Meadus v. Meadus, 2014 NLCA 17

Date: 201403 31 Docket: 12/99 Citation: Meadus v. Meadus , 2014 NLCA 17 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR COURT OF APPEAL BETWEEN: CORY R. MEADUS INTENDED APPELLANT AND: SUZANNE M. MEADUS (PEDDLE) INTENDED RESPONDENT AND: Docket: 13/03 BETWEEN: CORY MEADUS APPELLANT AND: SUZANNE MEADUS (PEDDLE) RESPONDENT Coram: Green C.J.N.L., White and Harrington JJ.A. Court Appealed From: Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador Trial Division (F) 201002F0696 Appeal Heard: March 13, 2013 Judgment Rendered: March 31, 2014

Reasons for Judgment by Green C.J.N.L. Concurred in by White and Harrington JJ.A. Counsel for Intended Appellant/Appellant, Cory Meadus: Self-Represented Counsel for Intended Respondent/Respondent, Suzanne Meadus (Peddle): Daniel M. Glover Green C.J.N.L.: [ 1 ] This matter deals with two potential appeals relating to custody and access issues arising from rulings in the Family Division. [ 2 ] The Court ordered that certain preliminary procedural issues relating to the two appeals be heard and dealt with together. [ 3 ] The issues arising relate to whether: (

i) in one case, an extension of time to appeal should be granted; (ii) in both cases, leave to appeal is required and, if so, whether leave should be granted; (iii) the appeal in one of the cases should, in any event, be dismissed or struck out; (iv) security for costs should be ordered with respect to any matter that is properly before the Court; and (

v) the formal order in one of the appeals properly reflects the ruling that was made. [ 4 ] In order to place these issues in context and to understand their significance, it is necessary to review some of the lengthy litigation history of this protracted and acrimonious family dispute. Background [ 5 ] The parties are no strangers to this Court. In 2012, this Court dealt with a consolidated appeal with respect to challenges by Mr.

Meadus to five family-related decisions involving acrimonious disputes with his wife over child support, matrimonial property, child custody and access, contempt and the imposition of emergency protection orders. With one minor exception relating to the form of a contempt order, all of Mr. Meadus’ appeal challenges were dismissed. See 2012 NLCA 59 (the “First Appeal Decision”). An application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was subsequently dismissed: 35303 (June 13, 2013). (

a) The 2012 Butler J. Order [ 6 ] Presently before the Court are two potential appeals. The first is from a procedural order dated August 28, 2012 made by Butler J. of the Family Division, following a case management hearing, (the “ 2012 Butler J. Order”) in which she, amongst other things: (

a) exempted the parties from referral for mediation to the Family Justice Services Division; (

b) ordered Mr. Meadus to file a financial statement in proper form with the court; (

c) ordered Mr. Meadus to file a current statement of earnings from all sources or to provide written explanations for not being able to do so; (

d) struck from the record certain documents, contained in an application to vary custody which had previously been filed by Mr. Meadus, as being irrelevant, unnecessary or an abuse of the court’s process, and defined the scope of the remaining record. [ 7 ] Of particular relevance to the matter currently before the Court is the following additional provision of the Order: 4. [Mr. Meadus’] Application to Vary the parenting order of Justice Butler, dated August 24, 2011 shall not proceed further until Mr. Meadus has filed with the Court and delivered copies of the following to counsel for Mrs. Meadus: (

a) proof that Mr. Meadus has agreed to and been compliant with the treatment plan of Dr. Wiener, or her successor, for at least six months; (

b) a medical report from Dr. Weiner or her successor confirming improvement in Mr. Meadus’ health and her opinion that he has been compliant with her treatment plan for the period referred to above; (

c) proof that Mr. Meadus has participated in psychological testing and a parental capacity assessment by a psychologist of his choice, at his expense, as well as a report from his psychologist supporting unsupervised access;

(

d) proof that the Children’s individual counselors and the family counselor support the return to unsupervised access. (

b) The 2011 Butler J. Order [ 8 ] These conditions were essentially a reiteration of the same conditions that were imposed following a lengthy trial of custody and access issues held by Butler J. between April and June 2011. See Meadus v. Meadus , 2011 NLTD(F) 29 (the “2011 Butler J. Order”). That case involved a claim by Mrs. Meadus for custody of their three children with restrictions on Mr. Meadus’ access. Butler J. awarded custody to Mrs. Meadus with supervised access to Mr. Meadus. [ 9 ] This case was the culmination of an number of events during the previous two years where Mr.

Meadus’ contact with the children became increasingly restricted, from an original co-parenting arrangement with equal time-sharing following separation, to restrictions on any contact imposed by an emergency protection order (EPO) issued by the Provincial Court following Mr.

Meadus’ involuntary committal to hospital under mental health legislation, to an interim access order from the Family Division allowing him limited unsupervised access (later changed to supervised access following another involuntary admission to a hospital) to a second EPO on the same terms as the Family Division interim order. [ 10 ] In making her decision awarding custody to Mrs. Meadus with supervised access to Mr. Meadus, Butler J. relied on, amongst other things, opinions of certain psychiatrists about Mr.

Meadus’ mental health and evidence that he had feelings of being conspired against and harassed, consistent with a delusional disorder. She summarized her findings as follows: [58] I conclude that Mr. Meadus’ mental health problems have caused extended significant distress to Mr. Meadus and his family, led to the breakdown of his marriage and impaired his ability to parent his Children. … In

summary, I have sufficient evidence of serious impairments in functioning in all aspects of Mr. Meadus’ life. … [68] Unfortunately, Mr. Meadus does not currently have the ability to meet the Children’s emotional needs. The evidence confirms that Mr. Meadus has communicated his irrational beliefs about Mrs. Meadus to or in the presence of the Children, which is akin to a form of parental alienation and/or emotional abuse … [69] Further, Mr. Meadus lacks the practical ability to act as a parent.

By denying his diagnosis and refusing to take treatment, he is impaired in his functioning and has exhibited extremely poor judgment … [ 11 ] In light of those findings, including the finding that Mr. Meadus had not made any commitment to treatment, Butler J. concluded that “the facts support the appropriateness of a sole custody order to Mrs. Meadus and for continuation of supervision of any contact that Mr. Meadus may have to his Children” (paragraph 72).

She then went on and made the Order referred to above, precluding him from making any application to vary the custody/access order unless he complied with the four outlined conditions. [ 12 ] It is a fair inference from the reasoning contained in the judge’s thorough judgment that she felt those conditions to be necessary in view of the evidence of Mr. Meadus’ mental health condition, his belief that he did not need treatment, and his penchant for litigation. It would not therefore be in the best interests of the children for them to face continual variation applications until such time as Mr.

Meadus addressed his mental health issues and could provide some indication that his access no longer required supervision. The judge was, in effect, outlining the sorts of things, arising from Mr. Meadus’ circumstances, that would have to be established to meet the threshold requirement for a material change in circumstances before a variation application could be entertained. (

c) The First Appeal Decision [ 13 ] Mr. Meadus appealed the 2011 Butler J. Order to this Court. That appeal was considered as part of the consolidated appeal heard in 2012. The appeal involved a broad challenge to the underlying factual conclusions reached by Butler J. that formed the basis of her decision. Mr. Meadus sought a reversal of the order so that he would have sole custody and access until such time as Mrs. Meadus could demonstrate that her mental condition enabled her to care for the children. [ 14 ] The appeal from Butler J.’s order was dismissed in its entirety.

Barry J.A. of this Court concluded: [63] All of [Butler J.’s] conclusions are supported by the evidence … [64] Mr. Meadus has been unable to point to any error of law or fact which would warrant reversing Butler J.’s decision of June 29, 2011. Mr. Meadus’ own evidence, his argument, and his behaviour before this Court support the conclusion that it is in the best interests of the children that Mrs. Meadus have sole custody with supervised access by Mr. Meadus. (

d) The Appeal of the 2012 Butler J. Order [ 15 ] The 2012 decision of Butler, which reiterated the four conditions which Mr. Meadus had to satisfy before being able to proceed with his application to vary custody and access, was made on August 28, 2012. The decision was not perfected by the filing of a formal order until September 26, 2012. However, Mr. Meadus did not purport to file an application for leave to appeal the order until December 18, 2012. [ 16 ] The application for leave to appeal appeared to take issue with the provisions of the 2012 Butler J.

Order relating to the decision to exempt the parties from the normal requirement to attend Family Justice Services for counseling and mediation and the order excising certain documents from the record of Mr. Meadus’ custody variation application. It also contained allegations of conspiracy, or at least

complicity, between Mrs. Meadus and Child, Youth and Family Services to subvert the normal counseling process and to produce a report that was negative towards him. [ 17 ] The application for leave to appeal did not specifically seek to challenge the four conditions, quoted earlier, which had been imposed in the 2011 Order, and reiterated in the 2012 Order. In any event, the 2011 Order was upheld by this Court on appeal. (

e) The Application Before Fry J. [ 18 ] The second appeal currently before this Court is an appeal from an oral decision of Fry J. of the Family Division, made on December 19, 2012, relating to an application by Mr. Meadus for Christmas access to his children. [ 19 ] In support of his application for unsupervised Christmas access, Mr. Meadus had filed an affidavit in which he asserted that he had complied with the conditions set out in the previous orders of Butler J. He apparently put that forward as a justification for being heard on the access issue. Mrs. Meadus responded with an application to prohibit Mr.

Meadus from filing further applications and for security for costs. An application for a divorce judgment was also before the Court. That judgment of divorce was granted. [ 20 ] Mr. Meadus did not stop with only a request for Christmas access. He essentially requested a reconsideration of the existing general parenting plan that had been established by the previous orders by Butler J. and sought equal joint custody along with compensatory custody for having been deprived (wrongly in his view) of such an equal custody arrangement over the preceding years.

Fry J. determined that these broader custody issues were not properly before the court because Mr. Meadus had not complied with the requirements previously established by Butler J. as pre-conditions for bringing further applications to Court. [ 21 ] Mr. Meadus attempted to argue that Butler J.’s orders were wrong because, among other things, she relied on the Emergency Protection Orders previously granted by the Provincial Court which, Mr. Meadus asserted, had been fraudulently obtained. Noting that the 2011 Butler J. Order had been appealed by Mr. Meadus and upheld by this Court and that the 2012 Butler J.

Order was still under appeal, Fry J. considered herself bound by those orders unless they were reversed. That meant that the conditions that Mr. Meadus had to satisfy before seeking variation of the existing parenting plan continued to apply. It further meant that Christmas access had to be supervised. [ 22 ] At the end of a very protracted hearing, Fry J. made an order granting Christmas access along the lines requested by Mr. Meadus but on a supervised basis. [ 23 ] With respect to Mrs. Meadus’ application to prohibit Mr.

Meadus from filing further applications without leave of the Court, Fry J., in an oral decision, acceded to this request in the following terms: I am prepared … to deal with the application not quite the way that you’ve asked but I will deal with that application because, as I have said, there has not yet been full compliance with Justice Butler’s order. So rather than say Mr.

Meadus is prohibited from filing any applications, there have been some difficulties in some court cases when there is a blanket prohibition on filing, the order I am prepared to make is, there shall be no further applications with respect to parenting without leave of a judge of the Court. That means that you cannot make an application to vary the order until the conditions are met or and without leave of a judge of this Court . … The easiest thing for you to do, Mr. Meadus, is to fully comply.

And I know you potentially disagree but full compliance with those four conditions gets you back into the door. (Transcript, p. 53.) (Underlining and italics added.) [ 24 ] It appears from this passage that Fry J. was enunciating two methods whereby Mr. Meadus would be able to make a further application to the court: (

i) by compliance with the four conditions previously outlined in Butler J.’s orders; or (ii) with leave of the court. Those scenarios contemplate that leave of the Court could be obtained even if the four conditions had not been satisfied. [ 25 ] The formal order that was subsequently filed, however, was expressed in a slightly different manner. It reads in pertinent part: 5. Mr. Meadus is precluded from making further Applications with respect to parenting without leave of a Judge … 6. The following conditions set by Justice Butler in her order dated August 28 th , 2012 (filed September 26 th ) still apply.

The Applicant’s Application to Vary the parenting order of Justice Butler, dated August 24 th , 2011, shall not proceed further until Mr. Meadus has filed with the Court and delivered copies of the following to counsel for Mrs. Meadus: [there then follow the four conditions in identical terms to those outlined in paragraph 4 of the 2012 Butler J. order set out previously in these reasons]. I will return to this difference later in these reasons. (

f) The Appeal of the Fry J. Order [ 26 ] Mr. Meadus attacks Fry J.’s Order using a broad brush. In essence, he claims: 1. With respect to the current custody/access arrangements: An “explanation” as to why he cannot have equal unsupervised custody of his children; 2. With respect to the order restricting him from filing further applications in the Court: (

i) An “explanation” as to why he is precluded from filing such further applications;

(ii) A declaration that, contrary to the ruling of Fry J., he has complied with the four conditions outlined in the orders of Butler J. and Fry J. and that there is now no impediment to his making a further application for custody and access; 3. With respect to the emergency protection orders granted by the Provincial Court: (

i) An order overturning them; (ii) Correction of an alleged error in the First Appeal Decision regarding the Court’s misunderstanding of a connection between the two EPOs that had been granted; (iii) A declaration that the legislation authorizing the making of EPOs is flawed because it is biased in favour of women; (iv) A recognition that inadequately-proven EPOs lead to acceptance and application or at least influence in subsequent proceedings in the Family Division and that that had happened in this case; (

v) An order setting aside certain criminal convictions flowing from charges that he failed to comply with the EPOs; 4. An order that Mrs. Meadus undergo psychiatric testing; 5. An order that a parenting capacity assessment be undertaken at the expense of the Court. (

g) Position of Mrs. Meadus [ 27 ] Counsel for Mrs. Meadus submits that the appeal against the 2012 Butler J. order ought not to be allowed to proceed because the application for leave to appeal was filed out of time and there are no grounds for extending the time for filing. In any event, he says, both the 2012 Butler J. order and the Fry J. order were interlocutory orders requiring leave and that leave ought not be granted. Even if leave were granted, however, he submits that the appeals are without merit and therefore should either be dismissed or struck out as being frivolous and vexatious.

He also seeks security for costs with respect to any matter that remains properly before the Court. Considerations (

a) Extension of Time to Appeal the 2012 Butler J. Order [ 28 ] The Court may extend time for filing a notice of application for leave to appeal where “refusal to do so would create an injustice”: Rules of the Supreme Court, 1986 , rule 57.05. The factors normally considered by the Court in determining whether it would be unjust not to grant an extension include: (

i) whether the appellant had a bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period; (ii) where the appellant has a reasonable excuse for failure to comply with the rules; (iii) the potential merits of the appeal; and (iv) whether there are any special or exceptional circumstances justifying or working against an extension: Director of Child, Youth and Family Services v. L.T. et al , 2011 NLCA 1 , 304 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 134 (Nfld. and Lab.) at para. 5 . [ 29 ] In this case, each of these factors favours denial of an extension. There is nothing to suggest that Mr.

Meadus had an intention to appeal within the original appeal period, nor did Mr. Meadus provide a reasonable excuse for not complying with the rules. [ 30 ] In his written material, Mr. Meadus submitted that he could not have filed an earlier notice because he had been incarcerated on a criminal charge during that period. I am not satisfied that incarceration in the local penitentiary in St. John’s in itself is a complete excuse; otherwise, incarceration would be tantamount to an automatic suspension of the time limits under the rules of court. In any event, while it is true that Mr.

Meadus had been convicted on a criminal matter ( R. v. Meadus, 2012 NLPC 0111 A0312), he was not convicted until October 25, 2012 and was released from Her Majesty’s Penitentiary on December 3, 2012. He could not therefore have been disabled by incarceration from filing his leave application between September 26, 2012, when Butler J.’s formal order was filed and October 25, 2012, the day of his conviction. At the oral hearing, he had no explanation as to why he did not act within that period except to say that he was distracted because he had not seen his children and he was seeking legal advice.

It follows that Mr. Meadus has no reasonable excuse for not complying with the rules. [ 31 ] As to the merits of the appeal, if an extension were granted, the decision of Butler J. in a case management meeting on such discretionary matters as exempting the parties from availing of counselling and mediation at Family Justice Services and removing certain documents from the record as being inappropriate, is entitled to a very high degree of deference. Mr. Meadus has pointed to nothing in the record that indicates any misapplication of principle by the case management judge.

It must be concluded therefore that the merits of the expressed grounds of appeal are very weak. [ 32 ] While Mr. Meadus did not, in his application for leave to appeal, specifically seek to challenge the propriety of Justice Butler reiterating, from the 2011 Order, the four conditions that Mr. Meadus had to satisfy before he could bring another application to vary custody or access, it was clear from what he said at the oral hearing that he does not accept the correctness of the Order in that regard, and he submitted that it was wrong. To the extent that Mr.

Meadus’ submissions on this point can be said to amount to a proper ground of appeal, it can be said that there is no merit in those submissions. The conditions were first imposed pursuant to the 2011 Butler J. Order. That order was affirmed by this Court as part of the 2012 consolidated appeal. The conditions were simply carried forward as part of the resulting case management order in 2012. They were not relitigated or revisited at the time of the case management, nor were they intended to be. The decision on this point is res judicata .

The appropriateness of those conditions cannot therefore be challenged on further appeal. To remove them, they must either be satisfied or varied on subsequent application to the Family Division if circumstances

justifying such variation are made out. [ 33 ] Consideration of the merits of the proposed appeal therefore does not favour an extension of time. [ 34 ] Finally, no circumstances militating in favour of granting an extension have been established by Mr. Meadus. In fact, the need to prevent unnecessary re-litigation of issues works in favour of denying an extension in this case. [ 35 ] Accordingly, I would deny an extension of time to file an application for leave to appeal. It is therefore not necessary to consider whether leave to appeal should be granted or to decide whether the appeal from the 2012 Butler J. order should be dismissed or struck out. (

b) Leave to Appeal the Fry J. Order [ 36 ] The hearing before Fry J. was to consider what specific arrangements for Christmas access were appropriate (as well as the granting of a divorce decree). Mrs. Meadus also sought on order prohibiting Mr. Meadus from filing further applications and for security for costs. Mr. Meadus is not appealing the timing of the Christmas access provisions nor the divorce. Mrs. Meadus’ application for security for costs was not granted and was not appealed. [ 37 ] Mr. Meadus’ appeal therefore effectively focuses on: (

i) the decision of Fry J. not to revisit the general custody/access arrangements and, in particular, not to grant unsupervised access; (ii) her finding that Mr. Meadus had not complied with all of the conditions in the 2011 and 2012 Butler J. Orders; (iii) her decision to reaffirm the four conditions in the 2011 and 2012 Butler J. orders; and (iv) her decision, additionally, to restrict further parenting applications “without leave of the court.” [ 38 ] In addition, he makes a number of allegations about the inappropriateness of having been made the subject of emergency protection orders in the Provincial Court.

He also asks for orders that Mrs. Meadus undergo psychiatric testing and that a parenting capacity assessment be undertaken. [ 39 ] I will deal with these latter allegations and requests first. They are all outside the scope of an appeal. The appeal with respect to the emergency protection orders was dealt with as part of the consolidated appeal in 2012. It was dismissed. Their validity cannot now be revisited. That is res judicata . With respect to Mr.

Meadus’ submission that in reaching its decision this Court misunderstood the basis of the Orders, that is effectively a request for reconsideration of the Court’s previous decision. Such a request in this case has not been brought within the principles for reconsideration recently enunciated by this Court in Metal World Inc. v. Pennecon Energy Ltd. , 2014 NLCA 10 . Mr. Meadus’ more general attacks on the EPO legislation on the basis that it is biased in favour of women and that it improperly influences decisions in the Family Division are simply not justiciable in the context of a specific appeal.

Finally, this Court is not a court of original jurisdiction (except insofar as matters are incidental to an appeal) and hence cannot make orders, simply at the request of Mr. Meadus, that Mrs. Meadus undergo psychiatric testing or a parenting capacity assessment paid for by the Court. [ 40 ] That leaves the issues respecting the custody and access provisions and the restrictions on further access to the Court. [ 41 ] With respect to Mr.

Meadus’ submission that he is entitled to “an explanation” as to why he cannot have equal unsupervised access to his children, I will treat that as a submission of error on the part of Fry J. in not concluding that the current regime should be varied to one of equal unsupervised custody. This matter is not one that is within the scope of the present appeal. The application dealt with by Fry J. related to Christmas access only.

She specifically and repeatedly said that review of the broader issues of custody and access, and whether it should be unsupervised, were not within the scope of the application with which she was asked to deal. Considering the pleadings and how the matter came before her, it is difficult to see how her decision could have been otherwise. This is not a case of a court arguably declining to exercise jurisdiction in relation to a live issue. The issue was not before her. Accordingly, there is nothing to appeal. [ 42 ] Mr.

Meadus’ submissions respecting the ruling that he had not complied with the conditions in the Butler J. orders, and that he should continue to be restricted in making further parenting applications are in a different category. These challenges relate directly to decisions made by Fry J. and are justiciable from an appellate point of view. [ 43 ] It is necessary, therefore, to address whether these decisions were interlocutory in nature, whether leave to appeal is required and, if so, whether leave ought to be granted. [ 44 ] Leave is required to appeal from an “interlocutory order”: Rule 57.02(1)(a).

The contrast is with a final order. The distinction depends on the nature and effect of the disposition, not whether the order was made as a step in a larger proceeding that is termed “interlocutory”. A final order is one that brings the proceedings at first instance to an end regardless of whether the order actually disposes of the rights between the parties. On the other hand, the disposition is interlocutory if the disposition’s effect is such that the real matter in dispute between the parties remains to be determined in the very proceeding from which it issued: Kent v.

Kent , 2010 NLCA 53 , 301 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 152, at para. 23 . The effect of the order is the key. As Carroll demonstrates, sometimes it is not easy to make the determination as to whether an order is interlocutory or not.

In that case, a determination that affected the degree of production of personal documents that a third party witness was required to provide to the court was regarded as a final order viewed from the perspective of the third party even though it did not finally determine the issues in dispute between the parties , because the order, unless appealed, finally determined the scope of the third party’s privacy rights.

It was regarded as final as far as the third party was concerned, enabling her to appeal the determination as of right. [ 45 ] In the current case, it could be said that the determinations that he had not complied with the conditions in the Butler J. orders and that he should be restricted in seeking variation of the existing parenting arrangement are final with respect to Mr. Meadus’ continued access to the court, unless appealed. On the other hand, they do not decide the ultimate issues between the parties but merely direct how the continued battle respecting custody and access is to be waged.

In that sense, they are interlocutory. In the circumstances, I

would be prepared to grant leave to appeal, even if the orders are properly characterized as interlocutory, because, as will becomeapparent later on, there is a legitimate issue respecting the scope of restricting Mr. Meadus’ further access that should be addressed. (

c) Should the Appeal Nevertheless Be Struck Out or Dismissed Because It Is Without Merit? [46] Counsel for Mrs. Meadus submits that even though Mr. Meadus may be able to appeal the Fry J. order as a matter of right, theappeal should be struck out or dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, vexatious, without merit and an abuse of process. [47] I agree with this submission in part. There is no basis for Mr. Meadus to assert that Fry J. erred in concluding that he had notcomplied with Butler J.’s four conditions.

There is nothing in the appeal record that could be said to amount to evidence that Mr.Meadus had provided the required proof that he had been compliant with Dr. Wiener’s treatment plan and that of her successor, or proofthat he had participated in psychological testing. Further, there was no evidence that the children’s individual counsellors and the familycounsellor supported the return of unsupervised access. As well, Mr. Meadus has not submitted a medical report from Dr. Wienerconfirming improvement in his health. Mr.

Meadus was specifically asked by the appeal panel, in advance of the hearing, to bring to thehearing copies of specific letters, opinions or other documents that he says show compliance with the conditions or otherwise identifysuch material in the record. He did not do so. [48] The most that Mr. Meadus was able to do was point to some documents that were not of the type referred to in the conditionsbut from which he said the Court could draw the inference that the conditions were nevertheless satisfied by other means. Fry J. was notprepared to accept such material as proof and neither am I.

On their face, they are simply non-compliant. I see no arguable case to thecontrary. If alternative documentation is to be acceptable, the conditions would have to be first amended. This aspect of the appeal istherefore without merit and should be dismissed. (

d) Restrictions on Court Access [49] What remains is the request by Mr. Meadus for an “explanation” as to why he is precluded from filing further applicationsrelating to parenting. As in the case of his request for an “explanation” of why he could not have equal unsupervised custody of hischildren, I will treat this request as an allegation of error on the part of the applications judge. [50] Insofar as Fry J.’s order incorporated the conditions previously imposed by Butler J., there is no merit to this challenge.

Fry J.was once again carrying forward the conditions as still being applicable because she had concluded that they had not been satisfied. Asnoted earlier, the imposition of the conditions themselves was affirmed in the First Appeal Decision and the scope of Mr. Meadus’application did not extend to seeking a variation or elimination of the conditions.

Fry J. rightly refused to entertain any such suggestion.In those circumstances, a continuation of the condition-compliance requirements was inevitable. [51] Fry J. went further and additionally imposed a requirement that “there shall be no further applications with respect to parentingwithout leave of a judge of the Court.” Fry J. did not, however declare Mr. Meadus to be a vexatious litigant (although I note that Mr.Meadus, in separate proceedings, has subsequently been held to be a vexatious litigant with respect to variation applications involvingparenting arrangements: Meadus v.

Meadus, 2013 NLTD(F) 37, 343 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 140 at para. 50). Fry J. could not therefore barMr. Meadus from accessing the court without leave on such a basis. Absent such a finding, a stand-alone restriction on access unlessleave is obtained would not be justifiable. [52] The formal order perfecting Fry J.’s ruling nevertheless purports to impose this restriction as a requirement separate from therequirement for compliance with the Butler J. conditions.

It is not necessary, however, to strike this provision from the order. [53] On a careful reading of the transcript of Fry J.’s oral ruling, it appears that she regarded the leave restriction and the condition-compliance restriction as interconnected.

After expressing the leave requirement, she stated: That means that you cannot make an application to vary the order until the conditions are met or and without leave of a judge of thiscourt. [54] This passage can thus be read, not as imposing two separate hurdles to be cleared before further access can be had, but asallowing access either by compliance with the four conditions or by obtaining leave even if the four conditions have not been completelysatisfied. On this

interpretation, any difficulty, by passage of time, in being able to comply with the four conditions could beaccommodated by allowing the Court to modify the conditions to take account of subsequent circumstances and still allow access wherefairness demanded it. [55] Such a requirement of leave can then be justified without a finding that Mr. Meadus was a vexatious litigant because it providesa more flexible means whereby Mr. Meadus could satisfy the spirit of the four Butler conditions. It will be recalled that Mr.

Meadus wassubmitting to Fry J. that other material that he had obtained effectively meant that compliance in spirit, if not in the letter, had occurred.While Fry J. rightly rejected this other material as not amounting to compliance, there could well be other circumstances wherecompliance in substance could be established.

A provision allowing access through a general leave requirement could accommodate this. [56] This Court has the power to modify or amend a formal order of the court appealed from to ensure that the wording of the orderproperly reflects the reasons for judgment and the findings giving rise to it: Wareham v. Steele (1985), (NL CA), 55Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 59 (NFCA); and rule 57.23(1)(

b) of the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1986. This is so even though the judge below hasapproved the form of the order by initialing it in accordance with rule 49.04. [57] The requirement for leave can thus be saved by amending the order of Fry J. to comply with my analysis, expressed above, ofwhat the applications judge was attempting to accomplish in her oral judgment. [58] In all other respects, there is no basis for the appeal. With the exception of the modification of the formal order as previouslyindicated, I would dismiss the appeal of Fry J.’s Order as having no merit.

Conclusion and Disposition [ 59 ] I would deny the application for an extension of time to file an application for leave to appeal Butler J.’s order made on August 28, 2012 and perfected by formal order dated September 26, 2012. [ 60 ] I would further dismiss the appeal from the Order of Fry J., made on December 19, 2012, and filed on December 20, 2012, but I would amend the formal Order by deleting from paragraph 5 the words: “Mr.

Meadus is precluded from making any further applications with respect to parenting without leave of a Judge of this Honourable Court” and adding at the end of paragraph 6 the words: “OR until Mr. Meadus has obtained leave of a Judge of the Court.” [ 61 ] I would order Mr. Meadus to pay costs in this Court on a party and party basis. Costs were not awarded in the Family Division and no submissions were made in this Court to change that disposition. I would therefore not make any contrary order regarding costs in the Family Division. _____________________________ J.D. Green C.J.N.L.

I Concur: ______________________ C.W. White J.A. I Concur: ______________________ M.F. Harrington J.A.