2023 QCCA 719, 2023 QCCA 719

Wang c. Director of Criminal and Penal Prosecutions 2023 QCCA 719 COURT OF APPEAL CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC REGISTRY OF MONTREAL No.: 500-10-700020-223 ( 550-36-000056-224 ) MINUTES OF HEARING DATE: June 2, 2023 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE MARK SCHRAGER, J.A. STEPHEN W. HAMILTON, J.A. MICHEL BEAUPRÉ, J.A.

APPLICANT COUNSEL zhao hui wang Mtre anne-france goldwater M tre AUDREY-ANNE LAFORME ( Goldwater, Dubé ) RESPONDENT COUNSEL director of criminal and penal prosecutions Mtre josiane larose ( Director of Criminal and Penal Prosecutions ) On appeal from a judgment rendered verbally by the Honourable Catherine Mandeville of the Superior Court, District of Gatineau, on March 17 , 2022, and transcribed on April 5, 2022. NATURE OF THE APPEAL: Code of Criminal Procedure – Appeal dismissed by the Superior Court –

Section 47 of the Animal Welfare and Safety Act – Animal disposal order granted – Motion for leave to appeal referred. Clerk at the hearing : Vitélina Saint-Phard Courtroom: Pierre-Basile-Mignault HEARING 9:00 Commencement of the hearing. Continuation of the hearing held on May 30, 2023. The parties were excused from appearing in Court.

Conclusion of the hearing. Vitélina Saint-Phard, Clerk at the hearing JUDGEMENT [ 1 ] The Applicant’s motion for leave to appeal a judgment rendered on March 17, 2022, by the Quebec Superior Court (the Honourable Catherine Mandeville, J.S.C.), [1] which dismissed his appeal against a judgment rendered on December 22, 2021, by the Court of Québec, Criminal and Penal Division (the Honourable Christine Auger, Justice of the Peace) , [2] said judgment having granted the Respondent’s application for permission to dispose of two kittens under s. 47 of the Animal Welfare and Safety Act [3] (the “ AWSA ”),

was referred to the Court. [4] [ 2 ] The Court accepts the common submission of the parties that the ruling of the justice of the peace is akin to a “judgment rendered in first instance” as contemplated at art. 266 (6) of the Code of Penal Procedure [5] (“ CPP ”): 266. Dans le présent chapitre, à moins que le contexte n’indique un sens différent, on entend par «jugement rendu en première instance» : […] 6° l’ordonnance de rétention, de confiscation ou de remise d’une chose saisie ou du produit de sa vente. 266.

In this chapter, unless the context indicates otherwise, “ judgment rendered in first instance” means […] (6) an order directing that a thing seized or the proceeds of the sale thereof be detained, forfeited or returned . [Underlining added] [ 3 ] The Civil Code of Québec (“ CCQ ”), the “foundation of all other laws” according to its preliminary provision, states at art. 898.1 (enacted in 2015) [6] that, although “[a]nimals are not things”, … “[i]n addition to the provisions of special Acts which protect animals, the provisions of this Code and of any other Act concerning property nonetheless apply to animals” (underlining added). [ 4 ] Accordingly, the Superior Cour had jurisdiction to hear the Applicant’s appeal at the first level pursuant to art. 270 CPP .

As for the jurisdiction of this Court to hear the appeal at the second level, it is not barred by the recent judgment in Autorité des marchés financiers c. Baazov , [7] which dealt with a different situation in fact and in law. In that case, as opposed to the present one, the Superior Court had not exercised its jurisdiction as a first-level appellate court but, rather, had heard the parties and decided the matter as a tribunal of first instance. [ 5 ] That being said, the Applicant may appeal to this Court in a penal matter on a question of law only, subject to leave under art. 291 C PP : 291.

L’appelant ou l’intimé en Cour supérieure et, même s’ils n’étaient pas

partie à l’instance, le procureur général ou le directeur des poursuites criminelles et pénales peuvent, s’ils démontrent un intérêt suffisant pour faire décider d’une question de droit seulement , interjeter appel devant la Cour d’appel, avec la permission d’un juge de cette cour , d’un jugement 1° rendu en appel par un juge de la Cour supérieure ; 2° qui accueille ou rejette une demande d’habeas corpus ou de pourvoi en contrôle judiciaire. 291.

The appellant or respondent in Superior Court and, even if they were not parties to the proceedings, the Attorney General and the Director of Criminal and Penal Prosecutions may, if they show sufficient interest in a question of law alone , bring an appeal before the Court of Appeal, with leave of a judge of that court , from a judgment (1) rendered in appeal by a judge of the Superior Court ; (2) granting or dismissing an application for habeas corpus or application for judicial review. [Underlining added] [ 6 ] In Drouin c.

Agence du revenu du Québec , [8] the stringent criteria applicable to a motion for leave to appeal under this

article were thus described: [14] Cela étant dit, et passant maintenant à l’examen des autres questions que propose le requérant, la requête pour permission d’appeler présentée en vertu de l’article 291 C.p.p. vise un deuxième niveau d’appel et, pour cette raison notamment, n’est accordée qu’avec parcimonie . Les critères à satisfaire sont donc exigeants et bien connus.

Ainsi : - l’appel ne peut porter que sur une question de droit « seulement » ; - même si le requérant soulève une telle question, la permission d’appeler sera refusée si l’appel envisagé ne présente pas de chances raisonnables de succès ; - le juge saisi de la requête pour permission d’appeler exerce donc un rôle de filtrage, entre autres afin de s’assurer que les moyens d’appel sont sérieux ;

- le juge doit aussi déterminer l’opportunité même de l’appel envisagé, notamment en analysant si ce dernier serait susceptible de permettre une intervention utile de la Cour ; - même s’il soulève une question de droit , le requérant doit en outre démontrer (

i) qu’il a un intérêt suffisant pour la faire décider, (ii) que cette question est sérieuse et (iii) qu’elle mérite l’attention de la Cour, soit, de façon non limitative, parce que la réponse à lui donner aurait un impact important sur l’administration de la justice ou que l’erreur de droit alléguée est évidente et lui cause une injustice flagrante. [9] [Italics added; references omitted] [ 7 ] In the present case, the Applicant does not satisfy these criteria and, accordingly, his motion for leave to appeal must be dismissed. [ 8 ] First, the Applicant’s arguments in law clash with the highly factual conclusions of the justice of the peace (whose judgment the Superior Court judge aptly qualified as “very detailed”), who found not only that the evidence adduced established that the welfare and safety of the two kittens were unequivocally (“ sans equivoque ”) [10] compromised given the highly unhealthy conditions under which the Applicant held them at the time they were seized by Inspector Umbriaco, but also that the Applicant was not in a position to ensure the welfare and safety of the animals (“ en mesure de s’en assurer ”). [11] Finally, in evaluating the risks of a subsequent offence by the Applicant, the justice of the peace added that the Applicant refused to have the kittens sterilized, [12] that he denied any problem, and minimized his own negligence [13] and that he cooperated rather reluctantly with the animal protection organization that was involved. [14] The Superior Court judge did not interfere with those conclusions.

Indeed, she wrote the following before ordering provisional execution of the justice of the peace’s ruling permitting the Respondent to dispose of the kittens by donation or sale: [15] [26 ] While the Appellant seems to suggest that with conditions, the animals could have been remitted to him, the reasons further found in paragraph 89 of the decision in appeal is to the opposite effect. [27] The judge states that the Appellant’s situation is akin to that of the case in Comeau .

She concludes by repeating the statement found in the Comeau case which is : “ le Tribunal ne peut voir comment il est humainement possible de conclure à la remise de 14 des chiens dans le contexte exposé par la preuve. Prendre une décision inverse est de faire fi de la

loi sur le bien-être et la sécurité de l’animal . ” [28] So the judge most definitely concluded that it would be against the well-being and the security of the animals to consider remitting the cats to the Appellant. [Italics in original; reference omitted] [ 9 ] Given those factual conclusions, it is evident that the justice of the peace would not have ordered the return of the kittens even subject to conditions if that were an available option.

As such, the Applicant’s argument that the Superior Court erred in law rests on no factual foundation, such that the conclusions he seeks on the merits, including that “the cats seized be returned to the Appellant, on such conditions that the Court sees fit”, [16] have no reasonable chance of success. [ 10 ] Moreover, by virtue of the provisional execution of the justice of the peace’s ruling as ordered by the Superior Court, which provisional execution was not stayed by a judge of this Court, [17] the two kittens were adopted by third parties over one year ago. [ 11 ] These considerations relate to the Applicant’s lack of “sufficient interest” and to the other criteria of art. 291 CPP and suffice to justify dismissing the motion for leave to appeal.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT: [ 12 ] DISMISSES the Applicant’s motion for leave to appeal the judgment rendered on March 17, 2022, by the Quebec Superior Court in file no. 550-36-000056-224, with the costs fixed by regulation against the Applicant. MARK SCHRAGER, J.A. STEPHEN W. HAMILTON, J.A. MICHEL BEAUPRÉ, J.A.