Harder Estate (Re), 2023 ABKB 496

Court of King’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Harder Estate (Re), 2023 ABKB 496 Date: 20230830 Docket: ES12 38653 Registry: Wetaskiwin Court File Number ES12 38653 Court Court of King’s Bench of Alberta (Surrogate Matter) Judicial Centre Wetaskiwin Estate Name Mabel Harder Applicant (Plaintiff) Daniel Harder Respondent (Defendant) Lenna Percheson Corrected judgment: A corrigendum was issued on September 1, 2023; the corrections have been made to the text and the corrigendum is appended to this judgment.

Corrected judgment: A corrigendum was issued on September 7, 2023; the corrections have been made to the text and the corrigendum is appended to this judgment. _______________________________________________________ Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice M.J. Lema _______________________________________________________ I.Introduction [ 1 ] Did the now-deceased joint-account holder establish a trust over the balance of the account at the time of her death (approximately $50,000), with the surviving co-account holder as trustee?

Alternatively, did the survivorship dimension of the joint account vest legal and beneficial ownership of those funds in the survivor? [ 2 ] The survivor is the adult daughter of the deceased co-holder (her mother). Per the daughter, the mother expressly stated, when the joint account was set up, that the daughter was to receive any account balance on the mother’s death (i.e. if she died first) to apply to assorted educational and charitable purposes of the mother.

Alternatively, per the daughter (implicitly), she received legal and beneficial ownership of the account balance in her own right, via survivorship, albeit subject to a moral (but not legal) obligation to apply the monies to her mother’s purposes. [ 3 ] The daughter’s brother (son of the mother) argues that the account was made joint only because the mother wanted the daughter’s assistance with banking, with no entitlement for the daughter of any kind (beneficial or as trustee) after the mother’s death (i.e. if the mother died first, which occurred).

Per him, the account balance fell into the mother’s estate and, per her will, is to be shared 50:50 by him and his sister. [ 4 ] No valid trust is shown here, and the daughter’s gain via survivorship was limited to legal (but not beneficial) ownership of the account balance. Accordingly, the monies formed, and continue to form, part of the mother’s estate on her death. II.Background [ 5 ] The daughter (Lenna Percheson) gave this evidence of the arrangement with her mother: Mother and I opened up a joint bank account together at [Bank of Montreal]. The account was the Savings Builder Acc # ….

The bank lady told Mother and [me] that [the account balance] would automatically come to me when [Mother] passed away. In order to understand why my mother wanted only me to manage the money in this bank account , I will tell somethings that happened. The bank lady told Mother and [me] that, upon [Mother’s] death, the account and contents would automatically be turned over to me. … Mother told me she wanted me to make sure her great-grandchildren had [the] opportunity to have Christian education.

And she also wanted me to continue to give money to her church charities [--] Adventist World Radio, It Is Written Canada, and missions (3 rd world countries). I want the court to turn the bank account over to me so I can keep my mother’s wishes . Mother did not see any need to include this in her will because the Bank Lady told her that it would automatically be turned over to me when she passed.

While I was [power of attorney for my mother], I was able to continue to do these things Mother wanted me to do, but since she passed, I have not been able to keep her wishes …. [daughter’s affidavit filed June 2, 2023] [emphasis added] [ 6 ] In correspondence to the Court on July 19, 2023 (after having been given an opportunity to gather and provide further evidence in support of her version of events), the daughter stated (in part): I have given all the evidence that I am able to give at this time and, as I said in court, Mother did not give the money to me for my own personal use, she told me very clearly that she wanted me to manage it for Christian education, Seventh-Day Adventist Church Mission work and Gospel Outreach .

The last time I was at the BMO Ponoka, …, manager, had a manager from their head department of estates in Canada on speaker phone, and he explained in detail the right of survivorship. I’m confident that I could get a copy of that conversation since it was recorded and happened recently in early June. However, I do not want to drag out this court case, but in order to do what is suggested in the email [re possibly gathering more evidence], I would need to ask for an adjournment until December. I cannot do an affidavit here from the country that I am in [i.e. in the Caribbean region].

I thought this would be all finished by now.

… I only promised my Mother to do with the money in the account what she asked me to do with it. [emphasis added] [ 7 ] Per the brother, concerning the account monies: I believe that Lenna was included on that account for convenience, and to allow her to assist [our mother] more efficiently. [his affidavit filed April 13, 2023] [ 8 ] Invited to provide further evidence on these issues, including the basis for his “only to assist” belief, the brother provided this (among other) evidence: Before the joint account was opened in July 2016, Mother had two accounts at BMO. … These accounts … were Mother’s accounts.

The money in the accounts belonged to Mother and the funds were to be used for her. The accounts were joint so that Mother could have help with her banking and to give us the ability to look out for Mother to prevent any scams. On June 1, 2016 Mother opened another savings account at BMO, owned jointly with Lenna. This is the account that is the subject of our dispute. … Mother never talked to me about why she opened the joint account with Lenna. By the time of Mother’s death [May 13, 2021], the only bank account she had was the joint account.

All of Mother’s income must have been deposited into this joint account and it must have been used as her day-to-day banking account since she had no other account. (I am not counting her term deposit at … as a bank account.) Based on the joint accounts Mother had in May 2016 and earlier, and the purpose of these accounts, outlined above, I believe that the purpose of the joint account in dispute would be no different than the earlier joint accounts and would be there so that Lenna could easily assist Mother with her banking.

To clarify, I do not know whether Lenna has taken money from the joint account since Mother died, but if she has, and the joint account is an estate asset, I want her to repay the money to the estate. [part of his supplementary affidavit filed July 14, 2023] [ 9 ] The brother: • did not explain the basis for his belief that the purposes of the earlier joint accounts were indeed “help with banking” and “loss avoidance”; • acknowledged he had no direct-from-their-mother evidence about the purpose of the current joint account; and • necessarily undercut or at least weakened his inference as to the “help with banking” purpose of the current account by basing it on his unsupported belief about the earlier accounts.

III.Analysis A. Presumption of resulting trust applies here; daughter has burden of proof [ 10 ] The presumption of resulting trust applies here, since the daughter did not provide any consideration (i.e. pay or otherwise give the mother anything for the account-balance monies) and the daughter is over 17 (i.e. with the presumption of advancement (or gift) not applying), per Pecore v Pecore , 2007 SCC 17 . [ 11 ] On resulting trusts, the Supreme Court of Canada stated: The presumption of resulting trust is a rebuttable presumption of law and general rule that applies to gratuitous transfers.

When a transfer is challenged, the presumption allocates the legal burden of proof. Thus, where a transfer is made for no consideration, the onus is placed on the transferee to demonstrate that a gift was intended : see Waters’ Law of Trusts , at p. 375, and E. E. Gillese and M. Milczynski, The Law of Trusts (2nd ed. 2005), at p. 110. This is so because equity presumes bargains, not gifts . The presumption of resulting trust therefore alters the general practice that a plaintiff (who would be the party challenging the transfer in these cases) bears the legal burden in a civil case.

Rather, the onus is on the transferee to rebut the presumption of a resulting trust. In cases where the transferor is deceased and the dispute is between the transferee and a third party, the presumption of resulting trust has an additional justification. In such cases, it is the transferee who is better placed to bring evidence about the circumstances of the transfer. [paras 24-26] [emphasis added] [ 12 ] In this case, the daughter did not give evidence of giving the mother anything for the ending-balance monies.

Accordingly, the law presumes, absent sufficient evidence to the contrary, that the daughter received those monies subject to the mother continuing to own them beneficially and, after the mother’s death, her estate continuing to so own them. In other words, the law presumes initially that the monies were not gifted or otherwise transferred to the daughter. As explained above, the daughter carries the burden of proof here i.e. that in fact a gift or other transfer was intended. [ 13 ] The opposite presumption -- i.e of advancement (or gift) -- applies where one spouse transfers property to the other spouse for

no consideration and also where a parent transfers property to a minor child for no consideration. Here, the law presumes (again, subject to sufficient contrary evidence) that gifts were intended, given the nature of such relationships.

In paragraphs 34-41, the SCC rejected the argument that this presumption should be extended to parental transfers to adult children. [ 14 ] Accordingly, we are in presumption-of-resulting-trust territory, with the (adult) daughter having the burden to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the ending-balance monies were given or otherwise transferred to her, rather than continuing to belong to the mother or the mother’s estate. [ 15 ] In so holding, I recognize that, in this phase of her argument, the daughter is not claiming beneficial ownership, instead that she was to receive the monies for application to the mother’s purposes. [ 16 ] Nevertheless, the daughter has the burden of proof, with her having provided nothing for the monies in question i.e. whether they were intended as a gift for her or intended to be transferred to her for the mother’s purposes.

In both cases, the fundamental divide is between the mother (or her estate) continuing to own the monies and the monies shifting to the daughter (whether for her own benefit or the benefit of the outside parties or purposes earmarked by the mother). [ 17 ] With the daughter acknowledging that no gift was intended here (i.e. no evidence that she was to receive the monies beneficially i.e. for the daughter’s own purposes), how do we characterize the nature of her claim to the balance monies? B. Daughter asserts a trust claim [ 18 ] The daughter is not seeking the account monies for herself.

Instead, she asserts that the mother asked her to “manage” the monies -- specifically, to underwrite “Christian education” for her great-grandchildren and to fund various charities. [ 19 ] Effectively, she asserts a trust, with the mother’s trust intentions reflected in her use-of-money statements, herself as trustee, the account monies as the trust subject matter, and the beneficiaries or purposes of the trust being the identified persons and charities (or charitable purposes). [ 20 ] Per the daughter, the asserted trust is the answer to the presumption of resulting trust here.

That is, despite the law’s presumption that the mother and her estate retained beneficial ownership of the mother, the mother created this trust to pull the money out of the estate, earmarked for the noted persons and purposes. C.

Trust as an answer to the presumption of resulting trust [ 21 ] I accept that, as an alternative to a “gift” position, a transferee can rebut the presumption of resulting trust by asserting, and proving, a trust in favour of others: Rufenack v Hope Mission , 2006 ABCA 60 (paras 21 and 22 ); Holvenstot v Holvenstot , 2012 BCSC 923 (Halfyard J.) (para 77 ); and Joint Bank Account Trusts and Protection of Older Adults from Financial Abuse: Exploring Equity’s Preference for Beneficiary-Direction Over Beneficiary-Protection , David Wiseman, (2016) 2(2) CJCCL 679 ( 2016 CanLIIDocs 96 ) at pp 704-706. [ 22 ] The question becomes whether the daughter sufficiently proved the asserted trust. [ 23 ] The only evidence of the trust comes from her i.e. her account of the mother telling her what she was to do with the account monies. [ 24 ] Here the daughter faces an obstacle in s. 11 of the Alberta Evidence Act .

D. Corroboration requirement [ 25 ]

Section 11 Alberta Evidence Act states: In an action by or against the heirs, next of kin, executors, administrators or assigns of a deceased person, an opposed or interested party shall not obtain a verdict, judgment or decision on that party’s own evidence in respect of any matter occurring before the death of the deceased person, unless the evidence is corroborated by other material evidence. [emphasis added] [ 26 ] Here we have an action, namely, the executor’s application for advice and direction, seeking a declaration that the account monies belong to the estate, contested by “an opposed or interested party” (i.e. the daughter) seeking a declaration that she holds the monies for the mother-selected purposes. [ 27 ] In these circumstances, s. 11 says that the daughter cannot obtain her requested outcome “on [her] own evidence in respect of any matter occurring before the death of the deceased person”, without corroborating (tending-to-confirm-or-support) evidence. [ 28 ] The “matter occurring” here is or are the mother’s statement(

s) to the daughter outlining her use-of-money intentions. If they occurred, they were (necessarily) before the mother’s death. [ 29 ] Accordingly, the daughter’s evidence alone of those statements by the mother are not enough here: they must be corroborated, or supported, by other evidence. [ 30 ] Here I find the following: • the daughter provided no documentary, audio, video or other physical evidence reflecting the mother’s use-of-money intentions;

• she provided no evidence from any third party about those intentions; • the only (possible) third-party evidence she described was from a BMO employee.

But, per the daughter’s description, thatperson’s evidence, even if available, would apparently have been limited to showing, or helping show, that the mother intended thebalance to move to the daughter i.e. did not extend to showing the nature of the interest the daughter was to receive from the mother i.e.would not have supported the daughter’s position that she was to receive the monies as a trustee for the benefit of the asserted personsand charities; • the daughter provided no evidence of her applying the account-balance monies, or any of them, to any of the mother’s purposesi.e. after the mother’s death. (Per the daughter’s recent correspondence, “I have not taken any money out of the Bank after my Motherpassed away”); • nothing in the son’s evidence supported the daughter’s trust position; and • nothing in the mother’s will supports the daughter’s position or otherwise sheds light on her relationship to the account monies. [31] In other words, the mother provided no corroborating evidence. [32] Per s. 11 Alberta Evidence Act, she cannot obtain her requested remedy (i.e. implicitly, recognition of the asserted trust),lacing the support of such evidence.

E. Alternatively, no valid trust was created [33] If I am wrong on corroboration, with the daughter sufficiently proving her mother’s use-of-money intentions, I find that novalid trust was created. [34] The reason is that the mother’s intended objects (i.e. beneficiaries or purposes) of the trust included both charitable(Adventist-focused) and non-charitable (great-grandchildren education) aims, with no allocation as between those two categories. [35] Per Waters’ Law of Trust in Canada (Fifth Edition – Donovan W. M. Waters, K.C., Mark R. Gillen and Lionel D.

Smith –Thomson Reuters – 2021): Even if the trust property is clearly defined or ascertainable [as here, with the identified bank account], the trust will ... be void and thetrust property revert to the settlor [or, as here, her estate] if the beneficial shares in that property are not clearly defined. ... ... The quantum of property allocated to each interest may be totally vague.

The testator may make a gift of specific property to trustees todistribute “such part or portion thereof as they may think best and proper” among a class of persons according to need, “and theremainder thereof” to be devoted by the trustees in their discretion to certain charitable purposes. It is not only uncertain what amount ofproperty is to be available for distribution among the class, but also as a consequence the sum available for distribution among charitiesis uncertain. The trust is therefore void.

What the testator had in mind was a distinct discretionary trust for the class, and anotherfor the charitable purposes. The testator would have succeeded had he or she allocated definite amounts of property to eachtrust, for there is no objection to discretionary trusts per se. ... Charitable or public trusts are exempted from the requirement of [a particular earlier-described] form of certainty of objects.

As aconcession to charity, and provided the settlor has wholly devoted the trust property to the furtherance of charitable objects, the lawpermits the settlor to describe the trust objects simply as for charitable purposes or for one type of charitable activity, withoutparticularizing further as to the specific purposes which are to be pursued or the specific charitable institutions which are to receivebenefit from the trust. The certain required of the objects of a charitable trust is that the purpose of the range of purposes orinstitutions contemplated by the settlor is within the legal concept of charity.

Has the settled enable his or her trustees to doanything which would be non-charitable? – that is the question. ... If, then, the objects of the trusts are exclusively charitable, the trust will not fail for uncertainty even though specific purposes orinstitutions have not been spelled out. ... ... [reference to Cameron v Church of Christ Scientist, (1918) (SCC), 57 SCR 298]...

It is apparent that in this case,though the testatrix was clearly motivated throughout by a religious faith and zeal, and indeed expressed the desire that whole of herestate as to be used “for God only,” the objects of her trust were so elusive that no court could tell what objects, of a kind that could beimplemented, she had in mind. Moreover, and this was the point, because they were so vague as they stood, they clearly straddledboth the charitable and the non-charitable. ... ... the certainty required of a charitable trust is that the objects are exclusively charitable.

No trust will be executed by the courtby way of a scheme or in any other way if the objects are definite but constitute or include non-charitable objects .... [from pp169-171, 726, 729 and 730] [footnotes omitted] [emphases added] [36] On whether the educational dimension of the intended trust might itself be classified as charitable, the answer is no: see thediscussion in Waters’ Law of Trusts in Canada of charitable trusts and, specifically, what is contemplated by the “advancement ofeducation” stream of such trusts i.e. broad-focused objectives i.e. not education for specific persons i.e. the great-grandchildren here (pp780-787).

[37] Applying these principles here, the mother’s intended trust included both charitable and non-charitable purposes but failed toallocate the amounts devoted as between the two purposes. As explained above, the consequence is that no valid trust was created. F. Alternatively, daughter not showing beneficial survivorship [38] The daughter (implicitly) argued alternatively that, via survivorship, she received the balance monies legally and beneficially,with the freedom but no obligation to apply them to the mother’s purposes. 1.

Joint bank account with express right of survivorship [39] The BMO account agreement described the account as “JOINT WITH RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP”, with the mother anddaughter as the named holders. [40] It also included the following: FORM OF CO-OWNERSHIP (Not applicable in Quebec) – Your account will be joint with Right of Survivorship unless the following isticked: _____ No Right of Survivorship [41] That blank remained blank (i.e. no tick mark) on the agreement here. [42] I accept the daughter’s position on the joint nature of the account and the existence of a right of survivorship here. [43] The question becomes: what right or rights passed to the mother via survivorship on the mother’s death? [44] Did she acquire both the legal and beneficial interest in the monies, giving her the right to apply them as she chose, includingto the mother-preferred purposes (or otherwise)?

Or did she only acquire the legal right to the monies, with the beneficial ownershipmoving from the mother to the mother’s estate? [45] I note here that the daughter did not argue that she acquired any beneficial stake in the monies before the mother’s death i.e.she focused exclusively on the right of survivorship i.e. as the source of her (asserted) legal and beneficial stake in the monies. 2.

Onus on daughter to prove survivorship included beneficial interest [46] The daughter assumes that survivorship means a shift to her of both legal and beneficial ownership. [47] However, Canadian law continues to draw a distinction between the two interests, with a legal-interest transfer being the“base”, “core” or “automatic” transfer i.e. necessarily transferring on the death of the co-account-holder, and, where the presumption ofresulting trust applies (as here), the surviving account holder having the onus of proving that the beneficial interest also transferred. [48] As discussed above, with the daughter not paying for or otherwise giving anything to the mother for the balance remaining inthe mother’s account, the presumption of resulting trust applies, even in a joint-bank-account setting, per the Supreme Court of Canada inPecore v Pecore (cited above): ... the presumption of a resulting trust means that it will fall to the surviving joint account holder to prove that the transferor intended togift the right of survivorship to whatever assets are left in the account to the survivor.

Otherwise, the assets will be treated as part of thetransferor’s estate to be distributed according to the transferor’s will. [para 53] [emphasis added] [49] In Pecore, the SCC identified various potential indicators of whether the deceased co-account-holder’s intention was for bothlegal and beneficial ownership, or just legal ownership, to shift, including the account agreements and other bank documents: In the past, this Court has held that bank documents that set up a joint account are an agreement between the account holders andthe bank about legal title; they are not evidence of an agreement between the account holders as to beneficial title: see Niles andRe Mailman.

While I agree that bank documents do not necessarily set out equitable [i.e. beneficial] interests in joint accounts, bankingdocuments in modern times may be detailed enough that they provide strong evidence of the intentions of the transferorregarding how the balance in the account should be treated on his or her death: see B. Ziff, Principles of Property Law (4th ed.2006), at p. 332. Therefore, if there is anything in the bank documents that specifically suggests the transferor’s intent regardingthe beneficial interest in the account, I do not think that courts should be barred from considering it.

Indeed, the clearer the evidence inthe bank documents in question, the more weight that evidence should carry. [paras 60 and 61] [emphasis added] [50] In Pecore itself, the bank account in question was joint with a right of survivorship. As far as I can tell from reviewing thelower-court decisions ( (ONSC) and (ONCA), the account agreement did not further particularizethat right. [51] Plainly, the above “bank accounts” discussion by the SCC requires something beyond the mere existence of a survivorshipright.

That is, it is not enough, to prove beneficial entitlement to the monies, merely to point to a right of survivorship. The key, bank-documents-wise, is some indication that both legal and beneficial interest was to transfer. [52] The SCC confirmed this aspect in the companion case to Pecore -- Madsen Estate v Saylor, 2007 SCC 18, where the Courtheld: Beyond the fact that both accounts were designated as carrying the right of survivorship, the banking documents do not contain

any express reference to beneficial entitlement to the assets in the accounts. The Toronto-Dominion Account Agreement provided: If the account has a right of survivorship then if any one or more of us dies any moneys standing to the credit of the account are to be subject to withdrawal by the survivor or, if more than one, by any one or more of the survivors; [Emphasis in original.] The CIBC Wood Gundy Account Agreement provided: The following provisions shall apply upon the death of any Applicant: (

i) the survivor(

s) will promptly notify you of such death; (ii) the survivor(

s) will provide you with a certified copy of the death certificate . . .; (iii) the estate of the deceased shall continue to be liable for any amounts owing ...; and (iv) the survivor(

s) shall continue to have the same rights as described in paragraph 12(c) [providing for the operation of the accounts by the survivor]. Having regard to the lack of clarity in the documents on this critical point, I would accord them little weight insofar as the issue of beneficial entitlement to the assets in the accounts is concerned. [paras 25-27] [emphasis added] [ 53 ] Again, the mere existence of a survivorship right is insufficient when it comes to gauging whether the beneficial interest moved.

On this aspect, see also Edgecombe v Nicholas , 2023 NLCA 19 (paras 19-21 and 40-42 ); Newhouse v Garland , 2022 BCCA 276 (paras 123 and 124 ) and Guglick Estate (Re) , 2020 ABQB 561 (Michalyshyn J.) (paras 55-59 ). [ 54 ] In the present case, the bank documents provide no such indication. [ 55 ] As for other possible indicators of a beneficial-interest-shift intention discussed in Pecore : • the daughter provided no useful or material evidence bearing on the period between creation of the joint account and the mother’s death of account activity that might have signaled that the daughter was to receive both legal and beneficial title on the mother’s death: Pecore at paras 56-59.

On this aspect, as noted above, the daughter’s evidence was that the mother told her and the BMO employee (responsible for setting up the account) that she (the mother) wanted the daughter to receive the monies at the end i.e. if the mother died first.

As already discussed, per the noted cases, that is neutral on whether that receipt was “legal interest only” or “legal and beneficial interest.” Assuming the mother’s statements should be interpreted as the latter, the daughter runs into the same s. 11 AEA obstacle discussed above: her account of such statements by the mother, even if potentially confirmed by the BMO employee, is anchored here on the daughter’s evidence alone, with no corroborating evidence of the mother’s statements or of the BMO employee’s (possible) statements on this point: Edgecombe v Nicholas (cited above) at paras 24-27; • the daughter gave no evidence of personal use by her of any of the account monies before the mother’s death or any particular control by her (the daughter) of the monies or any portion of them in that period i.e. somehow signaling that the daughter was to receive the beneficial stake at the end: Pecore at paras 62 to 66; • she gave evidence that, when she “was POA [i.e. had a power of attorney from the mother], [she] was able to continue to do these things Mother wanted me to do” i.e. apply some of the monies in the account to the mother’s educational and charitable purposes.

However, that is (at best) neutral on whether the mother intended the daughter to receive the beneficial interest at the end. In fact, the existence of a power of attorney here may well signal that the mother did not intend for the daughter to have a beneficial stake in the monies, at least while the mother was alive: Pecore at paras 67 and 68.

And (again) the daughter did not assert that she had a beneficial stake at any point before the mother’s death; and • she gave no evidence of paying or contributing to any taxes assessed in respect of the joint account (e.g. on any interest paid on the account), whether before or after the mother’s death: Pecore at paras 70 and 71. [ 56 ] The mother did not provide any other species of evidence bearing on whether the beneficial interest moved to her, staking her entire position on the mere existence of a survivorship right i.e. without showing how extensive that right was. [ 57 ] Overall, the daughter provided no evidence showing or signaling that her mother intended her to receive the beneficial stake in the monies at the end, leaving her with legal ownership only. [ 58 ] The daughter may wonder what it means to receive legal, but not beneficial, ownership of the account balance on the mother’s death.

It may mean that, as between the bank and herself, the daughter is able to withdraw the monies i.e. be recognized as a person with authority to compel the bank to surrender the monies to her. [ 59 ] But that is separate from whether, once the daughter might so acquire the monies, she is entitled to treat them as her own i.e. apply them as she wishes, versus being required (as found above) to apply them as directed by the beneficial owner -- in this case, in light of the above findings, the mother’s estate.

IV.Conclusion [ 60 ] With the daughter lacking corroboration of her mother-directed-trust evidence, in any case insufficient certainty of the trust property (as between the charitable and non-charitable purposes), and her right of survivorship here limited to legal ownership only, the beneficial ownership of the monies moved from the mother to the mother’s estate on her death. [ 61 ] Accordingly, I declare that the joint-account balance as of the mother’s death formed, and forms, part of the mother’s estate. [ 62 ] I hereby direct the daughter to pay the account-balance monies (as of the mother’s death), plus any accrued interest, to the brother in his capacity of the co-executor of the estate within ten days of release of this judgment, with the monies to be administered by him in accordance with the mother’s will.

[ 63 ] Failing the daughter paying over the as-of-mother’s-death balance (plus accrued interest) by that deadline, the bank shall be entitled to, and shall, pay over the account-balance monies (or such portion as may currently remain) to the brother, in his capacity as co- executor of the mother, on his request, with no liability or other exposure of the bank to the daughter for that payment. [ 64 ] If the daughter withdrew all or any portion of the date-of-mother’s-death account balance after the mother’s death, she shall pay the withdrawn amount(

s) to the brother, in his capacity as co-executor, by the same deadline, failing which the brother can seek directions from me on the process to be followed for determination of any claim he wishes to bring on behalf of the estate for recovery of the shortfall monies. [ 65 ] Costs-wise, the brother was the successful party. He is entitled to his Schedule-C-level costs of this application for advice and directions. Heard on May 23 and June 6, 2023 in Wetaskiwin, Alberta, with follow-up submissions received on June 22, 2023 and July 14 and 18, 2023 Dated at Wetaskiwin, Alberta on August 30, 2023. M. J.

Lema J.C.K.B.A. Appearances: Tracy King The Estate House by Gorman & Koski LLP For the applicant Lenna Percheson a.k.a. Lenna Harder Self-represented respondent Giovanna L. Hinman Jackie Handerek & Forester Barristers & Solicitors For the Estate _______________________________________________________ Corrigendum of the of The Honourable Justice M. J. Lema

_______________________________________________________ Changed jurisdiction to reflect Wetaskiwin. _______________________________________________________ Corrigendum of the Reasons for Judgment of The Honourable Justice M.J. Lema _______________________________________________________ Paragraph 62- First sentence, word mother replaced with daughter. Paragraph 62 – First sentence, after brother added in his capacity as co-executor of the estate. Paragraph 63 – First sentence, word mother replaced with daughter. Paragraph 63 – First sentence, words personal representative replaced with co-executor. Paragraph 64 – First sentence, words personal representative replaced with co-executor.