Erdman v. Erdman, 2024 BCSC 119

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: Erdman v. Erdman, 2024 BCSC 119 Date: 20240126 Docket: E222719 Registry: Vancouver Between: Tiffany Janice Erdman(

n) Clamant And Jeffrey John Erdman(

n) Respondent Before: The Honourable Justice Branch Reasons for Judgment Counsel for the Claimant: K. Redmond Counsel for the Respondent: J. Cudmore Place and Date of Hearing: Vancouver, B.C. November 7, 2023 Place and Date of Judgment: Vancouver, B.C. January 26, 2024 Table of Contents I. INTRODUCTION .. 3 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND .. 3 The Relationship . 3 Claimant’s Employment History . 3 Respondent’s Employment History . 4 The Separation Agreements and Support Payments . 6 T’s Situation .. 8 III. ANALYSIS .. 9 A. Bonus Inclusion . 9 B. “Severance” 9 C. Income Attribution to the Claimant 13 D. Support for T . 14 E. Position in the Range . 18 F. Outcome . 18 G. Costs . 19

I. INTRODUCTION [ 1 ] The parties have brought cross-applications in this family law matter, both effectively seeking to determine the appropriate retroactive and prospective support payments. The parties agree that these applications should be treated as a review. [ 2 ] The Court is being asked to consider four key questions:

a) Should the respondent’s prospective bonus be included in his present income?

b) Should the respondent’s Employment Insurance (“EI”) benefits be treated as “severance” for the purposes of their separation agreement?

c) Should any additional income be imputed to the claimant?

d) How should child support be calculated given that one child is now at university? II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The Relationship [ 3 ] The claimant was born on July 19, 1963 and is currently 60 years old. The respondent was born on January 24, 1964 and is 59. [ 4 ] The parties were married on October 9, 1993. [ 5 ] They have two children together: T. born in May 2004, and L. born in April 2007. [ 6 ] The parties separated on December 1, 2019. Claimant’s Employment History [ 7 ] In 1986, the claimant received her Bachelor of Education degree from the University of British Columbia.

From 1990 to 2015, she worked as a Regional Coordinator for the Justice Education Society. Her highest income year was 2003 when she earned approximately $54,000. [ 8 ] In 2015, the claimant resigned from the Justice Education Society. The parties decided that, due to the respondent’s frequent business travel, it would lessen the strain if the claimant stayed home with the children. [ 9 ] From 2017 to 2019, the claimant worked as an educator and a curriculum developer. Her position ended due to the COVID-19 pandemic. [ 10 ] In May 2021, the claimant began working with the North Vancouver School District.

She is currently an Education Assistant working approximately six hours per day, five days per week. Her employment is considered part-time. On July 4, 2023, the claimant started a second job as a Behavioural Interventionist, where she earns $30/hr and works 2.5 hours two days a week.

She indicates that her current annual income is $37,180 from her two positions. [ 11 ] The claimant’s Line 15000 (formerly 150) income for the past three years has been as follows: a) 2020: $59,274 (of which there was no employment income); b) 2021: $144,488 (of which $13,198 was employment income); and c) 2022: $141,663 (of which $36,810 was employment income). Respondent’s Employment History [ 12 ] In 1986, the respondent received his Bachelor of Economics from the University of British Columbia.

The respondent holds multiple professional designations, including chartered professional accountant, chartered accountant, certified internal auditor, certified information systems auditor, and certified information systems security professional. He has worked as a senior executive for numerous corporations from 1993 onwards. [ 13 ] In 2019, the respondent was employed by Finning Canada as Vice President, earning $463,764 annually. Finning Canada terminated his employment in September 2020.

A payment of $380,998 was negotiated in lieu of termination notice. [ 14 ] By May 2021, the respondent obtained a new position with TrevaIi Mining Corporation ("Trevali") on an hourly rate basis, translating to about $270,000 annually. In September 2021, he secured a permanent position with Trevali at a salary of $321,260. Trevali entered creditor protection in August 2022 following a serious accident at one of its mines. The respondent was laid off. His last paycheck was received on October 14, 2022. He did not receive any further payment from the company, but he did qualify for EI

benefits. [ 15 ] The respondent’s Line 15000 income for the past three calendar years has been as follows: a) 2020: $727,894; b) 2021: $331,858; and c) 2022: $285,465. [ 16 ] On July 4, 2023, the respondent began working with Pacific Blue Cross as Chief Compliance & Risk Officer, earning $220,000 annually, with taxable benefits of $2,388 and bonus incentives of up to 25% of his salary. The terms of his bonus are outlined in an Incentive Compensation Plan (“ICP”). The key terms of the ICP are as follows: M5 Associate Vice-President Minimum ICP 0% Target ICP 18% Maximum ICP 25%...

A new Employee who received base salary earnings in the applicable year are eligible to receive ICP subject to the following… Your ICP for 2023, which will be disbursed in 2024 will not be pro-rated and will be based on your full salary. The Separation Agreements and Support Payments [ 17 ] On July 29, 2020, the parties entered into Minutes of Settlement ("MOS") following a mediation. In the MOS, the parties agreed to an income attribution of $32,500 for the claimant and $450,000 for the respondent. These amounts were more than their actual incomes at the time.

These incomes yielded support payable to the claimant at the following monthly levels: $5,058 for child support and $7,500 for spousal support. [ 18 ] A dispute arose between the parties after the respondent was terminated from Finning Canada because he stopped paying support. He eventually returned to paying the amounts payable under the MOS. The parties entered into a formal Separation Agreement dated May 26, 2021 (the "Separation Agreement") that reflected the terms of the MOS. It included the following “Whereas” statement: (

E) Tiffany worked for the Justice Education Society from 1990 until 2014, when she formally left the workforce. Given that Jeff previously travelled for work, Tiffany and Jeff decided to lessen the strains of two working parents and have Tiffany stay home to support and care for the children. [ 19 ] The Separation Agreement also provided that the Special and Extraordinary Expenses would include the following: 9.1(

e) expenses for post-secondary education as discussed and agreed between the parties for a child’s post-secondary degree, that are not covered by the Children’s RESP [ 20 ] On December 14, 2021, the parties attended a second mediation to address the respondent’s changed employment status, where they agreed to certain amendments to the Separation Agreement (“Amending Agreement").

These amendments adjusted the respondent’s obligations by using a reduced income of $321,360 which yielded $4,180 per month payable by the respondent for child support, $523 payable by the claimant, for an offset amount payable to the claimant of $3,657. Spousal support was also reduced to $6,000 per month. [ 21 ] The Amending Agreement included the following provisions relevant to the issues before me: RECITALS D.

Jeff represents that current annual remuneration with Trevali is $321,260 (“Jeff's Base Income”) calculated as follows: a. $250,000 salary; b. a $25,000 incentive bonus (estimated); and c. approximately 18.5% of his base salary in benefits, anticipated to be $46,260. E. Tiffany is employed for the School District of North Vancouver as an educational aid. She earns approximately $32,500. … 4. Retroactive child support and reviews of child and spousal support 4.1 If Jeff’s employment is terminated and he is paid severance, then his new guideline income will be based on an annualized income for the severance amount.

For example, if Jeff is terminated on September 1 and given severance of $360,000, then he is deemed to have guideline income of $360,000 for the calculation of child and spousal support commencing September 1 and continuing for a period of 12 months (the “Severance Period”). If Jeff is not employed at the end of the Severance Period, an automatic review is triggered including Tiffany’s ability to claim that Jeff is deliberately underemployed.

If Jeff becomes employed during Severance Period, for example two months after receiving $360,000 severance, he will pay Tiffany a tax-free amount equivalent to 30% of the after-tax value of the remaining severance ($360,000 - $60,000 =$300,000 minus tax x 30%). Jeff’s new guideline income will then be his actual new employment income.

… 4.3 Subject to the terms of this Agreement including the amounts to be included in Jeff’s Guideline income for calculation of support, Jeff and Tiffany will review and adjust the spousal support and proportionate sharing of special and extraordinary expenses annually by May 31 st of each year starting in 2023 to take account changes in: (

a) the parties’ respective Guideline incomes, (

b) the amount required to be paid under the Federal and British Columbia Child Support Guidelines, and (

c) the Children’s needs and expenses. 4.4 The process for the review and adjustments referred to in

section 4.2 will be as follows: … (

b) At the May 2023 review, a second calculation of Jeff’s income in 2022 (“Jeff’s Adjusted Income) will be done which will include the amount of any Short Term Incentive payment he has received in 2023. Jeff’s Adjusted Income will be used for prospective child and spousal support payments from the May 2023 review until May 2024. … 4.6

(1) Either party, at any time, may request a review of Child Support by delivering a written notice to the other if: (

a) there is a material change of circumstances, such as a change in income of either Jeff or Tiffany… … 5. Spousal Support 5.2 The Periodic Spousal Support Payments will be reviewed and adjusted in accordance with

section 4. Tiffany will not owe Jeff for any overpayment of Periodical Spousal Support at any time. [ 22 ] On November 1, 2022, after the respondent had been laid off again, he unilaterally reduced his payments by half of the support payable under the Amending Agreement: $2,090 for child support and $3,000 for spousal support. [ 23 ] In December 2022, the respondent paid $483.36 in child support. Also in December 2022, the respondent paid $241.68 in additional child support for November 2022. [ 24 ] From January 1, 2023, to July 1, 2023, the respondent paid $486.36 in monthly child support and no spousal support.

On February 16, 2023, the claimant registered the Separation Agreement and Amending Agreement with the Family Maintenance Enforcement Plan. [ 25 ] On August 1, 2023, the respondent began paying the claimant $2,285 in child support and $2,877 in spousal support, which the claimant accepted under protest. The respondent apparently based these amounts on the following income levels: $222,388 for the respondent and $50,000 for the claimant. As noted above, the latter amount was above the claimant’s actual salary.

The amounts were also evidently calculated at the low range yielded by the associated DivorceMate calculation. T’s Situation [ 26 ] The parties’ daughter, T., has suffered certain mental health challenges. She is presently attending university and living off- campus. T. lived at home with the claimant in the summer of 2023. The claimant says she maintains a place for T. at her home year- round. The parties have both been contributing to her expenses. The claimant says that T. has been using her credit card for certain additional costs. III. ANALYSIS A.

Bonus Inclusion [ 27 ] The claimant seeks to include the respondent’s projected bonus (i.e. his potential earnings under the ICP) in his current year’s income for support calculation purposes. [ 28 ] The respondent objects, stating that:

a) he will not receive any bonus until 2024; and

b) it is possible that he will not receive any bonus at all. [ 29 ] I agree with the respondent. The wording of his contract clearly supports both of the respondent’s assertions. [ 30 ] That said, the claimant should be able to have support reassessed if any bonus is paid. What is the best means of accommodating that possibility? Using the parties’ own Amending Agreement’s language in paragraph 4.4(

b) as a base, but modifying it somewhat to accommodate the new situation, I conclude that the following order would be appropriate:

Support will be reviewed by the parties in May 2024 if Jeff receives any bonus payment. At any such review, a second calculation of Jeff’s income in 2023 (“Jeff’s Adjusted Income”) will be done which will include the amount of any bonus payment he has received in 2024. Jeff’s Adjusted Income will be used for prospective child and spousal support payments from the May 2024 review until May 2025. B. “Severance” [ 31 ] After the respondent was laid off in 2022, he attempted to pursue pay in lieu of termination notice through counsel but was unsuccessful. He did, however, receive EI.

The respondent seeks to characterize his EI payments as “severance” for the purposes of paragraph 4.1 of the Amending Agreement. Such an

interpretation would benefit the respondent, as he would be in a position to automatically reduce his Guidelines income to be “based on an annualized income for the severance amount” as a result of his relatively low EI benefits. [ 32 ] I find that EI benefits cannot properly be characterized as “severance”. [ 33 ] First, as a matter of contract

interpretation, the following aspects of the clause suggest that EI benefits were not intended to be treated as “severance”:

a) The paragraph uses the conjunctive “and” in the first sentence, requiring both a termination “and” the payment of severance before the automatic income adjustment clause is engaged. Receiving severance from one’s employer is not guaranteed (for example, where there is termination for cause); hence, it makes sense for the clause to be conjunctive. However, the availability of EI following termination is more universal/automatic, making the use of a conjunctive requirement less logical;

b) The mathematical example used in the provision assumes a lump sum severance payment, but EI is not calculated or paid in this fashion: see s. 12(1) of the Employment Insurance Act , S.C. 1996, c. 23 [ EIA ]; and

c) The clause also addresses a situation where the respondent becomes employed “during [the] Severance Period”. Again, this does not fit with the structure of the EI scheme, which requires that you be unemployed to receive benefits; see s. 49(1) of the EIA . [ 34 ] Second, as a matter of statutory

interpretation, the EI regime provides that the EI benefits may be reduced, adjusted or eliminated if you receive “damages for wrongful dismissal,” “amounts payable to a claimant in respect of wages,” “severance pay” or “severance”: EIA ss. 45 - 46 ; Employment Insurance Regulations , S.O.R./96-332, ss. 35 - 38 ; Knights v. Doyle , 2023 BCSC 47 at paras. 31 , 47, 55-57. The logical implication is that EI benefits are not severance, as the statute and regulations confirm that EI benefits are adjusted if there is severance. [ 35 ] Third, case law supports the position that EI benefits are not severance. This Court has consistently demonstrated that EI benefits and severance are distinct:

a) In J. v. J., 2007 BCSC 522 , the Court distinguished between the two types of payments, stating: [4] Presently, there is no interim order in relation to child support. When the father lost his job as a police officer he reduced his payments from $400 per month to $196 per month; a figure based upon Employment Insurance (EI) benefits. Except for EI benefits, and a severance payment of $12,000, the father has been without income since his employment with the police force ended. … [13] While Mr. J. was with the police force, his base salary was $72,000. In 2005 his “line 150” income was $97,359.

In 2006 his “line 150” income, from employment as a police officer in the first part of 2006, severance pay, and Employment Insurance benefits , was $46,709. [Emphasis added.]

b) In Miller (Re) , 2011 BCSC 1037 , the Court also made this distinction, stating: [17] In September of 2010, Mr. Miller was terminated from his employment. He received a net severance pay of approximately $10,000. Mr. Miller is also entitled to employment insurance which he has collected since the severance pay was exhausted . [Emphasis added.]

c) In Fuchser v. Wilson, 2012 BCSC 176 , the Court stated: [97] After her severance ended in 2009, the plaintiff was in receipt of Employment Insurance which required that she be looking for work. … [ 36 ] Fourth, as a conceptual matter, severance and EI are distinct. The government pays EI to, among other things, provide temporary income to unemployed workers while they get back on their feet. The nature of employment insurance benefits is set out in s. 59 of the EIA : The Commission may establish employment support measures to help insured participants and other workers, including workers in groups underrepresented in the labour market, to obtain or keep employment, including measures to (

a) provide insured participants with courses or programs of instruction or training; (

b) provide insured participants with employment opportunities or provide employment support;

(

c) provide workers with employment assistance services; and (

d) support research, innovation or partnerships related to helping workers to prepare for, obtain or keep employment and to beproductive participants in the labour market. [37] On the other hand, pay in lieu of termination notice, colloquially referred to as “severance”, is paid by an employer when aworker loses their job without cause. The amount paid in severance generally replaces what the worker would have been paid had theybeen given the required notice of termination and worked during that period. Indeed, pay in lieu of notice and EI benefits are generallydefined in a way that cannot be squared.

The Oxford Dictionary of Law, 9th Ed. (2018) defines “payment in lieu of notice” as: A payment made to an employee on the termination of the contract of employment without notice. The payment should reflect the totalpecuniary losses that the employee will incur by not working out the notice period … [38] Not only is the payor different, but the underlying rationales are different. Termination notice is a valuable right whichemployees are entitled to from their employers. EI benefits are paid by the government to assist insured individuals. They areconceptually distinct. [39] An

interpretation that EI does not constitute severance does not create any absurd results. Although paragraph 4.1 would not beavailable to the respondent to facilitate an automatic adjustment, there was still another clause that the respondent could have invoked tosecure an adjustment: paragraph 4.6(1).

Under this clause, the respondent was entitled to seek a review if there was a “material change incircumstances, such as a change in income”. [40] As such, I find that the formula in paragraph 4.1 of the Amending Agreement was not available to the respondent to allow him toalter his child support obligation automatically and unilaterally without a court order. [41] Although I decline to rule on the point because it was not before me, the respondent may still be able to retroactively adjustsupport by invoking paragraph 4.6(1).

The claimant indicated an intention to argue estoppel were such an application advanced, giventhat such an alternative request could have been included in the respondent’s present application. Again, I decline to prejudge this issue. C. Income Attribution to the Claimant [42] The respondent seeks to attribute income to the claimant because she (1) used to earn a higher salary and (2) is not working full-time.

He suggests that an attribution at $70,000 per year would be reasonable. [43] Per s. 19 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175 [Guidelines], a court may impute income to a spouse that itconsiders appropriate in the circumstances. The court may impute income if the spouse is intentionally underemployed or unemployed(other than where the underemployment or unemployment is required by the needs of a child or the reasonable educational or healthneeds of the spouse).

There will be intentional underemployment or unemployment where the parent voluntarily chooses to earn less thanwhat they are capable of earning: Drygala v. Pauli (2002), (ON CA). The onus is on the party trying to imputeincome to show that the underemployment or unemployment is intentional: Marquez v.

Zapiola, 2013 BCCA 433 at para. 36. [44] When imputing income, the test is reasonableness, having regard to the parent’s “capacity to earn income in light of their age,education, health, work history and work availability”: Marquez at para. 37. [45] The claimant advised that she was prepared to accept that her income for support purposes should be $40,300, the amount sheexpects to earn going forward from her two positions. [46] I accept that the assessment should be performed based on this figure and disagree that further income attribution is supported:

a) While the claimant may have earned more in the past, that was before she took time off to care for the parties’ children, and beforeshe was 60 years old;

b) The fact that the claimant is not earning what she did previously is understandable, given the years that she was out of the full-timeworkforce raising the parties’ children and supporting the respondent’s high-intensity career;

c) The claimant is effectively working full time (or, more precisely, 35 hours per week) when one tallies the hours spent at bothpositions.

d) The respondent presented no evidence that the claimant has failed to pursue or has turned down higher-paying employmentopportunities. D. Support for T [47] The respondent argues that he should not have to pay child support to the claimant in relation to T., given that T.’s expenses aregenerally already being covered by the parties as a special expense, and T. is only living with the claimant during the four summermonths. (The respondent does not take the position that T. is no longer a child of the marriage.) [48] The Guidelines provide two methods for determining child support for a child over the age of majority: 3 …

(2) Unless otherwise provided under these Guidelines, where a child to whom a child support order relates is the age of majority or over,the amount of the child support order is

(

a) the amount determined by applying these Guidelines as if the child were under the age of majority; or (

b) if the court considers that approach to be inappropriate, the amount that it considers appropriate, having regard to the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of the child and the financial ability of each spouse to contribute to the support of the child. [ 49 ] The more the adult child’s circumstances resemble those of a minor child living at home, the more likely the standard calculation under s. 3(2)(

a) would be appropriate: McClement v. McClement , 2017 BCCA 416 at para. 12 . I find that applying s. 3(2)(

a) here would be inappropriate, as T. (1) has access to RESP funds, (2) had a summer job, and (3) generally resides away from both parents’ homes: Thompson v. Thompson , 2022 BCSC 1431 at para. 65 . Section 3(2)(

b) is more often applied in such situations: P.R.M. v. B.J.M. , 2012 BCSC 1795 at para. 120 . Therefore, any amount paid by the respondent should be calculated with regard to the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of T. and the financial ability of each parent to contribute to her support. [ 50 ] In Thompson , the daughter was a full-time student at the University of Victoria. She lived in Victoria while attending classes, but returned to her mother’s home during the summers and regularly visited during the year.

The child received money from an RESP, had some part-time work and received certain loans and grants; the monthly payments made up the shortfall between those amounts and the child’s educational and living expenses. The Court determined that Mr. Thompson should not be required to pay child support to Ms. Thompson while the parties’ adult child is at university. The Court did, however, employ 3(2)(

b) to require that Mr. Thompson (1) pay the usual Guidelines amount while the child was with Ms. Thompson for the summer and (2) contribute to the child’s expenses throughout the balance of the year. [ 51 ] In L.F. v. R.B. , 2021 BCSC 464 , the Court found that child support under the table amount was payable during the summer months, and the respondent had to contribute a set amount for living expenses while the child was at school, based on the budget information provided: [55] Further referring to the reasoning in Hamilton v. Popp , 2014 BCSC 506 and H.M.K. v.

B.P.K ., 2012 BCSC 435 , particularly regarding the duplication of efforts where the parties have contributed to RESPs for the child, are paying s. 7 tuition and living expenses for the child’s education, and would otherwise be required to continue to pay child support, Ball J. concludes it would be inappropriate and thus reduces the child support from 12 months to four months per annum. [56] I agree with the father’s submissions that it would be appropriate to similarly reduce his child support obligation to the table amount of support for the four summer months that K.B. is home from school.

However, I believe that the circumstances of this case also require some measure of support from him towards K.B.’s expenses during the school year beyond that covered by her s. 7 expenses and RESP… [ 52 ] In R.M. v. A.M., 2018 BCSC 318 , the Court found that the full table amount should continue to be paid for an adult student attending university and living away from home. While the father wanted to split the university expenses in proportion to income, the Court held that the usual Guidelines amount of support was not inappropriate: at para. 39. The Court relied primarily on the following factors:

a) the payor’s ability to pay the table amount, as he made over $900,000 a year;

b) the parties’ separation agreement required that the adult child be responsible for 1/3 of their post-secondary expenses, but the adult child could not contribute that amount;

c) the recipient spouse paid for all the adult child’s weekend food costs, which equated to two full months of full-time food costs; and

d) The recipient spouse provided the student with ongoing full-year financial assistance, subsidizing the amounts the adult child could not pay and providing a home for the child during the summer. [ 53 ] In Hosseini v. Kazemi , 2021 BCSC 1938 , the Court declined to award full table child support for an adult child living away from home and attending university. The Court stated: [81] While Ms. Hosseini does have to maintain the home while Maysa is away, food costs will certainly decrease for the eight months of the year that Maysa is living in residence. Those food costs are an expense that Ms.

Hosseini does not now have to incur, but would be covered in part by the child support to be paid by Dr. Kazemi. [82] In addition, by his contribution to the

section 7 expenses, Dr. Kazemi is also paying for 83% of the cost of food at residence. In my view, it would not be fair for him to have to pay for food costs twice; once in the form of child support and once in the form of

section 7 expenses. [ 54 ] The Court ordered that 50% of normal child support would be payable while the adult child was living in residence, and there would be no deduction to normal support during the summers: paras. 88-90. The Court recognized that Ms. Hosseini needed to maintain the home even while the adult child was away. The Court distinguished R.M. because in R.M. , the non-payor also had to pay for the child’s weekend food costs, even while he was in residence. [ 55 ] In this case, invoking the flexibility of s. 3(2)(

b) is generally the better approach for all months save those where T. resides with the claimant. However, applying this provision is difficult, as the parties did not provide a budget for T. nor adequate detail on their respective contributions towards T.’s expenses either pursuant to the Separation Agreement or otherwise. Nonetheless, it is possible to craft more general directions, particularly given the indication of the parties’ intentions in para. 9.1(3) of the Separation Agreement. [ 56 ] I find that notwithstanding the terms of the Separation Agreement:

a) for those months that the respondent lives with the claimant, support should be paid by the respondent to the claimant using the two- child Guidelines formula;

b) for the balance of the year: i. support should be paid by the respondent using the one-child formula; and ii. T.’s reasonable living and education expenses for those months when she is not living with the claimant (which expenses shall include any expenditures for tuition or books, irrespective of the month in which such costs are incurred) are payable from the following sources and in the following priority: 1) from any RESP available to T.; 2) from T.’s earnings, loans and grants received over the previous year; 3) from the parties in proportion to their incomes. E.

Position in the Range [ 57 ] The respondent’s application raised one further issue: where spousal support should be set within the range established by the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines .

The respondent argues that the prior agreements used the low end of the range, and he suggests that should continue. [ 58 ] While the parties’ prior agreements may have used the low end of the range, in my view, that has limited relevance on a review. [ 59 ] This case presents a fairly standard fact pattern, i.e. a recipient spouse who had an earlier career, took time off to help raise the children and support the spouse, and then started to integrate herself back into the workforce once the children were older. This presentation generally supports a mid-range award.

However, I note that (1) the children are now of an age where the claimant works full-time, and (2) the claimant presently reports a net worth higher than the respondent's. [ 60 ] In these circumstances, I would set spousal support at the midpoint between the low and mid-range figures: L.P.H. v. J.M.R ., 2021 BCSC 1282 at paras. 126-133 . F. Outcome [ 61 ] I leave it to the parties to determine what amounts are properly payable in light of my findings, as neither party presented a scenario that precisely matches these findings. I note that the claimant only sought a retroactive adjustment to August 2023.

There is a reasonable basis for an adjustment to extend at least back to that date given that the respondent has been paying only what he unilaterally deemed appropriate over this period. I note that the respondent made no formal application for a retroactive adjustment (presumably because he has been paying only what he considered appropriate). [ 62 ] If there are any remaining issues following counsel’s discussions, they may set down an MS Teams hearing before me, preferably at 9:00 a.m. for one hour on a mutually convenient date. G.

Costs [ 63 ] Unless there are factors of which this Court is unaware, I would order that each party bear their own costs, given that there were mixed results on their respective motions. “The Honourable Mr. Justice Branch”