HIS MAJESTY THE KING - v. –, 2023 SKKB 185

KING’S BENCH FOR SASKATCHEWAN Citation: 2023 SKKB 185 Date: 2023 07 17 Docket: CRM-SA-00205-2022 Judicial Centre: Saskatoon BETWEEN: HIS MAJESTY THE KING - and – DARYLE KIDDER Counsel: Andrea J. Newsham for the Crown Logan R. Marchand for the accused ___________________________________________________________________________ WRITTEN REASONS FOR SENTENCE ELSON J.

FOLLOWING ORAL PRONOUNCEMENT ON JULY 17, 2023 AUGUST 31, 2023. ___________________________________________________________________________ Introduction [ 1 ] On April 3, 2023, the offender, Daryle Kidder, entered guilty pleas to four counts in the six-count Indictment against him. These counts alleged the following: That Mr.

Kidder, on or about the second day of September 2021, at or near Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, did: Count 1: Unlawfully have in his possession a controlled substance, to wit: cocaine, for the purpose of trafficking, contrary to s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act , SC 1996, c 19 [ CDSA ]; Count 2: Unlawfully have in his possession a controlled substance, to wit: methamphetamine, for the purpose of trafficking, contrary to s. 5(2) of the CDSA ; Count 3: Have in his possession property or proceeds of property having a value exceeding five thousand dollars, knowing that all or part of the property or proceeds was obtained or derived directly or indirectly from the commission in Canada of an indictable offence, to wit: trafficking in a controlled substance, contrary to s. 5(2) of the CDSA , thereby committing an offence contrary to sections 354 (1) and 355 (

a) of the Criminal Code , RSC 1985, c C-46 ; and

Count 4: Possess ammunition, to wit: shotgun shells, while he was prohibited from doing so by reason of an order made pursuant to s. 109 of the Criminal Code , contrary to s. 117.01 (1) of the Criminal Code . [ 2 ] The guilty pleas were entered before one of my colleagues on the understanding that the inquiry pursuant to s. 606 of the Criminal Code would be conducted by another judge of this Court on June 16, 2023, being the date scheduled for a sentencing hearing. It was also understood that a pre-sentence report would be prepared in the interim.

I was subsequently assigned to attend court on the adjourned date, to conduct the necessary inquiry and, if the plea was accepted, to hear sentencing submissions. Following the compliance with s. 606 , I accepted the guilty pleas and heard submissions. The Crown eventually entered a stay of proceedings with respect to the other two counts in the Indictment. [ 3 ] The sentencing hearing was contested. A particularly contentious issue between counsel related to the principle of parity and the application of a sentencing range for methamphetamine trafficking at the level of Mr. Kidder’s involvement.

While that issue was contentious, both Crown and defence counsel agreed that there was a paucity of published Saskatchewan authorities on sentences for offences related to methamphetamine. Indeed, counsel expressed the hope that I would publish my sentencing decision in this case. Despite my workload, and perhaps unwisely, I agreed. With that, the decision was taken under reserve with the expectation that sentence would be imposed on July 17, 2023. [ 4 ] Unfortunately, personal circumstances conspired to prevent me from writing a publishable decision by the scheduled date.

Even so, I had satisfied myself about the appropriate sentence in this case. Rather than prolonging Mr. Kidder’s pre- sentence custody, I elected to pronounce sentence orally on the scheduled date. At that time, I sentenced Mr. Kidder to five years imprisonment on Count 2, with a four-year concurrent sentence on Count 1, a four-year concurrent sentence on Count 3 and a two-year concurrent sentence on Count 4. In addition, certain ancillary orders were made. [ 5 ] At the time I imposed sentence, I advised the parties that publishable reasons would follow. This judgment contains those reasons.

Circumstances of the Offence [ 6 ] The charges against Mr. Kidder arose from an investigation by the Saskatoon Police Service [SPS], which began in the mid-winter of 2020-2021. Initially, the investigation focused on two persons, whom I will simply identify as “C.” and “M.”. M. is a co-accused in the same Indictment as Mr. Kidder, but only with respect to Counts 1, 2 and 3. For reasons not disclosed to the Court, C. has not been charged in the Indictment. [ 7 ] An Agreed Statement of Facts [Agreed Statement] was presented to the Court to describe the relevant circumstances.

According to the Agreed Statement, confidential information led SPS investigators to believe that C. and M. were trafficking cocaine and methamphetamine. By June 2021, the investigators became aware of Mr. Kidder’s involvement in the operation when they saw him meeting with C. and/or M. [ 8 ] Among other activities, the investigation involved surveillance centred on three Saskatoon locations. These three locations were: (1) the parkade, lobby and entrances of the downtown apartment building where M. was a tenant; (2) the apartment building where Mr.

Kidder began residing in July 2021, located approximately five blocks from M.’s apartment; and (3) a house in the Forest Grove neighbourhood [Forest Grove address], which M. had rented in the name of C.’s employer. During the surveillance, the investigators made several observations. The observations directly involving Mr. Kidder are described in the following subparagraphs. a. On various occasions in June 2021, Mr. Kidder and C. met with M. and/or other persons in the parkade and rear entrance of M.’s apartment building. During these interactions, Mr.

Kidder was seen either delivering or receiving items contained in sports bags, duffel bags or grocery bags. Between the delivery and receipt of these items, C. and M. were seen leaving the apartment building and subsequently returning with items. b. Following the move to his apartment, Mr. Kidder was seen travelling to M.’s apartment building following which he drove to various other locations in Saskatoon, where he met with certain people, including a known and recently convicted drug trafficker. On some of these occasions, Mr. Kidder used a vehicle registered in his name but with M.’s residential address. c.

On one of his trips, Mr. Kidder happened to park his vehicle beside an undercover surveillance officer. The officer saw Mr. Kidder with his head down looking at a stack of $50 bills, approximately three inches thick. The officer estimated the sum of cash at somewhere between $10,000 and $20,000. d. C. met with Mr. Kidder at his apartment building after which Mr. Kidder made two trips while carrying bags to and from the building. M. was later seen attending at the building. e. Throughout August 2021, Mr.

Kidder attended at the Forest Grove address on multiple occasions to pick up drugs and take them to various locations in and around Saskatoon, where drug deals were undertaken. On one occasion, he left the Forest Grove address with drugs in a grocery store bag and attended at an acreage outside the city. The acreage was owned by a known and recently convicted drug trafficker. After staying at the acreage for approximately a half hour, Mr. Kidder returned to his own residence with the grocery bag empty. [ 9 ] On August 15, 2021, C. and M. were arrested in an unrelated incident.

They were charged with possession of methamphetamine and possession of a knife. As a result of the arrest, C.’s parole was revoked, and he was returned to Saskatchewan Penitentiary. M. was released on bail. [ 10 ] While C. was in custody, the SPS obtained recordings of telephone calls to and from the Penitentiary. In one of the first calls, C. and M. talked about carrying on the drug trafficking operation while C. remained in custody. Subsequently, Mr. Kidder participated in three-way calls during which they discussed, among other things, how to keep the business going. Both M. and Mr.

Kidder agreed to follow C.’s instructions. Thereafter, between August 20 and September 1, 2021, M. and Mr. Kidder continued to meet

regularly and carry on the trafficking operations. [ 11 ] On August 25, 2021, SPS officers removed garbage from the bin outside the Forest Grove address. Inside, they discovered 30 corner cut baggies with residue. The residue tested positive for cocaine. [ 12 ] M. and Mr. Kidder were both arrested on September 2, 2021. On that same date, SPS officers executed search warrants for M.’s apartment, Mr. Kidder’s apartment, the Forest Grove address as well as vehicles observed during the investigation. The particulars of the material seized include the following: a.

M.’s apartment - 17.6 grams of methamphetamine, a commercial cash counter, a notebook/scoresheet, five cell phones, $67,670 in cash, cash counter receipts and money packaging envelopes; b. Mr. Kidder’s apartment - manual and combination for a Sentry safe, a total of 152 grams of methamphetamine, a total of 36.5 grams of cocaine, 4 grams of psilocybin, two digital scales, a butterfly knife, two 12-gauge shotgun shells and a Taser; c. Mr. Kidder’s vehicle - two notebooks/scoresheets and a case containing 0.3 grams of fentanyl, 0.5 grams of cocaine, 3.5 grams of cocaine and 2.6 grams of methamphetamine; d.

Forest Grove address - five kilograms of methamphetamine (four one-kilogram bags, 11 28-gram bags and some smaller quantities), 9 ounces of cocaine (nine one-ounce bags), 46.5 grams of cocaine (58 0.8-gram bags), a grocery bag with scale and drug packaging materials, two Pyrex beakers and a Sentry safe containing an additional 18.3 grams of cocaine. [ 13 ] In addition to the above seizures, SPS officers seized items from Mr. Kidder at the time of his arrest. They included two cell phones and one folding knife.

It should also be noted that, on M.’s arrest, officers seized various items from her, including three cell phones (one of which was described as a “deal phone”), two money orders from a known and convicted drug dealer as well as keys to M.’s apartment, Mr. Kidder’s apartment and the Forest Grove address. Circumstances of the Offender Criminal Record [ 14 ] While not extensive, Mr. Kidder’s criminal record is not insignificant. The particulars of his record are as follows: 2004-08-09 EDMONTON ALTA

(1) POSS OF PROPERTY OBTAINED BY CRIME UNDER $5000 SEC 355(

B) CC (1-2) $300 I-D 15 DAYS ON EACH CHG

(2) FAIL TO ATTEND COURT SEC 145(2) CC

(3) POSS OF PROPERTY OBTAINED BY CRIME UNDER $5000 SEC 355(

B) CC (3) $500 I-D 15 DAYS

(4) POSS OF BREAK IN INSTRUMENTS SEC 351(1) CC (4) $400 I-D 15 DAYS (EDMONTON PS 264850) 2004-10-18 EDMONTON ALTA THEFT UNDER $5000 SEC 334(

B) CC (EDMONTON PS 264850) SUSP SENT & PROBATION 12 MOS 2005-05-24 EDMONTON ALTA

(1) POSS OF PROPERTY OBTAINED BY CRIME UNDER $5000 SEC 355(

B) CC (1-3) 30 DAYS INTERMITTENT & PROBATION ON EACH CHG CONC

(2) POSS OF BREAK IN INSTRUMENTS SEC 351(1) CC

(3) FAIL TO APPEAR SEC 145(5) CC (EDMONTON PS 264850)

2006-01-16 EDMONTON ALTA

(1) OBSTRUCT PEACE OFFICER SEC 129(

A) CC (1-2) $200 I-D 3 DAYS ON EACH CHG

(2) UNLAWFULLY AT LARGE SECTION 145(1)(

B) CC

(3) FAIL TO COMPLY WITH PROBATION ORDER SEC 733.1(1)(

A) CC (2 CHGS) (3) $100 I-D 1 DAY ON EACH CHG CONC

(4) POSS OF PROPERTY OBTAINED BY CRIME UNDER $5000 SEC 355(

B) CC (4-5) 30 DAYS INTERMITTENT & PROBATION ON EACH CHG

(5) POSS OF BREAK IN INSTRUMENTS SEC 351(1) CC (EDMONTON PS 264850) 2013-02-19 EDMONTON AB

(1) OBSTRUCT PEACE OFFICER SEC 129(

A) CC (1) 5 DAYS

(2) THEFT UNDER $5000 SEC 334(

B) CC (2) $250 I-D 1 DAY (DCN11329400001101001402) (EDMONTON PS 264850 2013-02-21 VALLEYVIEW AB

(1) ASSAULT SEC 266 CC (1-2) 30 DAYS ON EACH CHG CONC

(2) FAIL TO APPEAR SEC 145(5) CC

(3) FAIL TO APPEAR SEC 145(5) CC (3) 15 DAYS CONC (DCN11310600097901001403) (RCMP VALLEYVIEW 2006-1364976) 2014-06-05 EDMONTON AB

(1) FAIL TO COMPLY WITH RECOGNIZANCE SEC 145(3) CC (2 CHGS) (1-2) 45 DAYS ON EACH CHG

(2) POSS OF A WEAPON SEC 88(1) CC (DCN11524300035501001403) (EDMONTON PS 264850)

2014-06-26 EDMONTON AB

(1) POSS OF PROPERTY OBTAINEDBY CRIME OVER $5000 SEC 355(

A) CC (1) (3 MOS PRE- SENTENCE CUSTODY) 2016-05-26 EDMONTON AB MANSLAUGHTER SEC 236(

B) CC (DCN11636309300599945108) (EDMONTON PS 264850) 6 YRS &MANDATORYWEAPONSPROHBIITION SEC 109 CC Personal Circumstances [15] The offender’s personal circumstances were presented to the Court through a Pre-Sentence Report [PSR] andcounsel’s remarks. [16] Mr. Kidder is presently 43 years old. He was born in Grande Prairie, Alberta, and spent most of his youth inEdmonton with his parents. It is my understanding that he also spent time with his aunt and uncle at Sturgeon Lake Cree Nation, nearValleyview, Alberta, which is his mother’s home community. Mr.

Kidder told the PSR author that he has had a reasonably goodrelationship with his mother, but much less so with his father whom he described as abusive. According to information presented to theCourt, Mr. Kidder’s father worked in the oilfields and became a heavy drinker when away from work. When he drank, it was notuncommon for him to become physically abusive to both his spouse and children. Eventually, the parents separated but not before Mr.Kidder had become an adult.

He advises that he has had no contact with his father over the last 10 years. [17] Although he describes no difficulties in school (despite being held back in Grade 8), Mr. Kidder dropped out ofhigh school after Grade 10 when he obtained employment on a pipeline. [18] At the age of 19, Mr. Kidder sustained a serious workplace injury for which he received workers’ compensationbenefits and pain medications for almost three years. He claims that, after his benefits and medications were cut off, he found it difficultto cope. As a result, he turned to illicit drugs, primarily methamphetamine.

Except for a seven year period of sobriety between the agesof 25 and 32 (2005 to 2012) and periods of incarceration, Mr. Kidder has been a regular user of methamphetamine. [19] Mr. Kidder’s first offence was committed shortly after he began using illicit drugs. His initial crimes wereprimarily property offences, committed to support his drug habit. He also engaged in drug dealing from time to time. Mr. Kidder’s onlyfederal sentence was the six year sentence for manslaughter in 2016. After his initial statutory release from that sentence, in May 2019,Mr. Kidder resumed his methamphetamine use.

This resulted in the suspension of his release three months later. The author further notesthat, while Mr. Kidder has undergone drug-related programming in previous incarcerations, he is now much more motivated to changehis approach to dealing with his substance abuse problem. This would include taking treatment programs after his release from prison. [20] The PSR author also notes that Mr. Kidder has had a lengthy history of “negative peer associations” as an adult.These kinds of associations directly led to the circumstances that brought him before this Court.

Specifically, the Court was told that Mr.Kidder moved to Saskatoon in the spring of 2021 after a “friend”, whom he had earlier met in the federal correction system, offered hima job selling drugs. Although I suspect this friend was C., that suspicion was never confirmed in Court. Mr. Kidder told the author thathis role in the Saskatoon drug operation was primarily that of a “runner”. He also said that his continued addiction to methamphetamineplayed a central role in his agreeing to participate in the operation. [21] Turning to Gladue factors (R v Gladue, (SCC), [1999] 1 SCR 688 [Gladue]), Mr.

Kidderremains a status member of Sturgeon Lake Creek Nation, which is a part of the Western Cree Tribal Council and a party to Treaty 8.Although it does not appear that he has an extensive connection to his Indigenous heritage, Mr. Kidder told the PSR author that he missesthe simpler lifestyle at Sturgeon Lake Cree Nation. He also expressed the hope to return there some day. [22] There may also be some intergenerational effects from Mr. Kidder’s family members being part of theresidential school system and the so-called “60’s scoop”. In particular, the PSR discloses that Mr.

Kidder’s mother had been part of the“60’s scoop”. [23] The PSR author concluded his

summary and sentence considerations with the following comments: Daryle is 44 and facing further sentencing for drug trafficking and a firearm offence. He accepts responsibility for the charges andadmits he was living a high-risk and criminal lifestyle leading up to the index assault and detainment. He was not employed and wasdisconnected from his family support system living in Saskatoon. Daryle was addicted to drugs and primarily associated with other peersengaged in drug misuse and criminal behaviour. There is significant and recent criminal history on record.

Since his detainment in September 2021, Daryle has responded well to the structure, is reported to exhibit exceptional behaviour, and hasadhered to all facility expectations. Daryle expresses favourable intentions to address root causes for problem areas within the facilityand the community. Though, for successful reintegration, Daryle will need to follow through with expressed intentions to access servicesin addressing drug use, the negative influence of peers, and associated thoughts and attitudes surrounding the index incident.

There are Gladue factors for consideration in this case, including intergenerational trauma as a result of the residential school system and 60’s scoop upon his family, family breakdown, history of familial substance misuse and domestic violence, the effects of racism, loss of language, and the impact of enduring traumas. There are opportunities to access cultural programming and connection in Edmonton and Sturgeon Lake Cree Nation in Alberta.

When Darrell re-integrates into the community he intends to relocate to Edmonton with his mother and eventually to Sturgeon Lake Cree Nation to be nearer his son and in a supportive community. Positions of Crown and Defence [ 24 ] Crown counsel asked the Court to impose a global sentence of six years imprisonment.

More particularly, the Crown proposed a sentence of six years’ imprisonment on the methamphetamine count, with four years concurrent on the cocaine count, four years concurrent on the proceeds of crime count and two years concurrent on the weapons/ammunition breach. [ 25 ] In support of this proposed sentence, Crown counsel relied principally, if not exclusively, on the observation made in an unreported 2017 sentencing judgment delivered by Allbright J. in R v Favreau (15 November 2017) Saskatoon, CRM-SA- 00100-2016 (Sask QB) [ Favreau ].

In that judgment, my former colleague imposed a sentence of six years’ imprisonment for an active high-level wholesaler of methamphetamine. In doing so, he observed that there was a six to ten year sentencing range for methamphetamine trafficking offences. I will address Favreau later in this judgment. [ 26 ] Defence counsel had a different perspective.

Aside from questioning a rigid application of the range referenced in Favreau , counsel posited that, given the circumstances of the offence and the offender – including the relevant Gladue factors – a fit and just sentence would be something in the area of 56 months’ imprisonment less credit for pre-sentence custody. Applicable Law Purpose and Principles of Sentencing [ 27 ] The sentencing of an offender is not an exact science or an inflexible, predetermined procedure.

Rather, it is a process in which the sentencing judge is expected to craft an appropriate sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and the personal characteristics of the offender. In doing so, the sentencing judge must be guided by the considerations mandated by Parliament in the Criminal Code .

These considerations include: (1) the purpose of sentencing; (2) the available objectives of any sanction designed to serve the purpose of sentencing; and (3) the principles which are to guide sentencing judges in their task. [ 28 ] The fundamental purpose of sentencing, and the available objectives behind the sanctions imposed to serve that purpose, are set out in s. 718 of the Criminal Code : 718.

The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives: (

a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct; (

b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences; (

c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary; (

d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders; (

e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and (

f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community. [ 29 ] The principles intended to guide sentencing judges in their task are set out in ss. 718.1 and 718.2 of the Criminal Code . The first of these provisions articulates the fundamental principle of proportionality while the second provision identifies additional principles to be applied. Excluding those portions that are not relevant to Mr.

Kidder’s case, ss. 718.1 and 718.2 read as follows: 718.1 A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. 718.2 A court that imposes a sentence shall also take into consideration the following principles: (

a) a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender, …; (

b) a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances; (

c) where consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined sentence should not be unduly long or harsh; (

d) an offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances; and (

e) all available sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done to victims or to the community should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders. [ 30 ] A focal point for both sentencing submissions in this case, associated with the objectives of denunciation and deterrence, was the principle of parity, reflected in s. 718.2(b). Consideration of the parity principle in this case touches on the issue of

appropriate sentences for methamphetamine trafficking. I will speak directly to that issue under the next heading. Sentences for Trafficking Methamphetamine [31] The Crown posited that, having regard to the substance’s impact in the community, sentences for traffickingmethamphetamine have historically demanded greater consideration for denunciation and deterrence than for trafficking in other illicitsubstances.

In the Crown’s view, the dangers associated with methamphetamine are such that it stands apart from other substances.Given this submission, it may be helpful to describe the substance and its history before turning to the jurisprudence that has developedon methamphetamine trafficking, particularly in other jurisdictions. [32] Methamphetamine is a derivative of amphetamine. Both drugs arise from alteration of the stimulant drug,ephedrine, which is also used to treat allergies.

Methamphetamine can take a variety of forms, including a powder, a base, and a crystal.Crystal methamphetamine, commonly known as “crystal meth”, is the drug’s most potent form, consisting of a crystalline substance witha translucent or white appearance. [33] Methamphetamine has a much longer history than is commonly believed, stretching back more than a century.Amphetamine was first synthesized in Germany in 1887. This was followed, six years later, by the synthesis of methamphetamine by aJapanese chemist in 1893. See Ralph Weisheit & William L.

White, Methamphetamine: Its History, Pharmacology and Treatment(Center City, Minnesota: Hazelden Publishing, 2009) [Weisheit and White],

chapter 2. [34] Weisheit and White note that, following their syntheses, both amphetamine and methamphetamine experienced aprolonged dormancy until the 1920s and 1930s. Around that time, amphetamine, produced under the brand name Benzedrine, was seenas a safe and non-addictive treatment for a wide variety of maladies, including various physiological and psychiatric ailments.

Theauthors also note the widespread use of amphetamine and methamphetamine by German, Japanese, American and British soldiers duringWorld War II. [35] Perhaps the most notorious, commercially available methamphetamine product came into use in 1937. In thatyear, Temmler Werke, a German pharmaceutical company, began marketing methamphetamine as a non-prescription stimulant under thebrand name “Pervitin”. Initially, Pervitin was believed to be a simple “pick-me-up”, no more stimulating or addictive than caffeine.

Itsoon became extremely popular. [36] As noted in Norman Ohler, Blitzed: Drugs in Nazi Germany (London: Penguin UK, 2017),

chapter 2, Pervitincame to the attention of a physiologist in Germany’s defence bureaucracy. Determined to counter natural fatigue in the ranks of theWehrmacht, the physiologist seized upon Pervitin as a possible solution. After a series of tests, as well as selective use of the drug duringthe 1939 conquest of Poland, Pervitin became a regular part of Germany’s war effort in April 1940. A month later, it played an importantrole in the European “Blitzkrieg” of 1940.

During the campaign, Pervitin was found to extend wakefulness and reduce the need for sleep,thereby allowing the Wehrmacht to pursue its advance around the clock. The drug also reduced sensitivity to hunger and pain, whilesimultaneously increasing a soldier’s self- confidence, concentration, and a willingness to take risks. [37] After France fell in June of 1940, distribution of Pervitin was reduced when the German command becameaware of discipline problems among the ranks of the Wehrmacht.

Despite these concerns, methamphetamine and other amphetaminederivatives remained a notable part of the war effort among both Allied and Axis combatants. [38] Weisheit and White observe that, following the war, amphetamine/methamphetamine use moved from militaryto domestic use, most notably in Japan and the United States.

The authors observe the presence of a “surge” in the use ofamphetamine/methamphetamine products in both countries. [39] In the United States, the surge continued throughout the 1950s and took on epidemic features during the 1960s.This contributed to the enactment of comprehensive federal legislation in 1970, including the Controlled Substances Act, Title II of theComprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 USC. Similar to Canada’s current legislation, that statute establishedschedules of controlled substances. Initially, all amphetamine products, including methamphetamine, were classified as

Schedule IIIsubstances. Within a short time, they were moved to

Schedule II, where they came under more restrictive regulation, including strictercriminal sanctions. [40] In Canada, Parliament did not fully appreciate the dangers of methamphetamine until the late 1990s, with theenactment of the CDSA. Under previous legislation, trafficking in amphetamine-related products was an offence, but simple possessionof the substance was not. Moreover, it was not until 2005 that Parliament moved all amphetamine products, including methamphetamine,from

Schedule III to

Schedule I. [41] Before the CDSA, Canadian courts displayed a somewhat better understanding of methamphetamine’s harmfulimpact than Parliament. In R v Ward (1980), (ON CA), 56 CCC (2d) 15 (WL) (Ont CA), the Ontario Court of Appealset aside a non-custodial sentence for two counts of trafficking in methamphetamine and imposed two concurrent six-month sentences inits place. The offender in that case was a mid-level trafficker who sold drugs to support his addiction.

In imposing the stiffer sentence,Martin J.A. noted, at para. 10, that, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, trafficking in dangerous drugs required custodialsentences. The Court went on to observe that methamphetamine fell within this category of illicit drugs. [42] As expected, Parliament’s decision to elevate methamphetamine to

Schedule I prompted a sharp increase intrafficking-related sentences for the drug. It also prompted a greater understanding of methamphetamine’s dangerous and addictivequalities. One of the first authorities to drive home this point was the Alberta Court of Appeal judgment in R v Ruth, 2007 ABCA 34[Ruth]. In Ruth, the offender entered guilty pleas to two counts of possession of unidentified quantities of methamphetamine for thepurposes of trafficking and one count of possession of cannabis marijuana. The sentencing judge imposed a global sentence of 36 monthsless credit for pre-trial custody.

In doing so, the sentencing judge found an aggravating factor in something that was neither proved noradmitted. On appeal, the Court concluded that this finding amounted to error and reduced the sentence to 16 months. Even so, Belzil J.(ad hoc) felt it necessary to emphasize that “methamphetamine is an insidious drug” and that the starting point sentence for trafficking in

drugs of this type was three years. The Court also recognized that denunciation and deterrence are primary sentencing objectives. [ 43 ] Similar observations were made in R v Copeland , 2007 CarswellOnt 5598 (WL) (Ont Sup Ct) . In that case, the offender pled guilty to possession of cocaine and possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, as well as possession of proceeds of crime of a value less than $5,000. The quantity of methamphetamine amounted to 8.15 grams of packaged crystalline product as well as 272.68 grams of bulk crystalline product.

The offender, who had a significant criminal record, was sentenced to three years imprisonment on the methamphetamine count and two years less a day imprisonment on the cocaine count. The published decision does not indicate whether these sentences were concurrent or consecutive.

In addressing the impact of methamphetamine, Spies J. referenced the Community Impact Statement for Methamphetamine Offences, prepared by Health Canada, and made the following comments at paras. 19-20: 19 Significant adverse effects come with methamphetamine use including minor physical effects and more severe effects including seizures, convulsions, extreme anxiety, repetitive compulsive behaviours, hallucinations, paranoia, violence, psychoses, cognitive impairment and changes to brain chemistry and structure. In extreme cases methamphetamine can cause death.

Recurring methamphetamine use has been associated with cognitive impairment and brain injuries. Most chronic abusers eventually develop long- term psychotic behaviour characterized by intense paranoia and visual and auditory hallucinations, which can be coupled with extremely violent behaviour. 20 According to the Impact Statement, methamphetamine is a highly addictive drug. Studies have shown it to produce rates of addiction similar to those of heroin and cocaine. The treatment of methamphetamine addicts is more difficult than those addicted to other substances of abuse.

In addition methamphetamine abusers have unusually high rates of relapse. Withdrawal from methamphetamine results in mood disturbances and violence is easily provoked. [ 44 ] A more recent commentary, specifically referenced in the context of sentencing, appears in R v Hidalgo , 2017 MBQB 100 . In that case, the offender pleaded guilty to conspiracy to traffic a total of 6 kilograms of methamphetamine in five transactions. It was acknowledged that the offender was a high-level dealer, involved in negotiating transactions, setting prices, directing accomplices and employing anti-detection techniques.

The Court sentenced the offender to nine years in prison less three months and two days credit for pre-trial custody. In addressing the scourge of methamphetamine, Suche J. addressed the factors that made denunciation and deterrence paramount considerations in the crafting of a proper sentence. In this regard, she wrote the following at para. 21: [21] It is trite law that denunciation and deterrence are the paramount considerations when sentencing offenders who traffic in hard drugs.

Although an everyday occurrence within the court, it should never be forgotten that drugs such as methamphetamine truly wreak devastation in our community: to those who are addicted, whose lives are ruined and sometimes ended; to relationships destroyed and children neglected or worse. A wide variety of crimes are committed and the public is required to fund police, child and family services agencies and hospitals to deal with the fallout. All of this to satisfy the greed involved in a very lucrative business.

The moral culpability of those involved in the high end of the hierarchy is very high and they must be treated severely. [Emphasis added] See also R v Hamilton , 2020 SKPC 19 at para 58 . [ 45 ] Another Saskatchewan case worth noting is the sentencing judgment of the Provincial Court of Saskatchewan in R v Bellerose , 2019 SKPC 13 . In that case, the offender was found in possession of crystal methamphetamine and $735 in cash. She entered a guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking as well as possession of proceeds of crime.

Lane P.C.J. found that the offender was a mid-level trafficker in a “dial-a-dope” operation and sentenced her to 27 months’ imprisonment. In his sentencing judgment, Lane P.C.J. wrote about his observations, as a local trial judge, on the impact of crystal methamphetamine. His comments, at paras. 43-45, deserve repetition here: [43] To better understand the seriousness of the impact of crystal methamphetamine, one must look at the Prince Albert experience. Offences involving crystal methamphetamine have become, in my experience, by far the most prevalent drug use in Prince Albert.

I would suggest that the overwhelming majority of CDSA charges in Prince Albert that I see involve crystal methamphetamine with the remainder being primarily cocaine. I see these charges virtually every day in court and, with great frequency, other charges that typically accompany crystal methamphetamine charges include firearms offences such as possessing prohibited firearms, possessing firearms, and possessing loaded firearms. It goes without saying that Ms.

Bellerose was not charged nor was she found in possession of any firearms however, she was found in possession of 12 shotgun shells. [44] I see victims of addiction to crystal methamphetamine in court, some almost literally dying in front of me. [45] There is much case law that discusses the highly addictive and destructive nature of crystal methamphetamine. There was a time when heroin was considered generally by the courts to be the most addictive and destructive drug. It seems that crystal methamphetamine is now seen by the courts as being as addictive and destructive, if not more so, than heroin.

I pause, at this point, only to note that my own observations, particularly in criminal and child protection proceedings, resemble those of my Provincial Court colleague. [ 46 ] By my reading of the relevant authorities, the blameworthiness of an offender’s conduct, in trafficking methamphetamine, or any other illicit drug, depends principally on the extent of the offender’s involvement.

This engages inquiries as to: (1) whether the trafficker is an active wholesaler of the product; (2) whether the particular offender is the operating mind or principal actor in a given operation; and (3) the level of trust and responsibility accorded to a particular offender. Such inquiries can lead to consideration of possible sentencing ranges corresponding to the extent of such involvement. [ 47 ] An illustration of this understanding is reflected in R v Rocha , 2009 MBCA 26 , 236 Man R (2d) 213 [ Rocha ] , a judgment of the Manitoba Court of Appeal.

In Rocha , the offender was found guilty of trafficking 20 ounces of crack cocaine and sentenced to four years’ imprisonment. The sentence was based, at least in part, on the finding that the offender was a mid-level courier.

The Crown appealed the sentence on the grounds of a misapplication of the parity principle. In dismissing the Crown’s appeal, the Court addressed the relevant ranges of sentence for drug couriers and drug offenders who are accorded greater levels of trust. In this regard, Chartier J.A. described two sentencing ranges at paras. 64-65: 64 Those that are trusted beyond a mere courier at the mid-level group should normally expect a sentence in the range of five to eight years . See R. v. Dew (V.L.) , [2006] M.J. No. 229 (Q.B.) (QL) , and R. v. Labossiere which was referred to in R. v.

Dew (E.J.) , 2008 MBQB 159 , 232 Man.R. (2d) 1 . Those who are mere couriers involved at the mid-level and whose sole purpose is to transport the drugs for their boss in order to prevent the latter from being detected should expect a sentence in the range of three to six years . See R. v. Lyons and R. v.

McRae referred to in Dew (E.J.) . 65 Here, as there is no evidence that the accused was anything more than a courier transporting drugs at the multi-ounce level, he falls in the three- to six-year range. [Emphasis added] [ 48 ] Of course, in considering the above comments, it must also be remembered that sentencing ranges are only guidelines designed to help sentencing judges to advance parity. They should not be seen as hard and fast rules. As such, a sentence that falls outside a recommended range may not, by that reason alone, amount to an error of law or principle.

See R v Nasogaluak , 2010 SCC 6 at para 44 , [2010] 1 SCR 206 and R v Parranto , 2021 SCC 46 at paras 20-22 , [2022] 1 WWR 1 . [ 49 ] Further to the issue of sentencing ranges, I will now address the judgment in Favreau .

In Favreau , the offender entered guilty pleas to four counts: (1) trafficking in cocaine; (2) possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking; (3) possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking; and (4) possession of proceeds of crime over $5,000. [ 50 ] According to the evidence accepted at the sentencing hearing, the offender had been under surveillance before a search warrant was executed at her home. In the execution of the warrant, police seized 172.38 grams of methamphetamine and 68.76 grams of cocaine. Police also seized score sheets as well as text messages from two cell phones.

Allbright J. found that the information extracted from the phones were consistent with the scenario that the offender was involved in ongoing drug trafficking activities between April 23 and November 5, 2015. In these activities, the offender supplied multiple quantities to lesser level traffickers in Saskatoon, Regina, Prince Albert and other smaller communities in Saskatchewan. It was also noted that the offender’s methamphetamine trafficking was frequently at the half kilogram level and reached the kilogram level on at least one occasion.

She received her supply from Edmonton and negotiated the sale transactions to her purchasers. Sometimes, the offender accepted property in exchange for drugs or to satisfy drug debts. In short, the offender’s activities were essentially that of an entrepreneur in a sophisticated, high-level trafficking operation. [ 51 ] Allbright J. concluded that the nature and level of the offender’s operation amounted to a significant aggravating factor.

Another aggravating factor related to the fact that methamphetamine and cocaine are highly addictive, a fact that was illustrated by the offender’s own addiction. [ 52 ] After accounting for all the aggravating and mitigating factors, and referencing Crown and defence counsel’s respective positions, Allbright J. said the following: I have concluded that Ms. Favreau’s conduct relating to these offences is most serious.

I have further concluded that the range for sentences relating to methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine, as is the case here, is six years to ten years’ incarceration at her level of involvement . The range for sentencing relating to the offences involving cocaine is, in my view, somewhat less, perhaps more accurately described as three to six years. Her involvement in cocaine was, in my respectful view, not towards the high-end as was her involvement in methamphetamine. [Emphasis added] Allbright J. then sentenced the offender to six and one-half years’ imprisonment on the methamphetamine count.

Concurrent sentences on the other counts were three years’ imprisonment for trafficking in cocaine, four years for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and four years for possession of the proceeds of crime. [ 53 ] Other relevant authorities include the following: a. R v Paterson , 2013 BCSC 880 – The 28-year-old offender, with an unrelated criminal record, was found guilty of nine offences, including firearms and ammunition offences and possession of certain drugs for the purposes of trafficking.

The drugs in question included approximately 200 grams of methamphetamine, 825 grams of cocaine and approximately 9,000 pills of MDMA (“ecstasy”). For the firearms and ammunition offences as well as the possession of cocaine, MDMA and methamphetamine for purposes of trafficking, the offender was sentenced to four-and-one-half year concurrent sentences. He also faced lesser concurrent sentences for simple possession of marihuana and oxycodone.

Although Blok J. did not reference the level of the offender’s trafficking activity, the described circumstances suggest that the offender was a mid to high level trafficker. As for aggravating circumstances, the Court focused principally on the firearms in the offender’s possession. b. R v Chanmany , 2016 ONCA 576 , 338 CCC (3d) 578 – The 32-year-old offender, with no criminal record, was found guilty of possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime. In a search warrant of the offender’s vehicle, police seized 7 kilograms of methamphetamine and $1,800 cash.

At trial, the offender testified that he had been a long-time dealer in cocaine but denied possession of the methamphetamine. In imposing sentence, the trial judge concluded that the offender was an active wholesaler of both cocaine and methamphetamine. He imposed a sentence of nine years’ imprisonment, less credit for pre-trial custody. On appeal, the sentence was adjusted only for a minor error in the calculation of pre-trial custody.

In all other respects, the sentence fell within the appropriate range having regard to the significant quantity, the danger of the drug, packaging for delivery and financial gain. c. R v Ban , 2014 BCCA 68 – The 23-year-old offender, with five prior convictions, was found guilty of possession of one kilogram of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. One of the offender’s prior convictions related to the offender being found in possession of a

similar quantity of methamphetamine in 2008. The trial judge imposed a conditional sentence order [CSO]. In doing so, he noted, among other things, that the offender acted as a courier, placing him above street level trafficking in cocaine, but below a kilogram-level dealer. In the trial judge’s view, this circumstance did not justify a penitentiary sentence. On appeal, the Court of Appeal concluded that the sentence was demonstrably unfit, even with the acceptance of the offender’s explanation of the circumstances.

The Court varied the sentence to three years’ imprisonment, with credit for four months served on the CSO. Although this sentence did not involve possession of methamphetamine, it provides some guidance related to sentencing for above street-level trafficking. d. R v Le , 2015 ONCJ 154 – The 56-year-old offender, with no previous criminal record, pled guilty to charges of production of methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of chemicals knowing they would be used to manufacture methamphetamine.

The search of the offender’s vehicle incidental to arrest revealed 42,000 allergy medication pills, nine kilograms of pseudoephedrine and 984 grams of crystal methamphetamine. The sentencing judge found that the chemicals could have led to the production of six kilograms of methamphetamine, valued at between $33,000 and $1,050,000. The offender was sentenced to six and one-half years’ imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

Aggravating factors included the extremely high volume of the substance and the fact that the offender was an important member of a sophisticated drug production and trafficking operation. e. R v Ziaee , 2017 BCSC 569 [ Ziaee ] – According to the judgment in this case, M. and Z. were engaged in the trafficking of cocaine, ecstasy, methamphetamine, and marijuana. Z., who had no criminal record, entered guilty pleas to the possession for the purpose of trafficking charges and was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment.

M. was found guilty at trial and sentenced to five years each for possession for purpose of trafficking of cocaine and methamphetamine, and two years each for possession for the purpose of trafficking of ecstasy and marijuana, to all be served concurrently. The sentencing judge specifically noted that M. was the operating mind of the operation and directed Z in his role. f. R v Delacruz , 2017 MBCA 10 [ Delacruz ] – The offender, whose age and criminal record were not disclosed, received a five-year prison sentence for trafficking and possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking.

In imposing sentence, the sentencing judge determined that the offender was a mid-level courier rather than an operator of a stash house. According to Rocha , the recommended sentencing range for a mid-level courier was three to six years’ imprisonment, while the operator of a stash house could expect a sentence of between five to eight years. On appeal, the Crown noted the sentencing judge’s comment to the effect that the offender’s position as a courier was accorded a high level of trust, thereby justifying a sentence at the high end of the mid-level courier range.

In the Crown’s view, this was a misapplication of the applicable range. While the Manitoba Court of Appeal agreed with this view, it was not prepared to intervene in the substantive sentence. Writing for the Court, leMaistre J.A. observed that sentencing ranges are “guidelines rather than hard and fast rules”. As such, a deviation from a sentencing range is not synonymous with an error of law or an error of principle. In this case, the misapplication of the range did not result in a demonstrably unfit sentence. g.

R v Hamilton , 2020 SKPC 19 – The 42-year-old offender, with a lengthy criminal record that included drug-related offences, entered guilty pleas to possession of property obtained by crime and possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking. After arresting the offender for assault, police found the offender had $5,260 in cash on his person. A subsequent search warrant of the offender’s apartment revealed a canister containing packaged quantities of methamphetamine. The total amount of methamphetamine seized was 846 grams.

Stang, P.C.J. concluded that the offender was a mid-level trafficker and that the large quantity of methamphetamine amounted to an aggravating factor, along with his prior criminal record and the possession of a prohibited weapon (bear spray). Having regard to all the relevant factors, including Gladue considerations, the sentencing judge imposed a sentence of 56 months imprisonment, with 12 months credit for pre-trial custody.

Considerations under s. 718.2 (e) [ 54 ] Turning to the Gladue considerations, under s. 718.2(e), this Court has received guidance from a number of Saskatchewan Court of Appeal decisions that have, in turn, considered and applied the analysis in the two leading Supreme Court of Canada authorities, namely, Gladue and R v Ipeelee , 2012 SCC 13 , [2012] 1 SCR 433 [ Ipeelee ].

The Court of Appeal decisions I reference are R v Chanalquay , 2015 SKCA 141 , 472 Sask R 110 [ Chanalquay ]; R v Whitehead , 2016 SKCA 165 , 344 CCC (3d) 1; R v Slippery , 2015 SKCA 149 , 472 Sask R 181 [ Slippery ]; R v Delorme , 2017 SKCA 3 ; R v Lemaigre , 2018 SKCA 47 [ Lemaigre ]; and R v Bear , 2022 SKCA 69 . These judgments, particularly the analysis in Chanalquay , call for sentencing judges to assess whether the systemic and background factors speak to the culpability of Aboriginal or Indigenous offenders in such a way that the moral blameworthiness of the offender’s conduct may be lessened.

If so, such factors may impact the determination of a fit sentence. [ 55 ] In R v Sand , 2019 SKQB 123 , Danyliuk J. carried out a helpful review of the then leading Saskatchewan authorities on the application of s. 718.2(e), along with references to the judgments in Gladue and Ipeelee . A point-form

summary of that review is as follows: a. Subsection 718.2(

e) requires sentencing judges to take a view of sentencing that is more restorative in nature where such a view is warranted and possible. ( Sand at para 20 .) b. Subsection 718.2(

e) is neither a “get out of jail free” card nor an automatic discount in sentence. Rather, it is a direction that sentencing judges must consider additional factors in crafting a fit sentence. ( Chanalquay at para 54 ; Lemaigre at para 17 ; Sand at para 21 .) c. Two main additional factors are: (1) systemic factors, such as residential schools and the theory of colonization, of which sentencing judges are entitled to take judicial notice; and (2) alternative types of sentencing procedures or sanctions, other than incarceration, that may be best for a particular offender. ( Sand at paras 22 and 25 .) d.

Systemic factors may illuminate the degree to which an Aboriginal or Indigenous offender possesses the moral blameworthiness or responsibility for the crimes committed. Even so, such factors are unlikely to eliminate moral blameworthiness or vitiate the voluntariness of an offender’s actions ( Sand at para 23 .) e. It is not incumbent on an offender to establish any direct causal link between the so-called Gladue factors and the subject

offences. ( Ipeelee at para 83 ; Slippery at paras 45 and 46 ; Sand at para 26 .) [ 56 ] Danyliuk J. concluded his review with an important observation. He observed that sentencing judges should not easily rebut or overstate the importance of the Supreme Court of Canada’s

interpretation of s. 718.2 (e). Citing comments from Chanalquay , Danyliuk J. wrote the following at para. 28: 28 However, while the importance of Gladue and Ipeelee cannot be gainsaid, neither should they be overemphasized. They do not create an entire new system of sentencing. The Criminal Code , and the cases interpreting same, simply make it incumbent upon sentencing judges to give genuine and meaningful consideration to s. 718.2(e), just as judges must give genuine and meaningful consideration to the other sentencing principles set out in the Criminal Code and in case law.

The type of crime and its effects on the victims remain to be properly considered as well. Chief Justice Richards said this in Chanalquay at paras 42 and 43 : [42] Thus, while s. 718.2(e), as interpreted by Gladue and Ipeelee , mandates a particular kind of analysis when sentencing an Aboriginal offender, it does not create a wholly new sentencing paradigm. Sentencing judges must attempt to give meaningful effect to the remedial purpose of s. 718.2(

e) and must be highly alert to the ongoing problem represented by the troubling incarceration rates of Aboriginal people. But, the ultimate sentencing objective is clear: considering all of the relevant sentencing principles, including s. 718.2(e), what is a fit sentence for the offender given his or her circumstances, the nature of the crime, the situation of the victim, and the interests of the community? ( Gladue at para 75 .) [43] I note that this means a sentencing judge must attempt to understand not just the situation and background of the offender and the particulars of the crime in issue.

He or she must also, to the extent reasonably possible, attempt to understand the relevant dynamics of the community and the circumstances of the victim. After all, the victims of crimes committed by Aboriginal offenders are all too frequently other Aboriginals, often ones with precisely the same Gladue backgrounds as the offenders. They must not be overlooked.

In order to understand all of this, it may sometimes be necessary for a trial judge to demand more than is typically provided in this province by way of a pre-sentence report. [Emphasis added] Analysis [ 57 ] As reflected in the authorities referenced in this written judgment, the sentencing objectives of denunciation and deterrence, both general and individual, are paramount considerations in sentences involving methamphetamine trafficking. This is particularly so in cases involving wholesale operations.

Where the offender holds a principal or leadership role in such an operation, as was apparent in Favreau , a sentence of the kind imposed by Allbright J. is entirely appropriate. Indeed, there may be a compelling argument to support an even stiffer sentence in such circumstances. [ 58 ] Having said all this, I am not convinced that the sentencing range described by my former colleague is as mandatory and unyielding as the Crown contends. I say this, for two reasons.

First, as defence counsel pointed out, it is noteworthy that Allbright J. did not reference specific case authorities in support of the sentencing range he described. While I do not disagree with the sentence imposed in Favreau , it is not clear to me that the described range is beyond challenge. Even if mandatory as the Crown submits, a deviation from the range, similar to that reflected in Delacruz , would appear to be acceptable. [ 59 ] Secondly, I was satisfied that, while Mr.

Kidder played a trusted role in this wholesale methamphetamine trafficking operation, it was reasonably clear that he was not one of the principals or operating minds behind the operation. In saying this, I acknowledge that his role seemed to be somewhat greater than that simply of a “runner”, an acknowledgement principally based on his direct engagement with lower-level methamphetamine traffickers. That said, it is equally apparent that these transactions were almost certainly at the direction of either C. or M. Moreover, unlike the situation in Favreau , there is no evidence that Mr.

Kidder actively negotiated the transactions that he completed. In this sense, his role was more consistent with that of the offender in Ziaee , who acted on the instructions of the other offender. [ 60 ] Even so, I accept that Mr. Kidder’s integral role in this particular operation attracts the sentencing objectives of denunciation and deterrence, both general and individual.

In addition, there are aggravating factors associated with the offender’s involvement in the wholesale trafficking of this insidiously dangerous drug, including the quantity of the substance that was discovered within the operation. [ 61 ] As for mitigating circumstances, the Crown did not vigourously challenge the assertion in the PSR that Mr. Kidder’s own methamphetamine addiction played a significant role in his involvement with this operation. While this clearly does not excuse Mr.

Kidder’s conduct, it shows that the financial motive for his involvement was to support his addiction – not for pure financial gain. [ 62 ] As for Gladue factors, I accept that there may be lingering intergenerational impacts related to the experiences of Mr. Kidder’s family members. That said, it is unclear how that evidence lessens the moral blameworthiness of this offender’s behaviour. At most, it may suggest some vulnerability to such things as drug abuse which, in turn, led to Mr. Kidder’s criminal activity. In my view, even that is somewhat tenuous.

Conclusion [ 63 ] Taking all these matters into account, particularly acknowledging that Mr. Kidder’s role was more that of an underling in this wholesale operation, I directed a global sentence of five years imprisonment. This consisted of a sentence of five years’ imprisonment on the methamphetamine charge (Count 2), along with four years concurrent on the cocaine charge (Count 1), four years concurrent on the proceeds of crime charge (count 3) and two years concurrent on the weapons/ammunition offence (Count 4).

[ 64 ] The aggregate sentence imposed amounted to 1,825 days. As Mr. Kidder had been in custody since September 2, 2021, his total time of pre-sentence custody, calculated to July 17, 2023, amounted to 683 days. With credit at one and one-half days for each day of pre-sentence custody, this amounted to a remand credit of 1,024 days, leaving a net sentence going forward of 801 days to serve. [ 65 ] In addition, I directed the following ancillary orders: a. Pursuant to s. 487.051 of the Criminal Code , there shall be an order in Form 5.03 authorizing the taking of the number of samples of bodily substances from Mr.

Kidder that is reasonably required for the purpose of forensic DNA analysis and retention in the DNA information databank; and b. Pursuant to s. 109 of the Criminal Code , that you be prohibited from possessing any firearm, crossbow, prohibited weapon, restricted weapon, prohibited device, ammunition and explosive substance for life. [ 66 ] I also directed the issue of a separate forfeiture order in the form to be drafted by Crown counsel. [ 67 ] Finally, as the evidence disclosed that Mr.

Kidder had no assets or financial resources with which to pay victim surcharges, I directed that it be waived pursuant to s. 737(2.1) (

a) of the Criminal Code . ______________________________J. R.W. ELSON