KADEN PARISEE APPLICANT - v. -, 2023 SKKB 97

KING’S BENCH FOR SASKATCHEWAN Citation: 2023 SKKB 97 Date: 2023 05 08 Docket: CRM-RG-00085-2022 Judicial Centre: Regina BETWEEN: KADEN PARISEE APPLICANT - and - HIS MAJESTY THE KING RESPONDENT The restriction on publication has been lifted pursuant to the judge’s order of October 20, 2023. RESTRICTION ON PUBLICATION: There is a court order prohibiting the publication or broadcast of any evidence tendered or submissions made in this application, including this decision, until the jury has retired to consider its verdict.

PUBLICATION RESTRICTION: The publication of these reasons is restricted pursuant to ss. 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code such that any information that could identify the complainant or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way. Counsel: Christina G. Skibinsky for the applicant Nathanial Scipioni for the respondent RULING RE: APPLICATION FOR STAY OF PROCEEDINGS MAY 8, 2023 TOCHOR J.

I. INTRODUCTION [1] Kaden Parisee is charged in an indictment alleging he committed offences contrary to s. 272(1)(c.1) and s.279(2) of the Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46 on February 8, 2020. His trial before a judge and jury has been re-scheduled tocommence on June 5, 2023. [2] Mr. Parisee brings an application under s. 11 (

b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, R vJordan, 2016 SCC 27, [2016] 1 SCR 631 [Jordan] and R v Cody, 2017 SCC 31, [2017] 1 SCR 659 [Cody]. He argues the presumptive30-month ceiling is August 12, 2022, and, since his trial is not scheduled to conclude until June 16, 2023, the presumptive ceiling isexceeded. As a result, he submits, he is entitled to a stay of proceedings. [3] The Crown submits a significant portion of the delay is attributable to Mr. Parisee and, after defence delay isdeducted from the total delay, the Jordan ceiling is not exceeded.

It therefore submits the application should be dismissed. [4] For the reasons which follow, I dismiss Mr. Parisee’s application for a stay of proceedings. II. IS THERE UNREASONABLE DELAY?

a) The Legal Framework [5] When considering an application for a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay, it is important to start withthe underlying concerns expressed in Jordan. [6] There, the court lamented the criminal justice system had lost its way (para. 29) and was mired in a culture ofcomplacency about delay (paras. 40-41). This troubled the court because timely trials are constitutionally required (para. 141) and thejudicial system’s failure to deliver them erodes confidence in the administration of justice (paras. 22 and 25).

The court went further andheld this failure presents a threat to the legitimacy of our system: [26] Extended delays undermine public confidence in the system. And public confidence is essential to the survival of the system itself,as “a fair and balanced criminal justice system simply cannot exist without the support of the community” (Askov [(SCC), [1990] 2 SCR 1199], at p. 1221). [7] In response to this threat, Jordan held a change in culture was necessary (paras. 5, 44 and 112) and it thereforeimposed a precise time limit in which trials must occur.

While the court acknowledged the imposition of presumptive ceilings mightcause discomfort in the short term (para. 134), it held this was necessary given the indisputably high stakes (para. 3). [8] An oft-cited

summary of the steps required to consider a delay application is provided in R v Coulter, 2016ONCA 704 at paras 38-41, 340 CCC (3d) 429 [Coulter]: [34] Calculate the total delay, which is the period from the charge to the actual or anticipated end of trial (Jordan, at para. 47). [35] Subtract defence delay from the total delay, which results in the “Net Delay” (Jordan, at para. 66). [36] Compare the Net Delay to the presumptive ceiling (Jordan, at para. 66). [37] If the Net Delay exceeds the presumptive ceiling, it is presumptively unreasonable.

To rebut the presumption, the Crown mustestablish the presence of exceptional circumstances (Jordan, para. 47). If it cannot rebut the presumption, a stay will follow (Jordan,para. 47).

In general, exceptional circumstances fall under two categories: discrete events and particularly complex cases (Jordan,para. 71). [38] Subtract delay caused by discrete events from the Net Delay (leaving the “Remaining Delay”) for the purpose of determiningwhether the presumptive ceiling has been reached (Jordan, para. 75). [39] If the Remaining Delay exceeds the presumptive ceiling, the court must consider whether the case was particularly complex suchthat the time the case has taken is justified and the delay is reasonable (Jordan, at para. 80). [40] If the Remaining Delay falls below the presumptive ceiling, the onus is on the defence to show that the delay is unreasonable(Jordan, para. 48). [41] The new framework, including the presumptive ceiling, applies to cases already in the system when Jordan was released (the“Transitional Cases”) (Jordan, para. 96). [Emphasis in original] [9] The Coulter framework is routinely referred to with approval by our Court of Appeal: R v Boehmer 2019SKCA 74 at paras 29-30, 3 WWR 509 [Boehmer]; R v Lemioer, 2019 SKCA 95 at para 17, 380 CCC (3d) 307 [Lemioer]; R v Spencer2022 SKCA 135 at para 21 [Spencer]; and R v Gardener 2023 SKCA 12 at para 4.

b) Applying the Legal Framework [10] The judgments in Jordan and Cody provide specific direction for considering applications for a stay ofproceedings. [11] After apportioning responsibility for delay, and making appropriate deductions, the trial judge is required toascertain whether the delay exceeds the presumptive ceiling. If the ceiling is exceeded, and the Crown is unable to rebut the

presumption of unreasonableness, a stay must follow: Jordan at para 47 . [ 12 ] The parties agree that the 30-month presumptive ceiling set out in Jordan is 913 days.

c) The Total Delay [ 13 ] Applying the framework summarized in Boehmer , the first step is the determination of the total delay—from the swearing of the Information against Mr. Parisee on February 12, 2020 to the anticipated conclusion of the trial on June 12, 2023. In this case, the parties agree the total delay is 1,217 days. [ 14 ] I note both parties refer to the scheduled end date of the trial as June 16, 2023.

However, that proposed end date of the trial is not accurate. [ 15 ] The trial date was initially scheduled for one week and then, because of the Remembrance Day holiday, it was necessary to consider whether the trial could be completed in four days. When certain issues arose in the week before the commencement of the trial on November 7, 2022, it became apparent that the trial could not be completed within four days.

Therefore, it was agreed the parties would make themselves available for two days the following week. [ 16 ] The fact that two additional days was allotted—and that the subsequent trial date in June 2023 has two weeks set aside—does not mean the trial was intended to run for nine or ten court days. Instead, the trial is expected to last five or six days. An accurate proposed end date for the trial, therefore, is June 12, 2023. [ 17 ] The total delay to the end of trial in this matter is therefore 1,217 days.

d) The Calculation of Defence Delay [ 18 ] The second step requires the subtraction of any defence delay. Jordan points out, at para. 60 , that delay attributable to the defence must be subtracted from the total delay when calculating delay against the presumptive ceiling. i. The Admitted Delay [ 19 ] There are no periods of delay for which the defence admits responsibility. ii. The Contested Delay [ 20 ] Mr.

Parisee filed voluminous materials, including extensive reply materials, and after reviewing the materials filed by both counsel and hearing submissions, I conclude the issue of unreasonable delay may be analysed by considering two periods of contested delay: 1. Setting the Trial Date: April 29, 2022 to November 10, 2022 (195 days); 2. Adjourning the First Trial Date: November 10, 2022 to June 12, 2023 (215 days). [ 21 ] I address each of these time periods separately. 1.

Setting the Trial Date: April 29, 2022 to November 10, 2022; (195 days); [ 22 ] The first period of contested delay regards the time required to set the first trial date. [ 23 ] At the criminal pre-trial conference held on March 11, 2022, the parties agreed five court days were needed for this trial. The first date for trial offered by the court was April 25-29, 2022, and the Crown was available, but Mr. Parisee’s counsel was not. The next date offered by the court was June 13-17, 2022, and the Crown was available, but Mr. Parisee’s counsel was not.

The court next offered November 7-10, 2022, and both counsel were available. Because of the Remembrance Day holiday, only four days were available that week, but both counsel agreed at the pre-trial conference that the jury trial could be completed within that time. The parties therefore agreed to

schedule the trial for November 7-10, 2022. [ 24 ] Mr. Parisee advances three arguments why the defence is not responsible for this portion of the contested delay. First, he argues this period of delay should not be attributed to him when his counsel was unavailable for trial on the first two trial dates offered. Second, he argues the Crown was not ready to proceed until it produced a final witness list to him.

Third, he argues the Crown was not available for trial on the April and June 2022 trial dates because his disclosure requests were not answered by then. [ 25 ] I address each of his arguments with respect to this portion of delay below. Defence Counsel’s Unavailability for Offered Trial Dates [ 26 ] Mr. Parisee’s counsel first argues she was available to conduct the trial before the first offered date of April 25, 2022. She advises she was available for trial in early April 2022, but the court did not have available time to offer her then. This, she argues, means Mr.

Parisee is not responsible for delay which occurred before the scheduled trial date of November 7, 2022. [ 27 ] This argument is quickly and decisively answered by Jordan . There, the court emphasized the defence is responsible for delay if counsel is not available for an offered trial date: [64] As another example, the defence will have directly caused the delay if the court and the Crown are ready to proceed, but the defence is not. The period of delay resulting from that unavailability will be attributed to the defence.

[ 28 ] A long, unbroken, line of cases follows Jordan on this point, including R v Bilachi , 2019 ONSC 5149 at para 22 ; R v Gordon , 2020 SKQB 227 at para 32-35 ; R v Balogh , 2020 BCCA 96 at para 29 ; R v Virk , 2021 BCCA 58 at para 14 , 403 CCC (3d) 492 ; R v Langford , 2022 ONSC 4542 at para 18 . [ 29 ] A helpful explanation of the reasoning behind this ruling in Jordan is found in R v Jeha , 2019 ABQB 44 at paras 40 and 42 [ Jeha ] . There, Labrenz J. endorsed a “nearly bright line rule” that defence unavailability results in defence responsibility for delay.

He stated: [40]… Jordan/ Cody established and meant to establish a nearly bright line rule ascribing any unavailability of defence counsel as defence delay. … [42] To approach the unavailability of defence counsel as anything other than a bright line rule, would have the ironic result of increasing litigation delay, a result that was not endorsed or contemplated by the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in Jordan … [Emphasis in original] [ 30 ] Labrenz J. also said, at paras. 41 and 42, that it would be legally absurd to allow an accused to rely upon his counsel’s unavailability as a basis for an unreasonable delay application: [41] … Jordan does not permit a court to excuse delay due to the unavailability of defence counsel when there is evidence the Crown and the Court are otherwise prepared to proceed. [42] …A legal absurdity would arise if Jordan was viewed as endorsing an approach that would see the presumptive ceilings exceeded for those accused who could find legal counsel with limited or no availability in their litigation calendars, while at the same time permitting a successful s.11(

b) Charter application based upon the unavailability of counsel of choice… [Emphasis in original] [ 31 ] To borrow the language used in Jeha , it is legally absurd for Mr. Parisee to argue he is not responsible for the delay which occurred because his counsel was not available. As pointed out in Jeha , if this were so, an accused could engineer a stay of a criminal charge simply by retaining a lawyer who was not available within the Jordan timeline. As well, to go one step further, wrongly motivated lawyers would be able to orchestrate a stay of proceedings simply by declaring they are unavailable.

It cannot be argued Jordan intended such a result. [ 32 ] For these reasons, the first part of Mr. Parisee’s argument with respect to this part of the delay fails. Delivery of “Final” Witness List to Mr. Parisee [ 33 ] In the second part of his argument on this part of the delay, Mr. Parisee argues the Crown is responsible for all delay up to the date its “final” witness was provided to his counsel, on November 1, 2022. He submits the Crown did not disclose the “actual” finalized witness list until September 29, 2022, and therefore, it was not available for trial on the offered dates in April and June 2022.

He argues his case “is a demonstration where the Crown was never prepared to proceed at the time it insisted on a date being assigned” [Applicant’s Brief at para 19]. [ 34 ] Again, this part of Mr. Parisee’s argument can be quickly answered. [ 35 ] It is important that Mr. Parisee’s argument here focuses on the list , not on the identification of a potential witness or on the disclosure from a witness. He does not argue he was unaware of a witness proposed by the Crown on the witness list and, significantly, he does not raise issue with what the proposed witnesses would testify to.

Instead, he argues that until the “final” witness is provided to him, the Crown cannot truthfully claim to be ready for trial. [ 36 ] I have no hesitation in rejecting this part of his argument. His submission is a mischaracterization of the requirement for the Crown to provide a witness list. He erroneously elevates this requirement into a pre-requisite for setting a trial date. It is not. [ 37 ] It is true the Crown changed the witness list before the trial but Mr. Parisee received disclosure of the witnesses well in advance of any changes.

The requirement for a witness list was never intended to become a formal pre-requisite to the setting of a trial date. [ 38 ] For these reasons, the second part of Mr. Parisee’s argument with respect to this part of the delay fails. Delay in obtaining DNA Disclosure [ 39 ] Third, Mr. Parisee argues the Crown was not truly available for trial during the time period between April and November 2022 because the DNA disclosure was not complete. Mr.

Parisee submits the Crown was not ready to proceed to trial until September 2022 when the DNA warrant, and the accompanying Information to Obtain the Warrant [ITO], were disclosed. He submits the Crown was not in a position to set trial dates—or accurately claim to be ready for trial, until September 2022. This, he claims, means the defence was not responsible for the delay when the April 2022 and June 2022 trial dates were offered by the court. [ 40 ] As pointed out by the Crown, this submission is, at its very highest, plainly wrong. Although Mr.

Parisee argues he did not receive the DNA warrant and ITO until September 2022, the evidence establishes this was disclosed to his counsel on March 7, 2022, and receipt was confirmed by his counsel on March 8, 2022.

[ 41 ] While this disclosure was forwarded to Mr. Parisee’s counsel a second time in September 2022, this did not impact the availability of the Crown to proceed to trial in April or June 2022. This part of Mr. Parisee’s submission is factually incorrect and must fail. [ 42 ] Some further context in this regard is also important to note. The DNA report initially forwarded to Mr. Parisee indicated that no DNA profile was found. Nonetheless, Mr. Parisee sought the DNA warrant and the ITO, even though there was no DNA evidence to challenge. Further, Mr.

Parisee later sought the “lab workup disclosure”, despite the lack of DNA evidence. His claim that disclosure was not complete—and that the Crown was not actually available for trial—in April or June 2022 betrays the facts. [ 43 ] It is also noteworthy that as early as March 10, 2022, Mr. Parisee’s counsel voiced an intention to make a disclosure application for the Crown DNA expert’s file, so that she could provide it to her own DNA expert. [ 44 ] Mr.

Parisee appears to rely upon Spencer at para 31 for the proposition that full disclosure of DNA evidence should be anticipated by the Crown; however, the factual basis in Spencer is distinguishable . There, the Crown indicated readiness for trial before any DNA disclosure was available. Here, however, the DNA report, warrant, and ITO were disclosed to Mr. Parisee before trial dates were offered and set. [ 45 ] For these reasons, the third part of Mr. Parisee’s argument with respect to this part of the delay must fail. [ 46 ] In

summary, I conclude the defence is responsible for this period of delay and, as a result, 195 days must be subtracted from the total delay in accordance with the direction in Jordan at paras 64 and 66 , Coulter at para 35, and Boehmer at paras 29-30 . 2.

Setting the Second Trial Date: November 10, 2022 to June 12, 2023 (215 days) [ 47 ] The second time period in which responsibility for delay is hotly contested is the time period between November 10, 2022, to June 16, 2023. [ 48 ] As noted above, the correct date for the agreed-upon anticipated completion of the trial is June 12, 2023; therefore, this represents a delay of 215 days. [ 49 ] Mr. Parisee argues the Crown’s change in the witness list five weeks before the trial date compelled the defence to take two drastic and unanticipated steps: (

a) bring a s. 276 application and (

b) retain a DNA expert. [ 50 ] He argues these steps would not have been necessary, but for the Crown’s change in position, and that any resulting delay is the sole responsibility of the Crown. However, during submissions before the November 2022 trial was adjourned, counsel for Mr. Parisee provided some acknowledgment that defence was, at least in some part, responsible for delay. She submitted that she would “fall on her sword” when requesting an adjournment.

During submissions made when the delay application was later argued, she reluctantly conceded the defence may have been partly responsible for the delay but initially felt the defence responsibility was relatively small.

Later, in submissions, she submitted that the worst-case scenario for the defence was to accept half of the responsibility for the delay: for the sake of argument, she suggested responsibility should be attributed “50-50”. [ 51 ] The Crown argues all delay in this regard is the responsibility of the defence and is the result of illegitimate conduct on the part of counsel. [ 52 ] For the reasons that follow, I conclude the defence is solely responsible for the delay in this time period. [ 53 ] At the outset, I acknowledge that, during the course of submissions when the adjournment request was made on the eve of trial in November 2022, I remarked the defence bore sole responsibility for this delay of the trial.

However, that comment cannot be considered binding, or even of persuasive value, on this application. That remark was made before the delay application was brought by Mr. Parisee and before the requisite evidentiary basis was filed. In argument during the application, both parties proceeded on the basis that remark was not binding and that the application must be determined on the evidentiary basis filed. [ 54 ] The core facts leading up to the adjournment of the trial are relatively simple.

On September 29, 2022, about five weeks before trial, the Crown filed an amended witness list to include a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner. On October 31, 2022, about one week before the trial, the defence filed a s. 276 application, indicating this was necessary because of the Crown’s addition to the witness list. On November 1, 2022, one day later, in response to the defence s. 276 application, the Crown removed the Nurse Examiner from the witness list, citing concerns with the timing of such an application before a jury trial set to commence on November 7, 2022.

This obviated the need for the proposed s. 276 application. [ 55 ] I conclude this was a reasonable and diligent response by the Crown in the days before the trial was to commence. It is noteworthy that, although the defence responded to the change in the witness list in a month, the Crown—in an effort to maintain the trial date—responded within one day. [ 56 ] At a case management conference with counsel and Mr.

Parisee on Wednesday November 2, 2022, one of the many issues raised—as part of the mandatory case management requirements set out in the Criminal Code —was whether the parties anticipated any expert evidence. The Crown replied in the negative and counsel for Mr. Parisee remained silent. [ 57 ] In the late afternoon of Thursday November 3, 2022, Mr. Parisee filed a notice of expert witness for a DNA expert.

In less than twenty minutes, a case management teleconference with the parties was arranged, and the primary purpose was to determine if an adjournment was necessary or whether the trial date could somehow be maintained. Counsel for Mr. Parisee pointed out she had just contacted the DNA expert and that the expert was not available until the last day of trial. This would make it impossible to complete the trial—with counsels’ addresses and the charge to the jury—in the allotted time. Counsel for Mr. Parisee also argued that the late notice of the expert witness could only be remedied by an adjournment.

[ 58 ] The essence of Mr. Parisee’s submission was that an adjournment was necessary, but it was the Crown’s fault. [ 59 ] I reject Mr. Parisee’s submission on this aspect for the following reasons. [ 60 ] First, the Crown added a name to the witness list about five weeks before the trial was set to commence, and Mr. Parisee did not make a s. 276 application until one week before the trial. I cannot justify attributing delay to the Crown when Mr. Parisee waited one month to respond.

The affidavit of Kirsten Hubbard—an employee of defence counsel’s law firm—was sworn on March 20, 2022 and appears to be offered as some kind of explanation for counsel’s delay. Generally, the affidavit is improper and offers many examples of irrelevant material and hearsay. It offers the employee’s opinion of how late and how hard counsel works and what the employee has been told by others about how hard counsel works. The affidavit also attaches a picture of Mr.

Parisee’s file to show it is about a foot high. [ 61 ] I surmise this affidavit was intended to explain why it took counsel four weeks to address what, if any, response may be necessary to the change in witness list. After considering this affidavit in light of all the circumstances, I conclude counsel was simply too busy to address the change in witness list and was not as prepared as she might have wanted to be prior to the trial.

The fact that Crown counsel was able to respond to the filing of the s. 276 application in one day—and remove the witness from the witness list —stands in stark contrast to the relative inaction of defence counsel. [ 62 ] Second, defence counsel’s actions in filing an expert notice for an expert who could not testify within the time allotted for trial also weighs heavily in favor of attributing delay to the defence. The Crown did not receive any time to consider whether it would need an expert in response and, if so, how that could be arranged. [ 63 ] There is another troubling aspect to this expert notice.

As mentioned above, at the case management teleconference on November 2, 2022, counsel did not answer my question about the possibility of any expert witnesses but chose – in her words – to “remain silent”. When asked the next day about her silence, she explained that calling an expert was “not on my radar” the day before. It is troubling to recall that, as early as March 10, 2022, counsel voiced her intention to make a disclosure application for the Crown DNA expert’s file, so that she could provide it to her own DNA expert.

In these circumstances, I do not accept her explanation that the prospect of calling a DNA expert was not on her radar. [ 64 ] During submissions of counsel and the Crown in the court appearances before the November 7, 2022 trial was adjourned, there was some discussion around the ethical obligations of counsel. However, if there are any ethical concerns, these are best left to a different forum and a different time.

For the limited purposes of this application, I will restrict my conclusions to where responsibility for delay should be placed. [ 65 ] In these circumstances, I conclude the defence is solely responsible for the delay of the trial from November 10, 2022 to June 12, 2023.

The defence attempts to place blame on the Crown—even for a portion of the delay—are without merit. [ 66 ] If I am later held to be in error in this conclusion, I pause to alternatively address whether there should be mixed responsibility for this part of the delay. [ 67 ] As set out in Lemoier , responsibility for a period of delay may be shared between Crown and defence. In Lemioer , a 92-day delay occurred when the accused’s first legal counsel withdrew from the record and new counsel was retained. However, during this delay, there were also outstanding disclosure issues.

The Crown argued the entire period should be attributed to the defence as a result of the withdrawal, while the accused argued this time should be attributed to the Crown as a result of the outstanding disclosure. [ 68 ] The trial judge took a “compromise position” and apportioned this delay between the parties. He concluded 60 days of the 92-day delay should be characterized as defence delay with the balance being the responsibility of the Crown.

The Court of Appeal upheld this apportionment at para. 42: [42] However, there was a clear and simple evidentiary basis for the trial judge’s conclusion that he was “satisfied that some portion of the delay should be attributed to the accused” (at para 88)…I therefore can find no error in the trial judge’s finding of fact that 60 days of the 92 days in this first period was caused by the defence. [ 69 ] The court in Lemioer at para 41 also held, a trial judge is required to “analyze whether there were other events occurring in the prosecution that would have caused the delay in any event”. [ 70 ] After undertaking this part of the Lemioer analysis, I conclude there is nothing in the evidentiary record to suggest any other cause for the 215-day delay during this period.

Mr. Parisee did not identify any other event in the prosecution that would have caused, or contributed to, the delay during this time period. Nor did he suggest any other reason as to why this delay should be the responsibility of the Crown. [ 71 ] As set out above, I conclude the defence is entirely responsible for this part of the delay (215 days); however, even if I were to hypothetically apportion a portion of the delay to the Crown, this would not affect the result in this application.

Attributing to the Crown, for the sake of argument, 30 or 60 or 90 days of delay would not impact the final result of this application. [ 72 ] In

summary, I conclude the entirety of the 215-day delay from November 10, 2022 to June 12, 2023 is solely attributable to the defence. Consequently, 215 days must also be subtracted from the total delay in accordance with the direction in Jordan at paras 64 and 66 , Coulter at para 35, and Boehmer at paras 29-30 .

Summary of Delay Calculations [ 73 ] As set out above, the total delay is 1,217 days.

[ 74 ] The contested delay for which I have found the defence is solely responsible is (a) 195 days between April 29, 2022 and November 10, 2022 and (b) 215 days between November 10, 2022 and June 12, 2023. [ 75 ] The total defence delay is therefore 410 days. [ 76 ] Deducting this delay from the total delay leaves a net delay of 807 days. This is well below the presumptive ceiling set by Jordan . (

c) Exceptional Circumstances [ 77 ] When the net delay exceeds the presumptive ceiling, the onus is on the Crown to rebut the presumption by establishing exceptional circumstances. In general, as maintained in Jordan at para 47 and paras 69-71, exceptional circumstances fall under two categories: either discrete events or particularly complex cases. [ 78 ] Here, the net delay falls below the presumptive ceiling, and it is not necessary for the Crown to attempt to rebut the presumption. (

d) Was the Remaining Delay Unreasonable? [ 79 ] In accordance with Coulter at para 40 , since the remaining delay of 807 days falls below the presumptive ceiling, the onus is on the defence to show that the delay is unreasonable ( Jordan , para 48 ). [ 80 ] Here, no submission was advanced on this point by Mr. Parisee and he did not argue the remaining delay was unreasonable. On this basis, Mr. Parisee has not established the remaining delay was unreasonable and he is not entitled to a stay of proceedings. III. CONCLUSION [ 81 ] In

summary, the remaining delay falls below the presumptive ceiling in Jordan , and the defence has not met its onus to show the remaining delay was unreasonable. [ 82 ] The delay is therefore presumptively reasonable and Mr. Parisee’s application must be dismissed. J. M. D. TOCHOR