, soit en fondant sa propre entreprise concurrente, soit en investissant dans une entreprise concurrente,etc.).

Il peut même se livrer à une concurrence vigoureuse, à condition toutefois que cette concurrence demeure loyale et respecte leprincipe de bonne foi. - Le contenu obligationnel précis du devoir de loyauté postcontractuel variera selon les circonstances (par exemple : nature ducontrat et de l'entreprise, nature, conditions et niveau hiérarchique du poste occupé par l'ex-salarié, motifs de la terminaison du contrat detravail, état de la concurrence dans le secteur d'activités de l'employeur, etc.). - En elle-même, la sollicitation de clientèle n'est pas interdite, en principe, puisqu'il s'agit d'un acte de concurrence ordinaire, larecherche de la clientèle étant l'élément définitionnel de la concurrence. - La jurisprudence tend à interdire des comportements tels : utiliser, aux fins de sollicitation de clientèle, des documents ourenseignements confidentiels de l'ex-employeur ou utiliser de tactiques de dénigrement ou se livrer à des tromperies ou à de faussesreprésentations; profiter indûment de certaines relations privilégiées avec la clientèle; solliciter de façon insistante et systématique ses ex-collègues de travail et tenter de les convaincre de quitter l'employeur; conserver des biens ou des documents de l'ex-employeur8, etc. - Enfin, le devoir de loyauté postcontractuel ne dure qu'un temps, celui d'un « délai raisonnable », comme le dit l'article 2088C.c.Q.

Là encore, la jurisprudence est assez réservée : la durée de l'obligation de loyauté postcontractuelle dépend des circonstances de chaque espèce9, mais elle dépasse rarement quelques mois. Il peut y avoir des cas exceptionnels, mais ils sont, justement, exceptionnelset doivent le rester si l'on ne veut pas indûment limiter le principe de concurrence qui régit notre société et avantager les employeurs audétriment des salariés.

Après l'expiration de ce délai raisonnable, l'ex-salarié n'est plus assujetti qu'aux règles ordinaires applicables à la concurrence (en vertu de l'article 1457 C.c.Q.).10 ________________ 8 Le refus de remettre ces biens, d'ailleurs, constitue dans certains cas un vol pur et simple, sans égard à la notion de loyauté. 9 Les facteurs mentionnés plus haut seront à nouveau considérés (par exemple : nature du contrat et de l'entreprise, nature, conditionset niveau hiérarchique du poste occupé par l'ex-salarié, durée du service de l'ex-salarié au sein de l'entreprise de l'employeur, motifs de laterminaison du contrat de travail, état de la concurrence dans le secteur d'activités de l'employeur, etc.).

On s'intéressera en outre auxmotifs et aux circonstances de la rupture du contrat de travail, de même qu'à la durée du service antérieur de l'ex-salarié. Ainsi, lecaractère injustifié d'un congédiement peut avoir un effet à la baisse sur la durée du délai raisonnable. La bonne ou la mauvaise foi del'ex-salarié peut être un élément à considérer dans l'évaluation de la durée de ce délai raisonnable. 10 Sur le tout, voir par exemple : Excelsior (L'), compagnie d'assurance-vie c. Mutuelle du Canada (La), compagnie d'assurance-vie, (QC CA), [1992] R.J.Q. 2666 (C.A.); Dufresne c.

Groupe Christie Ltée, (QC CA), [1992] R.D.J.546 (C.A.); Positron c. Desroches, [1988] R.J.Q. 1636 (règlement hors cour, C.A., 1991-09-16, 500-09-000620-880); Improthèque inc. c.St-Gelais, [1995] R.J.Q. 2469 (C.S.); Groupe Financier Assbec c. Dion, (QC CA), [1995] R.D.J. 172 (C.A.); FrankWhite Enterprises Inc. c. 130541 Canada inc., J.E. 95-1233 (C.A.); Armanious c. Datex Bar Code Systems Inc./Systèmes de code àbarres Datex inc., précité, note 6; Étiquette nationale inc. c. Sarrazin, J.E. 2002-508; Industries Flexart ltée c.

Baril, (QC CA), [2003] R.J.Q. 665, [2003] R.J.D.T. 39 (C.A.); Gestion Marie-Lou (St-Marc) inc. c. Lapierre, J.E. 2003-1698 (C.A.);Corporation scientifique Claisse inc. c. Instruments Katanax inc., 2006 QCCA 1425, J.E. 2006-2266. [35] By taking the respondent’s database and other documents when he left for Vican, and then by using the information containedtherein to his advantage and that of his new founded company, the appellant breached the post-contractual duty of loyalty andconfidentiality owed to his former employer.

He also acted disloyally when he denigrated the latter, albeit subtly, by advising clients “tobe careful with them”[11] and implying some sort of dishonesty or incompetence.[12] [36] As indicated earlier,[13] the appellant argues that most of the information in the database was not confidential. One cancertainly recognize that part of said information was not confidential.

But, firstly, the database did contain a large amount of valuable,indeed precious, information regarding the identity, contact information, trading profile, etc. of the respondent’s clients and suppliers; onprices charged or paid on every transaction; on commissions paid to third-party traders, etc. In short, this was the very information thatgives a clear competitive advantage to its holder and is usually kept secret for that reason, especially when the holder is also the one whoassembled it.

The respondent considered this information to be confidential, and rightly so (needless to say, the fact that its employees, inthe course of their duties, generated this information while dealing with the clients or could use it did not make it less confidential).Secondly, the information stored on the database, whether confidential or not, was indexed, referenced and organized, and thatmeticulous compilation made it a very useful tool: there most definitely was added value to that compilation, which also constituted anundeniable competitive advantage. [37] According to the trial judge, therein lies the reason why the appellant was so successful in his new venture at Vican.

He had a“turnkey solution” at hand indeed, one that he managed to purloin from the respondent. [38] The appellant, as we have seen,[14] submits that clients do not belong to anyone and that he was thus entirely free to solicitthose of the respondent. [39] Clients, indeed, do not belong to those they do business with and, absent a non-competition stipulation in the contract ofemployment (art. 2095 C.c.Q.), an ex-employee may, as a matter of principle, try to attract and serve his former employer’s clientele.Freedom to compete is the rule, even for an ex-employee who may “concurrencer librement, voire même vigoureusement eténergiquement son ancien employeur.”[15] As stated in Concentrés scientifiques Belisle,[16] however, he may not do so by disloyal orunfair means[17] such as “utiliser, aux fins de sollicitation de clientèle, des documents ou renseignements confidentiels de l'ex-employeurou utiliser de tactiques de dénigrement […]; profiter indûment de certaines relations privilégiées avec la clientèle; […]; conserver desbiens ou des documents de l'ex-employeur, etc.”.[18] This is a fitting description of the appellant’s conduct in the present case.

[ 40 ] Furthermore, the appellant not only stole confidential information from the respondent but he also used it in order to solicit its clients and, in particular the Russian clients with whom he had established a personal and privileged relationship while working for the respondent. The appellant had earned the trust of these clients, whom he knew intimately, but, precisely for that reason, he could not solicit them or, to be more accurate, aggressively go after them immediately after his resignation.

In the circumstances, a waiting period was in order, pursuant to art. 2088 C.c.Q. [ 41 ] Certainly, the appellant could have reconstituted from memory the list of his clients and part of the information that concerned them (confidential or not). But this would have been possible only at the price of a considerable effort, to say nothing of the time that this would have taken. He avoided both by appropriating and then using the respondent’s database and simply plucking the necessary information therefrom, to his own benefit and that of Vican, a stratagem which allowed him to quickly build a performing business.

This is exactly what he had promised his two associates: they were to house and finance Vican’s operations, and he would bring the rest. And that he did, in flagrant violation of his obligation towards his former employer, pursuant to art. 2088 , 2 nd para. C.C.Q ., which gives rise to his liability. [ 42 ] It must be noted that art. 2088 does not impose upon the employee the equivalent of a non-competition clause and that the obligations of loyalty and confidentiality only “continue for a reasonable time” after the termination of the contract.

The duration of this “reasonable time” may not exceed a few months (seldom more than three or four), to be determined on a case-by-case basis. [19] In this instance, the trial judge considered that a six-month period was reasonable. In view of the case law, this appears to be at the upper limit of the acceptable range, but was warranted by the circumstances.

In any event, the appellant did not challenge, as such, the judge’s determination in that respect. [ 43 ] Finally, the appellant’s last ground of appeal relates to the nature of the prejudice suffered by the respondent and the quantum of the damages awarded by the judge. [ 44 ] The standard of appellate review in such matters is exacting: [240] La norme d’intervention d’une cour d’appel en matière de dommages est connue et a été maintes fois répétée. Dans Andrews c.

Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd. [reference omitted], le juge Dickson la résume en ces termes : En guise d’introduction, il convient de rappeler qu’aucune cour d’appel n’est fondée à modifier le montant des dommages-intérêts accordés en première instance simplement parce qu’elle aurait alloué un montant différent si elle avait entendu l’affaire en premier lieu. Elle doit être convaincue que le juge de première instance a commis une erreur de principe ou que la somme accordée est le résultat d’une erreur sérieuse dans l’évaluation du préjudice; Nance v. B.C.

Electric Railway Co. [Renvois omis] [241] Bien qu’émanant de la common law , cette norme d’intervention, très sévère, s’applique également en droit civil [reference omitted].

Le professeur Gardner souligne [reference omitted]: 241. […] Cette règle [de non-intervention] est a fortiori applicable en matière de préjudice corporel, où les difficultés d’évaluation et le recours à des probabilités laissent une zone discrétionnaire encore plus grande au premier juge : […] L’intervention de la Cour d’appel sera encore plus rare en ce qui concerne les pertes non pécuniaires, où la précision mathématique est par essence impossible : Le devoir de réserve imposé en matière d’interprétation des faits, de la crédibilité des témoins et des thèses des experts s’applique aussi à la détermination du quantum de la réclamation surtout lorsqu’il s’agit de l’estimation des pertes non pécuniaires résultant de douleurs, souffrances et inconvénients, opération qui relève plus d’un exercice philosophique que d’un calcul rigoureux. [Notre ajout] [242] L’intervention de la Cour est donc limitée aux erreurs de droit ou aux situations d’indemnisation manifestement incorrectes [reference omitted], soit lorsque le montant accordé est si excessivement bas ou si excessivement élevé qu’il doit constituer une estimation entièrement fausse des dommages [reference omitted]. [20] [ 45 ] In Service d'excavation Jacques Lirette inc. v.

Economical, compagnie d'assurances , [21] the Court summed up the rule in a succinct manner: [22] Le principe est bien connu : « les cours d’appel refusent d’intervenir dans l’évaluation faite par le juge de première instance, à moins que le montant accordé ne choque leur sens de la justice, parce que manifestement disproportionné ou déraisonnable » [reference omitted] [ 46 ] Yet, aside from inviting the Court to scrutinize the evidence anew and substitute its own determinations for those of the trial judge, the appellant fails to demonstrate “that a wrong principle of law was applied, or that the overall amount is a wholly erroneous estimate of the damage” [22] or is patently disproportionate.

Indeed, damages can seldom be evaluated with scientific precision, hence the discretion granted to trial judges. [ 47 ] In the present case, relying on the testimony of the respondent’s representatives and, to some extent, that of its expert, the trial judge concluded that the appellant’s conduct did cause prejudice to his former employer, which lost part of its clientele to Vican and thus lost substantial revenues and profits. On the quantum of damages, however, she dismissed the expert’s report and testimony, which lacked in precision and disregarded some important factors.

She then assessed said quantum on the basis of the loss of profits incurred by the respondent during the six-month period following the appellant’s resignation. The amount of this loss was deemed to be the equivalent of the profits made by Vican, during that period, from transactions by the appellant and Ms. Xhang with former clients or suppliers of the respondent. Such profits totalled approximately $196,000, rounded up to $200,000. Exhibit D-30, which was prepared and provided by Vican , played a determining role in this assessment.

[48] Considering the evidence, and, particularly, exhibit D-30, this award is neither disproportionate nor unreasonable, on thecontrary, and I can see no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge’s conclusion on this point. 3.

Expert fees and legal costs [49] Though she dismissed the expert’s report and most of his testimony on the quantum of damages, the trial judge neverthelessgranted the respondent’s cross-application “AVEC DÉPENS contre Anatoli Gutin incluant les frais de l’expert comptable, monsieurJacques Gervais, limités à 6 650 $”.[23] The appellant asks that this conclusion be set aside as far as it relates to expert fees. [50] According to his invoices (exhibit D-31), the expert’s fees totalled $10,279.52, and the trial judge included them in the legalcosts only in part, up to $6,650, thus excluding all fees related to the transfer of the file from the respondent’s former counsel to his newcounsel, plus time spent in court on October 22 and 23, 2015. [51] In Simard v.

Larouche,[24] Thibault J.A. wrote that: [107] Le juge de première instance a accordé aux intimés la totalité des frais d'expertise encourus ainsi que les frais d'assistance auprocès. Dans son jugement, celui-ci fait une analyse

sommaire de la question des dépens, en se référant à la règle générale posée parl'article 477 C.p.c. : 477. La

partie qui succombe supporte les dépens, frais du sténographe compris, à moins que, par décision motivée, le tribunal ne lesmitige, ne les compense ou n'en ordonne autrement. Le tribunal peut également, par décision motivée, mitiger les dépens relatifs aux expertises faites à l'initiative des parties,notamment lorsqu'il estime que l'expertise était inutile, que les frais sont déraisonnables ou qu'un seul expert aurait suffi.

Dans le cas d'une action personnelle et sous réserve de l'article 988, la somme des frais de poursuite, à l'exclusion des fraisd'exécution, que le défendeur condamné peut être appelé à payer ne doit pas excéder le montant de la condamnation, si celui-ci n'est passupérieur au montant prévu au paragraphe a de l'article 953, à moins que, par décision motivée, le tribunal n'en ait ordonné autrement. [Je souligne] [108] Dans une décision récente, j'ai écrit ceci concernant le rôle du juge lorsqu'il évalue l'utilité d'une expertise dans un litige : [98] À mon avis, lorsque le juge d’instance examine la question de l’utilité d’une expertise, il doit faire preuve d’une certainesouplesse et éviter de juger cette question a posteriori alors qu’il a en main toutes les réponses fournies par les parties.

Il me semble, eneffet, qu’il est plus logique et plus conforme à la réalité des litiges de juger de l’utilité d’une expertise en se plaçant du point de vue de lapartie qui prend la décision, et cela, au moment de la prise de la décision. [reference : Michaud c. Équipements ESF inc., 2010 QCCA2350, paragr. 98] [109] Comme le mentionne la Cour dans BMW Canada inc. c.

Automobiles Jalbert inc., la norme d'intervention de la Cour en matièrede dépens est élevée : [249] Il est acquis qu'en matière de dépens, la Cour n'intervient qu'exceptionnellement compte tenu du pouvoir discrétionnaire dontjouissent les juges de première instance en cette matière (art. 477 C.p.c.); la Cour n'interviendra pas si cette discrétion est exercéejudiciairement mais elle n'hésitera pas à le faire si la décision du premier juge crée une injustice réelle ou manifeste. [reference : BMWCanada inc. c.

Automobiles Jalbert inc., 2006 QCCA 1068, paragr. 249] [110] Le juge LeBel, quelques années auparavant, soulignait toutefois que les décisions discrétionnaires des juges de première instancene sont pas absolues et qu'elles peuvent faire l'objet d'un contrôle par une cour d'appel : 43 Comme je l’ai fait remarquer dans R. c. Regan, [2002] 1 R.C.S. 297, 2002 CSC 12, toutefois, les décisions discrétionnaires nesont pas entièrement à l’abri de tout contrôle (par. 118).

Une cour d’appel peut et doit intervenir lorsqu’elle estime que le juge depremière instance s’est fondé sur des considérations erronées en ce qui concerne le droit applicable ou a commis une erreur manifestedans son appréciation des faits. Comme la Cour l’a dit dans Pelech c.

Pelech, (SCC), [1987] 1 R.C.S. 801, p. 814 815,les conditions d’exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire du juge constituent des critères juridiques et leur définition, tout comme leur nonapplication ou leur mauvaise application, pose des questions de droit susceptibles de révision en appel. [reference : Colombie-Britannique (Ministre des Forêts) c.

Bande indienne Okanagan, 2003 CSC 71, [2003] 3 R.C.S. 371, paragr. 43] [52] These comments are applicable mutatis mutandis to art. 339 and 340 C.C.P., the relevant excerpts of which are reproducedbelow: 339. […] 339. (…) Les frais d’expertise incluent ceuxqui sont afférents à la rédaction durapport, à la préparation du témoignage lecas échéant et au temps passé par l’expertpour témoigner ou, dans la mesure utile,pour assister à l’instruction.

Expert fees include the costsrelated to the drafting of the report and, ifapplicable, preparing testimony, andremuneration for the time spent testifyingand, to the extent useful, attending thetrial.340. Les frais de justice sont dus à lapartie qui a eu gain de cause, à moins quele tribunal n’en décide autrement. 340. Legal costs are owed to the partythat was successful, unless the courtdecides otherwise. […] (…) [53] In the present case, considering that the judge, having discarded the expert’s report and found his testimony largely unhelpful,

did not explain why she nevertheless decided to include a substantial part of his fees in the legal costs owed to the respondent, I believe an intervention is in order. The expert fees will thus be struck from para. 117 of the judgment. B. Incidental Appeal [ 54 ] The trial judge did not award punitive damages, either for the prejudice allegedly caused to the respondent’s reputation ( art. 4 and 49 of the Charter of human rights and freedoms ) [25] or the misappropriation of the respondent’s property (art. 6 and 49 of same).

The respondent suggests that she should have granted such damages in the amount of $50,000, considering the unlawful and intentional conduct of the appellant, who deliberately interfered with its reputation and property. [ 55 ] I see no reason to disturb the judge’s conclusion on this point. Punitive damages, which must be specifically provided for by law, are not awarded solely on the basis of the existence of a fault and a prejudice, even in Charter matters, but are subject to art. 1621 C.C.Q. : 1621.

Lorsque la loi prévoit l’attribution de dommages-intérêts punitifs, ceux-ci ne peuvent excéder, en valeur, ce qui est suffisant pour assurer leur fonction préventive. 1621. Where the awarding of punitive damages is provided for by law, the amount of such damages may not exceed what is sufficient to fulfil their preventive purpose.

Ils s’apprécient en tenant compte de toutes les circonstances appropriées, notamment de la gravité de la faute du débiteur, de sa situation patrimoniale ou de l’étendue de la réparation à laquelle il est déjà tenu envers le créancier, ainsi que, le cas échéant, du fait que la prise en charge du paiement réparateur est, en tout ou en partie, assumée par un tiers.

Punitive damages are assessed in the light of all the appropriate circumstances, in particular the gravity of the debtor’s fault, his patrimonial situation, the extent of the reparation for which he is already liable to the creditor and, where such is the case, the fact that the payment of the reparatory damages is wholly or partly assumed by a third person. [ 56 ] Considering the criteria set out in the second paragraph of this provision and the paucity of evidence on the patrimonial situation of the appellant, I am of the view that an award for punitive damages would have been superfluous in light of the amount of the compensatory damages, the punitive, preventive and deterring effects of which should be sufficient. [ 57 ] The incidental appeal should thus be dismissed.

III. CONCLUSION [ 58 ] For the foregoing reasons, I would allow the appeal for the sole purpose of replacing para. 117 of the judgment of the Superior Court with the following: [117] AVEC DÉPENS contre Anatoli Gutin, excluant les frais d’expert. [ 59 ] I would uphold the conclusions of the judgment a quo in all other respects, and therefore adjudicate the legal costs in favour of the respondent on the principal appeal. [ 60 ] Finally, I would dismiss the incidental appeal, with legal costs. MARIE-FRANCE BICH, J.A.