R v Gooddo, 2023 ABCJ 246

In the Alberta Court of Justice Citation: R v Gooddo, 2023 ABCJ 246 Date: 20231122 Docket: E10691310T Registry: Edmonton Between: His Majesty the King Crown - and - Singh Jit Gooddo Accused Reasons for Judgment o f Justice of the Peace Wesley Smart [ 1 ] Gooddo, Singh Jit was charged with unlawful contravention of subsection 22(2) of the Cargo Securement Standard (the ‘Standard”) by a violation ticket served upon him by Cst. Kyle Westergaard of the Edmonton Police Service on October 28, 2022. The matter proceeded to trial before me in Traffic Court in Edmonton on September 13, 2023.

I shall refer to the Accused as the Defendant. [ 2 ] The substance of the charge alleged that the Defendant: DID UNLAWFULLY CONTRAVENE SECTION 22(2) OF THE CARGO SECUREMENT STANDARD – INADEQUATE NUMBER OF TIEDOWNS. [ 3 ] The charge notably does not state an offence section. The Defendant did not challenge the validity of the charge prior to the trial commencing.

Based on the evidence heard, it was apparent that if any offence was committed, it was contrary to 17(3) of the Commercial Vehicle Safety Regulation , Alta Reg 121/2009 as amended (the “ Regulation ”): A carrier or an owner of a commercial vehicle shall not permit a driver to operate, and a driver shall not operate, a commercial vehicle where the cargo transported in or on the commercial vehicle is not contained, immobilized or secured in accordance with NSC Standard 10 as it relates to the particular type of commercial vehicle. [ 4 ] Based on s 44 of the Regulation and s 157(3) of the Traffic Safety Act RSA 2000 c T-6 as amended (“ TSA ”), I concluded the charge was sufficient to proceed in this case.

An exception provided under s 17(5) of the Regulation did not apply on the facts of this case. [ 5 ] During the trial the Crown tendered the evidence of one witness, Cst. Kyle Westergaard, and the Defendant elected to testify in his own defence. I found there was no material difference in the evidence as between the witnesses. I summarize it here.

[ 6 ] On October 28, 2022 the accused was operating a tractor-trailer unit at 184th Street and Highway 16 in Edmonton, Alberta. The tractor bore an Alberta license plate registered to 1693826 Alberta Ltd, which was Mr. Gooddo’s company, and it was pulling a flatbed trailer. The certificate entered as Exhibit 2 by the Crown showed that the vehicle was a 2013 Freightliner Cascadia truck, of a Class 1-61 and having a registered weight of 46, 500 kilograms. Exhibits 4, 5, 6 and 7 entered by the Defendant during his case, show the flatbed trailer as well as the tractor unit, from various angles.

Those photographs were taken after the officer conducted his investigation and after the Defendant had applied tiedown straps over the steel bins on the trailer as shown particularly in Exhibits 3 and 4. [ 7 ] The officer testified that when he stopped the vehicle, he did an inspection before issuing the ticket. He observed two steel bins resting on the flat deck trailer. The bins were not tied down to the trailer by the use of any straps.

He testified that the length of the trailer was 12.34 meters and, based on his understanding of the National Safety Code for Motor Carriers, there was a requirement for two tie-down straps at the first 3.04 meter mark and then one further strap for each 3.04 meters of distance moving from the front of the trailer to the back.

He testified that the size of the container determined the number of tie-downs needed; further, that the forward bin was not tied down and the cargo only had 3 straps whereas 6 were required. [ 8 ] The officer has experience in commercial vehicle regulation, having been employed in the commercial vehicle inspection unit of the Edmonton Police Service for 17 years and before that, in commercial vehicle inspection with the Alberta Transportation department. He mentioned that in 2005 new standards were introduced to regulate commercial vehicles and he took extensive training to become familiar with them.

He was not qualified as an expert witness but I accept he has a working knowledge of the regulations relevant in this case. [ 9 ] A view of the trailer as shown in Exhibits 4 through 7, which I accepted as an accurate depiction, showed that there were chains that appeared to secure the bins to the trailer: one at each of the front and rear of the front blue bin; another at the front of the rear bin and a further midway in a triangular fashion (secured at two points on the trailer rising to a single point at the top of the bin). [ 10 ] The Defendant showed Exhibits 3 through 7 to the officer during cross-examination.

The officer accepted they were accurate photographs of the vehicle except that the tiedown straps were not on the bins when he conducted his investigation. The accused subsequently testified that he took the photographs approximately 30 minutes after the officer stopped him. The photographs show the state and condition of the tractor-trailer unit at the time of the investigation except that they also show straps or tie-downs over the top of the bins, that were not there when the officer stopped the vehicle.

The officer testified that he gave direction to the Defendant to tie the bins down and the Defendant testified that he complied with the direction after the officer directed him to put the tie-downs on, after which he took the photos. [ 11 ] After the evidence was presented by the prosecutor but before the Crown’s case was closed, the prosecutor was asked whether the NSC Standard 10 was being presented in evidence.

He sought to produce for reference a copy of a document apparently obtained from a legal resource service, but not a certified copy from a government source nor one published in any Alberta or Canada Gazette. [ 12 ] The terms of the Standard and its proper

interpretation are central to determining legal requirements binding commercial vehicle operators in Alberta and the question of whether, on the facts in this case, the Defendant did not comply with those requirements.

In cases where the question of due diligence has been considered, the definition of terms in guidelines or policy documents adopted in law can become a central issue (see Swaigen & McRory, Regulatory Offences in Canada: Liability and Defences, 2 nd ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2018) at pp 138-145 and cases cited infra ). [ 13 ] The prosecution contended that as the bins were not physically part of the trailer structure, they were “cargo” within the meaning of the Standard and the Regulation and therefore required tie downs to secure them to the trailer unit, as described in the evidence of the officer. [ 14 ] The Defendant contended that the bins were secured to the trailer by using secure chains, that this was the way such bins are typically attached to and form part of the trailer in the trucking business, and that only when there is cargo put in the bins for transport are tie-downs needed.

The Defendant testified that on this occasion the bins were empty. There was no other evidence to indicate that there was any material, goods or objects in the bins. I accept and infer from the Defendant’s evidence that the bins were empty. I also infer from all of the evidence that the chains in place secured the bins to the trailer. No evidence was offered and no finding can be made about how secure they were. [ 15 ] On the evidence heard and submissions heard, these issues emerged: 1.

May judicial notice be taken of the National Safety Code for Motor Carriers Standard 10 (Cargo Securement) (the “Standard”) as adopted under s 2(

f) of the Commercial Vehicle Safety Regulation , Alta Reg 121/109 as amended, given that the Standard was not introduced in evidence during the course of the trial? 2. Have the requirements of Standard 10 been sufficiently proved in evidence if judicial notice cannot be taken of them? 3. Was “cargo” transported on the facts of this case and within the meaning of Standard 10 or s 17(3) of the Regulation , not “contained, immobilized or secured” in accordance with s 17(3) of the Regulation ? [ 16 ] At the close of the case, submissions were made by the Crown and by Mr. Gooddo on his own behalf.

I reserved for judgment. Subsequently, upon further review of the issues and in particular the question of judicial notice, the parties were invited to offer any further submissions. On October 11, 2023 the matter was heard. The Crown offered oral submissions and identified the decisions in R v Collins (op cite R v Sims et al ), 2000 BCCA 437 [ Collins ] and R v Khan , 2017 ABPC 10 as relevant, and provided a copy of Standard 10 which was said to be reproduced from the CanLII legal resource service (marked as Exhibit A for identification).

The Crown argued that judicial notice must be taken of Standard 10 whether or not it had been proved in evidence. The Defendant’s argument (marked now as Exhibit

B) did not address the issue of judicial notice but did reiterate and supplement arguments at trial that

the steel bins were not cargo and were sufficiently secured. I note that when a search was subsequently made of the CanLII service, the Standard was not located or accessible, though one could be obtained by a search of the Council of Ministers website at : https://www.ccmta.ca/web/default/files/PDF/NSC_Standard_10-_June_2013.pdf. [ 17 ] Page 10-2 of that document contains this endorsement: The NSC Standard 10 Cargo Securement was approved by the Council of Ministers Responsible for Transportation and Highway Safety on June 8, 2013.

The content and numbering of this text is identical to the Standard as approved by the Council of Ministers; however the appearance and layout may be different, including the pagination, the header and footer. This style has been adopted to be consistent with all standards that appear in the Manual: National Safety Code for Motor Carriers. June 2013 ISBN 978-0-9878957-2-1. Is the Standard a ‘regulation’ [ 18 ]

Section 2 (

f) of the Commercial Vehicle Safety Regulation provides, inter alia, that: The following standards are adopted and apply to commercial vehicles under this Regulation : . . . (

f) National Safety Code for Motor Carriers Standard 10 (Cargo Securement), referred to as NSC Standard 10, made by the Canadian Council of Motor Transport Administrators and dated June 2013, as amended from time to time,

section 1 (Interpretation) and Parts 1 and 4; [ 19 ] During the trial no proof of the Standard was offered, although the Crown offered to provide a copy of the Standard purportedly printed from the CanLII legal information service. As noted, ultimately that copy was accepted as Exhibit B for identification. The Crown was not able to produce a certified copy of the Standard nor a copy reproduced from the Canada or Alberta Gazette, though an opportunity to do so was provided. [ 20 ] The wording of s 2(

f) of the Regulation suggests a legislative intent that the Standard form part of the Regulation . However, the Standard does not appear to be reproduced in any manner nor is attached as an appendix to the Regulation . [ 21 ] The Regulations Act, RSA 2000 c R-14 created a procedure for filing and requiring publishing notice of regulations enacted by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council under authorizing legislation. It defines a regulation at s 1(

f) as: (f) “regulation” means a regulation as defined in the

Interpretation Act that is of a legislative nature. [ 22 ] The

Interpretation Act, RSA 2000, c I-8 , s 1(1)(

c) defines “regulation”: (c) “regulation” means a regulation, order, rule, form, tariff of costs or fees, proclamation, bylaw or resolution enacted (

i) in the execution of a power conferred by or under the authority of

an Act, or (ii) by or under the authority of the Lieutenant Governor in Council, but does not include an order of a court made in the course of an action or an order made by a public officer or administrative tribunal in a dispute between 2 or more persons; [ 23 ] Subsection 1(2) of the Regulations Act states certain instruments or documents are not regulations:

(2) The following are not regulations within the meaning of subsection (1)(f): . . . (

d) a document adopted or incorporated by reference in a regulation [ 24 ] By virtue of s 1(1)(

f) and 1(2) of the Regulations Act , I conclude the Standard is not a regulation. Therefore the publication requirements under that Act are of no effect regarding it. If it were a regulation, non-publication would be a critical obstacle to enforcing it because of s 3(5) of the Regulations Act , which states:

(5) Unless expressly provided to the contrary in another Act, and subject to subsection (3), a regulation that is not published is not valid as against a person who has not had actual notice of it. [ 25 ] If the Standard were a regulation but not published, then the Crown would be required to adduce positive evidence proving that the accused had notice of its requirements. [ 26 ] What bearing then does the non-publication of the Standard have on its enforceability against the accused? For this I then turn to the question of whether judicial notice can be taken of it. Judicial Notice

[27] As has been commented by one prominent legal writer, the common law requires courts to judicially notice the common law,as well as public or general statutes but nothing more, including subordinate legislation (David Watt, Watt’s Manual of CriminalEvidence (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2020) at para 14.03). How then is subordinate legislation to be put before a Court forconsideration? [28] First, regard must be had for any binding statutory law. There is applicable legislation at both the Provincial and Federallevel. [29] The Alberta Evidence Act, RSA 2000, c A-18, sections 27 to 33 inclusive, address the proof of letters patent, statutes and,under

section 29 in particular, proof of a “proclamation, order, regulation or appointment in office” by way of a copy of such instrumentproduced from the Canada Gazette or official gazette of a Province.

Section 32 then requires that judicial notice be taken of every Act orregulation of Alberta and every publication of them in the Canada or Alberta Gazette. [30] As noted above, the Regulation expressly adopts and applies the Standard as amended from time to time (section 1 and Parts 1to 4 of the Standard), but the Standard is not reproduced or shown published as a part of the Regulation.

The Evidence Act provisionsenabling judicial notice are therefore inapplicable in this case as the Regulations Act expressly excepts a document incorporated byreference from being a regulation, and the Standard is not otherwise published in an official Gazette. [31] The Regulation identifies the Standard as one made by the Canadian Council of Motor Transport Administrators, whichimplies a national regulatory body that may be recognized, and from that it might have been inferred that the Standard is a publicdocument, which might have been introduced in evidence by use of a certified copy shown to have been certified by an appropriateofficial, pursuant to s 33 of the Alberta Evidence Act.

That was not done in this case. [32] It is to be noted that the Provincial Offences Procedures Act, RSA 2000, c P-34, as amended, [POPA] also addresses thequestion of judicial notice, but not the question considered here of judicial notice of a document incorporated by reference under aregulation.

Section 20 of POPA states: The following shall be judicially noticed;

a) Any rule, order or bylaw made pursuant to

an Act;

b) The publication or promulgation of a rule, order or bylaw as required to be published or promulgated by

an Act. [33] The Criminal Code of Canada, RSC 1970, c C-34 has provisions that might be considered. Criminal Code provisions areincorporated by reference under Provincial law pursuant to

section 3 of POPA.

Section 781 of the Criminal Code states: 1) Want of proof of order in council – No order, conviction or other proceeding shall be quashed or set aside, and no defendant shallbe discharged, by reason only that evidence has not been given

a) of a proclamation or order of the Governor in Council or lieutenant governor in council;

b) of rules, regulations or by-laws made by the Governor in Council under

an Act of Parliament or by the lieutenant governor incouncil under

an Act of the legislature of the province; or

c) of the publication of a proclamation, order, rule, regulation or by-law in the Canada gazette or in the office gazette for the province. 1) Judicial notice – Proclamations, orders, rules, regulations and by-laws mentioned in subsection (1) and the publication thereofshall be judicially noticed. [Emphasis added] [34] Reading the noted provisions of the Alberta Evidence Act and Regulations Act together and noting s 781 of the CriminalCode, it is clear that judicial notice is to be taken of an ‘order, rule, regulation or by-law” provided that it is published in the officialgazette.

It bears emphasizing that a copy of the Standard was apparently not published in either the Canada or Alberta Gazette, nor wasany such document put before me during the tendering of evidence at the trial nor in the course of submissions at the end of the trial. [35] This case is remarkably similar to that considered in R v “Evgenia Chandris” (The), (SCC), [1977] SCR 97[Evgenia Chandris], in which the issue of judicial notice of subordinate legislation was considered.

Laskin, CJ, while in dissent, summedup the circumstances before the Court as follows at para 2: Crown counsel at the hearing of the charge apparently did not have the Regulations upon which the charge was founded with him or, ifhe did, he kept them concealed. They were not produced to the Court in any way, nor were they referred to by counsel or by any witness.At the conclusion of the evidence and when argument was commenced by Crown counsel, the Provincial Judge drew attention to the factthat the Regulations had not been brought before him in any way.

Crown counsel did not ask the Court to take judicial notice of theRegulations and did not state or even imply that the Regulations had ever been published. [36] Thus the question in Evgenia Chandris was whether judicial notice could be taken of a regulation even though its publicationhad not been proved.

The majority resolved that issue in favour of the Crown based upon the regulation in question having beenpublished in the Canada Gazette and by applying s 23(1) of the Statutory Instruments Act, 1970-71-72 (Can) c 38, which read: 1) A statutory instrument that has been published in the Canada Gazette shall be judicially noticed. 2) In addition to any other manner of proving the existence or contents of a statutory instrument, evidence of the existence or contentsof a statutory instrument may be given by the production of a copy of the Canada Gazette purporting to contain the text of the statutoryinstrument. 3) For the purposes of this section, where a regulation is included in a copy of a consolidation of regulations purporting to be printed

by the Queen’s Printer, the regulation shall be deemed to have been published in the Canada Gazette. [37] The Court (per de Grandpre J for the majority) stated at para 20: Thus, by the words of the statute, the rule of judicial notice is limited to those instruments which in fact had been published in theGazette.

But this fact of publication needs no proof. [38] The minority in Evgenia Chandris would have dismissed the Crown’s argument on the application of the StatutoryInstruments Act because to not require proof of the fact of publication would have made parts of s 23 redundant or to have led to anabsurdity. [39] Whether considering the rule in Evgenia Chandris or statutory rules under the Criminal Code or Alberta legislation, thefundamental rule that requires publication of subordinate legislation before it can be judicially noticed remains, subject to any statutoryenactment removing the requirement of proof (see R v Markin, (BCCA) at para 89).

In the absence of a statutoryprovision requiring or permitting judicial notice, the subordinate legislation must be proved in evidence: R v Schaeffer, 2005 SKCA 33 atpara 15. [40] As to whether s 781 of the Criminal Code (formerly, s 687 as considered in both Evgenia Chandris and R v Markin), allowsfor recognition of a regulation not published, Courts have confined the application of s 781 to proceedings for judicial review under theprerogative writs, rather than it being a positive statement of law that subordinate legislation need not be published for it to be judiciallynoticed.

And Courts have remained consistent on the principle that it is publication of subordinate legislation in the official Gazette ofthe jurisdiction that allows judicial notice to be taken of the enactment, whether publication is proved and whether or not a copy of theenactment is even produced in Court: R v The Vessel “Besseggen”, (BCCA). [41] The prosecutor submitted Collins in support of the proposition that proof of publication of a standard adopted by regulationwas not required.

In that case the British Columbia Court of Appeal held that incorporation by reference was complete withoutpublication of the text of the incorporated documents in the Canada Gazette, and that it was not necessary to publish a regulatorystandard incorporated by reference in the regulation for a prosecution of an offence to proceed.

The decision, along with the subsequentdecision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in R v St Lawrence Cement Inc, (ONCA) [St Lawrence Cement], whichadopted the decision in Collins (at para 20), considered a different statutory regime which did not contain the same provision as s 1(2) ofthe Alberta Regulations Act which expressly states that a document incorporated by reference is not a regulation. What was implicit inthe Collins ruling is that a contravention of an unpublished regulation could not be prosecuted by virtue of s 11(

f) of the StatutoryInstruments Act, RSC 1985, c S-22 a provision similar to s 3(5) the Alberta Regulations Act, which states “a regulation that is notpublished is not valid as against a person who has not had actual notice of it” (emphasis added). If an unpublished regulation is notenforceable, even more so is an unpublished document incorporated by reference in a regulation. In neither Collins nor St LawrenceCement was the line of authority represented by Evgenia Chandris, R v Markin and R v Schaeffer considered. [42] The decision of the Alberta Provincial Court (per L.W. Robertson, Prov.

J) in R v Khan, 2017 ABPC 101[Khan] is directly onpoint on the issue in this case. In Khan, the accused was charged with multiple offences under the Alberta Fire Code (AFC) relating toinadequate design and construction of a dwelling house that involved increased occupancy with risk of threat of smoke and fire.

Theaccused asserted a defence of invincible mistake of law (defined by the Court at para 81 as “the impossibility of complying with a lawsince it is impossible to know the content of the law and consequences for non-compliance with it”). [43] The accused in Khan also challenged the prosecution’s reliance on the AFC as it was not published or gazette in the usualmanner of Provincial Acts and regulations and argued that the Court could not take judicial notice of it.

During the proceedings the Cityof Calgary as prosecuting agency and the Provincial Crown as Intervenor led evidence by affidavit, accounting for the origins of theAFC, its purpose and current status including availability to the public. The evidence showed the AFC was available free of charge atpublic libraries as well as on a government Municipal Affairs website, and on a fee for access basis to the construction industry throughthe National Research Council.

Further, viva voce evidence of a senior government administrator demonstrated how the Code wasdeveloped as part of a national set of building codes under the auspices of the National Research Council. [44] Judge Robertson considered the issue of judicial notice, taking note of the same Alberta statutory provisions as reviewed hereearlier, as well as the contention of the prosecution that the AFC was not a regulation, thereby avoiding the effect of s 3(5) of theRegulations Act.

He concluded, as had the Ontario Court of Justice in a comparable case (R v Edwards, A Unit of SPX Canada Inc, 2002CarswellOnt 2083 (ONCJ)) that where the safety code adopted under a regulation was not published nor put in evidence before theCourt, it was not “before the court”. [45] Similarly, in this case I concluded that Standard 10 was not in evidence and therefore not before the Court to be interpretedand applied as required to determine the guilt or innocence of the Defendant.

The importance of publication for the law to be enforced isto ensure that the liberty of the individual is not affected unless the individual charged and the public at large has notice of the law underwhich they may be punished (R v The Vessel “Besseggen” at para 67). [46] I note that in Khan the Court went on to take judicial notice of the AFC by virtue of the evidence produced to identify andaccount for it as a public instrument of the National Research Council, which was accepted to be an authoritative and responsible publicbody.

Although this was not demonstrated in this case, Standard 10 may well be of a similar nature as other safety codes, readily knownby some in the trucking industry. That is not of sufficiently broad notoriety so as to be judicially noticed without further evidence.

Further, as will be addressed below, if Exhibit A is an accurate and reliable copy of Standard 10, examination of it shows that it covers adiscretely specialized and technical range of subjects that would not necessarily be well known and understood by the ordinary memberof the public, and perhaps not even by a person involved in the trucking industry. [47] There was no evidence of the notoriety of Standard 10 in this case, unlike that of the AFC in Khan.

Whether under commonlaw principles judicial notice should be taken of unpublished legislation is a curious question, as the concept of notice pertains towhether facts relevant to the issues in a case, can be admitted without proof. The issue need not be addressed here as there was not anyevidence of existence and notoriety of the regulatory standard as was tendered in Khan. Further as far as proof of facts is concerned the

test of judicial notice is now more stringent than simply being facts that “everyone knows”.

As stated in R v Find, 2001 SCC 32, 2001SCC 32 [Find] at para 48: …a court may properly take judicial notice of facts that are either: (1) so notorious or generally accepted as not to be the subject ofdebate among reasonable persons; or (2) capable of immediate and accurate demonstration by resort to readily accessible sources ofindisputable accuracy. [48] The Supreme Court later in R v Spence, 2005 SCC 7, stated the permissible scope of judicial notice should vary according tothe nature of the issue under consideration, making it clear, at least with respect to the question of judicial notice of facts, that the closerthe facts approach the dispositive issue the more the court must insist on compliance with the strict criteria as expressed in Find.

Again,however, the point relates to proof of facts in the case, rather than determining what if any law applies. [49] I conclude that Standard 10 cannot be judicially noticed and for it to be considered it ought to have been produced in evidenceas authorized under the Alberta Evidence Act or through qualified evidence of the kind heard in Khan. Accordingly, I would find thatthe Crown has not proved an offence known to law against the Defendant, beyond a reasonable doubt, and the accused must be acquitted.

Decision on merits if Standard 10 can be considered [50] If I am incorrect in law in finding that judicial notice cannot be taken of Standard 10, on the evidence before me I concludethat the Crown has not proved the case beyond a reasonable doubt. [51] I find that the Crown has not proved that the steel bins attached to the trailer were “cargo” as contemplated by Standard 10.

Ifthe bins were cargo then Standard 10 is not sufficiently clear to indicate that tiedowns were required as outlined in s 22(2) of theStandard, when the evidence otherwise indicates they were secured to the trailer by use of chains. [52] Cst.Westergaard clearly considered the bins to be “cargo” which then required tiedowns at specified locations.

Needless tosay, while expert evidence from a qualified witness may be received to aid in determining facts from the evidence or indeed, in assistingthe Court in determining how the law may apply to the facts so found, it cannot be used to determine the ultimate issue, which is theCourt’s function. Nor for that matter, following these principles, can the Court leave it to a witness to state what the law is as well as tointerpret and apply it to the facts. Again, that is the Court’s function.

Such expert evidence is not excluded simply because it suggestsanswers to issues at the core of the case, but because the evidence cannot be allowed to determine the result on the core issue: R vBurns, (SCC), Bleta v. The Queen, (SCC). Even if the Crown witness had been qualified as an expertwitness, his evidence about the requirement for tiedowns could not be accepted as definitive of the regulatory requirement. [53] Beyond the evidence of the officer, the Standard itself is hardly clear. Reviewing the content of Exhibit ‘A’, theinterpretation

section defines “cargo” as “all articles or material carried by a vehicle, including those used in the operation of thevehicle”. A “vehicle” is defined as “…a truck, a truck tractor, individually or in combination with one or more semitrailers or trailers”.“Tiedown” is defined as “..a combination of securing devices that are attached to one or more anchor points on a vehicle”. [54] Section 22(2) is the subsection in the Standard said to have been violated in this case. The relevant parts of

section 22 read: 22(1) Subject to subsection 4(1), cargo transported by a vehicle shall be secured using the number of tiedowns calculated undersubsection (2) or (3).

(2) Where an

article of cargo is not blocked or immobilized by a front end structure, bulkhead, by other immobilized cargo or byanother device that prevents it moving forward, it shall be secured by at least… (

c) where the

article is longer than 3.04 metres (i) 2 tiedowns for the first 3.04 metres of length, and (ii) 1 extra tiedown for each additional 3.04 metres or fraction of 3.04 metres. [55] The officer testified there were insufficient tiedowns as straps were not affixed over the top of the steel bins, connected to ananchor point on the trailer. The evidence indicated that the bins were secured to the trailer regardless of the absence of straps. Atiedown, under the terms of the Standard, is a “securing device”.

Subsection 22(2) requires spacing of tiedowns as indicated if thearticle of cargo is not immobilized by “other immobilized cargo or by another device that prevents it moving forward” [emphasis added].The Standard is not sufficiently clear to conclude that empty steel bins secured by chains attached to a flatbed trailer are “cargo”, but inany event, the only inference to draw from the evidence was that such bins were secured by chains that prevented them from movingforward or indeed from separating from the trailer at all. [56] Accordingly, the Crown has not proved that the accused committed an offence as may be framed by reference to theRegulation and Standard 10.

The Defendant is accordingly acquitted. Heard on the 13th day of September, 2023. Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 22nd day of November, 2023.

Wesley Smart A Justice of the Peace Alberta Court of Justice Appearances: Keith Pitzel for the Crown Singh Jit Gooddo for the defendant