R. v. Ali, 2022 BCPC 35

Citation: R. v. Ali 2022 BCPC 35 Date: 20220210 File No: 96866-2C Registry: Port Coquitlam IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Criminal Court REGINA v. FAREEN SHABNAM ALI REASONS FOR SENTENCE OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE JETTÉ Counsel for the Crown: I. Wiesel Counsel for the Defendant: M. Swartz Place of Hearing: Surrey , B.C. Date of Hearing: 16 November 2021 Date of Judgment: 10 February 2022

A Corrigendum was released by the Court on February 10, 2022. The corrections have been made to the text and the Corrigendum is appended to this document. Introduction [ 1 ] Fareen Shabnam Ali is before me for sentencing for the offence of possessing Fentanyl and Cocaine for the purpose of trafficking contrary to section 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (“ CDSA ”). That offence was committed on the 10 th of August 2016. Ms. Ali plead guilty on 9 April 2021. A pre-sentence report was ordered and the matter came before me for hearing on 16 November 2021. Counsel for Ms.

Ali has filed letters of support from Ms. Ali’s current husband, her parents and one of her two older sisters. Ms. Ali also addressed the court at the conclusion of the sentence proceedings. [ 2 ] Crown counsel submits that I should apply the 18-36 month range for first time street-level Fentanyl traffickers established by our Court of Appeal in R. v. Smith , 2017 BCCA 11 , and sentence Ms.

Ali to serve a jail sentence of 18 months less a time served credit of 5 months. [ 3 ] Defence counsel submits that the range in Smith does not apply because this offence was committed in August of 2016; he asks that I impose a sentence of time served followed by a period of probation. In the alternative, defence counsel submits that a conditional sentence order (“CSO”) of 9-12 months in addition to the time served credit would be a fit sentence in this case. Defence counsel submits that a conditional sentence order is available for this offence on the authority of R. v. Chen , 2021 BCSC 697 .

While Crown counsel does not agree that a CSO would be a fit sentence for Ms. Ali, he accepts that I am bound by the decision in Chen , supra , which struck down those parts of s. 742.1 of the Criminal Code that rendered a CSO unavailable for drug trafficking offences. Circumstances of the Offence [ 4 ] A police street enforcement unit was working in Maple Ridge on the evening of 10 August 2016. Members of that unit began surveillance of a Chrysler Sebring. Ms. Ali and others were observed in and out of the vehicle at a variety of locations during the course of the evening.

Police also observed a series of short duration meets which they believed were consistent with dial-a-dope drug trafficking. The vehicle was stopped and the driver and Ms. Ali, who was in the front passenger seat, were taken into custody. Ms. Ali voluntarily surrendered a clear “dialer bag” of drugs which contained 66 packages of fentanyl with a total weight of 9.34 grams, and 36 packages of cocaine, total weight 9.75 grams. [ 5 ] Police searched the vehicle and recovered two cell phones, one of which was ringing continuously. They also located a woman’s purse on the floor in front of the passenger side.

The purse contained $1,710 cash, score sheets, a pipe used for smoking drugs, and 3 small baggies of methamphetamine weighing 0.84 grams. [ 6 ] Ms. Ali was released with an undertaking and promise to appear. [ 7 ] A police drug expert estimates that the drugs located in the dialer bag were worth $2,610 if sold at street level. Bail Issues Post Release [ 8 ] As noted, the offence was committed in August of 2016 but Ms. Ali did not enter her guilty plea until April of 2021. Ms.

Ali failed to appear in court or otherwise breached the terms of her release order on a number of occasions following her initial release on bail. These problems continued off and on into early January of 2021. During that span Ms. Ali was at large and not reporting from April 2017 to May of 2018, and again from April 2019 until she surrendered herself into custody on the 7 th of January 2021. Ms. Ali obtained a new release order on the 12 th of January 2021 and she has complied with conditions since that date. Circumstances of the Offender [ 9 ] Ms.

Ali is currently 31 years old; she was in her mid-20s when this offence was committed. Her father won a $5 million lottery when she was two years old and she reports that she was “spoiled” by her father. Her parents separated when she was in grade 8 and later divorced, but she otherwise reports that her childhood years were unremarkable. She has two older sisters. [ 10 ] Ms. Ali married when she was only 17 years old; she told the PSR writer that the marriage was “unhealthy and unhappy.” She had two children with her husband then left the marriage after four years, taking the children with her.

She entered a six month long relationship with another man who had two children of his own. He introduced her to the use of illegal drugs, and she developed an addiction that interfered with her ability to take care of her children, who were eventually placed into the care of their paternal grandfather. Ms. Ali also reports that she suffered physical and emotional abuse before leaving the relationship. [ 11 ] Ms.

Ali reports that she next fell in with a pair of former high school friends who introduced her to the world of dial-a-dope drug trafficking; she was paid for her work and used that money to supply her own addiction to crystal methamphetamine. She told the PSR writer that she sold drugs from about 2014 into 2017. [ 12 ] Ms. Ali reports that she first began to pull herself out of this spiral early in 2018, when she met her current husband, Zameel Haroom. They married in 2020 and are now parents to a one-year-old daughter. Mr. Haroom reports that he knew Ms.

Ali from some years before, and says that when they re-connected she told him “what she was going through”. He supported her as she worked to leave her past life behind. [ 13 ] Ms. Ali’s 13-year-old son from her first marriage still lives with his paternal grandfather and she does not have any contact with him. Staff from the Ministry of Children and Family Development (“MCFD”) removed her 10-year-old daughter from her father’s care in late 2020. Her daughter now resides with Ms. Ali’s mother, and Ms. Ali has regular contact with her.

[14] Ms. Ali is one course shy of a Medical Office Assistance and Pharmacy Technician Diploma offered by Sprott Shaw College andhopes to complete that course in the near future. She has had a limited work history. Most recently, she has worked at a COVID centre,and was hired by Coast Capital Savings in the summer of 2021; she passed through her probationary period with that employer and isnow working fulltime. Does the Smith Range Apply? [15] Mr. Smith pleaded guilty to possessing Fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking on 20 January 2015 and was sentenced to sixmonths jail. The Crown appealed that sentence.

All three judges on the Smith panel agreed with the Crown that a new range wasnecessary for Fentanyl traffickers. That range was set at 18-36 months, or even higher where additional aggravating circumstances arepresent (see at paras. 45 and 48). Madame Justice Newbury would have allowed the Crown’s sentence appeal and substituted a sentenceof 18 months for the six-month term imposed by the sentencing judge.

After considering drug toxicity statistics and public healthinformation that tracked the evolution of the Fentanyl crisis since 2013, Justices Harris and Willcock concluded that the new range didnot apply to Mr. Smith’s January 2015 offence. Writing for the majority, Justice Harris said the following: [61] Since January 2015, there have been a number of changes which would render the sentence imposed on Mr. Smith demonstrablyunfit had the offence occurred later, particularly if it had occurred late in 2016. R. v.

Smith, supra. [16] The courts have struggled with this passage from Smith when confronted with Fentanyl trafficking offences committed in 2016.In R. v. Adams, 2017 BCSC 2529, the sentencing judge applied the Smith range to an offence committed in April of 2016. In R. v. Johal,2018 BCSC 549, the court found that a trafficking offence committed in August 2015 did not attract the Smith range. During that analysisthe court considered three Provincial court decisions: 1. The unreported case of R. v.

Forsberg (27 September 2017) Victoria Registry File No. 167638-4C, where the Smith range wasapplied to an offence committed in March of 2016; 2. R. v. Joon, 2017 BCPC 301; the Smith range was applied to an offence committed in January of 2016; and 3. R. v.

Olenik, 2017 BCPC 390; there the sentencing declined to apply the Smith range to an offence committed on 25 July 2016because that date was “prior to late 2016.” [17] After considering drug toxicity statistics filed by Crown counsel which demonstrated the increase in Fentanyl-detected drugoverdose deaths from 2012 to 2017, the sentencing judge in Johal, supra, came to the following conclusion at paragraph 69: “as ageneral principle, early 2016 should be the minimum threshold (for applying the Smith range), as reflected in Forsberg and Joon.” [18] The Crown also filed Fentanyl related drug toxicity statistics in the proceedings before me, as is typical in cases of this sort.Those statistics track drug toxicity deaths in BC from 2011 to the end of May 2021.

Defence counsel submits that the court in Smithplaced special emphasis on late 2016 because the statistics show a doubling of drug toxicity deaths starting in November of 2016. I findthat I cannot consider that number in isolation. The same statistics show a slow but steady climb throughout 2015 which, with some upsand down, continued through the first two thirds of 2016. I cannot find that the phrase in Smith at paragraph 61, “particularly if it hadoccurred late in 2016” excludes application of the new range to offences committed earlier in that calendar year.

Indeed, the balance ofthat paragraph suggests that the new range might be applied to offences committed earlier than “late 2016”, a general time span whichappears to have been left purposely imprecise. [19] Having considered these authorities and the materials related to the drug overdose crisis in British Columbia filed by the Crownin this case, it is my view that the range in R. v.

Smith does apply to a Fentanyl trafficking offence committed in August of 2016. [20] Having found that the Smith range applies, it is important I remind myself that a sentencing range established for an offence orcategory of offences is a guideline and not a strait-jacket, an observation made by the court in Smith and again most recently in R. v.Parranto, 2021 SCC 46. A suggested range does not preclude lesser or greater sentences if warranted. Sentencing is an inherentlyindividualized process. No two offenders are identically situated. There is no such thing as a uniform sentence for a particular crime.

Asentence outside the usual range can be imposed so long as it is in accordance with the principles and objectives of sentencing: R. v. M.(C.A.), (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500; R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64; R. v. Smith, supra, at paras. 35, 43 and 46; R. v.Williams, 2019 BCCA 295; R. v. Padda, 2019 BCCA 351; R. v. Friesen 2020 SCC 9. [21] In Parranto, supra, the Supreme Court of Canada reminded sentencing judges that “(T)he goal in every case is a fair, fit andprincipled sanction.

Proportionality is the organizing principle in reaching this goal…” This means that courts of first instance muststrive to ensure that the sentence imposed is proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender:R. v. Parranto at para. 10. See also R. v. Nur, 2015 SCC 15 at para. 43. Applicable Principles [22] The applicable sentencing principles for drug offences are set out in the CDSA at s. 10.

The purpose and principles of sentencingalso appear in the Criminal Code at sections 718 and 718.2. [23] Denunciation and deterrence are the primary principles when sentencing an offender for offences related to drug trafficking. Assuch, those who engage in trafficking can generally expect a custodial sentence: R. v. Smith, 2017 BCCA 112; R. v. Voong, 2015 BCCA285; R. v. Creuzot, 2017 BCSC 1075.

While these principles are paramount in cases of this type, I must not fail to consider as well that“one of the main objectives of Canadian criminal law is the rehabilitation of offenders” which assists the court to impose a sentence inany given case which is “just and appropriate”: R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64 at para. 4; see also R. v. Schneider, 2019 BCCA 310 atparas. 10-11. I must also take into account the principle of restraint expressed in s. 718.2(

e) of the Code.

Analysis [ 24 ] As discussed above, I agree with Crown counsel that the Smith range applies here. Crown submits that a fit sentence would be 18 months jail, the bottom of that range, less a time served credit of 5 months. While I am not bound by that range, I cannot find anything in the circumstances of the offence or offender which would justify a sentence below the bottom end of that range. [ 25 ] The next issue to be decided is whether the sentence I impose should be a sentence of institutional jail or a jail sentence served in the community as a CSO.

Crown counsel has submitted that a CSO for trafficking in hard drugs is only available where the offender has demonstrated “exceptional circumstances.” Real Jail versus Conditional Sentence Orders [ 26 ] The statutory pre-conditions for imposing a CSO are found in s. 742.1 of the Criminal Code .

The jail sentence imposed must be for less than two years, and the court must be satisfied that service of the sentence in the community would not endanger the safety of the community, and would be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing set out in sections 718 to 718.2 of the Code . [ 27 ] In R. v. Proulx , 2000 SCC 5 , the Supreme Court of Canada distinguished a CSO from probationary measures, and observed that Parliament intended conditional sentences to include both punitive and rehabilitative aspects.

The court suggested that for this reason a CSO should generally include punitive conditions that are restrictive of the offender’s liberty. The court also found that a CSO fashioned in this way can provide significant denunciation and deterrence, while at the same time achieving the restorative objective of rehabilitation. [ 28 ] Crown counsel cites R. v.

Herrell , 2014 BCCA 114 , as authority for the proposition that in cases of serious drug trafficking, a prison sentence is required unless the offender demonstrates that exceptional circumstances specific to that offender justify a less punitive sentencing option, including a CSO. In that case, counsel for Mr. Herrell at the sentence appeal conceded that a six month sentence fell within the range for trafficking MDMA but argued that Mr. Herrell’s personal circumstances supported a CSO rather than institutional jail.

The court dismissed the appeal and said the following at paragraph 23: Generally speaking, the offence of possession of MDMA for the purpose of trafficking will attract a prison sentence unless exceptional circumstances are demonstrated. [ 29 ] Crown counsel submits that I should take this reference to exceptional circumstances, apply the analysis suggested by our Court of Appeal at paragraph 59 in R. v. Voong , 2015 BCCA 285 , and find that Ms. Ali’s personal circumstances do not support a CSO in this case: 59 In

summary, absent exceptional circumstances, the sentence for a first offence or with a minimal criminal record, dial-a-dope drug seller will be in the range of six to eighteen months imprisonment, depending on the aggravating circumstances. Exceptional circumstances may include a combination of no criminal record, significant and objectively identifiable steps towards rehabilitation for the drug addict, gainful employment, remorse and acknowledgement of the harm done to society as a result of the offences, as opposed to harm done to the offender as a result of being caught.

This is a non-exhaustive list, but at the end of the day, there must be circumstances that are above and beyond the norm to justify a non- custodial sentence. There must be something that would lead a sentencing judge to conclude that the offender had truly turned his or her life around, and that the protection of the public was subsequently better served by a non-custodial sentence. However, Parliament, while not removing a non-custodial sentence for this type of offence, has concluded that CSO sentences are not available.

Thus, it will be the rare case where the standard of exceptional circumstances is met. [ 30 ] It is important to note that the decision in Voong was directed to circumstances where a non-custodial sentence might be fit even though the usual range calls for jail. A CSO is a different species of sentence; it is a jail sentence served in the community. I also observe that in dismissing the appeal in Herrell , the Court of Appeal merely found that the sentencing judge made no error in principle in rejecting a CSO in that case.

The court was not asked to lay down a general rule or direction with respect to the fitness of a CSO in cases involving street-level trafficking of hard drugs. [ 31 ] This issue was considered recently in R. v. Laher , 2021 BCSC 1748 , where the accused was sentenced for possession of MDMA for the purpose of trafficking. The Crown in that case also made the submission that, on the authority of Herell , a CSO is not a fit sentence unless the offender demonstrates exceptional circumstances within the meaning of paragraph 59 in Voong . Mr.

Justice Harvey disagreed with that submission and imposed a CSO: [48] In my view, Mr. Laher need not establish himself as the exceptional offender, given the availability to me of a CSO which, as noted in Proulx , offers sufficient elements by way of punishment to stand as a general deterrent to others.

When Voong was considered, the CSO was not an available option; it is, at least as the law currently stands, available now. [ 32 ] I find that the reference to exceptional circumstances in Herrell , which pre-dates Voong , merely reflects the Court’s longstanding view that institutional jail is the presumptive outcome in cases involving the trafficking of hard drugs, subject to a consideration of mitigating or aggravating circumstances that might move an offender above or below the usual range. This kind of analysis is also applied where the question is whether a jail sentence can be served in the community.

This approach was emphasized by our Court of Appeal in R. v. Williams , 2019 BCCA 295 , at paragraph 58 : Individual circumstances of the offence or the offender may require an increase or reduction from the range of sentence in order to ensure that the sentence is a proportionate one that properly reflects the offender’s moral blameworthiness. [ 33 ] The SCC’s recent decision in Parranto , supra , provides a first principles approach to sentencing that applies to both the “starting point” and “sentencing range” models.

The reasons in Parranto make the same essential point that our Court of Appeal was referring to in the passage from Williams re-produced above.

[ 34 ] There are additional comments in Parranto which call into question more generally the notion that a demonstration of “exceptional circumstances” might be necessary before a sentencing court can depart from an established range of sentence. The court in Parranto divided on a number of issues and produced four separate sets of reasons.

A block of four judges (Brown and Martin JJ, with Wagner C.J. and Kasirer J. concurring) referred to the court’s recent decision in Friesen , supra , and a decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal and had this to say about “exceptional circumstances” in sentencing: …We emphasize, however, that it is inappropriate for appellate courts to “artificially constrain sentencing judges’ ability to impose a proportionate sentence” by requiring “exceptional circumstances” when departing from a range….Departing from a range or starting point is appropriate where required to achieve proportionality.

Parranto , supra, at para. 40 . [ 35 ] Two judges in Parranto (Karakatsanic and Abella JJ.) agreed with the analysis of this group of four judges at paragraphs 9 to 54 of their reasons that the “starting point” approach to sentencing is permissible, but they did not comment directly on the passage from paragraph 40 reproduced above.

Nor did any of the remaining justices offer an opinion on the “exceptional circumstances” justification for departing from an established sentencing range or starting point. [ 36 ] Finally, the Supreme Court’s decision in Proulx remains the leading authority on conditional sentence orders. That court did not apply any sort of qualifier or limit on the imposition of a CSO beyond the words of the Criminal Code itself.

The court was careful to emphasize that no category of offence or offender was excluded from consideration for a CSO so long as the offence met the conditions precedent set out in s. 742.1 of the Code. [ 37 ] I have decided that it would be an error in principle were I to require that an offender demonstrate the existence of exceptional circumstances as a condition precedent to the imposition of a CSO. [ 38 ] After considering the circumstances of the offence and the offender and the applicable principles of sentencing, there remains the task of deciding whether a CSO would be a fit sentence in this case. [ 39 ] I find that the following aggravating circumstances arise here: 1.

When she was arrested, Ms. Ali was holding a dialer-bag containing a variety of drugs intended for sale on the street; that supply included 66 packages of Fentanyl, a lethal substance which has caused a significant increase in overdose deaths amongst users of all types. 2. Ms. Ali employed the dial-a-dope business model to bring these dangerous drugs into the community: R. v. Franklin , 2001 BCSC 706 ; R. v. Aguilera Jiminez , YKCA 5 at para. 50. 3. This was not a one time lapse in judgment; Ms.

Ali told the PSR writer that she sold drugs from the end of 2014 into 2017, a time period which extends beyond the August 2016 offences which are before me. 4. After being charged and released on bail, Ms. Ali was a fugitive from justice for extended periods of time, including a block of some 20 months before her final release on bail in January of 2021. [ 40 ] I have also taken into account the following mitigating circumstances: 1. Ms. Ali’s guilty plea; while certainly not an early plea, it has still saved the time and expense of a trial, and indicates that Ms.

Ali has now accepted responsibility for her conduct. 2. Her expressions of remorse, which I accept as genuine. 3. This is Ms. Ali’s first criminal conviction. 4. Her involvement in the drug trade was driven by her own addiction to crystal methamphetamine. 5. After starting a new relationship with her current fiancé in 2018 she ended her use of illicit of drugs and her participation in the drug trade.

Since returning to custody in January of 2021 and her subsequent release on bail, she has engaged in part time employment, obtained a full time position with Coast Capital Savings, and hopes to complete her Pharmacy Technician Diploma. [ 41 ] I have also considered a number of cases submitted by defence counsel where CSOs have been ordered for CDSA trafficking offences: R. v. Goodkey , 2012 BCSC 2190 ; R. v. Sellars , 2018 BCCA 195 ; R. v. Flintroy , 2021 BCSC 1187 ; R. v. Howard , 2021 BCPC 167 ; and R. v. Mero , 2021 BCCA 399 . [ 42 ] Based on Ms.

Ali’s performance on bail over the last 13 months, I have concluded that a CSO would not endanger the safety of the community. This leaves for consideration the second branch of the test in

section 742.1(a); am I satisfied that a CSO would be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing set out in sections 718 to 718.2 of the Code ? [ 43 ] In deciding whether a CSO would be fit in this case I have of course considered that Ms. Ali spent long periods of time as a fugitive from the criminal justice system. [ 44 ] The Crown submits that I should apply the reasoning in R. v. Jansons , 2008 YKCA 15 and R. v. Partridge , 2005 NSCA 159 and find that a CSO would not be a fit sentence where important steps toward rehabilitation are taken during a period of abscondment. [ 45 ] In R. v.

Jansons , 2008 YKCA 15 the accused was to be sentenced for impaired driving offences. He failed to appear for the sentencing hearing in 1998, a warrant issued, and he was not arrested until sometime in 2006. After being re-released on bail he failed to appear once again. One month later he was arrested and sentenced to serve a mandatory minimum 90 day sentence less time served. The

trial judge imposed that minimum in part because of significant efforts at rehabilitation made by the offender during his time as a fugitive from justice. The Crown appealed. The Court of Appeal substituted a sentence of one year jail, and had this to say about the significance of the offender’s time as a fugitive: [12]…The inescapable message that is conveyed by the imposition of a virtual minimum sentence in circumstances in which, but for the rehabilitation made possible by abscondment, a two year sentence would have been imposed , is one which encourages flouting of the law.

While there can be do doubt that Mr. Janson’s efforts at rehabilitation are to be commended, general deterrence is not served by the imposition of the sentence in the circumstances of this case. [Emphasis added] [ 46 ] The facts in R. v. Jansons , supra, are distinguishable. Mr. Jansons entered a guilty plea in May of 1998 and was to have been sentenced the following September. Given his circumstances at that time, the Court of Appeal found that the 90 day mandatory minimum imposed by the trial judge some eight years later effectively encouraged his flouting of the law.

This was driven by the court’s view that Mr. Jansons would have received a sentence of two years in jail had he been sentenced in late 1998. Even so, the Court of Appeal only substituted a sentence of one year in jail. [ 47 ] Unlike Mr. Jansons, Ms. Ali did not enter a guilty plea then abscond; she was on bail and presumed innocent following her arrest in 2016. Her absences since that time have resulted in periods of pre-trial incarceration which I must take into account when determining a fit sentence. The Crown seeks a sentence towards the bottom of the range in R. v. Smith and I agree that is required here.

The only remaining question is whether that sentence will be served in the community or in jail. [ 48 ] I find that Ms. Ali’s history of extensive non-compliance with bail, including prolonged periods as a fugitive from justice, do not render her ineligible for a CSO. [ 49 ] I have considered the time spent in pre-trial custody as part of the total punishment for the offence committed by Ms. Ali: see R. v. Fice , 2005 SCC 32 . Having done so, I have come to the conclusion that proportionality can be achieved by imposing a CSO with punitive conditions.

In the circumstances here, it is my view that this disposition will provide a sufficient level of denunciation and deterrence and would be consistent with the purpose and principles of sentencing. I note as well that in R. v. Proulx the court held that it a CSO need not be of equivalent duration to a sentence of incarceration. Taking into account but not directly applying the time served credit of 5 months, the sentence I am imposing here effectively exceeds the 18 month jail term suggested by Crown counsel. [ 50 ] You must comply with a conditional sentence order for a term of 15 months.

The conditions are as follows: 3001 You must keep the peace and be of good behaviour. 3002 You must appear before the court when required to do so by the court. You must notify the court or your conditional sentence supervisor in advance of any change of name or address and promptly notify the court or supervisor of any change in employment or occupation.

You must remain in British Columbia unless you have prior written permission from the Court or your conditional sentence supervisor to leave the province. 3101 You must report in person to a conditional sentence supervisor at South Surrey Community Corrections by 3:00 p.m. on 11 February 2022, and after that you must report as directed by your supervisor. 3204 You must live at 6096 147 th Street, Surrey, B.C. and provide your conditional sentence supervisor with your phone number.

You must not change your address or phone number without prior written permission from your supervisor. 3209-2 For the first 10 months of this order, you must obey house arrest by being inside your residence at 6096 147 th Street, Surrey, B.C. or on its lot, 24 hours a day, every day. You must present yourself immediately at the door to your residence or answer the phone when any peace officer or conditional sentence supervisor attends or calls to check on you during the curfew. You may be away from your residence during the house arrest with the prior written permission of your conditional sentence supervisor.

Such permission is to be given only for employment or other compelling reasons. You must carry the permission, which can be in electronic format, with you when you are outside your residence. 3209-2-A You may also be away from your residence during the house arrest while at, or going directly to, or returning directly from a healthcare facility because of a medical emergency involving yourself or a member of your immediate family.

If asked, you must provide your conditional sentence supervisor with proof of your attendance at the facility. 3401 You must not possess or consume alcohol, drugs or any other intoxicating substance, except with a medical prescription. 3501 You must attend, participate in, and complete any intake, assessment, counselling or education program directed by your conditional sentence supervisor. This may include counseling or programming for alcohol or drug addiction. Ancillary Orders [ 51 ] Pursuant to

section 109 of the Criminal Code , you are prohibited from possessing: a . any firearm, other than a prohibited firearm or restricted firearm, and any cross-bow, restricted weapon, ammunition and explosive substance for a period of 10 years from today; and

b. any prohibited firearm or restricted firearm, prohibited weapon, prohibited device and prohibited ammunition for life. [ 52 ] Possession for the purpose of trafficking in a

Schedule 1 substance is a secondary designated offence. After considering the factors set out in

section 487.051(3) of the Criminal Code , I am satisfied that it is in the best interest of the administration of justice to authorize the taking of samples of bodily substances from you. [ 53 ] I am ordering forfeiture of all offence related property pursuant to s. 16 of the CDSA . Counsel will work out the terms of that order and submit it for my signature. [ 54 ] The victim fine surcharge will be applied. _____________________________ The Honourable Judge M.

Jetté Provincial Court of British Columbia CORRIGENDUM - Released March 1, 2022 In the Reasons For Sentence dated February 10, 2022, the following changes have been made: Paragraph 50, Condition 3101, should read as follows: 3101 You must report in person to a conditional sentence supervisor at South Surrey Community Corrections by 3:00 p.m. on 11 February 2022, and after that you must report as directed by your supervisor. _____________________________ The Honourable Judge M. Jetté Provincial Court of British Columbia