R. v. F.A.B. Date:, 2012 BCPC 362

Citation: R. v. F.A.B. Date: 20120910 2012 BCPC 0362 File No: 91332-C-6 Registry: Kamloops IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA REGINA v. F.A.B. REASONS FOR SENTENCE OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE S.D. FRAME Counsel for the Crown: Ms. C. Elliott Counsel for the Accused: Mr. R. Caron Place of Hearing: Kamloops , B.C. Date of Hearing: July 12, 2012 Date of Judgment: September 10, 2012

[1] F.A.B. is before me for sentencing with respect to a guilty plea to a charge of sexually assaulting I.M. between January 1, 2007and November 5, 2010. I.M. is the grandchild of Mr. B.’s second wife. The incidents occurred while I.M. was between the ages of 6and 9 years. [2] This was a joint submission for an 18 month conditional sentence order. Eighteen months is the maximum sentence availablebecause the Crown is no longer proceeding by Indictment. The issue is whether it is appropriate to incarcerate Mr.

B. or if anappropriate conditional sentence order can be crafted in these circumstances. [3] Denunciation and deterrence are paramount considerations where the sex offences are committed against children. However, inthe face of R. v. Ipeelee 2012 SCC 13 , 2012 S.C.C. 13, the cases that came before it, and the sentencing principles set out in theCriminal Code, I must consider whether or a non-custodial sentence may be appropriate. [4] There is an added issue arising from the decision of my sister, Judge Connie Bagnall in R. v. Nguyen 2012 BCPC 97 ,2012 B.C.P.C. 0097.

That decision is helpful for a number of aspects of this case. She addresses the issue of a judge who will not “goalong” with a joint submission as well as whether a conditional sentence order is available for this offence. [5] Dealing first with the issue of whether a conditional sentence order is available, Judge Bagnall considered ss. 752 and 742.1.

Section 752 defines personal injury offence: 752. In this Part, “serious personal injury offence” means (

b) an offence or attempt to commit an offence mentioned in

section 271 (sexual assault), 272 (sexual assault with a weapon,threats to a third party or causing bodily harm) or 273 (aggravated sexual assault). [6]

Section 742.1 allows for conditional sentence orders in certain circumstances. It reads: 742.1 If a person is convicted of an offence, other than a serious personal injury offence as defined in

section 752, a terrorism offence ora criminal organization offence prosecuted by way of indictment for which the maximum term of imprisonment is ten years or more oran offence punishable by a minimum term of imprisonment, and the court imposes a sentence of imprisonment of less than two years andis satisfied that the service of the sentence in the community would not endanger the safety of the community and would be consistentwith the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing set out in sections 718 to 718.2, the court may, for the purpose of supervisingthe offender’s behaviour in the community, order that the offender serve the sentence in the community, subject to the offender’scompliance with the conditions imposed under

section 742.3. [7] Judge Bagnall said this at paragraphs 44 to 47 as excerpted by me: 44 The definition of "serious personal injury offence" clearly includes offences of sexual assault where the Crown has proceededsummarily.

However, the precise language of s. 742.1 leaves open the question of whether the Crown's decision as to how to proceeddetermines the availability of a Conditional Sentence... 45 The position of both counsel is that the clause "prosecuted by way of indictment" must modify all of: "a serious personal injuryoffence" and "a terrorism offence or a criminal organization offence for which the maximum term of imprisonment is 10 years or more".Counsel referred to the case of Regina v. Thompson, 2010 ONCJ 399.

The entire decision of the court respecting this issue is atparagraph 20: The Crown's position is that in s. 742.1, the phrase "prosecuted by way of indictment for which the maximum term of imprisonment isten years or more" modifies the words "a criminal organization offence", and does not apply to the words "other than a serious personalinjury offence as defined in s. 752". Thus, the

section should, according to the Crown, be read as follows: If a person is convicted of an offence other than: (

a) A serious personal injury offence as defined by s. 752; (

b) A terrorism offence; (

c) A criminal organization offence prosecuted by way of indictment for which the maximum term of imprisonment is ten years ormore; (

d) An offence punishable by a minimum term of imprisonment ... a conditional sentence may be imposed. In my view, this

interpretation is incorrect. A review of the sections of the Code which define criminal organization offences (ss 467.1-467.2) reveals that all of these offences must be prosecuted by way of indictment. There is no option to prosecute any of them by way ofsummary conviction. To restrict the application in s. 742.1 of the words "prosecuted by way of indictment" to criminal organization

offences alone would be nonsensical. To give meaningful effect to the wording of the

section requires that the words "prosecuted by wayof indictment" be read to modify all of the offences that precede those words, including the offence of sexual assault. 46 With respect to statutory

interpretation, Mr. Justice Iacobucci said this at paragraph 26 in the case of Bell ExpressVu LimitedPartnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42: In Elmer Driedger's definitive formulation, found at p. 87 of his Construction of Statutes (2nd ed. 1983): Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of

an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammaticaland ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament. Driedger's modern approach has been repeatedly cited by this Court as the preferred approach to statutory

interpretation across a widerange of interpretive settings. 47 With respect, I do not agree with the conclusion reached by Justice Maresca in Thompson. In my view, because of the placement ofthe commas and the separating words in s. 742, that is, the plain grammatical sense of that section, and considering the

section in thecontext of the entire Criminal Code, the excluded category of offences are: -- a serious personal injury offence as defined in s. 752 (which clearly includes the offence of sexual assaultregardless of the manner in which the Crown proceeds); or -- a terrorism offence or a criminal organization offence prosecuted by way of indictment for which themaximum term of imprisonment is 10 years or more or -- an offence punishable by a minimum term of imprisonment. [8] Both counsel have invited me not to follow this decision.

In the alternative, if I am bound to follow it, I should instead suspendpassing of a sentence and impose a similar period of probation. While it would at first blush seem to be a distinction without adifference, a period of probation does not come with the same repercussions as a conditional sentence order when a breach occurs. [9] This leads me to Judge Bagnall’s comments regarding a fit and proper sentence for offences of this nature: 36 In Regina v.

D.D., the Ontario Court of Appeal commented as follows at paragraphs 33 through 36: Before going further, I wish to emphasize that the ranges which I have identified are not meant to be fixed and inflexible. On thecontrary, sentencing is not an exact science and trial judges must retain the flexibility needed to do justice in individual cases. Thesuggested ranges are merely guidelines designed to assist trial judges in their difficult task of fashioning fit and just sentences in similarcases. The overall message however, is meant to be clear.

Adult sexual predators who would put the lives of innocent children at risk to satisfytheir deviant sexual needs must know that they will pay a heavy price. In cases such as this, absent exceptional circumstances, theobjectives of sentencing proclaimed by Parliament in s.718(a), (

b) and (

c) of the Criminal Code, commonly referred to as denunciation,general and specific deterrence, and the need to separate offenders from society, must take precedence over the other recognizedobjectives of sentencing. We as a society owe it to our children to protect them from the harm caused by offenders like the appellant. Our children are at once ourmost valued and our most vulnerable assets. Throughout their formative years, they are manifestly incapable of defending themselvesagainst predators like the appellant and as such, they make easy prey.

People like the appellant know this only too well and they exploitit to achieve their selfish ends, heedless of the dire consequences that can and often do follow. In this respect, while there may have been a time, years ago, when offenders like the appellant could take refuge in the fact that little wasknown about the nature or extent of the damage caused by sexual abuse, that time has long since passed. Today, that excuse no longerholds sway. The horrific consequences of child sexual abuse are only too well known. 37 In Regina v. R.E.M., Mr.

Justice Romilly of the Supreme Court of British Columbia noted at paragraph 32: It is my view that a clear message must be sent to every person in a position of trust in relation to a child that sexual contact with themwill not be tolerated in this society and that it will result in lengthy periods of imprisonment being imposed. I note that in R. v. Stone(1999), (SCC), 134 C.C.C. (3d) 353 the Supreme Court of Canada, at para. 239, considered the objectives of thesentencing process and stated: It is incumbent on the judiciary to bring the law into harmony with prevailing social values.

This is also true with regard to sentencing.To this end, in M.(C.A.), supra, Lamer, C.J. stated, at para. 81: The objective of denunciation mandates that a sentence should also communicate society's condemnation of that particular offender'sconduct. In short, a sentence with a denunciatory element represents a symbolic, collective statement that the offender's conduct shouldbe punished for encroaching on our society's basic code of values as enshrined within our substantive criminal law. ... Our criminal law isalso a system of values.

A sentence which expresses denunciation is simply the means by which these values are communicated. Inshort, in addition to attaching negative consequences to undesirable behaviour, judicial sentences should also be imposed in a mannerwhich positively instils the basic set of communal values shared by all Canadians as expressed by the Criminal Code.

[10] I must also consider, apart from the Gladue principles reiterated in Ipeelee, the fact that this is a joint submission. JudgeBagnall said this of joint submissions: 17 Counsel for the accused also referred to Regina v. Bezdan, 2001 BCCA 215, in which this was said at paragraph 15: I would not go so far as to say that a sentencing judge can only depart from the sentence suggested in the joint submission if he or she issatisfied that the proposal is contrary to the public interest, or that the sentence proposed would bring the administration of justice intodisrepute.

It is not clear to me that these two circumstances cover all situations in which a sentencing judge might conclude that thesentence proposed was "unfit". 21 It is my view that the fact that counsel agree as to the appropriate sentence should be and is a factor to be taken into account by thesentencing judge, but that there remains an obligation on the judge to determine and hand down a sentence which is fit. We work withinan adversarial system in which counsel advocate for a particular result and the sentence is decided by the court. [11] The facts of this case are disturbing and predatory. I.M. treated Mr.

B. as a grandfather. He would take I.M. to Kamloops withhim on his trips to town. On the way, he would stop at a pullout near W, stand outside the vehicle and touch I.M. in her breast andvaginal area with his hands and his mouth. Their homes were next door to each other. When I.M. would visit his house, he would closethe curtains and get her to take her pants off. He would kiss her vagina. He also did this once on an old bus during an outing. He didnot remove his clothing and she did not suffer physical injury.

This last happened on October 30, 2010. [12] Crown had been unable to reach either I.M. or her mother in preparation for sentencing, but they did speak back in February,2012. At that time, I.M. was seeing two counsellors. There is no victim impact statement beyond what is disclosed in the pre-sentencereport. I also have the benefit of I.M.’s testimony as related to me by Crown. [13] This matter had originally proceeded by Indictment and there was a preliminary inquiry. On the stand, I.M. bore no ill willtoward her grandfather and wanted him “fixed”. Ms.

M., however, advised the probation officer, Jon Jordan that I.M. has exhibitedbehaviours symptomatic of trauma including bed wetting and suicidal ideation. She said her daughter had been connected with VictimServices and was attending counselling. I.M. had been showing some progress. Her caregivers and counsellors remained focus onstrengthening her spiritual and emotional stability. Ms. M. told the probation officer that her daughter’s healing had been assisted by thecontact prohibitions and the previous prohibition that Mr.

B. not attend the X Reserve where she and her daughter reside. [14] While a specific Gladue report was not prepared, Mr. Jordan prepared sentencing considerations for aboriginal offenders toaddress the Gladue principles. Mr. B. is a 71 year old status member of the Y Indian Band. [15] Mr. B. was originally raised by his grandmother in the “Indian way” learning his native language as well as aboriginal cultureand traditions. At the age of six, though, he was placed in Z Residential School, which I am told by all accounts was a horrifyingexperience.

He became disconnected from his aboriginal heritage and identity, suffering punishment for any efforts to maintain thatconnection. [16] The pre-sentence report notes that placement of children in residential schools was part of an initiative to assimilate aboriginalpeople into western colonial society. Mr. B. did not speak of his experiences until 50 years later when he was empowered by othermembers of his community to speak out. While at Z, Mr. B. was sexually assaulted by an older student and suffered physical andemotional abuse from various school officials.

While he does not attribute that experience to his current offending behaviour, heacknowledges he has suffered a lasting trauma as a result of that abuse. [17] Mr. Jordan has been advised by Restorative Justice Assistant, Pauline Michelle, that the Y Indian Band provides socialprogramming as well as restorative justice initiatives for its Band members. The program works with the Band members in conjunctionwith any court orders to support individuals as well as facilitate access to social services.

They also involve local R.C.M.P., the Y Bandelders, and coordinators to facilitate healing circles based on eligibility determined by individual circumstances and the nature of theoffence. This is to address the rehabilitation as well as initiate reconciliation between the victim and the offender and achieve a sense ofwellness for the community. Mr. Jordan notes though that due to the nature and severity of the offence, though, that practice may not besuitable. [18] An additional factor is that Mr. B. has little connection with his aboriginal culture or interest in engaging with traditionalaboriginal activities.

Yet, he is an active member of the neighbouring aboriginal community where he now lives. He also has a stronginterest in being a support resource for other people who are survivors of residential school abuse. His wife remains a strong supporter. [19] I was provided with letters respecting his participation in support groups and counselling arising from residential school abuse. He is variously described as warm, quiet and kind. [20] Mr. B. makes no excuses for his actions and takes responsibility for them.

He assures the court that he will never return tocourt again. [21] The sentencing principles which require me to consider the Gladue principles are a recognition of the residential schoolexperience and the implications of poverty and unemployment. In Ipeelee, the court was dealing with breaches of long term supervisionorders resulting from long criminal records where the history of alcohol abuse resulted in the commission of violent offences. Thedecision reinforces the necessity of considering the principles set out in R. v. Gladue (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688.

Inits discussion regarding the sentencing of aboriginal offenders, the Supreme Court of Canada said this: 56

Section 718.2(

e) of the Criminal Code directs that "all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the

circumstances should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders ". This provision was introduced into the Code as part of the 1996 Bill C-41 amendments to codify the purpose and principles of sentencing.

According to the then Minister of Justice, Allan Rock, "the reason we referred specifically there to aboriginal persons is that they are sadly overrepresented in the prison populations of Canada" (House of Commons, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs , No. 62, 1st Sess., 35th Parl., November 17, 1994, at p. 15). 57 Aboriginal persons were sadly overrepresented indeed. Government figures from 1988 indicated that Aboriginal persons accounted for 10 percent of federal prison inmates, while making up only 2 percent of the national population.

The figures were even more stark in the Prairie provinces, where Aboriginal persons accounted for 32 percent of prison inmates compared to 5 percent of the population. The situation was generally worse in provincial institutions. For example, Aboriginal persons accounted for fully 60 percent of the inmates detained in provincial jails in Saskatchewan (M. Jackson, "Locking Up Natives in Canada" (1988-1989), 23 U.B.C. L. Rev. 215, at pp. 215-16). There was also evidence to indicate that this overrepresentation was on the rise.

At Stony Mountain Penitentiary, the only federal prison in Manitoba, the Aboriginal inmate population had been climbing steadily from 22 percent in 1965 to 33 percent in 1984, and up to 46 percent just five years later in 1989 (Commissioners A. C. Hamilton and C. M. Sinclair, Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba (1991), vol. 1, The Justice System and Aboriginal People , at p. 394).

The foregoing statistics led the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples ("RCAP") to conclude, at p. 309 of its Report, Bridging the Cultural Divide : A Report on Aboriginal People and Criminal Justice in Canada (1996): The Canadian criminal justice system has failed the Aboriginal peoples of Canada -- First Nations, Inuit and Métis people, on-reserve and off-reserve, urban and rural -- in all territorial and governmental jurisdictions.

The principle reason for this crushing failure is the fundamentally different world views of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people with respect to such elemental issues as the substantive content of justice and the process of achieving justice. 58 The overrepresentation of Aboriginal people in the Canadian criminal justice system was the impetus for including the specific reference to Aboriginal people in s. 718.2 ( e ). It was not at all clear, however, what exactly the provision required or how it would affect the sentencing of Aboriginal offenders.

In 1999, this Court had the opportunity to address these questions in Gladue . Cory and Iacobucci JJ., writing for the unanimous Court, reviewed the statistics and concluded, at para. 64: These findings cry out for recognition of the magnitude and gravity of the problem, and for responses to alleviate it. The figures are stark and reflect what may fairly be termed a crisis in the Canadian criminal justice system. The drastic overrepresentation of aboriginal peoples within both the Canadian prison population and the criminal justice system reveals a sad and pressing social problem.

It is reasonable to assume that Parliament, in singling out aboriginal offenders for distinct sentencing treatment in s. 718.2 ( e ), intended to attempt to redress this social problem to some degree. The provision may properly be seen as Parliament's direction to members of the judiciary to inquire into the causes of the problem and to endeavour to remedy it, to the extent that a remedy is possible through the sentencing process. 59 The Court held, therefore, that s. 718.2(

e) of the Code is a remedial provision designed to ameliorate the serious problem of overrepresentation of Aboriginal people in Canadian prisons, and to encourage sentencing judges to have recourse to a restorative approach to sentencing ( Gladue , at para. 93 ). It does more than affirm existing principles of sentencing; it calls upon judges to use a different method of analysis in determining a fit sentence for Aboriginal offenders.

Section 718.2(

e) directs sentencing judges to pay particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders because those circumstances are unique and different from those of non- Aboriginal offenders ( Gladue , at para. 37 ). When sentencing an Aboriginal offender, a judge must consider: (

a) the unique systemic or background factors which may have played a

part in bringing the particular Aboriginal offender before the courts; and (

b) the types of sentencing procedures and sanctions which may be appropriate in the circumstances for the offender because of his or her particular Aboriginal heritage or connection ( Gladue , at para. 66 ). Judges may take judicial notice of the broad systemic and background factors affecting Aboriginal people generally, but additional case-specific information will have to come from counsel and from the pre-sentence report ( Gladue , at paras. 83-84 ). [ 22 ] Sadly, the Supreme Court of Canada also observed that, despite the

section and the Gladue decision, over-representation has not changed to any discernable degree. Failure to have any impact was attributed to a misunderstanding and misapplication of both Gladue and the Criminal Code . After defending itself from attacks arising from literature including criticisms that sentencing is not an appropriate means of addressing over-representation; that the Gladue principles provide a race-based discount for aboriginal offenders; and that the principles provide special treatment and lower sentences to aboriginal offenders is inherently unfair, the court said:

a) first, systemic and background factors may bear on the culpability of the offender to the extent that they shed light on his or her level of moral blameworthiness (para. 73);

b) the second set of circumstances – the types of sanctions which may be appropriate – bears not on the degree of culpability of the offender, but on the effectiveness of the sentence itself (para. 74);

c) section 718.2(

e) does not create a race- based discount on sentencing; and

d) the provision does not ask courts to remedy the over-representation of aboriginal people in prisons by artificially reducing incarceration rates (para. 75). [ 23 ] The court emphasizes that an offender does not need to establish a causal link between the background factors and the commission of the current offence saying that “this judgment displays an inadequate understanding of the devastating intergenerational effects of the collective experiences of aboriginal peoples.” (para. 82) [ 24 ] The Supreme Court also denounced the view that the more serious the offence, the less likely the Gladue principles would have an impact on sentence: 85 Whatever criticisms may be directed at the decision of this Court for any ambiguity in this respect, the judgment ultimately makes it clear, at para. 82, that sentencing judges have a duty to apply s. 718.2( e ): "There is no discretion as to whether to consider the unique situation of the Aboriginal offender; the only discretion concerns the determination of a just and appropriate sentence." Similarly, in

Wells , Iacobucci J. reiterated, at para. 50, that [t]he generalization drawn in Gladue to the effect that the more violent and serious the offence, the more likely as a practical matter for similar terms of imprisonment to be imposed on aboriginal and non-aboriginal offenders, was not meant to be a principle of universal application. In each case, the sentencing judge must look to the circumstances of the aboriginal offender. [ 25 ] The court concluded its discussion of the duty of the court to consider Gladue principles at paragraph 87 : 87 The sentencing judge has a statutory duty, imposed by s. 718.2 (

e) of the Criminal Code , to consider the unique circumstances of Aboriginal offenders. Failure to apply Gladue in any case involving an Aboriginal offender runs afoul of this statutory obligation. As these reasons have explained, such a failure would also result in a sentence that was not fit and was not consistent with the fundamental principle of proportionality.

Therefore, application of the Gladue principles is required in every case involving an Aboriginal offender, including breach of an LTSO, and a failure to do so constitutes an error justifying appellate intervention. [ 26 ] The balance I must achieve, therefore, in sentencing Mr. B. is the conflict between my obligation to consider alternatives to incarceration pursuant to the Gladue principles, and a fit and proper sentence where the offence is one of sexual assault involving a child where the accused is in a position of trust.

In such a case, denunciation, general and specific deterrence, and the need to separate offenders from society must take precedence over the other objectives of sentencing. This must include such objectives as those set out in s. 718.2 (e). [ 27 ] Given Mr. B.’s heritage, the counselling he is presently undertaking, and the specific facts of his case, I might have been compelled to impose a conditional sentence order with very strict conditions such as those I am going to impose in his probation order. However, I must agree with my sister Judge Bagnall that there can be no proper grammatical

interpretation of s. 742.1 other than her plain reading of it. Consequently, I must find that a conditional sentence order is not available to Mr. B. [ 28 ] To suspend passing of a sentence and impose a lengthier period of probation would be a wholly unfit sentence. This is a prolonged sexual assault against Mr. B.’s step-granddaughter. While she appears to have a healthy and promising perspective and is receiving counselling, the harm caused to her cannot be overstated. The sentence I impose must reflect denunciation and deterrence.

That must be the paramount consideration even after I consider the Gladue principles. I also, however, cannot ignore the circumstances in which Mr. B. finds himself. I must acknowledge that rehabilitation is also a significant component of the sentence given his own traumatic experiences at Z. To achieve that balance, I impose a 6 month jail sentence and a 12 month probation order, the terms of which will be as follows: Mandatory conditions: You shall keep the peace and be of good behaviour. You shall appear before the Court when required to do so by the Court.

You shall notify the Court or your Probation Officer in advance of any change of name or address, and promptly notify the court or the Probation Officer of any change of employment or occupation. #401A - Within 24 hours after completion of your jail sentence, you shall report in person to the probation office located at Merritt, BC, and after that you shall report as and when directed by the probation officer. #402C - You shall reside at a residence approved by the probation officer and you shall not change your residence at any time without first obtaining the written consent of the probation officer. #404 - You are to remain within your residence or on the lot on which your residence is located at all times except as follows:

a) between the hours of noon and 2:00 p.m. each day, in order to attend to your personal business;

b) at any time with the written consent of the probation officer. Such consent is to be given only for compelling personal, family or employment reasons, which may include Healing Circles and counseling sessions for residential school survivors;

c) when traveling directly to or returning directly from your place of employment, or while in the course of your employment. You shall provide the probation officer with written proof of your employment if requested to do so;

d) in the company of an adult approved in writing by the probation officer.

e) in the event of a medical emergency and then only when traveling directly to, or returning directly from a hospital emergency ward; and

f) when traveling directly to or returning directly from a scheduled court appearance or a scheduled appointment with your probation officer. #406 - You shall present yourself at the door to your residence when any Peace Officer or probation officer attends there for the purpose of determining your compliance with the house arrest condition of this Order. #406A - You shall respond personally and immediately to the telephone when a Peace Officer or probation officer makes a telephone call to your residence for the purpose of determining your compliance with the house arrest conditions of this Order. #407 - You shall have no contact or communication, directly or indirectly, with I.M. #411 - You shall not attend the X Reserve. #412 - You shall not attend at, or be within 100 metres, of any place which you know to be the residence or school of I.M. #418 - You shall have no contact or communication, directly or indirectly, with nor be alone in the presence of any person you know to be, or who reasonably appears to be, of the age of sixteen (16) years or less, except as follows:

a) with the advance written consent of the probation officer;

b) in the presence of an adult third party, approved in writing in advance by the probation officer;

c) through legal counsel; or

d) while in attendance at Court. #419 - You shall not attend at any public park, school ground, daycare centre, swimming pool, playground, skating rink, community centre or recreational centre where persons of the age of sixteen (16) years or less are present or might reasonably be expected to be present, except in the presence of an adult third party, approved in writing in advance by the probation officer. #427 - You shall attend, participate in and successfully complete any assessment, counselling or program as directed by the probation officer.

Without limiting the general nature of this condition, such assessment, counselling or program may relate to post-traumatic stress counselling, sexual abuse counselling and such full-time attendance program as may be directed by the probation officer. You shall comply with all rules and regulations of any such assessment, counselling or program.

You must carry a copy of this order on your person at all times when you are outside your place of residence and produce it upon demand of a peace officer. #336 - You are required to make yourself available to the R.C.M.Police Detachment or Sheriff Services for the purposes of providing a sample of your DNA pursuant to the Criminal Code . I also impose SOIRA Order for a period of ten years.

_____________________ S.D. Frame Provincial Court Judge