Halton Children’s Aid Society v. K.C.L., 2014 ONCJ 168

WARNING The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file: This is a case under

Part III of the Child and Family Services Act and is subject to one or more of subsections 48(7), 45(8) and 45(9) of the Act. These subsections and subsection 85(3) of the Child and Family Services Act , which deals with the consequences of failure to comply, read as follows: 45.—

(7) Order excluding media representatives or prohibiting publication. — The court may make an order, . . . (

c) prohibiting the publication of a report of the hearing or a specified part of the hearing, where the court is of the opinion that . . . publication of the report, . . ., would cause emotional harm to a child who is a witness at or a participant in the hearing or is the subject of the proceeding.

(8) Prohibition: identifying child. — No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child's parent or foster parent or a member of the child's family.

(9) Idem: order re adult. — The court may make an order prohibiting the publication of information that has the effect of identifying a person charged with an offence under this Part. . . . 85.—

(3) Idem. — A person who contravenes subsection 45(8) or 76(11) (publication of identifying information) or an order prohibiting publication made under clause 45(7)(

c) or subsection 45(9), and a director, officer or employee of a corporation who authorizes, permits or concurs in such a contravention by the corporation, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both. ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE DATE: April 3, 2014 COURT FILE No.: C190/06 Citation: Halton Children’s Aid Society v. K.C.L. , 2014 ONCJ 168 BETWEEN: Children's aid society, Region of Halton Applicant, — AND — K.C.L. (mother) W.J.Q. (father) Respondents

Before Justice Roselyn Zisman Heard on March 29, 2014 Reasons for Judgment released on April 3, 2014 Diane Skrow…………………………………………………….. counsel for the applicant society K.C.L.………………………………………………………………………………. on her own behalf W.J.Q…………………………………………………………………………………on his own behalf John Grant..................................................... counsel for the Office of the Children’s Lawyer, legal representative for the child Zisman J.: Introduction [1] This is a

summary judgement motion wherein the society is seeking to place the child, I.C.P.Q. born […], 2000, (“ I. or thechild”) in the custody of the respondent W.J.Q. (“the father”), pursuant to

section 57.1 of the Child and Family Services Act and for anorder that access between the child and the respondent K.C.L. (“the mother”) shall be in the discretion of the father taking into accountthe child’s views and preferences. [2] The father and counsel for the child support this position. However, counsel for the child submits that the access should bespecified in accordance with the current arrangements. [3] The mother opposes the motion and seeks a trial.

She wishes the child placed with her or in the alternative that her access besignificantly expanded. [4] In support of its motion the society relied on the Status Review Application, Plan of Care and Amended Plan of Care,affidavit of Sharlaine Howes sworn June 28, 2013, affidavit of Lynda Dikken sworn February 18, 2014 and the temporary order of July25, 2013. [5] The father and counsel for the child did not file any materials and rely on the documents filed by the society. [6] The mother relied on her affidavit sworn March 24, 2014.

The society also provided the court with a copy of the mother’sAnswer and Plan of Care dated March 6, 2013 that was served but never filed with the court. Statutory framework and applicable law [7] Subrule 16 of the Family Law Rules allows a party to seek

summary judgment without a trial on all or part of a claim afterthe respondent has served an Answer or after the time for serving an Answer has expired. [8] Subrule 16 (2) specifically confirms that

summary judgment is available in child protection proceedings. [9] Subrule 16 (4) requires that the party making the motion serve an affidavit or other evidence that sets out the specific factsshowing that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial. [10] Subrule 16 (4.1) provides that the responding party must also set out in an affidavit or other evidence specific facts showingthat there is a genuine issue for trial. The responding party cannot make mere allegations or denials of the evidence. [11] Subrule 16 (6) is mandatory that is, if the court concludes that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial of a claim, the courtshall make a final order accordingly. [12] On a motion for

summary judgment, the court is required to take a hard look at the merits of the case to determine if there isa genuine issue for trial. The onus is on the Society to show there is no genuine issue for trial. (Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton v.M.N. (ON SC), [2007] O.J. No. 1526 (Ont.

S.C.J.). [13] In assessing whether or not a society has met its obligation of showing there is no genuine issue for trial, courts have equatedthat phrase with “no chance of success”, “when the outcome is a foregone conclusion”, “plain and obvious that the action cannotsucceed”, and “where there is no realistic possibility of an outcome than that sought by the applicant”. ( Children’s Aid Society ofOxford (County) v. J.J (ON SC), [2003] O.J. No. 2208 (Ont. S.C.J.); Catholic Children’s Aid Society of MetropolitanToronto v. O. (L.M.) (ON SC), [1996] O.J. No. 3081, (Ont.

G.D.)139 D.L.R. (4th) 534; Children’s Aid Society ofSimcoe v. C.S. [2001] O.J. No. 4915 (Ont. S.C.J.) and Children’s Aid Society of Niagara Region v. S.C. (ON SC),

[2008] O.J. No. 3969 (Ont. S.C.J.). [14]

Summary judgment should proceed with caution. However, it is not limited or granted only in the clearest of cases. JusticeHardman, in the case of Children’s Aid Society of the Regional Municipality of Waterloo v. T.S. (ON CJ), [1999]O.J. No. 5561 (Ont. C.J.), observed at paragraph 5 of that decision that because

summary judgment is now explicitly contemplated byRule 16, this may: …broaden the use of the procedure as it will no longer be characterized as an extraordinary remedy. Nevertheless, the considerations ofdue process, statutory requirements and the best interest, protection and well-being of the children will determine ultimately theappropriateness of

summary judgment. (See also Jewish Child and Family Services of Toronto v. A.(R.) [2001] O.J. No. 47 (Ont. S.C.J.). [15] The responding party, faced with a prima facie case for

summary judgment, must provide evidence of specific facts showingthat there is a genuine issue for trial. Mere allegations or blanket denials or self-serving affidavits not supported by specific factsshowing that there is no genuine issue for trial must be insufficient to defeat a claim for

summary judgment. (Children’s Aid Society ofToronto v. A. (M.), (ON CJ), [2002] O.J. No. 2371 (Ont. C.J.). [16] The court is not to assess credibility, draw inferences from conflicting affidavits or weigh the evidence at a

summaryjudgment motion. This is reserved for the trier of fact. (Children’s Aid Society of the District of Nipissing v. M.M.(ON SC), [2000] O.J. No. 2541 (Ont. S.C.J.); Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton v. M.N, supra). [17] There has recently been some debate in the case law as to whether or not the court should adopt the broader approach to acourt’s powers on a

summary judgement motion, by finding that subrule16 (6) has been bolstered by the new tools the court has pursuantto Rule 20.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure that permit a court to weigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of deponents and drawreasonable inferences. [18] The Supreme Court of Canada, in the case of Hryniak v. Maulin 2014 SCC 7 , 2014 S.C.C. 7, has clarified theprocess of applying the expanded

summary judgment rule. The court held that the judge should first determine if there is a genuineissue requiring a trial based on the evidence before her, without using the new fact-finding powers. There will be no genuine issue fortrial if the

summary judgement process provides her with the evidence required to fairly and justly adjudicate the dispute and is a timely,affordable and proportionate procedure.

If there appears to be genuine issue for trial, she should then determine if the need for a trial canbe avoided by using the new powers under Rules 20.04 (2.1) and (2.2). [19] Accordingly, the first step under either process is to determine if there is a genuine issue for trial based on the evidencepresented without relying on any expanded powers to weigh evidence or assess credibility. [20] In determining if there is sufficient evidence led by the parent, the question is not whether there is any evidence to supportthe position, but whether the evidence is sufficient to support a trial. (Children’s Aid Society of Dufferin v.

J.R. (ONCJ), [2002] O.J. No. 4319(Ont. C.J.). [21] In determining whether or not there is a triable issue, the court should not be asked to speculate as to possible evidence orelaboration. The court must rely on and evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence as disclosed by the affidavits. (Children’s Aid Societyof Toronto v. C.H. 2004 ONCJ 224 , [2004] O.J. No. 4084 (Ont. C.J.); Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton v. C.R. (ON SC), [2006] O.J.

No. 3442)(S.C.J.). [22] Although the court can rely on hearsay, subrule16 (5) provides a stricter rule with respect to hearsay than subrule 14 (19)motions, namely that if a party’s evidence is not from a person who has personal knowledge of the facts in dispute, the court may drawconclusions unfavourable to the party.

This rule is permissive in nature and provides discretion to the court as to whether or not to admitthe hearsay evidence and attach whatever weight to it, in any, that the court deems appropriate. [23] In interpreting subrule 16, the court must also consider the strict timelines that govern child protection proceedings andsubsection 1(1) of the Child and Family Services Act providing that the paramount purpose of the Act is to promote the best interests,protection and well- being of children. [24] It is also necessary to consider Rule 2 of the Family Law Rules to ensure that cases are dealt with justly by ensuring theprocedure is fair to all parties, saves time and expense and that case are dealt with in ways that are appropriate to its importance andcomplexity and giving appropriate court resources to the case while taking into consideration the need to give resources to other cases. (Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton v.

W.H. (ON SC), [2006] O.J. No. 1255 (Ont. S.C.J.). This appears to also be inkeeping with the process test set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in Hryiak v. Mauldin, supra. [25] In child protection proceedings, the genuineness of an issue must arise from something more than a heartfelt expression of aparent’s desire to resume care of the child.

There must be an arguable notion discernable from the parent’s evidence that she faces somebetter prospect that what existed at the time of the society’s removal of the child from her care and has developed some new ability as aparent. (Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. R.H. and M.N. (ON CJ), [2000] O. J. No. 5853 (C.J.). [26] In this case, the society also relies on

section 50 of the Child and Family Services Act that permits a court to consider any pastconduct of a person towards any child and to rely on an oral and written statement that the court considers relevant to the proceeding. Inparticular the society relies on the reasons for judgment by Justice Wolder dated June 5, 2008 that made an order that the child be madea Crown ward with access. Background

[ 27 ] The child is the only biological child of the respondent parents. The Halton and Peel children’s aid societies have been involved with the family since 2004 based on concerns about the mental health of both parents and the impact on their ability to care for their child. [ 28 ] In March of 2006, the parents lost their housing and voluntarily placed the child with the paternal aunt. On May 9, 2006 the child was admitted into the care of the society as the paternal aunt could no longer care for him. [ 29 ] On December 14, 2006 an order was made finding the child in need of protection pursuant to sections 37 (2) (f), 37 (2) (

g) and 37 (2) (

i) of the Child and Family Services Act. [ 30 ] A six day status review trial proceeded before Justice Wolder in February and March 2008. The parents, who were then separated, each sought an order that the child be returned to his or her care. The society sought an order that the child be made a Crown ward with access in the discretion of the society. [ 31 ] Justice Wolder released his decision on June 5, 2008 [1] finding that the child continued to be in need of protection and that the child be made a Crown ward with access.

He ordered that access be at the discretion of the society with respect to location, duration, and supervision provided that the child has at least two access visits per month with each of his parents and that the child also has access to extended family members. [ 32 ] The mother is a medical doctor trained in Britain. According to the findings of fact in the judgment of Justice Wolder, the mother became embroiled in a dispute with her employer sometime in 1996 and filed a grievance to remedy this perceived inequity.

Although the complaint was investigated by the British Medical Association, the mother did not receive the finding or remedy she sought. At paragraph 11 of his judgment, Justice Wolder states: Instead of accepting this outcome and moving on with her career, she has refused to let go and for the past eight years, her entire life has become consumed with her attempts to right this perceived wrong and her belief that government agencies are trying to keep her quiet and possibly kill her.

She is convinced that many organizations, including governments, have been conspiring against her to deny her the remedy that she is seeking and she honestly believes that her life is in danger. [ 33 ] At paragraph 40 of the decision, Justice Wolder found that the child could not be protected in his mother’s care for the following reasons: [40] I find that if this court ordered that Iain be placed in his mother’s care, he could not be protected by a supervision order and thus this placement would not be his best interests for the following reasons:

(1) Dr. L. has suffered and continues to suffer from some form of mental illness, likely paranoia. This mental illness has been recognized to exist for many years. At this time she is receiving no treatment for her symptoms. She has consistently refused to participate in a psychiatric assessment to seek such treatment even though such treatment is patently necessary. Based upon Dr. L.’s conduct during this trial including her outbursts throughout the trial, her outburst made on March the 13 th , and her statement made a the conclusion of trial, I am satisfied that Dr.

L. is clearly suffering from some sort of mental health issues that are not being treated and are not under control and that preventing her from being able to meet the needs of her child.

(2) Dr. L.’s plan for I. is vague; she wished to have custody of I. so she can live either in Canada, Britain, or Switzerland. She has no employment and no means to support herself and her son. She has virtually no support system in Canada. There is no evidence that she has any real insight into the damage that she and Iain’s father have caused to Iain’s emotional wellbeing. She consistently through the trial rejected any suggestion that I. had suffered from any emotional damage.

(3) There is no evidence to suggest that Dr. L. will obtain employment in the near future. She has not worked since November 2000. She has been living in shelters since April 2006 save and except during her reconciliation attempt with Mr. Q. between May and November 2007. There is no evidence that she has been attempting to obtain any housing at the present or in the future. She claims that she will not “stoop” to the level of getting Ontario Works or subsidized housing. She has demonstrated no ability to secure a proper home for herself and her son.

(4) Dr. L. has participated in disputes with her husband in I.’s presence in the past, notwithstanding that these disputes would escalate to the point of physical aggression. There is no evidence to suggest that Dr. L. will protect Iain from witnessing conflict in the future. Dr.

L.’s plan for Iain is speculative and lacks any form of foundation capable of meeting I.’s immediate needs. [ 34 ] With respect to the father, at paragraph 47 of the decision, after reviewing the evidence regarding the father’s mental health diagnosis and his plan of care, Justice Wolder found that the child could not be adequately protected by the father for the following reasons: [47]. While Mr. Q.’s bipolar mood disorder is a risk factor, I’m satisfied that this diagnoses is not a reason for failing to return I. to his care.

There are many parents who have mental health issues who are primary caretakers with children. As long as their medical conditions remain stable, there is no reason why they should not be able to parent their children. In the context of this case, I am satisfied that if the only issue were Mr. Q.’s bipolar mood disorder, there would be no reason for not returning I. to his care.

However, I find that it is his unwillingness or inability to develop a viable plan to care for his child that will provide his child with the stability that his child needs that is standing in his way. [ 35 ] With respect to the child’s long term best interests and the ability of either parent to in the future to request that the child be returned to his or her care, and Justice Wolder made the following comments at paragraphs 48 to 50: [48] Even if Iain is not returned to the care of one of his parents at this time and is made a Crown ward with access, it remains open to

either Mr. Q. or to Dr. L. in a subsequent status review application to attempt to demonstrate that these protection concerns that presently stand in the way of either parent caring for the child have been addressed. In the context of long term best interests, I find that if it were possible, it would be in I.’s long term best interests for him to be cared for by one of his parents even where there have been historical difficulties.

If such parent is prepared to develop a firm plan to meet the needs of the child and is prepared to put the child’s needs over his own needs and to address the issues that causes the child to continue to be in need of protection at this time, there is no reason why I. could not be re-united with one or both of his parents in the future. This will depend on the actions of the parents particularly the need for Dr. L. to secure medical assistance through a psychiatric assessment and viable treatment plan and the need for Mr.

Q. to either propose to become I.’s primary caretaker and present a viable plan that will allow him to do so. [49] Should Dr. L. in future seek the psychiatric intervention that she desperately needs and should she be able to receive treatment or intervention necessary to stabilize her mental illness, I am satisfied that she has the potential, without the burden of her identified paranoia to provide adequately for Iain and make a home for him. During the times that Dr. L.’s mental health was stable, she demonstrated that she had the ability to be a good mother and that she could meet her son’s day–to-day needs.

It is therefore Dr. L.’s undiagnosed and untreated mental illness that has interfered and continues to interfere with her ability to care for I. Dr. L. needs to recognize that if she wishes to regain the care of I., she must deal with her mental health concerns directly through appropriate psychiatric intervention. There is nothing to prevent her from privately participating in a psychiatric assessment and accepting appropriate psychiatric intervention and treatment.

Should such intervention result in her becoming and remaining stable and with proper medical evidence in support, there is no reason why she could not be re-united with I. in the future. It all depends on what Dr. L. is prepared to do to change her present situation. [50] In the case of Mr. Q., there is nothing to prevent him from presenting a viable parenting plan for I. in the future, provided that he has developed such plan and is able to present it to a court in the context of a status review application. Such plan would require Mr.

Q or the person who will be providing the day-to-day parenting of I. to come forward and present evidence of their plan, commitment, willingness and ability to discharge the parenting role otherwise to be performed by I’s father. Mr. Q.’s failure to seek the assistance of counsel in this case to help him to properly present the evidence that was required may have placed him at a disadvantage.

However, he may have the opportunity to place this matter back before the court in the future for reconsideration, should he seek out proper legal advice and should he then be able to present the witnesses and evidence this court would need in order to persuade the court that I. should then be placed in his care. Events since the Crown wardship order [ 36 ] The child remained in the same foster home from March 2008. He excelled academically and socially.

His foster family initiated and maintained his relationships with his extended family. [ 37 ] The child maintained consistent and regular access with his father that he enjoyed. Access gradually expanded from one hour a visit twice a month fully supervised, to three hours in the community unsupervised and then to full day visits. In April 2010, the child began some overnight visits with his father.

These visits were gradually expanded to alternate week-ends and then they began to spend holidays together. [ 38 ] The child received counselling to address the changes in his relationship with his father and the relationship between his foster parents and his father. The father worked co-operatively with the society with respect to improving his parenting skills and signed consents so the society could speak to his medical care providers.

There are no concerns about the father’s mental health. [ 39 ] The father maintained stable housing and employment and the father was observed to be able to meet the child’s needs. [ 40 ] Unfortunately the child’s access with his mother did not go as well.

The visits remained fully supervised as the mother did not address her mental health issues and she has not sought out any treatment. [ 41 ] In April 2008, the visits were moved from the society’s offices to Woodview Children’s Centre which is a mental health facility in the hope that this therapeutic setting that also had with more activities would improve the quality of the visits. Although the visits appeared to improve the child expressed that he did not like when his mother was not feeling well. He explained that this was when she spoke about “the conspiracy” or when the police needed to be called.

The police were called on several occasions due to escalating behaviour by the mother. The child was observed to regress emotionally and behaviourally during the supervised access visits with his mother.

He expressed that he wished to reduce access to one hour and did not like missing school to attend visits. [ 42 ] In February 2011, access had to be moved back to the society’s offices as a result of the mother’s escalating behaviours and concerns about the impact of her behavior on other families using the Woodview Children’s Centre. [ 43 ] From February to August 2011, the child began to verbalize that he felt obligated to visit his mother, that he did not enjoy the visits, that his mother scared him when she promised “to take him home” or “get him out of this situation”.

The mother was observed “to drill” the child about questions about his life. The child was worried he would “slip up” and mention seeing his father. The child continued to express his desire to reduce the visits to his mother. [ 44 ] In September 2013, after consulting with the child, the father and an attachment therapist, the society determined that the child should not be made responsible for determining access but rather that the adults should be making these decisions for him.

It was further agreed that access be reduced to once every two months. [ 45 ] The mother has attended all of her scheduled visits with the child. She is always prepared with activities and appropriate snacks. She has continued to vocalize her desire to have her son returned to her care. [ 46 ] In the summer of 2012, the mother did connect with a mental health worker and sought some medical treatment. However, the mother continued to exhibit concerning behaviour at the society’s offices including ongoing discussions about “the conspiracy”. The

society did not have any indication that the mother had acknowledged or received treatment for the mental health concerns that were the basis for the initial and ongoing protection concerns. The mother has struggled with homelessness and has continued to reside at various shelters throughout Toronto. [ 47 ] As a result, the society commenced this Status Review Application seeking an order that the mother’s access be varied to be in the society’s discretion in accordance with the child’s views and preferences.

The society also sought an order that the child be placed in the father’s care subject to a seven month supervision order. Court proceedings [ 48 ] The application was first before the court on February 14, 2013. On consent a without prejudice order was made that access be in accordance with the child’s views and preferences. Counsel was also appointed for the child. [ 49 ] After several adjournments, a temporary care and custody motion was heard on July 25, 2013.

For oral reasons, Justice O’Connell ordered that the Crown wardship order be terminated, that the child be placed in the care and custody of his father subject to terms and conditions of supervision and that the mother’s access be in the discretion of the society taking into account the child’s views and preferences. [ 50 ] There were several other attendances and according to the endorsements some misunderstanding about the society’s position with respect to obtaining a psychiatric assessment of the mother.

The issue was resolved as the society indicated that it was not prepared to pay for or obtain any assessments and that it wished to proceed with a

summary judgment motion. The motion was accordingly scheduled to proceed before me. Analysis [ 51 ] The child has been placed with the father since the temporary order of July 25, 2013. The society was originally seeking a seven month supervision order to monitor the placement of the child with the father. It is submitted by the society that as the child has been on the father’s care for eight months already and as the society has no protection concerns, there is no need for any ongoing supervision. [ 52 ] On behalf of the child, it is submitted that the child wishes to continue to reside with the father.

I voiced my concerns about counsel for the child giving evidence in his submissions about statements made by the child. The proper process for putting the child’s views and preferences before the court should be thorough an affidavit from a social worker from the Office of the Children's Lawyer. However, the child’s views and preference are amply set out in the affidavits filed by the society workers. Those views and preferences are not disputed by any evidence from the mother. [ 53 ] The society has carefully and slowly transitioned the child into his father’s care.

Based on the undisputed evidence as set out in the affidavit of Ms. Dikken, the re-integration has gone well and the child and father have adjusted to living together. The father and child have worked cooperatively with a family support worker, an attachment therapist and a family counsellor. The father and Ms.

Dikken have discussed and developed a safety plan in the event the mother attends at his home or the child’s school. [ 54 ] The protection concerns regarding the father that existed at the time of the status review trial in 2008 no longer exist. [ 55 ] The child is now 14 years old and has been on the care of the society since he was 6 years old. He has consistently advised that he is happy living with his father.

It is in his best interests that there is a permanent plan in place and that his relationship with his father is normalized and that there is no further involvement of the society in their lives. [ 56 ] The child has advised that he is happy to continue with access to his mother every other month for one hour and is aware that access can be changed if he desires. [ 57 ] The protection concerns regarding the mother that existed at the time of the status review trial in 2008 continue to exist. [ 58 ] There is no other plan before the court.

At times during the mother’s submissions she appeared to agree that at the present time, she has no home and therefore the child could not be placed in her care but then she would revert to speaking about the fact that she was the child’s primary parent and always took good care of him.

She did submit that even if she did not have a home that should not preclude her having expanded access. [ 59 ] However, for most of the time the motion was argued, the mother constantly interrupted counsel for the society, turned her chair around so as to not face the court and could not coherently address the issues before the court. Generally in both her interruptions and in her submissions, the mother rambled and was unfocussed.

She spoke of those out to get her, conspiracies to prevent her obtaining employment and that unknown people and agencies have interfered with her ability to obtain housing and interfered with her relationship with her son. She spoke about “someone using her identity” and “someone looking into it”. She spoke about the society being held accountable for her lack of relationship with her son and she kept referring to her son being “contaminated”. The mother stated that the entire process since her son was apprehended has been “tainted” and that the society is aware of the situation and has exploited it.

She placed blame for her lack of access on the society and other unknown parties. [ 60 ] It is clear from the mother’s affidavit and submissions that she has serious mental health problems. As long as she continues to refuse to acknowledge those problems and refuses to obtain appropriate treatment, she will not be able to have any expanded access to her son. The issue of the child returning to live with her is not within the realm of possibilities in view of his strong views and her obvious inability to meet his current or long term needs.

[ 61 ] I agree with the society’s submission that as the child has become older he has been able to recognize his mother’s mental health issues and that he has become uncomfortable in her presence and is afraid of what may happen if she has an outburst.

Based on the mother’s presentation during this motion his discomfort and concerns are easy to understand. [ 62 ] There is no question that the mother loves her son but there is not an iota of evidence that she is capable of caring for him or that access should be expanded. [ 63 ] The mother could not identify any genuine issue for trial. [ 64 ] The same concerns about the mother’s mental health and her inability to care for her son that were identified by Justice Wolder in his judgment of June 5, 2008 continue today.

In fact considering that these concerns have now existed since about 2000 without any improvement they are even more concerning now. [ 65 ] The society has met its onus of proving that is no genuine issue for trial. It is abundantly clear that there is no other realistic outcome other than that sought by the society. Based on the evidence before me, there is no further need for supervision of the father or involvement of the society. [ 66 ] I agree with counsel for the child that access should be specified as the society will no longer be supervising the mother’s access.

Based on the evidence before me and on my own initiative I feel that there should also be an order to prevent the mother attending at the home and school of the child.

Section 58 of the Child and Family Services Act permits the court to not only make access orders but also to impose such terms and conditions that the court deems appropriate. As the society will no longer be involved I feel that there should be some parameters in place to govern the interactions between the mother and the father and the child. [ 67 ] Accordingly, the

summary judgment motion by the society is granted as follows: 1. The child, I.C.P.Q., born […], 2002, shall be placed in the custody of the respondent, W.J.Q., pursuant to

section 57.1 of the Child and Family Services Act. 2. Pursuant to

section 58 of the Child and Family Services Act, access between the child and the respondent, K.C.L. shall be at the discretion of the respondent, W.J.Q. taking into account the child’s views and preferences. At present such access shall occur at a supervised access facility at a minimum of once every two months. 3. Both respondents shall co-operate in arranging such supervised access at a facility in the jurisdiction where the child resides. 4.

The respondent K.C.L. shall not attend at the home of the child and the respondent W.J.Q., at the child’s school or at any of the child’s extracurricular activities except with the respondent W.J.Q.’s prior written consent. 5. The respondent K.C.L. shall not contact the child directly or indirectly but this does not prevent the child from contacting the respondent K.C.L. if he chooses to do so. Released: April 3, 2014 Signed: “Justice Roselyn Zisman”