R. v. B.L.J., 2023 BCPC 39

Citation: R. v. B.L.J. 2023 BCPC 39 Date: 20230223 File No: 93493-1 Registry: Kelowna IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Criminal Court) REX v. B.L.J. PUBLICATION BAN Pursuant to s. 486.4 (2) of the Criminal Code of Canada REASONS FOR SENTENCE OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE A. TAM Counsel for the Crown: D. Blumenkrans and K. Shin Counsel for the Defendant: L. McPheeters Place of Hearing: Kelowna, B.C. Date of Hearing: November 18, 2022 Date of Sentence: February 23, 2023

Introduction [1] B.L.J. (Mr. J.) is before the Court for sentencing following a trial.

On June 13, 2022, this Court convicted him of the followingsexual offences: Count 1 – s. 151 (sexual interference) before May 1, 2008 Count 2 – s. 152 (invitation to sexual touching) before May 1, 2008 Count 3 – s. 271 (sexual assault) before May 1, 2008 Count 4 – s. 151 (sexual interference) after May 1, 2008 Count 5 – s. 152 (invitation to sexual touching) after May 1, 2008 Count 6 – s. 271 (sexual assault) after May 1, 2008 [2] The offences happened over the course of four incidents when the victim, D., was between the ages of 6 to 11. Mr. J. is D.’sgreat-uncle. At the relevant time, Mr.

J. was in his late 40’s to his early 50’s. At trial, D. was 24 and Mr. J. was 65. [3] On May 1, 2008, there was a change in the legislation, one effect of which saw the maximum sentence increased from 10 yearsto 14 years (for ss. 151 and 152 offences). The 10-year maximum applies to the first three of the four incidents (counts 1-3); the 14-yearmaximum applies to the last (counts 4-6). For the first three incidents, there was no minimum sentence, whereas a minimum sentence of45 days applies to the last incident. Mr. J. is entitled to the sentencing regime applicable at the time of the offences by virtue of s. 11(

i) ofthe Charter. Moreover, in light of the principle articulated in R. v. Kienapple, (SCC), [1975] 1 SCR 729, this Court haspreviously entered a conditional stay on the s. 271 offences (counts 3 and 6). Circumstances of the offences [4] The full details of the case are contained in an earlier trial decision R. v. B.L.J. 2022 BCPC 145. While the analysis in thatjudgment referred to them as allegations, I have now found them to have occurred beyond any reasonable doubt. As such, I will simplyquote from that

summary at paras. 4-7: [4] The first incident happened when D. was about 6 years old, so in 2003 or 2004. On that occasion, Mr. J. and D. were alone in acamper trailer that was parked on the property where Mr. J. lived. It was alleged that Mr. J. put his hand down D.’s pants and rubbed hervagina. He then pulled down her pants, and forced his penis into her vagina. He thrusted a number of times and then ejaculated on herstomach. [5] The second incident was alleged to have occurred in the small house where Mr. J. lived. This was on a family property on whichthere was another bigger family home.

On this occasion, Mr. J. was watching a pornographic video with D. The video showed a manand a woman having sex. He asked her if she wanted to do what was depicted in the video. D. said yes. She got undressed and laid downin the living room. Mr. J. put her legs up in the air. He put his finger inside her vagina. He then penetrated her vagina with his penis. Hethrusted 3 times and then ejaculated on her stomach. After the assault, Mr. J. was alleged to have gone to the store with D. to get hersome candy as a reward for being so brave, and copying what was portrayed in the video.

This incident also happened when D. wasabout 6 years old, or in other words, in 2003 or 2004. [6] The third incident was also alleged to have taken place in the small house where Mr. J. lived. On this occasion, D.’s friend, B.R.,was also present. B.R. is the same age as D. It is not disputed that Mr. J. had regularly babysat B.R. and B.R.’s older sister at the materialtime, including overnights on occasion. On the day in question, D. and B.R. were taking a bath and during the bath, Mr. J. came into thebathroom and asked D. whether she wanted to put his penis into her mouth.

She replied in the affirmative and put his penis into hermouth. Mr. J. then told her to lick it like a lollipop. B.R. also said that she wanted to try it. At that time, D. noticed something on Mr. J.’spenis that looked like a wart and made a comment about it. Mr. J. said to not worry and that it was just a mole. Mr. J. then placed thegirls on their backs and licked their vaginas. Mr. J. then put his finger in D.’s vagina and when he pulled it out, he commented that “itlooks like I popped your cherry”. B.R. wanted to know whether her cherry was popped as well. Mr.

J. then put his tongue on B.R.’svagina and his finger inside it. He then went on to confirm that he had in fact popped B.R.’s cherry as well. This incident was alleged tohave happened when D. was 7 years old, in other words in 2004 or 2005. [7] The fourth and last incident happened a few years later when D. was 11 years old, or in other words, in 2008 or 2009. Duringthis time, Mr. J. was no longer babysitting D. On the day in question, D. was visiting the property and went to look for Mr. J. D. enteredthe small house and went into his bathroom. Mr. J. then went into the bathroom and asked D. to go onto her knees.

He then unzipped hiszipper and asked if he could put his penis into her mouth. He did put his penis into her mouth and after a short time, he pushed D. awayand started crying. He got onto his own knees and hugged D. He told her that he loved her and then left the house. Circumstances of Mr. J. [5] Mr. J. is now 65 years old. At the time of the offences, he was in his late 40’s and early 50’s. Up until the current charges beinglaid in 2020, Mr. J. lived in a little house on his mother’s property.

When his offending came to light, his extended family essentiallyterminated their relationship with him, including his own children. He was no longer welcome to live on the family property. He thenspent a period of time living in his pick-up truck with his common law partner. A few months ago, he was able to retrieve his trailer outof storage. He now lives in this trailer with his common law partner at the transport yard where he works as a security guard. [6] Mr. J. left school when he was in grade 10 and has been steadily employed since. He has worked as a ranch hand, mechanic, taxi

driver, bus driver, business owner, and flagger. Since his extended family estranged him and evicted him from the property, Mr. J. has fallen on hard financial times. In part due to his housing situation, he did not have the funds to keep his flagging certification current. As a result, he lost that employment as well as much of his possessions, presumably to meet his living expenses.

He recently found work as a security guard at a transport yard. [ 7 ] Despite his relationship with his extended family having been soured, he still has the support of his common law partner of 14 years, as well as her son from a previous relationship. There is also a family friend who continues to be supportive of him. Mr. J. has some Métis heritage but Métis culture does not appear to play a part of Mr. J.’s life. [ 8 ] A pre-sentence report and a psychiatric assessment were prepared. During the interviewing process, and indeed during the sentencing hearing, Mr. J. continues to deny the index offences. Dr.

Hodelet opined that this is likely a coping mechanism. Mr. J. remains of the opinion that this whole saga has been orchestrated by D.’s brother with whom Mr. J. has had a strained relationship over the years. Mr. J. does not otherwise have any mental health issues or substance addiction difficulties. He himself had not been subject of any abuse or trauma. The risk of his re-offending was described as “low and not imminent”. Principles of Sentencing [ 9 ] The principles that play a dominant role at this sentencing hearing are that of general deterrence, denunciation and proportionality.

In the opening paragraphs of R. v. Friesen , 2020 SCC 9 , the Supreme Court of Canada started the judgment with this pressing message. At para. 1, the court said: [1] Children are the future of our country and our communities. They are also some of the most vulnerable members of our society. They deserve to enjoy a childhood free of sexual violence. Offenders who commit sexual violence against children deny thousands of Canadian children such a childhood every year.

This case is about how to impose sentences that fully reflect and give effect to the profound wrongfulness and harmfulness of sexual offences against children. [ 10 ] And then at para. 5: [5] Third, we send a strong message that sexual offences against children are violent crimes that wrongfully exploit children’s vulnerability and cause profound harm to children, families, and communities. Sentences for these crimes must increase.

Courts must impose sentences that are proportional to the gravity of sexual offences against children and the degree of responsibility of the offender, as informed by Parliament’s sentencing initiatives and by society’s deepened understanding of the wrongfulness and harmfulness of sexual violence against children.

Sentences must accurately reflect the wrongfulness of sexual violence against children and the far reaching and ongoing harm that it causes to children, families, and society at large. [ 11 ] While there are other principles that come to play, such as rehabilitation, totality, and restraint, the dominant ones remain those I have cited above. The call to action in Friesen mandates nothing less. Position of the Parties [ 12 ] On behalf of the Crown, Mr. Blumenkrans says that the proper range of sentence is between 6 to 8 years globally. In light of the aggravating features in this case, Mr.

J. should be sentenced at the upper end of that range. [ 13 ] Throughout her submissions, Ms. McPheeters submitted that, in light of the features in this case that are not as aggravating as some other cases, the proper range is that of 3 to 5 years. She asked the Court to impose a sentence toward the lower end of that range. Just as Ms. McPheeters was about to conclude her submissions, however, Mr. J. instructed his counsel to seek a sentence to be served within the community pursuant to a Conditional Sentence Order.

The defence acknowledges, however, that a Conditional Sentence is not available for the s. 151 and s. 152 offences that occurred after May 1, 2008 since there was a minimum sentence of 45 days. Aggravating Factors [ 14 ] There are a number of aggravating circumstances. Firstly, Mr. J. was in a position of trust vis-à-vis with D. When she was very young, her father had passed away. Raising 5 children on her own meant that D.’s mother had to work a few jobs and often long hours to make ends meet. In that context, Mr.

J. babysat D. with some regularity when she was 6 or 7 years old, upwards of 10-15 times per month. [ 15 ] In Friesen at para. 125 , the Supreme Court of Canada reinforced the concept that a relationship of trust exists on a spectrum, and there will be varying degrees to that trust. In this case, the level of trust placed on Mr. J. is at the higher end of the spectrum. D. was only 6 or 7 years old. Her mother had to work to provide for the family. There was a strong reliance placed upon Mr. J. to provide care for D. and protect her from harm. While Mr.

J. was not himself D.’s parent, and that they did not live together, the level of trust in the case at bar was nevertheless very high. A violation of that trust in this manner is extremely aggravating. [ 16 ] It is further aggravating that D. was 6 or 7 years old when Mr. J. sexually offended against her on three occasions. The power imbalance that existed in this case was total in that D. was entirely dependent on Mr. J. at that tender age. Her personality, sense of self, will, and ability to recover from harm had only begun to develop. This rendered her extremely vulnerable.

And the fact that the offences happened at such an early age meant that D. must endure the consequential harm of sexual violence for a longer period of time. The offences also happened at Mr. J.’s residence where he was babysitting D. – a place where D. should have been entitled to feel safe. Subsequent to the offences, D. no longer wished to return to that family property, resulting in additional suffering in her family life. [ 17 ] Further, the degree of physical interference was extreme.

In Friesen , the Supreme Court of Canada provided a new framework within which to analyze the “degree of physical interference”. Specifically, the Supreme Court warned against any hierarchy of physical acts. It is an error to downgrade the severity of an offence just because the act did not involve penile penetration, for example. Other types of activities that have traditionally been thought of as less intrusive could be equally harmful and worthy of the same level of denunciation and punishment. All that being said, it cannot be denied that what happened here amounted to a very high level of physical

interference. On the first three occasions, Mr. J. interfered with D.’s vagina with his hand, mouth and/or penis. On the first two occasions, he penetrated D.’s vagina with his penis to the point of ejaculation. D. still recalled that, on the first occasion, it hurt her to urinate afterward. On the second occasion, she experienced pain as her underwear was rubbing against her as she walked. D. was 6 years old during these incidents. [ 18 ] Another aggravating factor lies in the fact that, during the third incident, Mr. J. also offended against D.’s friend, B. B. is the same age as D. and Mr.

J. also babysat B. with some regularity at the material time. [ 19 ] Additionally, Mr. J. showed D. pornography before the second incident. This was an attempt to normalize the sexual offence that was about to take place and likely increased the psychological harm that flowed from these transgressions. [ 20 ] Moreover, Mr. J. offended against D. on four occasions: three times when she was 6 or 7, and once when she was 11. The repeated nature of this conduct is aggravating. And to whatever degree, if any, she had begun to heal after the first three offences, Mr.

J. robbed her of that and re-offended against her when she was 11. All that could be said under this heading is that the offending was not as frequent or as prolonged than in some other cases in the jurisprudence. Be that as it may, it is still aggravating that Mr. J. offended on four occasions. It certainly is not mitigating. [ 21 ]

Section 718.2(a)(iii.1) also requires the Court to take into consideration the impact Mr. J.’s assaults have had on D. To this end, D. had written a powerful victim impact statement. In it, she described how her relationship with her family had been destroyed. She suffers from depression, anxiety and flashbacks. She lost jobs because of the panic attacks. And the long term harm of Mr. J.’s offending continues to this day. She writes: I still have a hard time when someone touches me, whether it’s a hand shake, a pat on the shoulder, a hug or even intimacy with my partner. I lost my self-worth.

I developed 2 eating disorders; anorexia and bulimia. I let myself get physically and mentally abused in relationships, I let myself get sexually assaulted, broken down and beat because I thought that was love. I spent most of my teen years drinking and doing drugs to forget, but when that wasn’t enough, I tried to kill myself. I have taken pills, slit my wrists and tried to hang myself. I was 12 years old when I had my first attempt. My last attempt was when I was 17. I have had nightmares ever since I could remember.

Still to this day, I struggle to sleep and it got worse when I finally gathered enough courage to come forward about what you did to me. I wake up in a panic, in tears and terrified. I have a hard time going in public because I have panic attacks with certain smells, noises and words. I won’t leave my home without knowing exactly where I am going and what will happen because the thought of the unexpected is terrifying. [ 22 ] The Court had occasion to witness first hand the enduring effect of Mr. J.’s conduct.

During her evidence at trial, while D. testified overall in a very resilient fashion, the trauma of having to look at the photographs of Mr. J.’s penis was palpably evident, even through the television screen. Mitigating Circumstances [ 23 ] Mr. J. has consistently been gainfully employed in his adult life. While he lost much of his family as a result of being charged for these offences, he still has the support of his common law partner, her son, as well as one other family friend. [ 24 ] In the psychiatric assessment, Mr.

J. was found to be a low risk to reoffend, based on the fact that there is no evidence of any further offending in the last 14 or so years. As such, protection of the public is much less of a concern with Mr. J. as it would be with some other offenders. [ 25 ] Mr. J. does have a criminal record. However, it is largely dated and mostly unrelated. His last conviction was in 1987 for impaired driving. He was previously convicted of “assault causing bodily harm” in 1979. Defence counsel acknowledged that this is not so much mitigating, but at the same time, his record is not particularly aggravating either.

Other Cases [ 26 ] It is trite to say that sentencing is the most individualized process in the criminal justice system. Each case will depend on its own facts and offender and no two cases will be exactly alike. The exercise of comparing two cases will inevitably reveal some features that are more aggravating, and some less. However, the principle of parity does require the Court to treat similar offenders who committed similar offences under similar circumstances similarly (see s. 718.2(b)). Indeed, the principles of parity and proportionality work hand in hand.

At para. 33 of Friesen , the Supreme Court explains: [33] In practice, parity gives meaning to proportionality. A proportionate sentence for a given offender and offence cannot be deduced from first principles; instead, judges calibrate the demands of proportionality by reference to the sentences imposed in other cases. Sentencing precedents reflect the range of factual situations in the world and the plurality of judicial perspectives. Precedents embody the collective experience and wisdom of the judiciary. They are the practical expression of both parity and proportionality. [ 27 ] To that end, Mr.

Blumenkrans relies on a number of cases that bear some semblance to the case at bar. Ms. McPheeters does not take issue with the authorities provided and agrees that it is a fair representation of the post- Friesen jurisprudence. In his sentencing brief, Mr. Blumenkrans very helpfully summarized those cases as follows: 35. In Friesen , the accused entered a guilty plea to sexual interference and attempted extortion. The offences amounted to one incident of sexual touching against a four-year-old and attempted extortion of her mother. He did not have a criminal record.

His sentence of six years in jail was upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada. 36. In J.N.P. , the accused was convicted after trial for sexual interference, sexual assault and invitation to sexual touching. J.N.P. was the uncle of the victim, his 15-year-old niece. The facts reflected one incident where J.N.P. forcefully performed oral sex on the victim, put his penis in her mouth and ejaculated in her mouth. He was found to have abused a position of trust. He had a dated and unrelated

criminal record. He was sentenced to three years imprisonment for sexual interference. 37. In Scribner , the accused was convicted after a trial of sexual interference, sexual assault, and a grooming offence. He was found to have had sexual intercourse on two separate occasions with a 14-year-old victim he groomed online. He did not have a criminal record. He was sentenced to four years imprisonment for sexual interference. 38. In Norberg , the accused was convicted after a trial of of [sic] invitation to sexual touching and unlawful confinement.

The facts reflected several incidents of touching and forced oral sex on his eight or nine year old stepdaughter over a period of a few years. Mr. Norberg also restrained and threatened the victim. He was found to have abused a position of trust. He did not have a criminal record. He was sentenced to a global term of imprisonment of seven years . 39. In C.C.C. , the accused was convicted after a trial of sexual assault and sexual interference. He was found to have made the victim touch his penis, he sexually touched her and forced vaginal intercourse.

He was a step-grandparent and a father figure to the victim, and thus abused a position of trust. The victim was 11 years old at the time of the offences, which occurred over several months. The accused in indigenous, an alcoholic, and Gladue factors played a central role at his sentencing hearing. He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of five years . 40. In Z.K. , the accused was convicted after a trial of sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching against his daughter when she was between the ages of 9 and 11.

He touched her breasts, digitally penetrated her vagina, masturbated in front of her, and forced his penis into her mouth. He abused a position of trust. He did not have a criminal record. He was sentenced to seven years concurrent imprisonment on each count. 41. In R., the accused was convicted after a trial of sexual interference and sexual assault. He was the partner of the nine-year-old victim’s mother. The offending amounted to three incidents of touching, including touching the victim’s vagina with his penis. He was found to have abused a position of trust. He had no criminal record.

He was sentenced to five and one-half years imprisonment. 42. In R.V. , the accused was convicted after a trial of sexual interference. He attempted vaginal penetration of 7- or 8-year-old victim on three occasions. He was part of the extended family of the victim’s similarly aged friend. He did not have a criminal record. Accused had dated criminal record from the 1980s for sexually assaulting his 17-year-old niece. He was sentenced to an eight-year term of imprisonment. 43.

In Burch , the accused pleaded guilty to sexual interference and making available sexually explicit material to person under 16 for purpose of facilitating sexual offence. Accused was in a relationship with the victim’s mother. Offending included several incidents of digital sex, oral sex, and other sexual touching from when the victim was 10-12 or 13 years old. He had no criminal record. Accused sentenced to six years imprisonment. 44. In Sturgeon , the accused was convicted of sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching of his step-daughter when she was between 6 and 9 years old.

Sexual touching escalated to forcing victim perform oral sex on her [sic] and sexually touching her with his penis in her anal area. Accused had no criminal record. Accused sentenced to six years imprisonment. [ 28 ] In addition, the Court had an opportunity to review some other reported cases on its own accord. In R. v. J.S.S. , 2022 BCPC 96 , the accused pled guilty to sexually interfering with his daughter. The offences happened when the victim was between 6 and 11 years old. The acts included forced masturbation, forced oral sex, and digital penetration.

The abuse happened a few times a month over this 5 year period. The court imposed an 8 year sentence. [ 29 ] In arriving at his conclusion, Judge Koturbash also did a canvass of the relevant post- Friesen jurisprudence. At para. 60 of J.S.S. , he summarized those as follows: [60] In R v BDM , 2021 BCSC 1738 , the court imposed an eight-year sentence on an Indigenous offender for sexually abusing his two granddaughters. The sentence was imposed following a conviction after trial involving one granddaughter and a guilty plea involving another.

The circumstances of the offences that proceeded to trial began when the offender’s granddaughter was seven. It started with him touching and licking her breasts, and touching her vagina. He also had her touch his penis with her hand and mouth. This occurred on multiple occasions. The final incident occurred when his granddaughter was 14 and he had sexual intercourse with her. [61] The facts involving his second granddaughter occurred when she was between five and 12 years old. He would touch her chest and vagina, force her to touch his penis and would rub his penis on her buttocks and vagina until he ejaculated.

He confessed to those matters and pled guilty. [62] He was 65 years old, Indigenous and had a very difficult childhood. He did not have a criminal record. He too was sexually abused as a child. He suffered from bipolar disorder and depression and sought out and received psychiatric treatment before sentencing. He was described as a low-moderate risk to reoffend. He expressed a willingness to attend treatment.

The impact of the victims was described as devastating; both at one point considered suicide. [63] In R v JF , 2021 ONSC 7613 , the accused was found guilty after trial of sexually assaulting his daughter when she was between 11 and 15. The assaults included sexual touching and intercourse on multiple occasions. The impact on the victim was described as “profound”. He was sentenced to nine years. … [65] In R v CB, 2021 ONSC 187 , the offender was found guilty of sexually assaulting his daughter when she was between 13 and 16.

The abuse involved the offender putting his fingers inside her vagina, forcing her to put her mouth on his penis, masturbating him and repeated attempts at intercourse. When she refused intercourse, he became controlling and hostile towards her. [66] The offender had an unremarkable childhood. He did not have a criminal record. He was diagnosed with major depressive and

social anxiety disorder. At the time of sentencing, he continued to deny the offences and viewed himself as the victim. The victim was described as severely affected by the offences in all areas of her life. The sentence imposed was five years. [67] In R v AB , 2021 ONSC 484 , the accused pled guilty to sexual interference and making sexually explicit material available. The victim was his girlfriend’s daughter. The abuse occurred when she was between 10 and 13. The abuse occurred a few times per week.

As well as making sexually explicit material available, the abuse included oral sex, masturbation and anal intercourse. Since AB denied anal intercourse, the victim had to testify. He did not have a criminal record. He was sentenced to six years. [ 30 ] I pause here to say that it is singularly depressing seeing how many reported cases there are to canvass when doing this research.

This feeling worsens with the realization that reported cases are necessarily a small subset of all cases that come before the courts, which are themselves but a small fraction of the true incidence of sexual offending against children in our communities. Conclusion on a fit Sentence [ 31 ] In the case at bar, the aggravating circumstances far outweigh the mitigating ones.

The age of D., the degree to which her body was interfered with, the impact the offences had on her, the relationship of trust that existed, and the repeated nature of the offending, all call out for a lengthy penitentiary term in order to properly address the principles of denunciation, general deterrence, and proportionality. In my view, the range of 6-8 years submitted by the Crown is much closer to the mark than the 3-5 proposed by defence counsel.

A Conditional Sentence in this case would be demonstrably unfit and completely at odds with the lessons from Friesen . [ 32 ] At the end of the day, the Court cannot justify a sentence less than the 6 years Mr. Friesen received. In fact, Mr. J.’s case calls out for a longer sentence, not shorter. Mr. Friesen was not in a position of trust in relation to his victim. His offence occurred on one occasion. And he pled guilty to the offences. To be sure, as is inevitably the case, there are features which aggravated the circumstances in that case, including the fact that Mr.

Friesen was at a high risk to reoffend, he extorted the victim’s mother, and the victim was slightly younger than D. was. But on balance, I do not see Mr. J. as any less morally culpable than Mr. Friesen. This is also not to say that Mr. J. should be punished for not having pled guilty. Everyone has a constitutional right to a fair trial – not just those who are innocent. But in this case, there is no mitigating factor of a guilty plea, as we saw in Friesen and some of the other cases cited.

D. was required to relive her trauma in a very public forum. [ 33 ] Consequently, taking all of the above principles, case law, and circumstances into account, a fit global sentence is that of 7 years. This will apply to Counts 1 and 2. The circumstances of the fourth incident were slightly less aggravating than the first three in that D. was slightly older, Mr. J. was not babysitting her at the time, and the degree of physical interference was not as significant. Accordingly, Counts 4 and 5 will result in sentences of 5 years.

The principle of totality compels the Court to impose concurrent sentences on all offences so that the overall sentence would not be unduly long or harsh. [ 34 ] In

summary, the Court imposes the following sentences: Count 1 – s. 151 (sexual interference) 7 years; Count 2 – s. 152 (invitation to sexual touching) 7 years concurrent; Count 4 – s. 151 (sexual interference) 5 years concurrent; Count 5 – s. 152 (invitation to sexual touching) 5 years concurrent. [ 35 ] There will be a DNA order, a Sex Offender Information Registration Act ( SOIRA) order as well as a s. 109 weapons prohibition. I decline to make any no contact order pursuant to s. 743.21 given that Mr. J. has observed his bail conditions since his arrest with no difficulty.

I also decline to make any order under s. 161 of the Criminal Code given the nature of the offences before the Court and the psychiatric opinion of him being at a low risk to reoffend. ___________________ The Honourable A. Tam Provincial Court Judge