2019 QCCA 1267, 2019 QCCA 1267

Produits forestiers Arbec inc. c. Attorney General of Canada 2019 QCCA 1267 COURT OF APPEAL CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC REGISTRY OF MONTREAL No: 500-09-027769-181 (500-17-101502-170) DATE: 17 JULY 2019 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE JACQUES DUFRESNE, J.A. PATRICK HEALY, J.A. GENEVIÈVE COTNAM, J.A. PRODUITS FORESTIERS ARBEC INC. and PRODUITS FORESTIERS ARBEC S.E.N.C. APPELLANTS - Plaintiffs v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA RESPONDENT - Defendant JUDGMENT [ 1 ] This is an appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court dated 31 July 2018 that granted the respondent’s motion for a declinatory exception on the basis that the subject-matter of the appellants’ claim lies within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Court of Canada. [1] Facts [ 2 ] The appellants export softwood lumber to the United States and must pay a charge for doing so under the Softwood Lumber Products Export Charge Act, 2006 (“the Act”). [2] This litigation concerns charges, assessments and objections between 2008 and 2013. [ 3 ] In February 2008 the Canada Revenue Agency began an audit of the appellants’ reports of charges paid under the Act.

As a result, new assessments were issued in which the Agency refused deductions for costs of transport related to the appellants’ exports. The appellants filed notices of objection to these assessments but they were confirmed in an administrative appeal. The appellants did not appeal from these decisions to the Tax Court of Canada and did not seek an extension of time to do so. The appellants complied with the assessments to the end of 2011. [ 4 ] In 2014 the Agency conducted another audit for 2012 and 2013 and concluded that there would be no adjustment of the charges payable for the appellants’ exports.

In 2015 the appellants claimed reimbursement for charges paid between 2007 and 2013 and stated that these had been paid due to an erroneous assessment by the Agency. Reimbursement was refused on the ground that the claim was made after the expiry of the limit of two years after payment of charges, as set out in section 41(3) of the Act. Judicial application [ 5 ] In December 2017 the appellants filed a judicial application in the Superior Court for recovery of the reimbursement previously claimed.

This was a claim in extracontractual liability based on the alleged fault of the Agency and in which the appellants sought to recover damages equivalent to the reimbursement to which they claimed that they were entitled. The respondent filed a motion to dismiss and a declinatory exception.

The exception was granted on the ground that the appellants’ application was not an action in extracontractual liability but in effect an application to appeal from decisions by the Agency and that such an application lies within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Court of Canada. [ 6 ] The essential elements in the reasons of the Superior Court are found in the following paragraphs: [32] Les questions soumises à la Cour supérieure dans une affaire de responsabilité civile et celles soumises à la Cour canadienne de l’impôt en appel d’une décision sur cotisation sont distinctes.

C’est pourquoi la jurisprudence enseigne que la Cour supérieure ne doit pas attendre une décision d’annulation de la Cour canadienne de l’impôt pour intervenir en matière de responsabilité.

Pour cela, toutefois, encore faut-il qu’une action de portée générale, comme le sont celle en responsabilité civile ou encore en jugement déclaratoire, ne serve pas à vider le processus de contrôle judiciaire ou d’appel mis en place par la loi. [33] Or, la nature générale et abstraite du recours en responsabilité civile, laquelle lui permet de s’adapter à toute situation, présente un risque d’absorption du droit, lorsqu’on tente de l’utiliser en lieu et place à un recours spécifiquement établi par le législateur ne

pouvant plus, pour un motif ou un autre, être exercé.

Tel est le cas ici. [34] Afin d’établir si la Cour supérieure peut entendre le litige, il est dès lors nécessaire d’en établir « la nature essentielle » en se fondant sur « une appréciation réaliste du résultat concret visé par le demandeur ». [35] En l’espèce, il ressort nettement que cette nature essentielle de l’action est bien celle de la contestation des cotisations ou d’un appel déguisé des décisions sur les oppositions, les éléments constitutifs d’un éventuel recours en responsabilité civile se confondant au dossier d’opposition et à un appel de celui-ci. [36] Ainsi, la faute alléguée repose dans le fait pour les préposés de l’ARC d’avoir erré dans l’interprétation de la loi en ayant prétendument intégré une notion qui serait étrangère à cette dernière.

Il s’agit bien d’une critique à l’égard des décisions fondant les cotisations et le refus sur les oppositions. Admettre qu’il puisse y avoir là une faute civile reviendrait à remettre en question le système de contestation établi par la loi de même que la compétence exclusive de la Cour canadienne de l’impôt voulue par le législateur. [37] Cela n’implique pas qu’une décision de l’ARC ne puisse pas être l’occasion d’un fait générateur de responsabilité civile lorsque, comme dans certains cas récents, l’on constate un abus ou une faute dans l’enquête.

Rien en ce sens toutefois n’est allégué en l’espèce. […] [45] En définitive, accepter, dans un cas comme en l’espèce, d’attribuer par la voie des règles de la responsabilité civile une compétence à la Cour supérieure, remettrait donc significativement en question la compétence exclusive et spécialisée de la Cour canadienne de l’impôt. [Reference omitted.] Ground of appeal [ 7 ] The appellants advance three grounds of appeal but these may be restated as one ground, which is whether the Superior Court erred in concluding that it had no jurisdiction to consider the claim in extracontractual liability.

Discussion [ 8 ] The Superior Court rightly notes that an action in civil liability before the Superior Court and an appeal to the Tax Court concerning assessments by the Agency are juridically distinct. The jurisdiction of the latter is exclusive [3] and thus if the action is properly characterised as an appeal from a decision by the Agency the Superior Court must decline jurisdiction.

Such a characterisation requires “a realistic appreciation of the practical result sought by the claimant.” [4] [ 9 ] After careful scrutiny of the claim advanced by the appellants, the Superior Court concludes that its true subject-matter is a revision of assessments or an appeal from notices of objection that were previously dismissed.

The judge observes specifically that the damages sought match the claims for reimbursement that had been dismissed by the Agency. [ 10 ] The appellants submit that the fault committed by the Agency, and the source of the damage they allegedly suffered, was the transmission of false information to them by the Agency. The Superior Court does not accept this submission and concludes that any error lies in mistaken applications of the Act by the Agency rather the transmission of false information.

Thus the claim is properly characterised as a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Court of Canada because the Agency was acting within the scope of its statutory authority. [ 11 ] To be clear, however, the Superior Court does not preclude that in an appropriate case the Agency might be civilly liable in the Superior Court. [5] It notes, quite rightly, that such liability could exist only upon proof of an abusive exercise of authority or fault by a representative of the Agency. There is no allegation to this effect and no evidence of such fault in the present matter.

FOR THESE REASONS, the Court: [ 12 ] DISMISSES the appeal, with legal costs. JACQUES DUFRESNE, J.A. PATRICK HEALY, J.A.

GENEVIÈVE COTNAM, J.A. Mtre Yves Robillard MILLER THOMSON For Appellants Mtre Marjolaine Breton Mtre Sarom Bahk DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CANADA For Respondent Date of hearing: 21 March 2019