Arndt et al. v. Van. Int. Schl. et al Date:, 2014 BCPC 104

Citation: Arndt et al. v. Van. Int. Schl. et al Date: 20140409 2014 BCPC 0104 File Nos: See Below Registry: Port Coquitlam IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA File No: C10571 BETWEEN: MARGARET (PEGGY) ARNDT CLAIMANT AND: VANCOUVER INTERNATIONAL PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL SOCIETY doing business as GREYBROOK ACADEMY, 0708964 B.C. LTD., KIRA TURNER, NIGEL TURNER, SHELBY TURNER DEFENDANTS -AND- File No: C10575 BETWEEN: RONALD GORDON EDMONDS CLAIMANT AND: VANCOUVER INTERNATIONAL PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL SOCIETY doing business as GREYBROOK ACADEMY, 0708964 B.C. LTD.,

KIRA TURNER, NIGEL TURNER, SHELBY TURNER DEFENDANTS -AND- File No: C10572 BETWEEN: ANTOINETTE GAYE KEANE CLAIMANT AND: VANCOUVER INTERNATIONAL PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL SOCIETY doing business as GREYBROOK ACADEMY, 0708964 B.C. LTD., KIRA TURNER, NIGEL TURNER, SHELBY TURNER DEFENDANTS -AND- File No: C10588 BETWEEN: ANDREW AND ELIZABETH MULLIN CLAIMANTS AND: VANCOUVER INTERNATIONAL PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL SOCIETY doing business as GREYBROOK ACADEMY, 0708964 B.C. LTD., KIRA TURNER, NIGEL TURNER, SHELBY TURNER DEFENDANTS -AND-

File No: C11571 BETWEEN: MANDY DUYVESTYN CLAIMANT AND: VANCOUVER INTERNATIONAL PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL SOCIETY doing business as GREYBROOK ACADEMY, 0708964 B.C. LTD., KIRA TURNER, NIGEL TURNER, SHELBY TURNER DEFENDANTS -AND- File No: C11451 BETWEEN: SAMANTHA CUTTRISS CLAIMANT AND: VANCOUVER INTERNATIONAL PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL SOCIETY doing business as GREYBROOK ACADEMY, 0708964 B.C. LTD., KIRA TURNER, NIGEL TURNER, SHELBY TURNER DEFENDANTS -AND- File No: C10619 BETWEEN: RUPERT AND ELAINE HANMER GRANT CLAIMANT AND: VANCOUVER INTERNATIONAL PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL SOCIETY doing business as GREYBROOK ACADEMY,

0708964 B.C. LTD., KIRA TURNER, NIGEL TURNER, SHELBY TURNER DEFENDANTS -AND- File No: C10631 BETWEEN: KAREN AND RICHARD KELLN CLAIMANT AND: VANCOUVER INTERNATIONAL PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL SOCIETY doing business as GREYBROOK ACADEMY, 0708964 B.C. LTD., KIRA TURNER, NIGEL TURNER, SHELBY TURNER DEFENDANTS -AND- File No: C10574 BETWEEN: PAMELA PIDDOCKE AND CHRISTOPHER JACK CLAIMANTS AND: VANCOUVER INTERNATIONAL PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL SOCIETY doing business as GREYBROOK ACADEMY, 0708964 B.C. LTD., KIRA TURNER, NIGEL TURNER, SHELBY TURNER DEFENDANTS -AND-

File No: C10804 BETWEEN: IYA POLOTSKY AND OLEG POLOTSKY CLAIMANTS AND: VANCOUVER INTERNATIONAL PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL SOCIETY doing business as GREYBROOK ACADEMY, 0708964 B.C. LTD., KIRA TURNER, NIGEL TURNER, SHELBY TURNER DEFENDANTS -AND- File No: C10608 BETWEEN: ANYA GIMPEL CLAIMANT AND: VANCOUVER INTERNATIONAL PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL SOCIETY doing business as GREYBROOK ACADEMY, 0708964 B.C. LTD., KIRA TURNER, NIGEL TURNER, SHELBY TURNER DEFENDANTS ORAL REASONS ON APPLICATION OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE T.S. WOODS Appearing as Agent for the Claimant A. Gimpel and all other Claimants: C. Gimpel Counsel for the Defendant Vancouver International Primary and Secondary School: C. Wardell

Counsel for the Defendants 0708964 B.C. Ltd., S. Turner, N. Turner and K. Turner: S. Coulson Place of Hearing: Port Coquitlam, B.C. Date of Hearing: April 9, 2014 Date of Judgment: April 9, 2014 INTRODUCTION [ 1 ] On November 30, 2009, a private school operated in Pitt Meadows, British Columbia by the defendant Vancouver International Primary and Secondary School Society ("VIPSS") under the name Greybrook Academy ceased operations.

In doing so, it left parents without school placements for their children and teachers and staff without jobs. [ 2 ] The closure of Greybrook Academy led to the commencement of a number of individual civil actions by two groups of claimants, that is, the parents of certain students at the school to whom I will refer in these reasons as the "Parent Claimants" and certain members of the school staff to whom I will refer as the "Teacher/Staff Claimants". [ 3 ] None of the claimants in either group is represented by counsel. [ 4 ] The claims of the Parent Claimants and the Teacher/Staff Claimants are to be tried together eventually although the exact parameters of how they will be heard have not yet been determined. [ 5 ] The proceedings to this point have been focussed upon getting the Claimants' pleadings in an acceptable state, receiving recommendations from all parties regarding innovations that might be adopted to make the process of litigating all of the individual claims less unwieldy and time consuming, and hearing various interlocutory motions including multiple motions for dismissal. [ 6 ] I think it fair to say that as the entity that both groups contracted with and had the closest connection with, VIPSS is the primary defendant.

The Turner Directors and Numco are properly described as secondary defendants in the sense that their potential liability is indirect and based on theories that their wrongful acts or omissions were factors in the failure of VIPSS, the primary defendant, that in turn expose them to liability to the Parent Claimants and the Teacher/Staff Claimants. [ 7 ] Despite improvements that have been made to them, the Notices of Claim for the individual Parent Claimants and Teacher/Staff Claimants still present considerable challenges to the reader.

I however agree with counsel for the Turner Directors and Numco that the allegations made against those particular defendants fit generally though not necessarily exclusively into three categories. They are: (

a) That the Turner Defendants breached their duties owed to VIPSS as directors; (

b) That VIPSS is a sham and that in the circumstances the corporate veil that separates VIPSS from the Turner Defendants and Numco can and should be lifted in order that any liabilities that VIPSS may be found ultimately to bear vis à vis the Parent Claimants and the Teacher/Staff Claimants may be imposed on those Defendants; and (

c) That a previous determination made by a tribunal under s. 95 of the Employment Standards Act , R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 113 that VIPSS and Numco inter alia constituted one employer for the purposes of proceedings before that tribunal provides a basis for holding Numco liable in these proceedings for any liabilities to the Parent Claimants and the Teacher/Staff Claimants imposed upon VIPSS. [ 8 ] The Turner Directors and Numco together now move for

summary dismissal of the claims of all Parent Claimants and Teacher/Staff Claimants against them, arguing that those claims are without reasonable grounds and/or disclose no triable issues as between the claimants and the Turner Directors and Numco. JURISDICTION TO MAKE ORDERS OF

SUMMARY DISMISSAL [ 9 ] There is little room for doubt that the Provincial Court has jurisdiction to make an order for

summary dismissal in a proper case, although that jurisdiction is required to be exercised sparingly: see Belanger v. AT&T Canada , [1994] B.C.J. No. 2792 (Prov. Ct.) . [ 10 ] To begin, where it is apparent having regard to the pleadings and/or the evidence filed in relation to a motion for dismissal that a claim or part of a claim has "no prospect for success" then the purpose of resolving or determining disputes "in a just, speedy, inexpensive and simple manner" as articulated in s. 2 of the Small Claims Act , R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 430 is fulfilled by an order of

summary dismissal: see Wood v. CIBC Mortgages Inc. , [2012] B.C.J. No. 95 (Prov. Ct.) . [ 11 ] While the power to dismiss a claim which inter alia lacks reasonable grounds or discloses no triable issue is specifically conferred upon a judge presiding at a settlement conference under Rule 7(14)(i), it is implicitly available outside a settlement conference when a party moves for

summary dismissal under Rule 16(6)(o). In this regard, Bayliff P.C.J. in Watch Lake North Green Lake Volunteer Fire Department Society v. Haskins , [2010] B.C.J. No. 1215 (Prov. Ct.) held that "The same test should be applied to a motion for

summary dismissal when the Court is proceeding under Rule 16(6)(

o) where, as here, the motion is brought outside a settlement conference". [ 12 ] Finally, there is the inherent procedural jurisdiction that is complimentary to that conferred expressly by the Small Claims Rules and Small Claims Act . That too, has been acknowledged as being a source of a power to "dismiss actions which are on the face of

the documents alone destined to fail at trial" (Wood, supra, at para. 9). APPLICANTS’ SPECIFIC ARGUMENTS FOR

SUMMARY DISMISSAL Specific Duties Owed by the Turner Directors, as Directors to VIPSS [13] The Turner Directors point to the various references found in the pleadings of the Parent Claimants and the Teacher/StaffClaimants to duties owed by them as directors to VIPSS, under the Society Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 433 and otherwise. The TurnerDirectors’ argument in this regard is simple and straightforward.

They say at para. 23 of their written submission that even if suchbreaches were committed, which is not admitted, they are "actionable solely by the entity to which the duties are owed, that is, theSociety" and not the individual defendants. [14] This argument has merit so far as it goes.

Duties owed to a society or a corporation are indeed actionable by the society orcorporation in question, but the argument advanced in this regard is premised in part on the overall contention of the Turner Directorsand Numco that the claims of the Parent Claimants and the Teacher/Staff Claimants are purely contractual (see for example paras. 2 to 7and 16 of their written submission). [15] I have alluded above to the challenges of

interpretation that the Notices of Claim present. They are the product of lay litigantsand for that reason they must be read and interpreted generously, particularly in the context of an application brought by certaindefendants for

summary dismissal. [16] I cannot agree with the argument advanced by the Turner Directors and Numco that the Parent Claimants and the Teacher/StaffClaimants have left allegations of negligence on the part of the Turner Directors and Numco out of their Notices of Claim.

Claims ofnegligence have not been expertly pleaded, to be sure, but the various references found in them to duties, breaches, and losses do in myjudgment signal to the reader and to the Turner Directors and Numco that the law of negligence is on foot against them in theseproceedings. [17] It is indisputable that where a party can be shown to have breached a statutory duty or a standard, evidence of that breach canconstitute evidence of common law negligence: R. v. Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, (SCC), [1983] 1 S.C.R. 205. Thecorrelative proposition is also true.

Compliance with a statutory duty or standard can constitute evidence of conformity with thecommon law standard of care: Privest Properties Ltd. v. Foundation Company of Canada (1995), (BC SC), 128D.L.R. (4th) 577 at paras. 273 and following.

That is a Supreme Court decision which was affirmed on appeal at (1997), (BC CA), 143 D.L.R. (4th) 635 (B.C.C.A), and leave to appeal further was refused by the Supreme Court of Canada at [1997]SCCA No. 216. [18] Thus, while the Parent Claimants and the Teacher/Staff Claimants may not be able to invoke the Society Act to assert claimsagainst the Turner Directors that only belong to VIPSS, evidence of alleged breaches of duties owed by the Turner Directors to VIPSSunder the Society Act or otherwise may inform the Court's approach ultimately to the assertion that the Turner Directors breached dutiesowed to them which sound in negligence.

It follows that I cannot accede to the Turner Directors’ argument that, to the extent that the Parent Claimants and the Teacher/StaffClaimants have adverted to statutory duties owed by the Turner Directors, as directors, to VIPSS, their claims must be dismissed as being"destined to fail". Alleged Grounds for Lifting the Corporate Veil [19] The Parent Claimants and the Teacher/Staff Claimants have invited the court in somewhat different but broadly comparableways to lift the veil that separates the Turner Directors from VIPSS, the society of which they were Directors.

They advert, for example,to VIPSS being a sham and to the directors having precipitated its financial failure by using VIPSS funds for purposes that were personalto those directors, unguided by the society's interests and ultimately fatally injurious to the economic viability of the society and thus theschool.

In what I will say again are inexpert pleadings, the Parent Claimants and the Teacher/Staff Claimants do claim they attributetheir losses to wrongful conduct of the kinds mentioned above that they say ultimately deprived them, respectively, of placements fortheir children and their jobs at Greybrook Academy. [20] In support of their dismissal motion, the Turner Directors argue correctly that the circumstances in which a court will lift theveil that separates a corporation (or for present purposes a society) from its directors are very narrowly drawn: see, for example,Edgington v.

Mulek Estate (2009), 2008 BCCA 505 , 86 B.C.L.R. (4th) 78 (C.A.). [21] Counsel cites several of the authorities that give definition to the narrow grounds upon which the corporate veil will be liftedand then go on to identify what they say are deficiencies in the claimants' pleadings. The Turner Directors say, for example, at para. 31of their submissions that "…the claimants have not pleaded fraud and they have not pleaded that the [Turner Directors] have used VIPSSto perpetuate fraudulent acts which they would have been unable to perpetrate themselves".

Elsewhere they argue that "…the claimantshave not pleaded that the use of the corporate structure involving a company and a society was a sham from the outset" (at para. 33), andthat the claimants have not "…pleaded facts giving rise to personal liability or pleaded any separate tortious actions by the TurnerDirectors" or that they "…used VIPSS as a vehicle to commit fraud" (at para. 34). [22] With respect, these submissions seek to have the court hold the claimants to too high a standard in pleading as lay litigants. Iwill say it again: the Notices of Claim are inexpertly drawn.

But what are plainly evident throughout the pleadings of the ParentClaimants and the Teacher/Staff Claimants are assertions that repeatedly impute wrongful conduct of various kinds to the TurnerDirectors in relation to the finances of VIPSS. The society ultimately failed. Greybrook Academy closed its doors mid-year and theParent Claimants and the Teacher/Staff claimants were left respectively without school placements for their children or jobs.

Quite apartfrom issues of fraud, whether liability for the losses claimed by the Parent Claimants and the Teacher/Staff Claimants against the TurnerDirectors personally will ultimately be found against those defendants will turn at least in part on the question of whether in theirdealings with VIPSS those defendants engaged in conduct that was "wrongful" or "illegitimate" in the sense meant by the authorities

including Clarkson Co. Ltd. v. Zhelka (1967), (ON SC), 2 O.R. 565 (H.C.J.), discussed and analysed in detail at paras.12 and following of SPC Holdings and Construction Ltd. v. Gabriel, [2013] B.C.J. No. 343 (Prov. Ct.). [23] The Turner Directors also cite what they identify as evidentiary gaps in the claimants' materials in their effort to have thecorporate veil aspect of the Parent Claimants' and the Teacher/Staff Claimants' claims dismissed as being "without reasonable grounds"or as "disclosing no triable issue".

For example, they argue at para. 28 of their submissions that: “The evidence before this court is that neither the [Turner Directors] nor [Numco] had any role in negotiating any of the contractsbetween VIPSS and the claimants. Rather, all contracts entered into between VIPSS and the various claimants were made through thedirect and indirect involvement of Greybrook's Headmaster, Bruce Ashton, and Mr. Ashton was responsible for dealing with Greybrook'sbudget and all financial and contractual matters from the spring of 2008 until 2009.

In such circumstances it is impossible to say thatVIPSS had no independent functioning on its own.” [24] This argument affords me a convenient opportunity to address the issue of prematurity, a key issue on this application in myopinion. There is before me a substantial body of affidavit evidence -- mostly tendered by the claimants but some tendered by the TurnerDefendants and Numco -- that touches on various issues like the one mentioned in the foregoing extract from the written submission filedin support of the motion for dismissal.

Some of that evidence on first blush appears to favour the lifting of the corporate veil and someof it appears, again on first blush, to favour maintaining the corporate veil in place. But conspicuously and importantly, it is early daysin this litigation.

I consider that it would be dangerous and imprudent for me to dispose fully and finally of the question of whether theTurner Directors are entitled to the protection of the corporate veil without having heard and seen the relevant and material evidence andheard full argument based on that evidence. [25] I have already noted in these reasons that the Parent Claimants' and the Teacher/Staff Claimants' assertion that the TurnerDirectors are disentitled to the protection of the corporate veil is not so obviously misconceived on the law to be susceptible of dismissalas not even raising a triable issue.

There are authorities referred to above and discussed in detail in SPC Holdings, supra, that recognizethe proposition that, in a proper case, proof of wrongful or illegitimate conduct on the part of directors can result in them being heldpersonally answerable for the liabilities of the corporate entity with which they are associated.

It cannot therefore be said that what theParent Claimants and the Teacher/Staff Claimants are asserting in these proceedings, however inexpertly, is predicated on a theory ofliability that is unknown to law. [26] If the Turner Directors are to succeed then in their attempt to have the corporate veil-based claims dismissed summarily, theymust do so on the basis of evidence that is so persuasive and compelling that those claims can be justly dismissed. As McKim P.C.J.stated in Wood, supra, "A trial judge sitting on a

summary judgment application will need to determine on a case-by-case basis theamount and quality of evidence they will require to reach a just result" (at para. 11). [27] I have no hesitation in stating that -- given the breadth of what conceivably might be material to the question of whether theTurner Directors engaged in wrongful or illegitimate conduct of a nature and kind sufficient to deprive them of the protection of thecorporate veil -- the “amount and quality” of the evidence before me in connection with the current dismissal application brought at thisearly stage in the proceedings is insufficient to permit me “to reach a just result”. [28] While they have been in existence for some time, these proceedings are -- in terms of their progress toward trial -- mostdefinitely at a very early stage of their evolution.

These proceedings have been preoccupied, as I have mentioned, with preliminarymatters for a considerable time. They include interlocutory steps aimed at improving the pleadings. There have also been variousmotions, including the one now before the court, that have had to be heard and decided.

I understand that the present motion may notrepresent the last of those interlocutory skirmishes. [29] Given the unique situation in which the claimants find themselves -- having individually brought proceedings against the samedefendants and invoking largely overlapping factual assertions and legal theories -- the settlement conferences that were conducted enmasse in this litigation did not produce the usual document disclosure or other such orders.

As a result, the parties have thus far not beencompelled by court order to produce to each other copies of all of the documents that they have in their possession or control relating tothe matters in issue, whether harmful or helpful to their interests. They have not been compelled by court order to identify the witnessesthey intend to call at trial and summarize the evidence of those witnesses in "will say" statements. Orders compelling such limitedmutual discovery are routinely made by this court at settlement conferences in conventional actions.

I repeat that no such orders havebeen made in this distinctly unconventional aggregation of related actions. Thus, none of the parties have had the benefit of the limiteddiscovery that is available in Provincial Court, including mutual discovery of documents, in order to assist them to resist or indeed mountarguments concerning the viability of the claims that have been asserted by the Parent Claimants and the Teacher/Staff Claimants withrespect to the lifting of the corporate veil (or any other claims for that matter).

Plainly, in such circumstances it would be unjust toentertain and decide a dismissal application like the one currently before the court -- an application that is argued in part on the assertionthat the Claimants' responding materials are deficient in certain respects -- when not even the limited available discovery rights thatparties enjoy under the Small Claims Rules have yet been triggered by discovery-related court orders. [30] Here, I believe a parallel can be drawn between non-suit applications and dismissal applications.

What those applications havein common is the potential to yield final orders that are conclusively dispositive of claims or defences before the proceedings in whichthe claims or defences are asserted or raised have been heard in full.

Precisely because discovery rights are truncated in Provincial Courtproceedings, the Provincial Court is properly reluctant to grant such conclusively dispositive orders at the early stages of the proceedingsas the Turner Directors and Numco would have me do here. [31] In this regard I invoke the reasoning of McCarthy P.C.J., found at paras. 45 through 50 of his recent decision in Potter v.Montpetit, 2012 BCPC 268 , [2012] B.C.J. No. 1649 (Prov. Ct.). [45] The Small Claims Rules do provide a means of obtaining document disclosure before trial from another party.

This may occur atthe time of the settlement conference as provided for under Rule 7(5) or pursuant to Rule 7.5(9) by attaching documents to a trialstatement in connection with a trial conference. Production orders are available under Rule 7(14)(g). Documents received from an

adverse party may be very useful in assisting a party in making their case. However disclosed documents of an adverse party alone may not suffice. The opportunity to cross examine an adverse party on those documents may become vitally important to a party in proving their case. [46] In dealing with one of the key issues being what the Remaining Defendants knew or should have known about the deficiencies in the House, [talking now about the facts in Potter v.

Montpetit ] the Claimants are not only faced with a civil burden of proof but have the challenge of obtaining necessary factual information that is not readily available to them. That information is in the mind of Mr. Ford and possibly in the minds of other representatives of the Defendant Coast Realty, such as Randal Herbert Forbes, rather than in any specific document that may have been disclosed by the Defendants or received from other sources. [47] Like the situation in Stone v. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia [citation: [2008] B.C.J. No. 2585 (Prov.

Ct.) ], the Claimants in the matter before me clearly must wait until Mr. Ford, or other witnesses called by the Remaining Defendants testify in order to cross examine them and thereby elicit helpful admissions regarding the state of their knowledge and what reasonable steps they took to establish their knowledge about the House. [48] Given this key issue of knowledge of the Remaining Defendants, dismissing the Claimants' case on a no evidence motion will deprive the Claimants of the possibility of obtaining certain trial evidence which may be assistance to their case.

That potential evidence is available by means of the only procedure likely available to them, namely by way of cross examination of the Defendants' witnesses [49] It is my view that in considering a no evidence motion in a small claims trial, the Court should also look at the whole of the circumstances surrounding the case and consider from what sources important evidence is available.

If evidence that is required or helpful for the claimant's case is likely available from a defendant and is not likely available from other sources, then there should be a greater reluctance for the Court to grant the non-suit. [50] When looking at the whole of the circumstances surrounding a case and when dealing with a no-evidence motion in a small claims trial, the Court should also consider if the defendant is [self] represented by a lawyer and if the claimant is self-represented and is without legal training. [ 32 ] Based on the foregoing, I cannot accede to the Turner Directors’ argument that the claims of the Parent Claimants and the Teacher/Staff Claimants based on the lifting of the corporate veil should be summarily dismissed.

Summary dismissal of those claims at this stage of the proceedings would be premature.

Alleged Basis of Recovery based on the One Employer Determination [ 33 ] The Parent Claimants and the Teacher/Staff Claimants invoke in their Notices of Claim a determination made by the Director of Employment Standards that VIPSS and Numco were "one employer" under s. 95 of the Employment Standards Act as affording some basis for holding Numco liable for the contractual obligations of VIPSS to them. [ 34 ] Numco rightly argues that one employer determinations under Employment Standards legislation represent an exception to the common law treatment of distinct corporate entities.

It also rightly argues that the Parent Claimants have a less obvious basis for rational recourse to that determination than do the Teacher/Staff Claimants, and Numco is undoubtedly correct when it submits that the one employer determination by the Director of Employment Standards in separate proceedings brought under Employment Standards legislation is not in any way binding on this court. [ 35 ] However, employing an analysis not unlike that which I have employed with respect to the potential evidentiary value of breaches by the Turner Directors of duties owed to VIPSS under the Society Act , I am not prepared to conclude at this early stage that any arguments advanced that cite the one employer treatment given to Numco and VIPSS as a basis for visiting VIPSS' liabilities on Numco are "bound to fail".

Evidence concerning the factual indicia that led the Director of Employment Standards to make the one employer determination may or may not be probative of facts that would support the imposition of VIPSS' liabilities on Numco. [ 36 ] In relation to this aspect of the Parent Claimants’ and Teacher/Staff Claimants' claims, Numco attacks those claimants' pleadings and cites affidavit evidence of one of the Turner Directors to the effect that Numco "had no role and connection with the operation of Greybrook Academy other than being VIPSS' landlord".

Here again, I would say that the represented defendants cannot hold the unrepresented claimants to a standard of pleading that might govern if the claimants had counsel and were litigating their claims in Supreme Court.

As I have said before, what the evidence after discovery might furnish to either party in connection with Numco's role -- showing that it functioned as a landlord only or possibly more -- cannot be known at this time when no court-ordered discovery has yet taken place. [ 37 ] Therefore, once again I cannot accede to Numco's argument that, to the extent they are based on the Director of Employment Standards' one employer determination, the claims of the Parent Claimants and the Teacher/Staff Claimants against Numco must be dismissed summarily.

Summary dismissal at this stage of the proceedings would be premature. DISPOSITION [ 38 ] It follows from all of the foregoing that the

summary dismissal application brought jointly by the Turner Defendants and Numco must be and is dismissed. (ORAL REASONS FOR JUDGMENT CONCLUDED)