HIS MAJESTY THE KING - v. -, 2023 SKKB 20

KING’S BENCH FOR SASKATCHEWAN Citation: 2023 SKKB 20 Date: 2023 01 27 Docket: CRM-SA-00078-2021 Judicial Centre: Saskatoon ___________________________________________________________________________ BETWEEN: HIS MAJESTY THE KING - and - KARLEN SETH CROSWELL Counsel: Andrew J. Clements for the Crown Valerie N. Harvey for the accused ___________________________________________________________________________ SENTENCING JUDGMENT GERECKE J. January 27, 2023 ___________________________________________________________________________ A. INTRODUCTION [ 1 ] On January 27, 2023, in court, I gave my sentencing decision.

These are the written reasons. [ 2 ] On January 18, 2020, Karlen Croswell was involved in a violent assault on Johnson Nawakayas. By decision dated October 17, 2022, I convicted Mr. Croswell of aggravated assault under s. 268 of the Criminal Code , RSC 1985, c C-46 , and having in his possession a knife for the purpose of committing an offence, contrary to s. 88 of the Criminal Code . [ 3 ] Now I must determine a fit and just sentence to impose on Mr. Croswell. The Crown seeks a 6-year sentence. The defence asks for 3 to 3¼ years, which would result in Mr.

Croswell’s immediate release as a result of his enhanced remand credit. B. CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENCE [ 4 ] In the early morning of January 18, 2020, Mr. Croswell and another man committed a brutal, prolonged

assault on Johnson Nawakayas. Mr. Croswell has little or no memory of the incident, but was found by police covered in blood, with considerable blood in the home where the attack occurred. There was no provocation of Mr. Croswell by Mr. Nawakayas, who was repeatedly punched, stabbed and struck with a 2x4. As I rendered a detailed judgment following the trial, I will not attempt here to further outline the circumstances of the offence. C. VICTIM’S INJURIES [ 5 ] Mr. Nawakayas was fortunate regarding his injuries.

Despite receiving multiple stab wounds to his head (penetrating as deep as 2½ inches), he was able to be discharged from hospital within 15 hours after being admitted. He underwent some post-discharge treatment, but the Court is unaware of him having suffered long-lasting injuries. No victim impact statement was received by the Court, and Mr. Nawakayas did not speak with the assessor who prepared the Pre-Sentence Report [PSR]. D. MR. CROSWELL [ 6 ] Mr. Croswell is now 25 years old. He was 23 at the time of the offences. He did not testify at trial, but considerable information about him is contained in the PSR.

He was interviewed for the PSR, as was his father, his former mother-in- law and his mother’s former partner (Richard). It appears that he has good relationships with those individuals. Richard is willing to have Mr. Croswell reside with him after release and believes that Mr. Croswell’s parents would similarly be willing. [ 7 ] Mr. Croswell was raised mainly by his mother until he was about five years old. He has three siblings, though the Court knows little about them. He was apprehended by the Ministry of Social Services and then raised primarily by his father.

His mother struggled with mental health and then was incarcerated in a federal prison. His father, though never abusive, struggled with alcoholism. Mr. Croswell believes that he had a good childhood with his father, and that food, shelter and other necessities were provided for. [ 8 ] He started drinking alcohol at age 12 and started purchasing it when 15 years old. He has abused alcohol since then, at least while not in custody. He also has a history of use of methamphetamine, prescription pills and marijuana. He regularly combined consumption of drugs and alcohol.

His friends also engaged in substance abuse, so no one in his life was complaining about his own abuse of substances. [ 9 ] At 15 years of age, Mr. Croswell moved out. He met a girl, Kristina, and stayed together with her for about four years. They had a daughter together in 2015. Though he wishes for contact with his daughter, he has been incarcerated for much of her life. [ 10 ] He says he has not been involved in gangs but has lost friends to gang violence. [ 11 ] Mr. Croswell has an extensive criminal record that includes numerous violent offences. He was first charged with a violent offence at age 14.

His youth record includes 14 convictions, six of which involved assaults or threats of violence. He has 12 Criminal Code convictions as an adult, which includes the conviction for this aggravated assault. Several involved possession of weapons. In 2019 he assaulted his grandmother’s husband.

The aggravated assault for which I convicted him is his most serious offence to date. [ 12 ] He has previously had opportunities to engage in programming for addictions, living without violence, anger management, and employment but either did not follow through at all, or abandoned it. [ 13 ] While incarcerated, he has at times been a problem prisoner, though the PSR records that on his most recent remand he has followed the rules of the institution. [ 14 ] The PSR analyzed Mr. Croswell’s risk to reoffend. He is considered to be in the high-risk category, at the 96th percentile. That is extremely high risk.

His risk factors were described in the PSR as including residence stability, employment, family relationships, peers and companions, drug and alcohol use, attitude, and self-management. E. SENTENCING PRINCIPLES 1. Guiding principles [ 15 ] The Criminal Code sets out the following principles applicable to sentencing: Purpose 718 The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives: (

a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct; (

b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences; (

c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary; (

d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders; (

e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and (

f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community.

… Fundamental principle 718.1 A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. Other sentencing principles 718.2 A court that imposes a sentence shall also take into consideration the following principles: (

a) a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offenceor the offender, and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, … (iii.1) evidence that the offence had a significant impact on the victim, considering their age and other personal circumstances, includingtheir health and financial situation, … shall be deemed to be aggravating circumstances; (

b) a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances; (

c) where consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined sentence should not be unduly long or harsh; (

d) an offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances; and (

e) all available sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done tovictims or to the community should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginaloffenders. [16] Objectives of sentencing include denunciation, deterrence, rehabilitation, and acknowledgement of the victims.Proportionality to the gravity of the offence is required.

In R v Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13, [2012] 1 SCR 433 [Ipeelee], Justice LeBelexplained: [37] The fundamental principle of sentencing (i.e., proportionality) is intimately tied to the fundamental purpose of sentencing - themaintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society through the imposition of just sanctions. Whatever weight a judge may wish to accord tothe various objectives and other principles listed in the Code, the resulting sentence must respect the fundamental principle ofproportionality. Proportionality is the sine qua non of a just sanction.

First, the principle ensures that a sentence reflects the gravity of theoffence. This is closely tied to the objective of denunciation. It promotes justice for victims and ensures public confidence in the justicesystem. … Second, the principle of proportionality ensures that a sentence does not exceed what is appropriate, given the moral blameworthiness ofthe offender. In this sense, the principle serves a limiting or restraining function and ensures justice for the offender.

In the Canadiancriminal justice system, a just sanction is one that reflects both perspectives on proportionality and does not elevate one at the expense ofthe other. [38] Despite the constraints imposed by the principle of proportionality, trial judges enjoy a broad discretion in the sentencing process.The determination of a fit sentence is, subject to any specific statutory rules that have survived Charter [Canadian Charter of Rights andFreedoms] scrutiny, a highly individualized process.

Sentencing judges must have sufficient manoeuvrability to tailor sentences to thecircumstances of the particular offence and the particular offender. Appellate courts have recognized the scope of this discretion andgranted considerable deference to a judge’s choice of sentence. … [17] Also relevant is the principle of parity provided for in s. 718.2(b): that a sentence I impose should be similar tosentences imposed for similar offences in similar circumstances. Parity must be balanced with the need to maintain sentencing as anindividualized process as set out above in Ipeelee.

It was stated to be a secondary principle in R v Whitehead, 2016 SKCA 165, 344 CCC(3d) 1. [18] Mr. Croswell is not of Indigenous background, so the principles derived from R v Gladue, (SCC), [1999] 1 SCR 688 [Gladue], do not apply here. F. ANALYSIS 1. Crown and defence submissions regarding aggravated assault sentence [19] The Crown seeks a sentence of six years before deducting for remand credit. The Crown focuses on thefollowing themes (arguing that they all are aggravating factors): a. the accused’s lengthy record of violent offences and offences involving weapons; b. this was a prolonged attack. Mr.

Nawakayas was dragged from room to room. At times he lost consciousness and the attackeither continued or resumed; c. the attack involved two men “jumping” Mr. Nawakayas;

d. given several opportunities, before and after committing these crimes, Mr. Croswell failed to participate in programming; e. Mr. Croswell is assessed as a high risk to reoffend. Indeed, he is among the highest risk individuals; and f. Mr. Croswell has been involved in violent incidents while in custody. [20] The Crown argues that there are no mitigating factors. Though Mr. Nawakayas’s injuries are not as severe as inother cases, that is in part because he was fortunate to escape more severe injuries. [21] The defence focuses mainly on two things. First, Mr.

Croswell underscores the severity of injuries above otherfactors. Second, he strongly emphasizes the rehabilitation objective of sentencing. He says he is deeply remorseful. The PSR recordsexpressions of remorse. Mr. Croswell also read to the Court a letter he wrote, confirming his regret and his best wishes for Mr.Nawakayas and his family. [22] The defence argues that I should impose probationary conditions upon Mr. Croswell’s release, designed toaddress his risk factors. Mr. Croswell needs to be monitored, undergo programming, and be required to undergo addictions treatment.

Ifhe is released immediately or in short order, while he has been free of drugs and alcohol for some three years, the defence observed that“he doesn’t have the tools yet”. Asked for a duration of probation, the defence proposes two years. [23] The defence observes that Mr. Croswell has options for where to live if released. His mother and her formerpartner were present through the trial and for sentencing submissions and are each willing to have him reside with them. He wants tofocus on obtaining employment. His family relationships have improved.

He stayed away from gang involvement while incarcerated. [24] The defence did not attempt to identify aggravating factors, or even to specifically outline mitigating factorsexcept as discussed above. 2. Analysis concerning aggravated assault sentence [25] I have canvassed the decisions provided by the Crown and defence, along with certain other cases involvingsimilar circumstances for similar offences. Aggravated assault is a crime committed frequently, so there is ample case law. However,each case has its own unique facts, so application of the multitude of cases involves a balancing of factors.

As noted by Layh J. in R vAllary, 2020 SKQB 66 [Allary]: [21] Establishing parity when sentencing for aggravated assault is particularly complex since the relationship between the offenderand the victim can differ widely: whether strangers, as in this instance, or well known-to-each-other protagonists, sometimes evendomestic partners; the location of the assault: whether in a public place, as in this instance, or in a victim’s home; whether the offenderused a weapon: absent in this instance other than a shoed foot, or a knife as in other cases; the severity and permanence of the injury:whether severe brain injury, as in this instance, or mere scarring in another.

These are only a few of the circumstances and factors thatmust be brought to bear – some mitigating the severity of the sentence, some aggravating the severity of the sentence, and some doingneither, but still relevant to the overall sentence. [26] The case law that I reviewed includes: a. Allary; b. R v Chaske, 2011 SKCA (SentDig) 10; c. R v Klassen 2015 SKCA (SentDig) 32; d. R v Adamec, 2021 BCSC 1832; e. R v Trafiak, 2021 ABCA 105; f. R v Sayazie, 2010 SKCA 14, 346 Sask R 147 [Sayazie]; g. R v Scott, 2014 SKQB 307; 458 Sask R 119; h. R v Blind, 2013 SKPC 168, 432 Sask R 123; i.

R v Cullen, 2014 SKQB 371, 461 Sask R 267; j. R v Desjarlais, 2013 SKQB 251, 424 Sask R 236. k. R v Ratt, 2021 SKCA 7 [Ratt], leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada refused, ; and l. R v Omer, 2022 SKCA 147. [27] In my opinion, the Crown’s identification of aggravating factors is generally fair, though I give minimal weightto involvement in violence while on remand for these offences, as it is unclear whether Mr. Croswell initiated those incidents. Other thanthat exception, I find the aggravating factors to be those identified by the Crown. [28] I find the following as mitigating factors: Mr.

Croswell’s sincere expression of remorse, the support of family,his acknowledgement that he is at a crossroads and needs to change his life, and his desire to commit to rehabilitative measures. [29] I do not consider the relative lack of severity of the victim’s injuries to be a mitigating factor. That, in my view,

is more the product of good fortune for both Mr. Nawakayas and Mr. Croswell. [ 30 ] Overall, Mr. Croswell’s moral blameworthiness is high. [ 31 ] Our Court of Appeal has on numerous occasions commented that the general sentencing range for aggravated assault is for two to four years. As merely two examples, see Sayazie and Ratt . However, while most sentences for aggravated assault may fall within that range (see Ratt at para 82 ), the four year “ceiling” on that range is frequently exceeded.

The Crown characterizes the two-to-four-year range as reflecting situations where the offender does not have a long criminal record of violent offences and where the offence for which the sentence is imposed is not particularly violent. [ 32 ] As Kalmakoff J.A. explained in Ratt , the sentences exceeding that range generally follow particular themes. One of those themes is where the offender has a lengthy record for violent offences: Ratt at para 83 .

In Ratt , the assault involved a single punch, though with enough force to cause a deep cut in the victim’s lip and dislodge two of his front teeth, which had to be surgically removed. Mr. Ratt had a lengthy and violent criminal record and a history of non-compliance with rehabilitative aspects of previous sentences. The violence and injuries involved were considered by the trial judge to be at the lower end of the scale of aggravated assault. Mr. Ratt also had strong Gladue factors in his favour. But the assault was deliberate and unprovoked, and his criminal record was even longer and more violent than Mr.

Croswell’s. The trial judge, focusing on rehabilitation, imposed a sentence of 46 months, reduced to 25 months after deducting for remand credit. [ 33 ] The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge’s focus on rehabilitation was in error: [66] In this case, while the sentencing judge was correct to give careful consideration to Mr. Ratt’s personal circumstances and background, and to consider them along with systemic factors, it was unreasonable to focus, as it appears he did, almost entirely on the sentencing objective of rehabilitation.

The sentencing judge’s focus on rehabilitation propelled him to the conclusion that a fit sentence could be achieved only by imposing the shortest possible sentence that would allow Mr. Ratt to access the programming available in the federal penitentiary system. With the greatest of respect, in light the record before him, this was unreasonable. There was no evidence that Mr. Ratt was interested in availing himself of such programming and, if he decided to avail himself of such programming, no evidence to support a conclusion that he would be likely to remain engaged in or benefit from it.

His track record firmly established the opposite. In light of Mr. Ratt’s unrelenting history of serious violent offending, it was unreasonable, in my respectful view, to place rehabilitation at the forefront rather than focusing on separating him from society to protect the public. [67] Relatedly, the sentencing judge also erred by failing to appreciate the Crown’s submission advocating for a lengthy jail sentence for what it was: a call for public protection to be given primary focus. Instead, the sentencing judge characterized the Crown’s submission as seeking punishment.

This error diverted the sentencing judge’s focus from the task before him. [ 34 ] In the end, the Court of Appeal set aside the 46-month sentence, imposing a sentence of five years and six months, stating: [91] In the end, even though there is, as the sentencing judge found, a direct connection between Mr. Ratt’s traumatic and dysfunctional upbringing and the commission of his offences, this is not a case that can reasonably warrant a focus on restorative aspects of sentencing. In light of (

i) the gravity of the offence; (ii) Mr. Ratt’s overall criminal record; (iii) the unrelenting history of his violent offences, including the frequency and nature of such offences, and the rate at which Mr. Ratt commits such offences when not in custody; and (iv) his repeated failure to comply with any form of rehabilitative or restorative component of past sentences, it is clear that the primary focus in sentencing Mr. Ratt must be on protection of the public. The circumstances of this case strongly suggest that objective is best achieved by separating Mr. Ratt from society.

To that end, the sentence must be of sufficient length. [ 35 ] Mr. Ratt’s criminal record included 67 convictions – 34 as a youth and 33 as an adult. He was 33 years old at time of the appeal. His adult criminal record included two prior aggravated assault convictions, five convictions for assault and assault causing bodily harm, and numerous convictions for weapons offences.

His youth record spanned two years and his adult record 11 years. [ 36 ] Having considered the case law mentioned above, in my opinion, Ratt is a particularly useful guide for what should be ordered in this case – though a rebalancing of factors is needed here. Mr. Croswell has no Gladue factors, but alcohol was common in Mr. Croswell’s home growing up and he did not experience an ideal childhood. The assault by Mr. Croswell was much more severe than in Ratt . Mr. Croswell’s criminal record is not as long as Mr. Ratt’s and not quite as violent, but it still is long and violent. Like Mr. Ratt, Mr.

Croswell has failed to take up rehabilitative programming in the past. Mr. Ratt was considered to be high risk to reoffend, as is Mr. Croswell. Mr. Croswell expresses remorse and acknowledges the need to change, while Mr. Ratt did not. [ 37 ] Mr. Croswell argues that while his risk assessment has changed from prior assessments, he has not had the opportunity to make changes to impact that risk assessment. With respect to the risk factors identified in the PSR, the defence argues that Mr. Croswell has started to or has addressed the ones involving residence stability and family relationships.

Those are supported by the presence through trial of Richard and Mr. Croswell’s mother, and by the information in the PSR that he would have a place to live with one of them upon release. [ 38 ] The defence further argues that, given the opportunity, Mr. Croswell would be capable of addressing the risk factors involving employment, peers and companions, and drug and alcohol use. Mr. Croswell spent about the past three years on remand, in which programming is limited. But he has received and ignored ample previous opportunities to start on the path to rehabilitation. There was no evidence of Mr.

Croswell having made any real start on the path to change in his time on remand. He advised the PSR assessor and the Court that he is committed to rehabilitation moving forward, but he may have said that on prior occasions to judges sentencing him previously. [ 39 ] The Court acknowledges Mr. Croswell’s submissions as to his desire to start anew on a better path. It may be that given the opportunity he might address some of the outstanding risk factors, but that involves numerous “ifs”.

Nonetheless, even if the PSR’s risk assessment is considered to be on the high side (as 96th percentile is extremely high), I am not persuaded that categorizing him more broadly as a high risk to reoffend overstates his risk. I further am not satisfied that the objective of protection of the public

would be adequately fulfilled by a sentence much (if at all) shorter than ordered by the Court of Appeal in Ratt. [40] As noted, in Ratt the Court of Appeal held that where prior judicial efforts at rehabilitation had failed it couldrepresent an error to continue to focus on rehabilitation rather than finding the correct balance between rehabilitation, protection of thepublic and the other objectives enumerated in s. 718. Given the gravity of the offence in question, Mr.

Ratt’s overall criminal record, his“unrelenting” history of violent offences and his past failures to comply with rehabilitative orders that were part of prior sentences,Kalmakoff J.A. observed: [91] … it is clear that the primary focus in sentencing Mr. Ratt must be on protection of the public. The circumstances of this casestrongly suggest that objective is best achieved by separating Mr. Ratt from society. To that end, the sentence must be of sufficientlength. The Court of Appeal imposed a sentence on Mr. Ratt of 5½ years less remand credit. [41] The most common theme that emerges from both Ratt and Mr.

Croswell’s case is not only the need forrehabilitation, which is real, but also for protection of the public. [42] While I agree with the defence that rehabilitation is important for Mr. Croswell, that objective cannot trumpprotection of the public, particularly in a case such as this where the offender has a long and escalating record of violent offences and isat high risk of reoffending. Defence counsel’s observation that Mr.

Croswell still lacks the tools to adapt to reintegrate into thecommunity may have been aimed mainly at obtaining treatment for his addictions, but the Court remains concerned on a broad basisabout whether he is even close to having those tools. [43] Having considered the statutory principles of sentencing including parity, other case law concerning sentences,Mr. Croswell’s own circumstances, and the circumstances of this offence, I find a sentence of 5½ years to be appropriate for theaggravated assault conviction.

Below I will express that sentence in days and make the deduction for enhanced remand credit. [44] Before me an issue was raised about whether probation could be ordered if the sentence imposed beforeaccounting for remand credit (as opposed to the “net” sentence after application of remand credit) would exceed two years. The issue isresolved quickly by reference to R v Ahmed, 2019 SKCA 47, [2019] 10 WWR 99, but in any event is moot in light of the sentence that Iorder. 3.

The Section 88(1) Charge [45] Neither Crown nor defence made submissions as to an appropriate sentence for the offence of possession of aweapon for the purpose of committing an offence contrary to s. 88 of the Criminal Code. Instead, the focus was on whether that chargeshould be stayed for the weapons offence by operation of the principles set out in R v Kienapple, (SCC), [1975] 1 SCR729. The Crown acknowledges the factual nexus between the weapons charge and the aggravated assault but argues that no legal nexusexists. [46] There appears to be surprisingly little jurisprudence on point.

If the charge under s. 88 had been for possessionof a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, it would be simple to find the lack of legal nexus, arising from the public peaceelement. The defence’s argument here is that Mr. Croswell’s possession of the knife was for the purpose of committing the aggravatedassault, such that a legal nexus is present. [47] One pertinent case is R v Z.K., 2012 ABPC 169 [Z.K.], where a conviction was entered for aggravated assault,but there was also a charge under s. 88.

The Court reviewed R v Briscoe (1992), (BC CA), 76 CCC (3d) 563 (BCCA)[Briscoe] and R v Basilio (2003), (ON CA), 175 CCC (3d) 440 (Ont CA) [Basilio]. [48] In Briscoe, the accused possessed the handgun for the purpose of committing the assault with a weapon and wasfound guilty of assaulting the victim with the handgun (though she did not discharge it). The Court held that substantially the same“delict” underpinned both offences. [49] In Basilio the s. 88 charge was for possession of a weapon. The accused used the weapon, a knife, to stab thevictim.

The Court held that the same delict related to both offences, and the stabbing with the knife was what aggravated the assault. TheCourt of Appeal ordered that the weapons charge be stayed. [50] In Z.K., the Court analyzed as follows: [209] In this case, very little time elapsed from the moment the Accused picked up the knife and thought of killing his Father until theFather was stabbed in the skull. The facts that underlie both the

section 268 charge and section 88(1) charge are in a relationship ofsufficient proximity such that only one wrongful act, in both the physical and mental element, is involved. [210] The same delict was at the heart of both offences. ZK picked up the knife to kill his Father and immediately thereafter, actedupon his intentions. [211] In my opinion, entering a conviction on the section 88(1) charge would violate the rule against multiple convictions. [51] I am persuaded by that logic. There was no evidence at trial of Mr. Croswell holding a knife for any purposeother than the assault on Mr. Nawakayas.

Thus, the charge against Mr. Croswell under s. 88 has both a sufficient factual and legal nexusas to violate the rule against multiple convictions. [52] I therefore enter a stay of proceedings on the s. 88(1) charge. It is not necessary for me to determine a sentencefor a conviction under that charge.

G. CONCLUSION Mr. Croswell, would you please stand? [ 53 ] For the reasons set out in this judgment, as to Count 1 of the Indictment, I sentence you to a custodial sentence of 5½ years, which shall be calculated as 2,007 days. [ 54 ] As of January 9, 2023, Mr. Croswell had been on remand for 1,053 days. From that is subtracted 274 days, which is remand credit used up by his most recent conviction. That leaves 779 days, with the enhanced remand credit amounting to 1,168.5 days, including January 9, 2023, the day on which I heard submissions on sentence. The defence confirmed those calculations to be correct.

Rounded up, the enhanced remand credit is 1,169 days. [ 55 ] From January 9, 2023 until now, a further 18 days have passed (27 days of enhanced credit), so the total enhanced remand credit is 1,196 days. Deduction of the 1,196 days of enhanced remand credit results in a sentence of 811 days. [ 56 ] As this is Mr. Croswell’s second offence where a weapons prohibition is made under s. 109, a lifetime prohibition is mandatory. [ 57 ] I also make the following ancillary orders: a.

Pursuant to ss. 109(1) and 109(3) you shall be prohibited for life from possessing any firearm, cross-bow, restricted weapon, ammunition and explosive substance. b. A DNA order is required pursuant to s. 487.04, because of the inclusion of s. 268 as a primary designated offence. I so order. _________________________J. D.G. GERECKE