J.I. v. V.I., 2019 BCPC 326

Citation: J.I. v. V.I. 2019 BCPC 326 Date: 20191018 File No: 9132 Registry: Port Coquitlam IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA IN THE MATTER OF THE FAMILY LAW ACT , S.B.C. 2011 c. 25 BETWEEN: J.I. APPLICANT AND: V.I. RESPONDENT REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE D.L. DOREY

Counsel for the Applicant: S. Delechantos Appearing on their own behalf: V.I. Place of Hearing: Port Coquitlam , B.C. Dates of Hearing: July 18, and September 27, 2019 Date of Judgment: October 18, 2019 A Corrigendum was released by the Court on October 21, 2019. The corrections have been made to the text and the Corrigendum is appended to this document. A. Introduction [ 1 ] This case involves an application for retroactive and prospective child support brought by V.I., the father of two children ages 18 and 17 years. Until approximately three years ago, the children lived primarily with their mother, J.I.

Since then, the children have lived with V.I. full-time. [ 2 ] V.I. brings two applications under s. 152 of the Family Law Act to vary a consent order for child support granted by Woods PCJ on May 11, 2015 (the “May 2015 Order”). He seeks the following relief: (

a) An Order cancelling paragraph 8 of the May 2015 Order which obligated him to pay monthly child support of $662 to J.I.; (

b) An Order for retroactive and ongoing child support. In this regard, he seeks to have income imputed to J.I. based on her previous gross annual income earned as an insurance broker; and (

c) An Order compelling J.I. to reimburse him for the last four months of child support payments he paid between September and December 2016 on the ground that the children were primarily living with him. [ 3 ] V.I. initially filed an application seeking child support on December 15, 2016. This application did not proceed to hearing. He brought a second application on July 31, 2018 seeking substantially the same relief. J.I. opposes the applications on the grounds of financial hardship. B. Background [ 4 ] V.I. and J.I. were married on [omitted for publication], 2000.

They separated in 2005 and were divorced in December 2006. They are now 39 and 37 years of age respectively. [ 5 ] The children of the marriage are V. (V. Jr.), currently age 18 years and K., currently age 17 years. [ 6 ] The parties have been embroiled in family litigation for the past fourteen years and have brought numerous applications and cross applications against each other on matters involving parenting time and parental responsibilities, primary residency, child support, payment of support arrears, as well as applications for protection and conduct orders.

Suffice to say the court file is voluminous. [ 7 ] In her testimony, J.I. described V.I. as threatening and physically abusive during their relationship and after separation, and that she feared for her safety “in the past”. [ 8 ] V.I. denies J.I.’s claims of abuse but acknowledges that he entered into three peace bonds in which he agreed to no contact conditions with J.I.

In his testimony, V.I. states that J.I. has been psychologically abusive towards him. [ 9 ] It was obvious from their testimony that the parties continue to harbour a great deal of animosity towards each other. [ 10 ] V.I. is a “red seal” ticketed electrician. He has not worked as an electrician since 2011. According to his testimony, V.I. has been hampered by depression which he attributes to the stress of the family litigation with J.I. He claims he is capable of working part- time only. [ 11 ] V.I. remarried. His wife works full-time as an executive assistant and is the main income earner in the family.

They own a “clear title” home in Pitt Meadows and have no personal debts. [ 12 ] The children are financially supported by V.I. and his second wife. [ 13 ] Currently, V.I. has a half-time teaching position in the electrical trades at [omitted for publication], earning $35/hour. He also refurbishes second hand cars for re-sale and turns a modest profit. [ 14 ] V.I. also devotes significant time each week tutoring his children in their school subjects.

Through his efforts over the past three years, the children’s grades have improved. (This was confirmed by the children’s high school transcripts exhibited to one of V.I.’s affidavits during V.I.’s testimony.) He estimates that he has and continues to spend upwards of 8-10 hours per week helping the children organize and complete their schoolwork. [ 15 ] V.I.’s home and financial situation is in stark contrast to that of J.I. [ 16 ] J.I. remarried and is currently separated from her second husband. Their separation has and continues to be acrimonious.

She has a seven year old son from this relationship and shares equal parenting of her son with her second husband. [ 17 ] According to J.I., V. Jr. and K. were in her care until V.I. refused to return them to her home after summer vacation at the end of August 2016. She testified that V.I. unilaterally registered them for high school in Pitt Meadows.

[ 18 ] J.I. obtained an Order on September 9, 2016 requiring V.I. to return the children to her care. [ 19 ] In her testimony, J.I. explained that due to “complications” with her “current estranged spouse“, she agreed to let the children live with V.I. shortly after they were returned to her care. She testified that she agreed to a shared parenting arrangement with V.I. and the children began dividing their time between households. [ 20 ] Then in December 2016, V. Jr. made a disclosure to his father that he had been “sexually assaulted” by J.I. in her home.

This incident prompted an immediate investigation by the RCMP and the Ministry of Child and Family Development. [ 21 ] No criminal charges were laid against J.I. and the MCFD has had no further involvement with the family with respect to this allegation. J.I. continues to deny these allegations. From J.I.’s standpoint, the police and MCFD investigations are closed. [ 22 ] J.I. has a new relationship and lives “common law” with her current boyfriend.

They live in a two bedroom rented apartment in Maple Ridge which they share with her seven year old son. [ 23 ] J.I. was expecting her fourth child at the time this trial began. She had health complications and subsequently suffered a miscarriage. [ 24 ] J.I.’s boyfriend has been unemployed since November 2018. She did not elaborate further in her testimony as to why he cannot find work or is unable to work. [ 25 ] J.I. explained that she lost a series of three jobs as an insurance broker over the past two years, which she attributes to interference from her second husband at her work place.

Her last position was with [omitted for publication] in Coquitlam, which she started in May 2019 and was let go on July 3, 2019 during her probation period. [ 26 ] J.I. remains unemployed. She has searched for work as a paralegal (which she is qualified to perform with some upgrading), but has not found a position to date. [ 27 ] J.I. ran out of money and relies on loans from her parents to meet expenses. She cannot pay her debts and is contemplating filing for bankruptcy. C.

Position of the Parties [ 28 ] V.I.’s position is that J.I. was earning a good income in the insurance field and should have being paying child support for the care of the children. He submits that J.I. has the experience to find a good paying administrative position and that she should be contributing to the care of the children and for their future education. He thus seeks a retroactive and prospective child support award. [ 29 ] J.I. submits that the Court should exercise its discretion in her favour and dismiss these applications because she is unemployed and almost destitute.

She alleges that there are extenuating circumstances giving rise to her unemployment and poor financial situation. D. J.I.s’ Employment History and Financial Circumstances [ 30 ] J.I. worked for a small law firm in New Westminster as a paralegal and office manager for three years until April 2017. She left that position, returned to school to qualify to become an insurance broker, achieving a Level 1 insurance designation. [ 31 ] J.I. then found full time work as an insurance broker with [omitted for publication] in Coquitlam in July 2016. She worked for this employer for 18 months.

She quit this position and took a job with [omitted for publication] as a “broker inquiry representative” in early January 2018. [ 32 ] Her position with [omitted for publication] was short lived. She was fired three months later on April 29, 2018. The reasons for her dismissal are unclear. What I gleaned from J.I.’s testimony is that her second husband commenced a civil claim against J.I., [omitted for publication], and others, alleging a privacy breach for wrongfully accessing his personal information, and that this litigation is connected to her dismissal. This claim is not before me.

I understand from J.I.’s testimony that the allegations are denied. [ 33 ] J.I. then found a full-time position with [omitted for publication] in Mission where she worked as a broker placing automobile insurance. She worked from July 1, 2018 until August 28, 2018. According to J.I.’s testimony, her second husband caused an embarrassing scene at her workplace before staff and other customers.

She claims she was let go during her probationary period as a result of this outburst. [ 34 ] J.I. was out of work and collected employment insurance benefits for approximately six months. [ 35 ] She then obtained full time work as an insurance broker with [omitted for publication] in Coquitlam on May 24, 2019. J.I. was then dismissed from her employment during her probationary period on July 3.

The reasons for her dismissal were not entirely clear from J.I.’s testimony, although she seemed to indicate the reason was because her insurance licence was under review as a result of the privacy breach lawsuit brought by her second husband. [ 36 ] At the time of her dismissal, J.I. was in her first trimester of a pregnancy and was having some medical complications. [ 37 ] Since losing this position, J.I. has searched for full time work as a paralegal and has applied for numerous positions through an online job search platform. [ 38 ] She explained in evidence that she has to pick up her youngest son from school part of the week.

This involves a 45 minute commute to/from her home each way. She testified that her childcare commitments were making it difficult for her to secure full-time employment as she needs to work a shortened workday to meet her son’s pick-up times from school.

[39] The status of her insurance licence remains uncertain at the time of trial as the investigation is still pending. [40] J.I. reported on “Line 150” her gross taxable income on the her 2015-2018 income tax returns as follows: 2015 – employment income $51,953 2016 – employment income $94,371 2017 – employment income $68,224 2018 – employment income $36,301; EI benefits $8,206 [41] J.I.’s projected income for 2019 (as recorded on her June 17, 2019 financial statement) is $33,787.85.

She concedes this figureis optimistic and does not expect she will earn anywhere close to this sum by the end of this year. [42] J.I. was cross-examined extensively by V.I. on her financial statement. This cross-examination revealed that J.I. has negativeequity in three US time shares she co-owns with her second husband. She is maxed out on her credit cards and has cumulative credit carddebts over $41,000. J.I.’s Ford Explorer was repossessed because she could not afford to make the monthly payments (but still owes$30,000 on the outstanding loan).

Several creditors have brought legal proceedings to collect on these debts. [43] J.I.’s current plan is to move with her boyfriend to the community of [omitted for publication] near Kamloops for a fresh start.She testified that her rent and living expenses will be much cheaper and there are job opportunities for legal assistants and paralegals innearby Kamloops. They will be moving at the end of October. E. Issues [44] The legal issues to be decided on these applications are: a. Is V.I. entitled to retroactive support from J.I.? b.

If so, what is the date of retroactivity and what is the quantum of child support payable? c. Going forward, what is the quantum of monthly child support payable by J.I. to V.I.? d. Should J.I. reimburse V.I. for the child support payments she received between September to December 2016? F. The Legal Test to Be Applied for Retroactive Child Support Orders [45] The notion of child support as a “basic obligation” of parents “is in no way a recent concept”: DBS v. SRG 2006 SCC 37, [2006] 2 SCR 231, at para. 37.

Indeed this obligation is codified in s. 147(1) of the Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c. 25 (”FLA”),which provides: Each parent and guardian of a child has a duty to provide support for the child … [46] Child support is recognized as the “right of the child” and not that of the parents: Earle v. Earle, 199 CanLII 6914 at para. 16and 17 (S.C.). [47] Simply put: ….[P]arents have an obligation to support their children in a way that is commensurate with their income. This parental obligation, likethe children’s concomitant right to support, exists independently of any statute or court order.

DBS, at para. 54 [48] V.I. seeks a retroactive order for child support. J.I. opposes the retroactive award. She also seeks to suspend her obligation topay child support in light of her present financial circumstances. [49] These are both discretionary orders under s. 152 of the FLA which provides: 152

(1) On application, a court may change, suspend or terminate an order respecting child support, and may do so prospectively orretroactively.

(2) Before making an order under subsection (1), the court must be satisfied that at least one of the following exists, and take it intoconsideration: (

a) a change in circumstances, as provided for in the child support guidelines, has occurred since the order respecting child support wasmade; (

b) evidence of a substantial nature that was not available during the previous hearing has become available; (

c) evidence of a lack of financial disclosure by a party was discovered after the last order was made. [50] Turning first to V.I.’s application for retroactive child support, I am guided by the principles enunciated by the Supreme Courtof Canada in DBS in the exercise of my discretion. This exercise involves a balancing of the need for achieving certainty for the payorparent against the needs for flexibility and fairness to the child.

[ 51 ] At paras. 94-96, Bastarache J., for the majority of the Court, explained this balancing process: 94. The foregoing analysis only confirms that courts ordering child support will generally have the power to order it retroactively. But having determined that a court may order a retroactive child support award, it becomes necessary to discuss when it should exercise that discretion. 95. It will not always be appropriate for a retroactive award to be ordered.

Retroactive awards will not always resonate with the purposes behind the child support regime; this will be so where the child would get no discernible benefit from the award. Retroactive awards may also cause hardship to a payor parent in ways that a prospective award would not. In short, while a free-standing obligation to support one’s children must be recognized, it will not always be appropriate for a court to enforce this obligation once the relevant time period has passed. 96.

Unlike prospective awards, retroactive awards can impair the delicate balance between certainty and flexibility in this area of the law. As situations evolve, fairness demands that obligations change to meet them. Yet, when obligations appear to be settled, fairness also demands that they not be gratuitously disrupted. Prospective and retroactive awards are thus very different in this regard. Prospective awards serve to define a new and predictable status quo ; retroactive awards serve to supplant it. 97.

Lest I be interpreted as discouraging retroactive awards, I also want to emphasize that they need not be seen as exceptional. It cannot only be exceptional that children are returned the support they were rightly due. Retroactive awards may result in unpredictability, but this unpredictability is often justified by the fact that the payor parent chose to bring that unpredictability upon him/herself.

A retroactive award can always be avoided by appropriate action at the time the obligation to pay the increased amounts of support first arose. [ 52 ] Bastarache J. then set out four f actors a judge must weigh in deciding whether retroactive child support should be ordered: 1. Whether there is a reasonable excuse for why the variation of the support order was not sought sooner; 2. Conduct of the payor parent; 3. The circumstances of the children; and 4. Any hardship that would be occasioned by a retroactive award. [ 53 ] None of these factors is determinative: DBS , at para. 99 . G.

Application of the DBS Factors [ 54 ] I will now apply these four factors to the circumstances in this case in order to determine whether a retroactive support order is warranted. 1. Reasonable Excuse for the Delay [ 55 ] Delay in seeking child support is a factor the Court must consider in deciding whether or not to order retroactive support. While “delay” is “not presumptively justifiable”, Bastarache J., at para. 101 in DBS , recognized that: 101. … [C]ourts must be sensitive to the practical concerns associated with a child support application.

They should not hesitate to find a reasonable excuse where the recipient parent harboured justifiable fears that the payor parent would react vindictively to the application to the detriment of the family.

Equally, absent any such an anticipated reaction on the part of the payor parent, a reasonable excuse may exist where the recipient parent lacked the financial or emotional means to bring an application, or was given inadequate legal advice … On the other hand, a recipient parent will generally lack a reasonable excuse where (s)he knew higher child support payments were warranted, but decided arbitrarily not to apply. [Citations omitted] [ 56 ] At para. 103, Bastarache J. also stated: 103. … From a child’s perspective, a retroactive award is a poor substitute for past obligations not met.

Recipient parents must act promptly and responsibly in monitoring the amount of child support paid… Absent a reasonable excuse, uncorrected deficiencies on the part of the payor parent that are known to the recipient parent represent the failure of both parents to fulfill their obligations to their children. [Citations omitted] [ 57 ] I now turn to V.I.’s explanation as to why he did not proceed with his first application and delayed bringing his current application until July 31, 2018. [ 58 ] The reasons V.I. gave during his testimony for his delay were variously: to avoid the stress of further litigation with J.I., J.I. never disclosed her income to V.I., that he could not afford to hire a lawyer or seek legal advice, and most importantly, he wanted to wait until K. was at least 16 years of age before bringing this application. [ 59 ] He told the Court that he worried that if he proceeded with his application sooner, J.I. would seek to enforce primary residency of the children under the May 2015 Order (and reclaim child support payments from V.I.) in retaliation to his application for child support. [ 60 ] He also felt that K.’s voice as to which parent she wanted to live with would be more persuasive if he waited until she was at least 16 years of age or older to defend such an application if brought by J.I.

[ 61 ] I accept V.I.’s evidence that the main reasons for the delay is he wanted to reduce stress and minimize further conflict with J.I. Given the level of acrimony between the parties, V.I.’s delay, in my view, seems justified. 2. Conduct of the Payor Parent [ 62 ] V.I.’s position is that J.I. was earning a good income in 2016-2018 in the insurance field and should have, but did not, pay any child support when the children were in his full-time care.

He submits J.I. should be contributing to the care of the children and for their future education and she should not be relieved from her obligation to pay child support in light of her poor choices and blameworthy conduct. [ 63 ] J.I. was cross-examined at length on her sworn financial statement and bank statements produced in evidence in an effort to demonstrate that J.I.’s financial state is the result of poor financial management. [ 64 ] During cross-examination, it became apparent that there is a pending civil claim in this Court brought by V.I. and V. Jr. against J.I.

This claim alleges that J.I. misappropriated money belonging to V. Jr. from his bank account. The topic of this civil claim came up during cross-examination in the context of questions on J.I.’s outlays and spending patterns. Based on J.I.’s answers to this line of questioning, I formed the view (but without deciding) that J.I. may have a defence to this civil claim. [ 65 ] Unfortunately for J.I. there have been some further repercussions on her insurance licence due to the nature of the allegations in this civil claim.

Her licence still remains under investigation at this time. [ 66 ] Finally, J.I. testified she lost her most recent position as an insurance broker this past July. She attributes the loss of this job to her second husband’s privacy breach claim and the concurrent licencing investigation. [ 67 ] With her insurance licence under review, J.I. cannot work as an insurance broker. 3.

Circumstances of the Children [ 68 ] The past and present circumstances of the children “factor” were discussed by Bastarache J., at para. 113, in DBS : 113. … A child who underwent hardship in the past may be compensated for this unfortunate circumstance through a retroactive award.

On the other hand, the argument for retroactive child support will be less convincing where the child already enjoyed all the advantages (s)he would have received had both parents been supporting him/her … This is not to suggest that the payor parent’s obligation will disappear where his/her children do not “need” his/her financial support.

Nor do I believe trial judges should delve into the past to remedy all old familial injustices through child support awards; for instance, hardship suffered by other family members (like recipient parents forced to make additional sacrifices) are irrelevant in determining whether retroactive support should be owed to the child.

I offer these comments only to state that the hardship suffered by children can affect the determination of whether the unfulfilled obligation should be enforced for their benefit. [Citations omitted] [ 69 ] I will now summarize the evidence in relation to this factor. [ 70 ] Since December 2016, V. Jr. and K. have resided with V.I. and his second wife. [ 71 ] J.I. readily admitted in her testimony that the children have been well cared for in V.I.’s home and that the children have enjoyed a much better standard of living than what she would have been able to provide.

J.I. also emphasized that she has the responsibility to support her youngest son. [ 72 ] J.I. admitted that her family situation was “not very good” when the children went to live with V.I. as she was in the beginning stages of a messy break-up with her second husband. [ 73 ] In terms of family circumstances, V.I. testified that his family lives frugally. Because he has not been able to work full-time, he has not had the money for “extras” to enrich the lives of his children.

Consequently, the I.’s do not spend money on restaurant meals, extra-curricular activities, or on family vacations (although he admitted to having gone on a trip to Italy and a trip to Mexico with his wife without the children within the last three years). [ 74 ] V. Jr. graduated from high school in June 2018. He works 3-4 days per week in a retail position at [omitted for publication] and takes two courses to upgrade his grade point average for university entrance. V. Jr. has a career goal of going into medicine or working in the health care field as a medical technician. V.

Jr. hopes to start at Douglas College in September 2020 and is saving up for school. He is supposed to contribute $200 towards household expenses, but V.I. prefers that he save his money for his education. [ 75 ] K. is in grade 11 and has plans to study nursing on graduation. According to V.I., she has a mild learning disability and needs tutoring support, which V.I. provides. [ 76 ] V.I. has a good relationship with his children. J.I. does not. [ 77 ] J.I. alleges that V.I. has manipulated the children to turn against her. She points to the civil claim that V.

Jr. and V.I. have brought against her (as discussed above) to illustrate her point. [ 78 ] V.I. denies that he has done anything to alienate the children from their mother. He testified that has not placed limits on their contact or communications with J.I. and ensures the children maintain a close relationship with J.I.’s parents and extended family. [ 79 ] J.I. remains estranged from V. Jr. He refuses to speak to J.I. and has threatened police action should she try to contact him.

[ 80 ] J.I. has some limited contact with K. They communicate by telephone and text messaging, and she sees K. on average once a month when she takes her out for dinner. They do not have a close relationship. [ 81 ] I have concluded from review of the evidence that although the children have done without some of the “extras”, including vacations and restaurant meals, they are well cared for in V.I.’s home and are performing well at school. 4. Hardship [ 82 ] In DBS , Bastarache J., at para. 115 , discussed the hardship factor: 115.

There are various reasons why retroactive awards could lead to hardship in circumstances where a prospective award would not. For instance, the quantum of retroactive awards is usually based on past income rather than present income; in other words, unlike prospective awards, the calculation of retroactive awards is not intrinsically linked to what the payor parent can currently afford. As well, payor parents may have new families, along with new family obligations to meet.

On this point, courts should recognize that hardship considerations in this context are not limited to the payor parent: it is difficult to justify a retroactive award on the basis of a “children first” policy where it would cause hardship for the payor parent’s other children. In short, retroactive awards disrupt payor parents’ management of their financial affairs in ways that prospective awards do not. Courts should be attentive to this fact. [ 83 ] I accept J.I.’s submission that there is a marked disparity between the two households.

J.I. is living on the edge of bankruptcy, borrowing money from her parents to meet living expenses. V. Jr. and K., on the other hand, have a much better living standard in V.I.’s household than what J.I. can offer. [ 84 ] It is difficult to justify a retroactive child support in these circumstances. Such an award would cause financial hardship not only to J.I. but also to her youngest child, to whom she also is financially responsible. 5.

Conclusion on the Claim for Retroactive Support [ 85 ] A consideration of the DBS factors has lead me to the conclusion that a retroactive award of child support is not appropriate in the circumstances of this case. Only the first factor weighs in favour of the award. The hardship factor weighs heavily against the award in this case. H.

Ongoing Child Support [ 86 ] V.I.’s position is J.I. has not taken her responsibility to pay child support seriously and submits that the Court should impute income to J.I. for the purposes of calculating child support based on the average of her last three years of earnings. [ 87 ] While I agree with V.I. that J.I. has marketable job skills and is employable, I am satisfied that J.I. has made diligent efforts to find work despite the loss of her job in July and her recent miscarriage.

I also accept J.I.’s explanation that her need for reduced work hours due to her childcare commitments make her a less desirable candidate for an office position at present. [ 88 ] Moreover, J.I. also had health complications during her pregnancy and a recent miscarriage which cannot be overlooked as a further explanation as to why she has not yet found work. [ 89 ] Finally, I accept J.I.’s submission that there are extenuating circumstances due to her second husband’s interference at her workplace which caused or contributed to the loss of her employment.

The two civil claims and pending licencing investigations have also limited J.I.’s opportunities to find work in the insurance field. [ 90 ] The cumulative effect of these setbacks have prompted J.I. to seek a new start with the planned move to [omitted for publication]. [ 91 ] Before I began delivering my reasons, V.I. advised the Court that J.I. has purchased a home and has received a full-time job offer, which information he learned from J.I.’s second husband. [ 92 ] I queried counsel for J.I. whether this was accurate and if so, why these recent developments were not brought to the attention of the Court by J.I. [ 93 ] Counsel explained (and J.I. confirmed) that J.I.’s parents are helping her purchase the house and that she received an offer of employment at a law firm with an immediate start date.

The position is that of a full-time legal assistant at a law firm in Kamloops which has an annual starting salary of $45,000. [ 94 ] J.I. advised the Court that she has not accepted the offer yet and does not know how long the position will be held open for her. [ 95 ] Counsel for J.I. advised the Court that the reason she has not accepted the offer is because J.I. is in the midst of a Supreme Court application with her second husband involving the issue of relocation of their seven year old son to [omitted for publication].

I was advised that the application is contested and that there is a hearing date planned in late November. J.I. will remain in Maple Ridge until this application concludes. [ 96 ] In my view, this job offer is material information which ought to have been brought to the attention of the Court by J.I. prior to the start of today’s proceedings. The offer goes to the heart of V.I.’s application for ongoing child support.

The fact that J.I. received this offer and has a job waiting in Kamloops before she made her move to [omitted for publication], strongly suggests that J.I. should have no difficulty securing full-time employment as a legal assistant. [ 97 ] I accept that the pending Supreme Court application will have some bearing on the timing of J.I.’s planned move to [omitted for publication].

[ 98 ] In light of the totality of the circumstances, I am exercising my discretion in J.I.’s favour and I am adjourning generally V.I.’s application for child support with liberty to V.I. to proceed with his application after January 1, 2020. This postponement is necessary to give J.I. sufficient time to get settled in [omitted for publication] and to find employment. Given J.I.’s recent offer of employment, I am not prepared to postpone the determination on the child support application any longer. [ 99 ] Should V.I. wish to bring an application for

section 7 expenses, he has liberty to do so, but cannot bring this application until after January 1, 2020. [ 100 ] I am ordering the parties to file and deliver updated Financial Statements in Form 4 of the Provincial Court (Family) Rules , together with all attachments listed on page 2 of that form by December 31, 2019. [ 101 ] The parties are further ordered to exchange their 2019 T4 slips by March 1, 2020, and their 2019 T1 tax returns and notices of assessment by no later than July 15, 2020. [ 102 ] I am further granting an Order pursuant to

section 225 of the FLA that V.I. shall not, without leave of the Court, directly or indirectly disclose to J.I.’s second husband, the names, addresses, and contact information of any of J.I.’s current or prospective employers that he receives from J.I. in connection with this proceeding. J.I. needs to be able to work in an environment without risk of interference by her second husband. I. Reimbursement of Child Support Payments [ 103 ] V.I. produced in evidence four cancelled child support cheques, for the period September 1 to December 1, 2016, totalling $2,600.

He submits the children were in his care residing with him during that time and thus he seeks an order to compel J.I. to repay him this sum. [ 104 ] J.I. opposes this claim. She testified that the children were residing with her and that she drove them to and from school daily during the Fall 2016. [ 105 ] I accept J.I.’s evidence. I find that she retained primary residence and had day to day responsibility for the children during this time period which is consistent with Judge Woods’ May 2015 Order.

V.I. was bound by Judge Woods’ order to pay monthly child support to J.I. and she was entitled to cash the cheques. I thus dismiss this ground of relief. J. Cancelling V.I.’s Child Support Payment Obligations [ 106 ] V.I. ceased making child support payments to J.I. as of January 1, 2017, as the children were no longer in her care. J.I. accepted this decision. The parties, however, never sought to vary Judge Woods’ order to cancel V.I.’s monthly child support obligation to J.I. [ 107 ] Accordingly, paragraph 8 of Judge Woods’ May 2015 Order is cancelled retroactively to January 1, 2017. K.

Orders Made [ 108 ] In light of the foregoing reasons, I make the following orders: 1. V.I.’s obligation to pay ongoing child support to J.I., pursuant to paragraph 8 of Judge Woods’ May 2015 Order, is cancelled retroactively to January 1, 2017. 2. V.I.’s claim for retroactive support is dismissed. 3. V.I.’s claim for reimbursement of his child support payments made to J.I. for the period September 1, 2016 to December 1, 2016 is dismissed. 4. V.I.’s claim for ongoing child support is adjourned generally with liberty to V.I. to re-set set his application for child support for hearing and to apply for

section 7 expenses, but only after January 1, 2020. 5. The parties shall file and exchange updated financial statements in Form 4 of the Provincial Court (Family) Rules , together with all attachments list on page 2 of that form by December 31, 2019. 6. The parties shall exchange copies of their 2019 T4 slips by March 1, 2020, and their 2019 T1 tax returns and Notices of Assessment by July 1, 2020. 7. Pursuant to

section 225 of the FLA that V.I. shall not, without leave of the Court, directly or indirectly disclose to J.I.’s second husband, the names, addresses, and contact information of any of J.I.’s current or prospective employers that he receives from J.I. in connection with this proceeding. 8. V.I.’s signature is dispensed with on this Order. ____________________________ The Honourable Judge D.L. Dorey Provincial Court of British Columbia

CORRIGENDUM – Released October 21, 2019 [1] In my Reasons for Judgment issued on October 18, 2019, the following corrections have been made to paragraph 108, as set out with underlining below: [108] In light of the foregoing reasons, I make the following orders: 1. V.I.’s obligation to pay ongoing child support to J.I., pursuant to paragraph 8 of Judge Woods’ May 2015 Order, is cancelled retroactively to January 1, 2017. 2. V.I’s claim for retroactive support is dismissed. 3.

V.I.’s claim for reimbursement of his child support payments made to J.I. for the period September 1, 2016 to December 1, 2016 is dismissed. 4. V.I.’s claim for ongoing child support is adjourned generally with liberty to V.I. to re-set set his application for child support for hearing and to apply for

section 7 expenses but only after January 1, 2020. 5. The parties shall file and exchange updated financial statements in Form 4 of the Provincial Court (Family) Rules , together with all attachments list on page 2 of that form by December 31, 2019. 6. The parties shall exchange copies of their 2019 T4 slips by March 1, 2020, and their 2019 T1 tax returns and Notices of Assessment by July 1, 2020. 7. Pursuant to

section 225 of the FLA that V.I. shall not, without leave of the Court, directly or indirectly disclose to J.I.’s second husband, the names, addresses, and contact information of any of J.I.’s current or prospective employers that he receives from J.I. in connection with this proceeding . 8. V.I.’s signature is dispensed with on this Order. ____________________________ The Honourable Judge D.L. Dorey Provincial Court of British Columbia