TANYA TUCK APPELLANT AND: SUPREME HOLDINGS LTD. FIRST RESPONDENT AND: DANIEL LAKE SECOND RESPONDENT AND: MARLENE LAKE THIRD RESPONDENT AND: CANDICE LAKE FOURTH RESPONDENT, 2016 NLCA 40

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR COURT OF APPEAL Citation : Tuck v. Supreme Holdings , 2016 NLCA 40 Date : August 4, 2016 Docket : 14/96 BETWEEN: TANYA TUCK APPELLANT AND: SUPREME HOLDINGS LTD. FIRST RESPONDENT AND: DANIEL LAKE SECOND RESPONDENT AND: MARLENE LAKE THIRD RESPONDENT AND: CANDICE LAKE FOURTH RESPONDENT Coram: Welsh, White and Hoegg JJ.A. Court Appealed From: Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador Trial Division (G) 201201G1143 (2014 NLTD(G) 131) Appeal Heard: February 8, 2016 Judgment Rendered: August 4, 2016

Reasons for Judgment by: Hoegg J.A. Concurred in by: Welsh and White JJ.A. Counsel for the Appellant: Daniel Simmons Q.C. and Rebecca Marshall Counsel for the Second, Third and Fourth Respondents: Veronica Dillon Counsel for the First Respondent: No Appearance Hoegg J.A.: INTRODUCTION [ 1 ] This appeal concerns the meaning of section 16(1) (

b) of the Limitations Act , SNL 1995, c. L-16.1 and whether that

section time-bars the Plaintiff, Tanya Tuck, from proceeding with her action against the Respondents. BACKGROUND [ 2 ] On December 28, 2009 Ms. Tuck was involved in a motor vehicle accident. The following month she retained a lawyer to represent her in a claim for resulting damages, and on February 28, 2012, two years and two months after the accident, her statement of claim was issued. [ 3 ] The Respondents refused to entertain Ms. Tuck’s claim on the basis that it was issued outside of the applicable limitation period. Ms. Tuck maintained that her claim was not time-barred, arguing that the Respondents had confirmed her cause of action under section 16(1)(

b) of the Act which had the effect of resetting the limitation period such that her statement of claim was filed within time. There was an impasse, and Ms. Tuck applied to the Supreme Court under Rule 38 for a decision that her action was not time-barred. [ 4 ] Evidence supporting Ms. Tuck’s application was scant; the lawyer’s paper file was lost in a fire and the insurer’s file could not be found.

Nevertheless, the lawyer’s firm’s electronic back-up system contained some information which forms the evidentiary record: 1) The lawyer advised the Respondents’ insurer, in correspondence sent in January 2010 and marked “without prejudice”, that he had been retained to represent Ms. Tuck and that she was revoking any prior consent she had given to the insurer to obtain medical information; 2) The lawyer wrote to a named representative of the insurer on April 9, 2010, again on correspondence marked “without prejudice”, advising that he was in possession of a doctor’s report concerning Ms.

Tuck which he would be pleased to forward upon receipt of the doctor’s fee plus H.S.T.; 3) The Respondents’ insurer subsequently forwarded a cheque in payment for the report which was receipted by the law firm on May 21, 2010; and 4) The lawyer forwarded the medical report to the insurer on that date or shortly thereafter. There is no evidence of correspondence from the insurer covering the cheque sent by the insurer to the lawyer in May 2010, and no other evidence of communication between the lawyer and the insurer. The Applications Judge’s Decision [ 5 ] The Judge ruled that Ms.

Tuck’s application was appropriate for a Rule 38 determination. He also ruled that the evidence did not support the Respondents’ position that settlement privilege applied to the correspondence between the lawyer and the insurer. However, the Judge went on to rule that Ms. Tuck’s cause of action had not been confirmed by the Respondents because the Respondents had not admitted liability, which he reasoned was required for confirmation under section 16(1)(b), and also because the insurer’s reimbursement payment for the medical report was for the purpose of investigating Ms.

Tuck’s claim and not for the purpose of indemnifying her for damages caused by the collision and therefore was not a payment in respect of Ms. Tuck’s cause of action as required. Consequently, the limitation period respecting Ms. Tuck’s claim was not reset, and her claim, having been issued more than two years after the date of the accident, was time-barred.

The Appeal [ 6 ] No challenge on appeal is made to the Judge’s rulings respecting the appropriateness of the matter for determination under Rule 38 or the applicability of settlement privilege to the communications between the lawyer and the insurer. [ 7 ] Ms. Tuck appeals the Judge’s decision that section 16(1)(

b) of the Act does not operate to confirm her cause of action. She argues that the Judge erred in his

interpretation of the

section and that he applied the wrong law to the facts of her case, causing him to reach the wrong result. She maintains that payment for the medical report constitutes an admission of liability within the meaning of section 16(1)(

b) and also that it is a payment in respect of her cause of action. These conclusions, in her submission, would establish

confirmation and reset the applicable two-year limitation period to run from May 21, 2010, when the Respondents’ insurer paid for her doctor’s medical report, thereby putting her claim within time. [ 8 ] The Respondents maintain that the Judge correctly found Ms. Tuck’s claim to be time-barred by

section 5(

a) of the Act. They argue that section 16(1)(

b) requires an admission of liability which the Judge correctly found was not established on the facts, and also that the Judge was correct in ruling that the payment for the medical report was not a payment in respect of Ms. Tuck’s cause of action because it was reimbursement of a cost related to the investigation of Ms. Tuck’s claim and not indemnification for her damages arising from her cause of action. ISSUES [ 9 ] The central issue on appeal is whether the Judge erred in concluding that the insurer’s payment for the medical report did not confirm Ms.

Tuck’s cause of action so as to reset the limitation period. Resolution of this issue requires deciding whether the Judge correctly interpreted section 16(1)(

b) of the Act and whether he applied the correct

interpretation to the facts. Two questions of

interpretation arise with respect to whether confirmation obtains under section 16(1)(b): 1) Does section 16(1)(

b) require an admission of liability in order to constitute confirmation? and 2) Was the Respondents’ payment for the medical report respecting Ms. Tuck’s injuries “a payment in respect of [her] cause of action” within the meaning of section 16(1)(b)? STANDARD OF REVIEW [ 10 ] The standard of review applied by an appellate court depends on the issues being reviewed. Pure questions of law are reviewed on a standard of correctness, and findings of fact are reviewed on a standard of palpable and overriding error.

Questions of mixed fact and law, which can arise in the application of a statutory provision to a set of facts, are reviewed on the standard of palpable and overriding error unless the decision is based on an extricable error in principle, in which case the review standard is one of correctness. ( Housen v. Nikolaisen , 2003 SCC 33 , [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235, para. 33 ). Matters of statutory

interpretation are questions of law for which the standard of review is correctness ( Canadian National Railway Co. v. Canada (Attorney General ), 2014 SCC 40 , [2014] 2 S.C.R. 135, para. 33 and Newfoundland (Minister of Forest Resources and Agrifoods) v. A.L. Stuckless and Sons Ltd., 2005 NLCA 11 ). ANALYSIS The Law [ 11 ]

Interpretation of a statutory provision involves more than a reading of its words. The particular provision must be considered in the context of the whole statute in which it appears and the purpose of the statute.

Section 16 of the

Interpretation Act , RSNL 1990, c. I- 19 provides guidance in

interpretation, and established rules and maxims of

interpretation may also assist. The consequences of a proposed

interpretation are also a relevant consideration ( Stuckless and Archean Resources Ltd. v. Newfoundland (Minister of Finance ), 2002 NFCA 43, 215 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 124 ). [ 12 ] This modern approach is well described by Green J.A. (as he then was) in Archean, paras. 15 and 22-23: … Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of

an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, and the intention of Parliament. … s. [of the

Interpretation Act ] 16 directs the court to consider every provision “remedial” and to interpret it so that it “best” ensures the attainment of its “objects” according to its “true” meaning.

This requires a consideration, as an integral part of the interpretive exercise, of the problem or “mischief” to which the legislature directed its legislative act as a remedy and then the drawing of an inference, based on the language of the whole enactment and the court’s general knowledge of the state of the pre-existing law and any information as to the broad social context in which the legislative act occurred, as to what, broadly speaking, the object or objects of the legislative act must have been. The end result is to arrive at a “true” meaning.

That inevitably requires an examination of more than the bare words of the legislative enactment that is in issue, no matter how clear or unambiguous they may at first blush appear. The surrounding text, the interrelation of other related statutes, the social and legislative context in which the provision was enacted, and other extrinsic aids are all sources to be consulted in this exercise. … In truth therefore, s. 16 enunciates a principle of harmonization in which the courts are directed, in cases of dispute, to adopt and apply an

interpretation that fairly reconciles the language used in the enactment with the broader objects of the legislation so as to achieve the general goal, or to rectify the mischief, to which the legislative act appears to have been directed. … [ 13 ]

Section 16 of the Act sets out two ways by which confirmation of a cause of action can occur: 16.

(1) A confirmation of a cause of action occurs where a person (

a) acknowledges that cause of action, right or title of another person; or (

b) makes a payment in respect of that cause of action, right or title of another. [ 14 ]

Section 5 of the Act sets out the limitation period relevant to the cause of action in this appeal: 5. Following the expiration of 2 years after the date on which the right to do so arose, a person shall not bring an action (

a) for damages in respect of injury to a person or property, including economic loss arising from the injury whether based on

contract, tort or statutory duty; [15]

Section 16 of the

Interpretation Act reads: 16. Every Act and every regulation and every provision of

an Act or regulation shall be considered remedial and shall receive theliberal construction and

interpretation that best ensures the attainment of the objects of the Act, regulation, or provision according to itstrue meaning. The Legislation [16] The Act contains no

preamble or statement of purpose to assist in determining the legislature’s intention in enacting it. However, it is apparent that its purpose is to define periods within which people must seek to enforce their legal claims. In M.(K.) v.M(H.), (SCC), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 6 at page 28, the Supreme Court stated the rationales for limitation periods to becertainty, evidentiary, and diligence.

In Graeme Mew, The Law of Limitations (Markham: Butterworths Canada, 1990), four categoriesof reasons for limitation periods are listed: 1) peace and repose; 2) evidentiary concerns, 3) economic considerations; and 4) judgmentalreasons (pp. 7-8).

Suffice it to say that the reasons and rationales referenced above are all directed to the timely resolution of claims,disputes, and other grievances on the basis of reliable evidence in the context of the legal and social culture giving rise to them, so thatpotential plaintiffs and defendants can obtain closure, resume their normal affairs, and move on with their lives. [17] That said, this province’s legislature has acknowledged that in some cases, circumstances exist which relax the rigid applicationof a particular limitation period. Accordingly, several provisions of the Act address such circumstances.

One of those sections, section16, provides for the resetting of the commencement date of an applicable limitation period when confirmation of a cause of actionoccurs. Confirmation under

section 16 of the Act [18] Confirmation is a concept known to limitations statutes in the provinces of Newfoundland and Labrador and British Columbia. It relates to when limitation periods begin to run. When confirmation is established, the applicable limitation period is reset to begin torun from the date of confirmation. (Graeme Mew, Debra Ralph and Daniel Zacks, The Law of Limitations, 3d ed. (Markham, ON:LexisNexis, 2016)). [19]

Section 16 of the Act sets out two ways by which confirmation of a cause of action can occur. Section 16(1)(

a) provides that ifa person, presumably a potential defendant, acknowledges that another person, presumably a potential plaintiff, has a cause of action,confirmation occurs and the limitation period is reset from the date of the acknowledgement. [20] Section 16(1)(

b) provides that confirmation occurs if a person, presumably a potential defendant, makes a payment in respect ofa cause of action that another, presumably a potential plaintiff, has. [21] By way of background, it is well established in the common law that acknowledgement and part payment are two ways whichaffect the commencement of a limitation period. (The Law of Limitations, supra and J.S. Williams, Limitation of Actions in Canada, 2nded., (Toronto, ON: Butterworths, 1980), pp. 215-219.)

Section 16 of the Act has codified these common law principles. Does section 16(1)(

b) require an admission of liability in order to constitute confirmation? [22] Acknowledgement in section 16(1)(

a) has been held to require a written admission of liability (Ryan v. Moore, 2005 SCC 38,[2005] 2 S.C.R. 253). Both of the parties in this case seem to accept that section 16(1)(

b) also requires an admission of liability. However, Ms. Tuck argues that the Respondents’ payment for the medical report documenting her injuries is, by inference, anadmission of liability. In other words, the act of making the payment constitutes an admission of liability. The Respondents argue thattheir payment for the medical report is not an admission of liability. They say that their payment for the cost of the medical report ismerely reimbursement to Ms. Tuck’s lawyer for a cost relating to the investigation of her claim, from which no inference of liability canbe drawn. [23] In my view, confirmation under section 16(1)(

b) does not require an admission of liability. To the extent that it could be said torequire one, I accept Ms. Tuck’s argument that a payment in respect of her cause of action amounts to an admission of liability for thepurposes of confirmation.

Let me explain. [24] When a potential defendant confirms a cause of action by acknowledgement or part payment, he or she has in effect renouncedthe need to rely on his or her right to the strict application of the limitation period, thereby enabling the potential plaintiff in such asituation to rely on the acknowledgement or part payment for purposes of when the applicable limitation period begins to run. Thisextension of time to file suit enables the parties to resolve their differences without resort to litigation should they desire to do so.

Apotential plaintiff does not have to delay issuing his or her Statement of Claim, but confirmation permits him or her to do so if he or shechooses. In this way, confirmation promotes early settlement, decreases litigation, reduces expenses, and perhaps even enables parties toavoid embarrassment. [25] There are any number of reasons why a potential defendant might make a payment to a potential plaintiff. A payment might bemade to discourage further proceedings or to mitigate damages, or to discharge some moral or social obligation separate from legalliability.

It might serve another purpose, such as public relations. Or a potential defendant might simply want to avoid the risk andexpense of litigation by buying time to gather funds to pay a potential plaintiff’s claim. Making such a payment simply resets thebeginning of the limitation period, giving the parties more time to consider options other than imminent litigation. Whatever themotivation, the point is that while the action of making a payment may be suggestive of liability in certain circumstances, it does notdetermine liability.

It simply resets the running of the clock by deferring the commencement of the limitation period. [26] Ms. Tuck argues that section 16(1)(b), properly interpreted, means that the making of a payment in and of itself is an admissionof liability. She says that the words of the two sections are different and that therefore they have different meanings and applications,

and asserts that while sections 16(1)(

a) and (

b) can overlap, “[t]here are circumstances that would result in a confirmation only under 16(1)(b), which is where a payment made in respect of a cause of action is not accompanied by other evidence of admission”, which make them different. She argues that the Judge erred in reasoning that section 16(1)(

b) requires an admission of liability. [ 27 ] A reading of the two subsections shows that they are indeed different. The words are different. Such a difference in wording implies a difference in meaning. [ 28 ] The word “acknowledgement” in section 16(1)(a), interpreted to require an admission of liability, does not appear in section 16(1)(b). Instead, section 16(1)(

b) contains the words “makes a payment in respect of [that] cause of action”. The two sections are separated by the word “or”. The completely different words in the two sections and use of the word “or” between them demonstrate that

section 16 provides separate bases, independent of each other, on which confirmation can occur. Section 16(1)(

a) involves the conveyance of a position; section 16(1)(

b) involves something different – an action, the doing of which can constitute confirmation. [ 29 ] In considering the difference between the two sections, the well established presumption against tautology in statutory

interpretation assists: It is presumed that the legislature avoids superfluous or meaningless words, that it does not pointlessly repeat itself or speak in vain. Every word in the statute is presumed to make sense and to have a specific role to play in advancing the legislative purpose. (Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes , 6th ed. (Toronto, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2008), Appendix A, Tab 4, page 211.) If section 16(1)(

b) required an admission of liability, then that

section would not be necessary. Section 16(1)(

b) would be superfluous because acknowledgement of liability would have already resulted in confirmation under section 16(1)(a). [ 30 ] The notion that section 16(1)(

b) requires an admission of liability arises, to my mind, from a misinterpretation of Ryan v. Moore . In Ryan v. Moore , an insurer wrote a cheque to a doctor for a medical report about the plaintiff’s injuries. The insurer sent the cheque to the plaintiff’s lawyer, who argued that it was a “part payment” of the plaintiff’s cause of action so as to constitute confirmation and reset the applicable limitation period. The Court explained that it was not, saying: 47 … [B]oth payments mentioned by Ryan, payments for Ryan’s medical chart and Dr.

Landells’ medical report, were not evidence of liability by Cabot Insurance; nor did they indemnify Ryan, at least in part, for damages caused by the accident. Thus, they cannot be payments in respect of the “cause of action”. … The Court held that the payment in Ryan v. Moore did not establish confirmation under either section 16(1)(

a) or section 16(1)(

b) because the payment was not an admission of liability nor a payment in respect of the plaintiff’s cause of action. Bastarache J. explained the latter reason at paragraph 48: The purpose for which these types of payments and correspondence are made is critical. In this case, they were not intended as admissions of liability, but only to promote investigation and early resolution of certain aspects of the claim. [ 31 ] The notion that confirmation under section 16(1)(

b) includes an admission of liability presumes that liability for the cause of action has already been determined to be successful, or that it will inevitably be adjudged to be so. (I note that according to Mews at pp. 216-217 and Williams at pp. 215-219, acknowledgements and part payments did not preclude all defences respecting the determination of ultimate liability.) The notion ignores the reality that evidence is required (as Justice Bastarache referenced in paragraph 47) and defences must be considered before ultimate liability is found in respect of a cause of action. In my view the Supreme Court did not determine that acknowledgement of a cause of action under section 16(1)(

a) means that a potential defendant cannot defend a potential plaintiff’s claim, given that the purpose of confirmation in

section 16 of the Act is to reset the running of the limitation period. In any event, I read Ryan v. Moore as requiring that while there must be an admission of or at least some evidence respecting liability for acknowledgement to be established and confirmation to obtain under section 16(1)(a), payment in respect of the cause of action at issue is all that is required under section 16(1)(b). I see nothing in Ryan v.

Moore which refutes the fact that payment is a separate basis on which confirmation can occur or that an admission of liability or evidence respecting same in addition to a payment is required for confirmation to occur under section 16(1)(b). [ 32 ] I therefore conclude that admission of liability is not an additional hurdle that a plaintiff who seeks to establish confirmation under section 16(1)(

b) must meet. In this result, I am accepting Ms. Tuck’s argument that sections 16(1)(

a) and 16(1)(

b) have different meanings, and that the making of “a payment in respect of that cause of action”, without more, can constitute confirmation so as to reset the applicable limitation period. [ 33 ] In

summary, section 16(1)(

b) permits an applicable limitation period to be reset by the making of a payment “in respect of that cause of action” in issue. If this is done, 16(1)(

b) permits an inference that the person making the payment, presumably a potential defendant, is prepared to defer the commencement of the limitation period within which the person receiving the payment, presumably a potential plaintiff, can file suit. This

interpretation is consistent with the overall scheme of the Act which is about limitation periods and not about legal liability for claims, and is in harmony with the other provisions of the Act, which address circumstances affecting when limitation periods begin to run. Accordingly, to the extent that the judge interpreted section 16(1)(

b) as requiring an admission of liability in addition to a payment in respect of that cause of action, he erred. Was the Respondents’ payment for the medical report respecting Ms. Tuck’s injuries “a payment in respect of her cause of action? [ 34 ] In order for Ms. Tuck’s appeal to succeed it must be determined that by paying for her doctor’s medical report, the Respondents “[made] a payment in respect of [her] cause of action” within the meaning of section 16(1)(b). [ 35 ] On this point, Ms. Tuck urges the Court to interpret the words “payment in respect of a cause of action” in a broad fashion. She

says that the payment for the doctor’s report is a payment in respect of her cause of action because it is connected to her cause of action in the sense that the report would not exist and no payment for it would have been required but for her cause of action. She argues that the words “payment in respect of [her] cause of action” simply mean “payment in connection with her cause of action”, and a connection is all that is required for such a payment to be “in respect of that cause of action”. [ 36 ] Ms.

Tuck emphasizes that the payment for her doctor’s report was the result of the Respondents’ deliberate choice and action. She adds that the payment was not made on a “without prejudice” basis, and asserts that any insurer who wishes to obtain medical information respecting a potential claim without confirming a cause of action can simply submit payment to a plaintiff or his or her counsel on a “without prejudice” basis. I agree with Ms. Tuck that payment for a medical report on a “without prejudice” basis may avoid the payment being taken as confirmation of a cause of action.

However, this does not determine whether payment for a medical report in the context of an accident victim’s claim for damages is “a payment in respect of that cause of action” within the meaning of section 16(1)(b). [ 37 ] In this context, the words “payment connected with that cause of action” convey a different meaning than the words “payment in respect of that cause of action”. The words “in connection with” admit of wider and looser application. Connections can vary in degree, and a loose, tenuous, or tangential connection is still a connection.

By contrast, the words “in respect of that cause of action”, speak to the specifics of the cause of action at issue – in this case Ms. Tuck’s right to claim damages caused by the negligence of the Respondents. [ 38 ] In any event, the point was decided by the Supreme Court in Ryan v. Moore , wherein Justice Bastarache explained that the purpose of a payment for a medical report respecting an injury claim is investigatory. At paragraph 47 he said that “payments for Ryan’s medical chart and Dr. Landells’ medical report did [not] indemnify Ryan , at least in part, for the damages caused by the accident”.

He went on to explain at paragraph 48 that the purpose for which these types of payments are made is to promote investigation and early resolution of certain aspects of a claim. [ 39 ] Ms. Tuck argues that because the Court held in Ryan v. Moore that the

section 16 confirmation provisions of the Limitations Act could not be used to restart the limitations period in the Survival of Actions Act , the comments in Ryan v. Moore about confirmation were obiter and not binding. However, the Court acknowledged its comments to relate to confirmation under

section 16 of the Act and stated them as “a matter of principle”. The Court has therefore given direct guidance respecting the purpose of payment for a medical report in the context of a personal injury action and section 16(1)(b). Moreover, I see no basis on which Ms. Tuck’s case can or ought to be distinguished from the reasoning in Ryan v. Moore .

The Court’s statements are in accordance with the overall scheme of the Act and in harmony with the objective of section 16(1)(b). [ 40 ] As referenced above, acknowledgements and part payments of debts at common law have been held to restart applicable limitation periods. It was well established that such a part payment had to be on account of the debt for which the action was or would be brought in order to gain the benefit of a deferred limitation period ( Tippets v. Heane (1834), 1 Cr. M. & R. 251, 149 E.R. 1074 ).

The relationship between the payment and the debt, or cause of action, was clear; it had to be part payment of the debt. In my view, this requirement underscores the

interpretation that any payment in respect of a cause of action must be a payment in respect of the specific debt or damages arising from the cause of action in issue. Accordingly, payment for a medical report respecting a potential plaintiff’s injuries respecting his or her cause of action is not a payment in respect of that cause of action. [ 41 ] In this case, the Judge said “that payment for the medical report was not a payment in respect of Ms.

Tuck’s cause of action because it did not indemnify her for damages caused by the collision; rather, it was repayment of a cost of pursuing the claim only, just as legal fees are such a cost. Costs are not to be confused with damages”. I agree. The Judge’s reasoning in this regard is squarely within that of Ryan v.

Moore and accords with the purpose of the Act and the objective of section 16(1)(b). [ 42 ] By way of explanation, I would add that insurers, like those of the Respondents in this case, require medical and other information in order to set their reserves and act responsibly in handling claims of and against their insureds. Likewise, plaintiffs like Ms. Tuck and their counsel need medical and other information in order to evaluate and prosecute their claims. The expenses associated with these needs are costs related to the handling of claims, not payments in respect of a cause of action.

The overall purpose of obtaining medical information respecting a claimant or a potential claimant in a personal injury action is investigatory, and absent unusual circumstances, actions taken to investigate claims, without more, should not operate to alter the applicable limitation periods. [ 43 ] The Respondents alternatively argued that payments for lost wages and/or therapy in the context of a personal injury claim could constitute confirmation under section 16(1)(

b) because such payments would be indemnification for damages in respect of the particular cause of action and not costs associated with pursuing or defending a cause of action. Given the above result, it is not necessary to decide this argument. However, I would caution that if and when such payments are made by a potential defendant or his or her insurers, consideration of whether they ought to be made on a “without prejudice basis” would be prudent. [ 44 ] I add only that I also agree with the Judge’s comment that payment for a medical report made directly to the author of the report as opposed to a potential plaintiff’s counsel is a distinction without a difference.

SUMMARY AND DISPOSITION [ 45 ] Confirmation under section 16(1)(

b) occurs when a payment is made “in respect of that cause of action”. No additional evidence of admission of liability is required in order for confirmation to obtain under section 16(1)(b). Payment for a medical report in the context of a personal injury action is not a payment “in respect of that cause of action” within the meaning of section 16(1)(b). [ 46 ] Accordingly, the payment by the Respondents’ insurers to Ms. Tuck’s solicitor for the medical report concerning the injuries she sustained in the accident does not confirm her cause of action so as to reset the limitation period. [ 47 ] I would dismiss Ms. Tuck’s appeal, and grant the Respondents their costs on column 3.

___________________________ L. R. Hoegg J.A. I concur: ___________________________ B. G. Welsh J.A. I concur: ___________________________ C. W. White J.A.