R.L.H. v. T.R.P. Date:, 2017 BCPC 374

Citation: R.L.H. v. T.R.P. Date: 20171017 2017 BCPC 374 File No: F-3469 Registry: Burns Lake IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA IN THE MATTER OF THE FAMILY LAW ACT , S.B.C. 2011 c. 25 BETWEEN: R.L.H. APPLICANT AND: T.R.P. RESPONDENT REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE J. T. DOULIS Appearing on their own behalf: R.L.H. Counsel for the Respondent: K. Strimbold

Place of Hearing: Burns Lake , B.C.

Date of Hearing: October 12, 2017 Date of Judgment: October 17, 2017 Introduction [ 1 ] R.L.H. is before the court seeking to vary Judge Jackson’s order made March 1, 2017, specifying contact time with her two grandchildren, P.A.K. and B.L.S. [ 2 ] Since Judge Jackson made his March 1, 2017 order, P.A.K. and B.L.S.’s mother and primary care giver, T.R.P., moved to Kamloops, B.C. and the court-ordered contact is now impractical if not unworkable. [ 3 ] T.R.P. is R.L.H.’s daughter and P.A.K. and B.L.S.’s mother. [ 4 ] R.L.H. and T.R.P. are intractable in their respective positions: T.R.P. wants R.L.H. to have an equal contact with both P.A.K. and B.L.S.; R.L.H. wants substantive visits with only P.A.K.

Issues [ 5 ] The issues before me are as follows: a. Should the court vary Judge Jackson’s March 1, 2017 order? b. If so, how should it be varied? History of the Proceedings [ 6 ] I have set out the history of the proceedings below as they are relevant to my determination of the issues before the court. [ 7 ] On January 11, 2016, R.L.H. filed her originating Application to Obtain an Order, which she filed in the Prince George Registry as a Fraser Lake file. R.L.H. sought joint guardianship, shared parental responsibilities, parenting time and contact time with P.A.K., born [omitted for publication].

In the alternative to joint guardianship of and shared parenting responsibilities for P.A.K., R.L.H. sought the following contact time: a. three continuous days per week; b. alternating statutory holidays and long weekend; and c. four weeks during the months of July and August. [ 8 ] On February 11, 2016, T.R.P. filed a Reply indicating she disagreed with R.L.H.’s January 11, 2016 application for guardianship, allocation of parental responsibilities, parenting time and contact with P.A.K. and B.L.S. [ 9 ] On March 7, 2016, T.R.P. filed a Notice of Motion and supporting affidavit, seeking an order transferring the court file to the Burns Lake Court Registry on the basis that she and her children resided in Burns Lake, B.C. and R.L.H. worked for the [omitted for publication]. [ 10 ] On March 14, 2016, Judge Weatherly ordered, by consent, the court file be moved to Burns Lake, B.C. for all purposes and adjourned R.L.H.’s January 11, 2016 application. [ 11 ] On June 27, 2016, R.L.H. and T.R.P. and their respective counsel, Kimberly Pavao and Karl Strimbold, appeared before me in a family case conference.

At that time the Court made the following interim order, by consent: a. R.L.H. will have contact with the child, P.A.K., born [omitted for publication], from July 22, 2016 at 12:30 p.m. until July 25, 2016, at 8:30 a.m.; b. R.L.H. will have contact with the child, B.L.S., born [omitted for publication], on July 23, 2016 from 12:30 p.m. until July 23, 2016, at 3:00 p.m.; c. R.L.H. will be responsible for the pickup and drop-off of P.A.K. or B.L.S.; d. R.L.H. will contact T.R.P. for future contact with the children P.A.K. and B.L.S. by way of Facebook; e.

R.L.H. may have contact with the children on any additional times and dates as the parties may agree; and f. The matter was referred to the office of the Judicial Case Manager for hearing. The parties will contact the Judicial Case Manager by July 5, 2016, to

schedule a hearing date. [ 12 ] On July 13, 2016, R.L.H. filed an amended Application to Obtain an Order, in which she sought: a. joint guardianship of and shared parental responsibilities for P.A.K.;

b. shared parenting time with P.A.K.; and in the alternative i. three continuous days per week; ii. alternating statutory holidays and long weekend; iii. four weeks during the months of July and August; and c. contact with B.L.S. on a graduated basis as agreed between the parties . [ 13 ] On September 7, 2016, R.L.H. filed a notice of motion seeking: a. an order R.L.H. have contact with P.A.K. on a biweekly basis from Friday at 12:30 p.m. to Monday at 8:30 a.m. on an interim basis pending a hearing of R.L.H.’s January 11, 2016 application; b. an order R.L.H. have contact with B.L.S. on a biweekly basis from Saturday at 12:30 p.m. to 3:00 p.m. on an interim basis pending a hearing of R.L.H.’s January 11, 2016 application; c. an order R.L.H. have additional contact time with P.A.K. and B.L.S. at times as agreed to between the parties on an interim basis pending a hearing of R.L.H.’s January 11, 2016 application; d. an order that the director under the Child, Family and Community Service Act (the “ CFCSA ”) produce all child protection documents in the director’s possession or control relating to T.R.P., P.A.K. and B.L.S.; e. an order for disclosure of all documents in the possession or control of Dr.

Greg Norman, of Burns Lake, B.C. relevant to P.A.K.’s treatment or care; f. an order for disclosure of all documents in the possession or control of Dr.

William Abelson, of Prince George, B.C., relevant to P.A.K.’s treatment or care; g. an order for disclosure of all documents in the possession of the Bulkley Valley Child Development Centre, in Burns Lake B.C., relevant to P.A.K.’s treatment or care; and h. an order for disclosure of all documents in the possession of the College of New Caledonia Early Intervention Services in Burns Lake, B.C. relevant to P.A.K.’s treatment or care. [ 14 ] In support of her September 7, 2016 application for parenting time and disclosure of third party records, R.L.H. filed a lengthy affidavit setting out: a. the history of her relationship with P.A.K. and B.L.S.; b. the history of MCFD’s involvement in T.R.P.’s parenting of P.A.K. and B.L.S.; c. her concern about P.A.K.’s developmental delays; d. her efforts to obtain assistance for P.A.K. from physicians, speech therapists and occupational therapists; e. her difficulties in maintaining a close and continuous relationship with P.A.K. after MCFD had returned P.A.K. to T.R.P.’s care; f. her observations as to the deficiency in T.R.P.’s parenting; g. her observations and concerns as to T.R.P.’s historical drug use and continued marijuana use; h.

T.R.P.’s insistence that R.L.H. have visits with B.L.S. as well as P.A.K.; i. her difficulties in establishing a close relationship with B.L.S., and B.L.S.’s resistance to her attempts to do so; j. P.A.K.’s joy at visiting with her grandparents and her reluctance to return home to her mother at the end of the visit; and k. T.R.P.’s hostility toward her which include yelling, swearing and being cruel to R.L.H. [ 15 ] On September 23, 2016, T.R.P. filed a lengthy affidavit in response to R.L.H.’s September 7, 2016 application for parenting time and disclosure of third party records.

T.R.P. disputed almost all R.L.H.’s allegations and went on to discuss her troubled and painful childhood as a result of R.L.H.’s deficient parenting.

T.R.P. discussed specifically the hurt and resentment she felt as a result of her mother and maternal grandparents favouring her older sister, D. [ 16 ] T.R.P. attached to her September 23, 2016 affidavit a text message she received from R.L.H. stating: I really want to know why are you forcing me to take B.L.S. when I clearly don’t want to? [ 17 ] On September 26, 2016, R.L.H. filed a further lengthy affidavit contradicting the assertions of fact set out in T.R.P.’s September 23, 2017 affidavit. [ 18 ] On September 27, 2016, R.L.H. and T.R.P. and their respective counsel, Ms. K. Pavao and Mr. K.

Strimbold, appeared before Judge Birnie sitting in the Burns Lake Provincial Court. At that time, R.L.H.’s September 7, 2016 application for contact time was adjourned and Judge Birnie ordered:

1. the director under the CFCSA disclose to Ms. Pavao, R.L.H.’s legal counsel, all child protection documents in the director’s possession or control relating to P.A.K. and T.R.P.; 2. Dr. Greg Norman, of Burns Lake, B.C. disclose to R.L.H.’s counsel, all records in his possession or control of relevance to P.A.K.’s developmental issues since June 1, 2015; 3.

William Abelson, of Prince George, B.C., disclose to R.L.H.’s legal counsel, all records in his possession or control relevant to P.A.K.’s developmental issues since June 1, 2015; 4. the Bulkley Valley Child Development Centre disclose to R.L.H.’s legal counsel, all records regarding P.A.K.’s appointments for speech therapy and occupational therapy since June 1, 2015; 5. the College of New Caledonia Early Intervention Services in Burns Lake, B.C. disclose to R.L.H.’s legal counsel all records regarding P.A.K.’s appointments for speech therapy and occupational therapy since June 1, 2015; 6.

R.L.H. pay for the costs associated with the production of P.A.K.’s MCFD, medical and therapy records; 7. All records disclosed to Ms. Pavao would: (

a) be kept at her office in Prince George; (

b) not used for any purposes other than these proceedings; and (

c) be provided to counsel for T.R.P. or her counsel, in a timely manner; and 8. R.L.H. was prohibited from discussing the content of the records disclosed to Ms. Pavao with anyone other than Ms.

Pavao. [ 19 ] On October 19, 2016, R.L.H. filed with the Burns Lake Registry a Record Check Results from the Protection Order Registry pursuant to s. 51 of the FLA. [ 20 ] On October 28, 2016, R.L.H. filed with the Burns Lake Registry a Child Protection Record Check Results indicating the CFCSA had no open protection files with respect to R.L.H. [ 21 ] On November 15, 2016, R.L.H. filed an affidavit in Form 34 (Rule 18.1(1)) of the Provincial Court (Family) Rules in support of her application for guardianship of P.A.K.

To this affidavit R.L.H. attached as exhibits the October 19, 2016 and October 28, 2016, Record Check Results from the Protection Order Registry and from MCFD. [ 22 ] On December 13, 2016, R.L.H., T.R.P. and their respective counsel, Ms. Pavao and Mr. Strimbold, appeared before Judge Birnie sitting in the Burns Lake Provincial Court. At that time Judge Birnie made the following interim order, by consent: a. the hearing of R.L.H.’s amended application filed July 13, 2016, and T.R.P.’s reply filed February 11, 2016 be adjourned to the Judicial Case Manager; and b.

R.L.H. will have contact with P.A.K. commencing December 30, 2016, from Friday at 12:30 p.m. to Monday at 8:30 a.m. every 3 rd weekend on an interim basis until the hearing. [ 23 ] R.L.H.’s application came on for hearing before Judge Jackson on February 21, 22 and 23, 2017. R.L.H. was represented by her legal counsel, Ms. Pavao and T.R.P. was represented by her legal counsel, Mr. Strimbold. Upon the conclusion of the hearing on February 23, 2017, Judge Jackson reserved his decision. [ 24 ] On March 1, 2017, Judge Jackson handed down his decision and reasons for judgment which is indexed as L.H. v. T.R.

P., 2017 BCPC 179 . [ 25 ] On March 1, 2017, Judge Jackson made a final order which provided R.L.H. with the following contact with P.A.K. and B.L.S.: a. Commencing Friday, March 10 th , 2017, R.L.H. will have contact with P.A.K. from 12:30 p.m. until Monday March 13 th , 2017 at 8:30 a.m. and every second weekend thereafter, up to and including the weekend of April 21 st , 2017; b. R.L.H. will have contact with B.L.S. from 10:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m. on Sunday, March 12 th , 2017, every second Sunday thereafter, up to and including the Sunday of April 23 rd , 2017; c.

Commencing the weekend of May 5 th , 2017 [ sic ], R.L.H. will have contact with P.A.K. from 12:30 p.m. until March 13 th , 2017 at 8:30 a.m. and every second weekend thereafter; d. R.L.H. will have contact with B.L.S. from 10:00 a.m. on Sunday, May 7 th , 2017, overnight until Monday, May 8 th , 2017, at 8:30 a.m.; e. This order shall be in effect until varied by this court or by agreement of the parties; and f. If either party does not comply with this order, the opposing party may bring an application under

section 61 or

section 63 of the Family Law Act . Current Proceedings [ 26 ] On March 13, 2017, R.L.H. filed a Notice of Motion seeking directions regarding transitioning P.A.K. and B.L.S. under Judge Jackson’s March 1, 2017 order. [ 27 ] On March 14, 2017, R.L.H. filed an affidavit in support of her March 13, 2017 Notice of Motion. In her affidavit R.L.H. set out

the difficulty and expense associated with her having to transition P.A.K. and B.L.S. from her residence in Fraser Lake and T.R.P.’s residence in Burns Lake., B.C. The two communities are 75 kilometres apart. R.L.H. and her husband, T.C., have access to only one vehicle for personal their use, which T.C. requires on the weekend. [ 28 ] On March 15, 2017, R.L.H. filed an Application Respecting Existing Orders seeking to vary Judge Jackson’s March 1, 2017.

She states: The reasons for my application are as follows: I cannot do the driving for the pick-up and drop off of B.L.S. and it is too painful to try and have a relationship. [ 29 ] On March 15, 2017, the parties and their respective counsel, Ms. Pavao and Mr. Strimbold, appeared before Judge Jackson at the hearing of R.L.H.’s March 13, 2017 Notice of Motion. R.L.H. sought an order that T.R.P. pick up and drop off B.L.S. for R.L.H.’s Saturday visits.

In her submissions R.L.H. read the following statement she had prepared for court: I cannot do the driving back and forth from Fraser Lake to Burns Lake to pick up and drop off B.L.S., as I do not have access to a vehicle on the weekends. And I drive back and forth five days a week and should not be expected to drive again on the weekends, especially twice on Sundays. Two trips on Sundays is almost four hours of driving. And it is very apparent that I cannot reason with T.R.P. about anything. This is why I cannot have a relationship with B.L.S.

I have suffered a great deal of heartache not being able to see my granddaughter over these past few months, and it’s extremely upsetting. I know that if I establish a relationship with B.L.S., that T.R.P. will use that relationship to hurt me. And I’m not willing to take the risk, as it is affecting my health. I believe it is not in B.L.S.’s best interest to establish a relationship with his grandmother and then have his mother take that away, because it is exactly what T.R.P. will do. She has already done that to P.A.K.

I have a very close bond and relationship with P.A.K., as she lived with me for 17 months when she was removed from her mother’s care. She begs me to come and get her every single time I talk to her and she cries when I have to take her home. She wants to have regular contact. And I believe it is also extremely hard on her not being able to visit me. It is very obvious at the trial how angry and harsh T.R.P. is and it’s fair to assume that she acts in the same manner towards her children.

I believe it is in P.A.K.’s best interest to be able to have regular contact and continue her close living relationship with me. I am asking the court order exclude visits with B.L.S., as I am not willing or wanting to have a relationship with him, because it’s too painful. B.L.S. has had no relationship with me and has had little contact since his birth. And because I am not willing, it is not in his best interest or mine to be forced. I’m just being honest and I need to take care of myself. It is extremely difficult, especially dealing with T.R.P.

And I need all this to be dealt with because it is affecting my health. I have spent almost two years of my income on lawyers’ fees, and I’m out of money. I just want to be able to maintain a close living relationship with my granddaughter, and I know that it’s what P.A.K. wants, too. And after all her feelings should be considered first. She loves her grandma and shouldn’t be denied this love. So in closing, the way the court order stands, I have no choice but to walk away, because it’s impossible for me to follow. And I’m just asking that you please don’t take my granddaughter away from me.

It’ll break her heart, along with mine. [ 30 ] Judge Jackson dismissed R.L.H.’s March 13, 2017 request that T.R.P. pick up and drop off B.L.S. for R.L.H.’s contact time with him. [ 31 ] On April 5, 2017, T.R.P. filed a Reply to R.L.H.’s March 15, 2017 application.

In her Reply, T.R.P. states she disagreed with any change or suspension or termination of Judge Jackson’s March 1, 2017 order because: As stated in Judge Jackson’s reasons at paragraph 50, “It is also clear that a more equal amount of contact with both children would be in the best interest of both children,” and R.L.H. has failed to do so. [ 32 ] On May 10, 2017, R.L.H.’s March 15, 2017 application came before Judge Jackson, sitting in the Burns Lake Provincial Court. R.L.H. was self-represented and Mr. Strimbold appeared as T.R.P.’s counsel and agent.

At that time, R.L.H.’s March 15, 2017 application was adjourned and Judge Jackson recused himself. [ 33 ] On June 13, 2017, R.L.H.’s March 15, 2017 application came before Judge Dickey sitting in the Burns Lake Provincial Court. Both parties were present and represented by their respective legal counsel, Ms. Pavao and Mr. Strimbold. R.L.H.’s March 15, 2017 application was adjourned to a Family Case Conference scheduled for July 25, 2017. Also, on that date, Judge Dickey varied paragraph 3 of Judge Jackson’s March 1, 2017 order to state: 3.

Commencing the weekend of Friday, March 10, 2017, R.L.H. shall have contact with P.A.K. from 12:30 p.m. until Monday March 13, 2017, at 8:30 a.m. and thereafter on every second weekend from Friday at 12:30 p.m. until Monday at 8:30 a.m. [ 34 ] R.L.H.’s March 15, 2017 application came before me for hearing July 25, 2017. R.L.H. was represented by Linda Locke acting as duty counsel. T.R.P. appeared by telephone from Kamloops, while her legal counsel, Mr. Strimbold, appeared in person. The hearing of R.L.H.’s March 15, 2017 application was adjourned to the Judicial Case Manager to reschedule the hearing date.

In the interim, the Court made the following order, by consent: a. R.L.H. will travel to Kamloops on August 4, 2017, to pick up B.L.S. for a sleepover for one night. R.L.H. will return B.L.S. the following day and pick-up P.A.K. and bring P.A.K. to Fraser Lake for a one week visit with R.L.H. R.L.H. will return P.A.K. to Kamloops on August 12, 2017, before 2:00 p.m. in time for B.L.S.’s birthday party scheduled on that day. Upon returning P.A.K. to

Kamloops R.L.H. will again pickup B.L.S. for one more overnight visit; and b. R.L.H. will have a one week visit with P.A.K. and B.L.S. during the 2017 Christmas holidays at such times and on such dates as the parties may agree. [ 35 ] On September 27, 2017, R.L.H. filed an affidavit in support of her March 15, 2017 application. [ 36 ] R.L.H.’s March 15, 2017 application came before me for hearing on October 12, 2017, in Burns Lake Provincial Court. T.R.P. attended with her counsel, Mr. Strimbold, and R.L.H. was self-represented. At that time I reviewed the court file and heard oral evidence of R.L.H. and T.R.P.

I also had before me the following new material: a. R.L.H.’s affidavit sworn and filed March 14, 2017; b. R.L.H.’s affidavit sworn and filed September 27, 2017; and c. Exhibit 1, a text message exchanged between T.R.P. and R.L.H. on April 19 and 20, 2017. [ 37 ] On October 12, 2017, I reserved my decision on R.L.H.’s March 15, 2017 application. Pending my decision, I made the following interim order, by consent: R.L.H. may have contact with P.A.K. at such time and on such dates as to which the parties may agree.

Background Facts [ 38 ] The background facts to the parties’ conflict are set out in Judge Jackson’s order. [ 39 ] R.L.H. is the biological mother of the Respondent, T.R.P. [ 40 ] R.L.H. is 50 years old and resides in Fraser Lake, B.C. with her husband T.C. She works part-time for the [omitted for publication]. [ 41 ] T.R.P.’s biological father is R.P. who resides in Kamloops, B.C. [ 42 ] T.R.P. is the biological mother of P.A.K., born [omitted for publication] and B.L.S., born [omitted for publication]. [ 43 ] P.A.K. and B.L.S. have different biological fathers.

Neither father is a guardian to his child or involved in his child’s life. [ 44 ] MCFD became involved in P.A.K.’s life before she was one year old. On November 21, 2013, the director of CFCSA obtained an Interim Supervision Order as result of concerns with respect to T.R.P.’s parenting of P.A.K. Specifically, MCFD was concerned with T.R.P.’s drug use and relationship with T.S., someone who MFCD described as a violent crystal meth user and drug dealer. [ 45 ] On December 26, 2013, MCFD removed P.A.K. from T.R.P.’s care pursuant to s. 36(1) of the CFCSA and placed her in R.L.H.’s care.

Had R.L.H. not accepted responsibility for her care, P.A.K. would have been placed with foster parents. [ 46 ] P.A.K. lived with R.L.H. in Fraser Lake until April 21, 2015, with supervised access to T.R.P. MCFD eventually returned P.A.K. to T.R.P.’s care through a graduated plan. Judge Struyk ordered P.A.K. returned to T.R.P.’s care on April 21, 2015. [ 47 ] P.A.K. was in T.R. P.’s care from her birth except for the period when MCFD placed her with R.L.H. B.L.S. has resided with and been in T.R.

P.’s continuous care since birth. [ 48 ] T.R.P. significantly improved her circumstances and parenting skills in the past three years. Since 2013, T.R.P. quit using hard drugs, completed her high school equivalency, obtained a certificate with honours as a Health Care Assistant and underwent anger management counselling. She now has a good job in Kamloops as a health care aide. [ 49 ] Essentially, T.R.P. has grown up, and accepted the responsibility of properly parenting her children.

Judge Jackson noted at para. 29 of his decision that R.L.H. admits that T.R.P. is capable of caring for her children. [ 50 ] R.L.H. became very bonded to P.A.K. during the time they lived together. R.L.H. regards P.A.K. more as a daughter than a granddaughter, although she regards B.L.S. as a grandson. [ 51 ] R.L.H. continued to have contact time with P.A.K. after she was returned to her mother’s care. [ 52 ] T.R.P. gave birth to B.L.S. on [omitted for publication]. B.L.S. had never lived with R.L.H. and they never bonded.

Still, T.R.P. took the positon that R.L.H. had to develop a relationship with B.L.S. as well as P.A.K. T.R.P. refused to permit R.L.H. to have extended visits with P.A.K. unless she also had visits with B.L.S. [ 53 ] As tensions between them heightened, T.R.P. refused R.L.H. extended visits with P.A.K. to the exclusion of B.L.S. [ 54 ] R.L.H. commenced these proceedings to obtain a court order for specified contact time with P.A.K. At the family case conference on June 27, 2016, R.L.H. and T.R.P. agreed to an order allowing R.L.H. overnight visits with P.A.K. and shorter visits with B.L.S.

It was hoped that through short visits with B.L.S., R.L.H. would build a close and loving relationship with B.L.S. as she had done with P.A.K. This did not happen and R.L.H.’s relationship with B.L.S. did not flourish. [ 55 ] As a result of these proceedings, R.L.H.’s relationship with T.R.P. has deteriorated to the point that R.L.H. considers it broken and unfixable.

[ 56 ] In his March 1, 2017 Reasons for Judgment, Judge Jackson found large portions of R.L.H. and T.R.P.’s testimony contradictory or denials of allegations made by the other; they were obviously hostile to one another and agreed they have no relationship. [ 57 ] Judge Jackson concluded R.L.H. should not be named a guardian on the basis it was unnecessary and undesirable. It was unnecessary because T.R.P. had improved her parenting skills to the point that she was able to parent both her children; it was undesirable because they could not cooperate in implementing a parenting arrangement.

Judge Jackson states at paras. 45 - 47: [45] . . . [ L.M.O. v. S.S. and A.S., 2015 BCPC 328 ] held that “it is not in the best interests of the child to be placed into circumstances of real conflict between the custodial parent and a non-parent.” Section 37(2)(

i) of the FLA reads that the court must consider, “the appropriateness of an arrangement that would require the child’s guardians to cooperate on issues affecting the child including whether requiring cooperation would increase any risks to the safety, security or well-being of the child or other family members.” [46] Accordingly, this court concludes that joint guardianship would not be in the best interests of the children because there is ample evidence that the parties are unable to cooperate. [47] The same logic applies to the issue of whether R.L.H. should have access to medical, dental and educational records of the children in order, in her words, to have input.

While such disclosure can be ordered outside of guardianship, in light of the animosity between the parties, this court concludes such an order would at best be useless. [ 58 ] Judge Jackson found that despite their animus, both parties obviously cared for the children and agreed a healthy relationship between the children and their grandmother was in the children’s best interest. Judge Jackson was satisfied that contact between R.L.H., P.A.K. and B.L.S. was in the children’s best interests.

He also adopted T.R.P.’s view that R.L.H. ought to develop a healthy relationship with both grandchildren: [49] This court is reluctant to micro-manage contact time between R.L.H. and the children. It would be simplest to refuse to make any order for contact relying on the principles laid out in the law cited above. However, as admitted by the parties, a healthy relationship between the children and R.L.H. is in the best interests of the children. [50] It is also clear that a more equal amount of contact with both children would be in the best interest of both children.

An obvious imbalance in contact time can in the long run only cause resentment and friction between the two children. [51] Therefore, as is often said in family court, with “baby steps” a working arrangement to make the amount of contact time with each child more equitable may be established over time. Hopefully, a working arrangement will over time lead to more trust and cooperation between the parties. [ 59 ] With this goal in mind, Judge Jackson, at paras. 52 - 55, ordered specified interim order for contact between R.L.H. and the two children. He held at para. 52: . . .

The order may be reviewed in approximately six months to see if the situation has improved or whether this order should be changed. [ 60 ] As set out above, R.L.H. brought this matter back before Judge Jackson within two weeks of his order. R.L.H. asked the Court to order T.R.P. assist with transitioning B.L.S. for his contact time under the March 1, 2017 order. [ 61 ] On or about April 19, 2017, T.R.P. sent R.L.H. notice of her intention to relocate herself and the children to Kamloops as of June 18, 2017.

This notice was sent by way of the text message, a copy of which was marked Exhibit 1 in the October 12, 2017 hearing. This message reads: T.R.P.: I am just messaging to give you my 60 days’ notice I will be moving to Kamloops or Logan Lake on or about June 18, 2017 April 20, 2017 R.L.H.: Why are you taking me to court then? I received notification from your lawyer that you are taking me to court for not following the court order. The court order will have to be changed before you move so I can still have visits with P.A.K. [ 62 ] T.R.P. relocated with the children to Kamloops on about April 23, 2017.

She says when she initially when to Kamloops it was to find work. T.R.P. was one of many who completed the Health Care Assistant program in Burns Lake, so there were many more certified practitioners than jobs. [ 63 ] When she arrived in Kamloops, T.R.P. and the children lived with R.P. Although she was seeking employment in Kamloops, T.R.P. did not anticipate moving there in April 2017.

On May 19 th , 2017, however, T.R.P. found work as a health care aide with [omitted for publication] and now resides in Kamloops with the children with no expectation she will return to Burns Lake. [ 64 ] In her affidavit filed September 27, 2017, R.L.H. states that she only had three visits with P.A.K. and B.L.S. from March 10, 2017 until T.R.P. moved on April 23, 2017. R.L.H. believes T.R.P. moved to Kamloops to prevent R.L.H. from having regular visits with P.A.K. [ 65 ] R.L.H. did have a week long court ordered visit with P.A.K. this summer.

This visit involved R.L.H. having to drive to Kamloops on August 4, 2017, pick up B.L.S. for an overnight visit in a hotel, return him home the morning of August 4, 2017, then pick up P.A.K. and drive back to Fraser Lake. R.L.H. left Fraser Lake on August 11, 2017 to return P.A.K. to Kamloops before 2:00 p.m. on August 12, 2017 as ordered. R.L.H. then picked up B.L.S. for an overnight visit in her hotel. [ 66 ] R.L.H.’s August contact time with P.A.K. and B.L.S. was costly and time consuming. It involved R.L.H. having to drive between Fraser Lake and Kamloops twice and spend three nights in hotels.

The total costs for her hotel room, fuel and meals totalled $1,350.35, a sum she cannot afford on her part-time salary.

[ 67 ] R.L.H. finds Judge Jackson’s

schedule unworkable now that T.R.P. and the children reside in Kamloops. She is seeking an order for contact time with P.A.K., during the school holidays and long weekends, including: a. one week during the Christmas school break starting on December 26; b. one week during the school spring break; c. one month each summer holiday; and d. some Thanksgiving and Easter long weekends. [ 68 ] R.L.H. also asked T.R.P. share in facilitating her contact time with P.A.K.

Specifically, R.L.H. asks the court to order T.R.P. meet her in Quesnel, which is approximately half way between Fraser Lake and Kamloops, to transition P.A.K. This would involve R.L.H. and T.R.P. each driving four hours to the transition point in Quesnel, then driving four hours back to their respective homes. In this way P.A.K. could be transitioned within a day with minimal expenses to T.R.P. or R.L.H. [ 69 ] T.R.P. says R.L.H. is welcome to have contact with P.A.K., but only if she also has equal contact with B.L.S.

Although T.R.P. prefers R.L.H. have visits with both children at the same time, she does not insist upon it. T.R.P. is content for R.L.H. having visits with B.L.S. and P.A.K. at different times, provided she spends an equal amount of time with each grandchild. [ 70 ] R.L.H. is not seeking contact time with B.L.S. In her September 27, 2017 affidavit, R.L.H. states : 12. P.A.K. lived with us for one year and seven months and we have a very close bond and loving relationship. I am requesting visitation with P.A.K. only as I do not have a relationship with B.L.S. as I was never a parent to B.L.S.

B.L.S. has never lived with my husband T.C. and I, and my interactions with B.L.S. have been short and sporadic. B.L.S. does not know us and it was extremely stressful and disturbing for him to be sent off with us all by himself for two nights in the hotel. He cried hard for a long time for his mother and when I tried to comfort him he would cry louder and push me away. It was very upsetting for both of us. 17. I request these visits do not include B.L.S. as I have never had a relationship with B.L.S. and still do not have a relationship with him.

I do not believe it is in B.L.S.’s best interest therefore my own best interest to be forced to have visits as it was very upsetting to both of us. [ 71 ] T.R.P. and R.L.H. appeared before me on October 12, 2017, for the hearing of R.L.H.’s application to vary Judge Jackson’s March 1, 2017 order. [ 72 ] T.R.P. is steadfast in her view that R.L.H. must nurture a relationship with both grandchildren, and that can only happen if R.L.H. spends as much time with B.L.S. as she does with P.A.K.

Instead, R.L.H. only wants visits and telephone calls with P.A.K., to the exclusion of B.L.S. [ 73 ] Other than the over-night visits in the Kamloops hotel, R.L.H. spent only 2½ hours with B.L.S. since Judge Jackson’s made his March 1, 2017 order. B.L.S. has never been to his grandmother’s home. [ 74 ] T.R.P. says it is R.L.H., not B.L.S., who does not want a relationship. B.L.S. is a sociable three-year old boy who has no difficulties adapting to day care although he has had to deal with six different day care workers.

B.L.S. asks about his grandmother. [ 75 ] T.R.P. is not prepared to share the cost and inconvenience of transitioning the children between her home in Kamloops and R.L.H.’s home in Fraser Lake. T.R.P. argues that R.L.H. is not a parent or guardian and if she wishes to have visits with her grandchildren, then she must do so at her own expense. [ 76 ] R.L.H. says it is too physically difficult and stressful having both P.A.K. and B.L.S. to care for at the same time. Because of calcium build up in her shoulders, she could not lift B.L.S. without discomfort and pain.

Now that T.R.P. and the children reside in Kamloops, the cost associated with exercising sequential contact time with P.A.K. and B.L.S. is prohibitive. Moreover, it is too painful to develop a relationship with B.L.S., because T.R.P. will take him away from her as she has done with P.A.K. [ 77 ] R.L.H. is unequivocal she only wants contact time with P.A.K. At the hearing she stated: I just want to continue to have a relationship with my granddaughter. I don’t have a relationship with B.L.S. and when she has more kids other - the next few guys, am I going to be forced to take them too?

I don’t have a relationship with my grandson; I never have because my relationship with T.R.P. is like this. [ 78 ] T.R.P. recalls hurtful childhood memories of her mother and maternal grandparents favouring her older sister. T.R.P. is not prepared to allow R.L.H. to replay this dynamic in her relationships with P.A.K. and B.L.S. The Legal Framework Issue #1: Should Judge Jackson’s March 1, 2017 order be suspended or varied? [ 79 ] The issues before the court engage ss. 1, 37, 40, 41, 47, 59, 65, 66(1) and 67 of the FLA .

As R.L.H. is self-represented, I have reproduced those sections for ease of reference. [ 80 ] On March 1, 2017, Judge Jackson ordered R.L.H. have contact with P.A.K. and B.L.S. pursuant to s. 59 of the FLA , which states, in part: Orders respecting contact

(1) On application, a court may make an order respecting contact with a child, including describing the terms and form of contact.

(2) A court may grant contact to any person who is not a guardian, including, without limiting the meaning of "person" in any otherprovision of this Act or a regulation made under it, to a parent or grandparent. [81] R.L.H. seeks to vary Judge Jackson’s March 1, 2017 order under s. 60 of the FLA, which states: Changing, suspending or terminating orders respecting contact 60 On application, a court may change, suspend or terminate an order respecting contact with a child if satisfied that, since the making ofthe order, there has been a change in the needs or circumstances of the child, including because of a change in the circumstances ofanother person. [82] In Williamson v.

Williams, 2016 BCCA 87 , the B.C. Court of Appeal confirmed the test which applies to anapplication for variations in parenting time arrangements under s. 47 FLA is the material change in circumstances test establishedin Gordon v Goertz, (SCC), [1996] 2 SCR 27. This court in J.V.G. v. E.T., 2014 BCPC 307 , at para. 16 heldthis threshold test also applies to applications brought under s. 60 of the FLA: see J.V.G. v. E.T., 2014 BCPC 307 at para. 16,adopted in M.J.S. v. A.D., 2016 BCPC 367 , at para. 11 and D.L.G. v. S.M.S, 2015 BCPC 43 , at para. 139. [83] In Gordon v.

Goertz, the Supreme Court of Canada held a material change of circumstances must be one that affects the child. At paras. 11 to 13, Justice McLachlin (as she then was) set out the proper approach to the requirement for a material change ofcircumstances: 11. The requirement of a material change in the situation of the child means that an application to vary custody cannot serve as anindirect route of appeal from the original custody order.

The court cannot retry the case, substituting its discretion for that of the originaljudge; it must assume the correctness of the decision and consider only the change in circumstances since the order was issued: . . . 12. What suffices to establish a material change in the circumstances of the child? Change alone is not enough; the change must havealtered the child's needs or the ability of the parents to meet those needs in a fundamental way . . . The question is whether the previousorder might have been different had the circumstances now existing prevailed earlier . . .

Moreover, the change should represent adistinct departure from what the court could reasonably have anticipated in making the previous order. "What the court is seeking toisolate are those factors which were not likely to occur at the time the proceedings took place. . . . 13.

It follows that before entering on the merits of an application to vary a custody order the judge must be satisfied of: (1) a changein the condition, means, needs or circumstances of the child and/or the ability of the parents to meet the needs of the child; (2) whichmaterially affects the child; and (3) which was either not foreseen or could not have been reasonably contemplated by the judge whomade the initial order. [Citations omitted] [84] Division 6 of the FLA recognizes the significant impact of relocating a child. It states, in part: Division 6 — Relocation Definition and application 65

(1) In this Division, "relocation" means a change in the location of the residence of a child or child's guardian that can reasonably beexpected to have a significant impact on the child's relationship with (

a) a guardian, or (

b) one or more other persons having a significant role in the child's life.

(2) This Division applies if (

a) a child's guardian plans to relocate himself or herself or the child, or both, and (

b) a written agreement or an order respecting parenting arrangements or contact with the child applies to the child. Notice of relocation 66

(1) Subject to subsection (2), a child's guardian who plans to relocate himself or herself or a child, or both, must give to all otherguardians and persons having contact with the child at least 60 days' written notice of (

a) the date of the relocation, and (

b) the name of the proposed location.

(2) The court may grant an exemption from all or part of the requirement to give notice under subsection (1) if satisfied that (

a) notice cannot be given without incurring a risk of family violence by another guardian or a person having contact with the child, or (

b) there is no ongoing relationship between the child and the other guardian or the person having contact with the child.

(3) An application for an exemption under subsection (2) may be made in the absence of any other party.

Resolving issues arising from relocation 67

(1) If notice is required under

section 66 [notice of relocation], after the notice is given and before the date of the relocation, thechild's guardians and the persons having contact with the child must use their best efforts to cooperate with one another for the purposeof resolving any issues relating to the proposed relocation.

(2) Nothing in subsection (1) prevents (

a) a guardian from making an application under

section 69 [orders respecting relocation], or (

b) a person having contact with the child from making an application under

section 59 [orders respecting contact] or 60 [changing,suspending or terminating orders respecting contact], as applicable, for the purpose of maintaining the relationship between the childand a person having contact with the child if relocation occurs. [85] T.R.P. sent R.L.H. notice of her intention to relocate to Kamloops in 60 days; however, she then relocated within a week ofsending the notice.

Although T.R.P. may have intended at the time to return to Burns Lake, she never did. [86] As Kamloops is an eight hour drive from Burns Lake, T.R.P.’s relocation to Kamloops made it practically impossible forR.L.H. to exercise contact time with P.A.K. and B.L.S. pursuant to Judge Jackson’s March 1, 2017 order. [87] I find T.R.P.’s relocation to Kamloops with the children without proper notice to R.L.H. constitutes a material change ofcircumstances. Even absent this material change, Judge Jackson’s March 1, 2017 order is an interim order reviewable in six months.

Insuch circumstances, either party seeking to review the order after October 1, 2017, is not required to show a material change ofcircumstance. [88] On October 12, 2017, the court replaced Judge Jackson’s March 1, 2017 order with a further interim order giving R.L.H.contact with P.A.K. on such dates and times as the parties might agree. Issue #2: How should Judge Jackson’s March 1, 2017 be varied? [89] As R.L.H. is not a guardian, this court can order contact time under s. 59 of the FLA. R.L.H. seeks contact only with P.A.K.;she does not seek court-ordered contact with B.L.S.

R.L.H. bears the onus of establishing that contact is in P.A.K.’s bestinterests: Kalafchi v. Yao, 2015 BCCA 524 , at para. 12. [90]

Section 37 of the FLA requires a judge considering an application for contact with a child to consider only the best interests ofthe child. Section 37(2) then sets out a number of factors the judge must consider in determining what is in the child’s best interests.

Section 37 states: 37

(1) In making an agreement or order under this Part respecting guardianship, parenting arrangements or contact with a child, theparties and the court must consider the best interests of the child only.

(2) To determine what is in the best interests of a child, all of the child's needs and circumstances must be considered, including thefollowing: (

a) the child's health and emotional well-being; (

b) the child's views, unless it would be inappropriate to consider them; (

c) the nature and strength of the relationships between the child and significant persons in the child's life; (

d) the history of the child's care; (

e) the child's need for stability, given the child's age and stage of development; (

f) the ability of each person who is a guardian or seeks guardianship of the child, or who has or seeks parental responsibilities, parentingtime or contact with the child, to exercise his or her responsibilities; (

g) the impact of any family violence on the child's safety, security or well-being, whether the family violence is directed toward thechild or another family member; (

h) whether the actions of a person responsible for family violence indicate that the person may be impaired in his or her ability to carefor the child and meet the child's needs; (

i) the appropriateness of an arrangement that would require the child's guardians to cooperate on issues affecting the child, includingwhether requiring cooperation would increase any risks to the safety, security or well-being of the child or other family members; (

j) any civil or criminal proceeding relevant to the child's safety, security or well-being.

(3) An agreement or order is not in the best interests of a child unless it protects, to the greatest extent possible, the child's physical,psychological and emotional safety, security and well-being.

(4) In making an order under this Part, a court may consider a person's conduct only if it substantially affects a factor set out insubsection (2), and only to the extent that it affects that factor. [91] In Fawcett v. Read, 2016 BCSC 310, Madam Justice Russell held that when a non-guardian seeks contact,

section 37 should be

read in harmony with

section 41, which states: 41 For the purposes of this Part, parental responsibilities with respect to a child are as follows: (

a) making day-to-day decisions affecting the child and having day-to-day care, control and supervision of the child; (

b) making decisions respecting where the child will reside; (

c) making decisions respecting with whom the child will live and associate…; (

d) making decisions respecting the child's education and participation in extracurricular activities, including the nature, extent andlocation; (

e) making decisions respecting the child's cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage, including, if the child is anaboriginal child, the child's aboriginal identity; (

f) subject to

section 17 of the Infants Act, giving, refusing or withdrawing consent to medical, dental and other health-related treatmentsfor the child; (

g) applying for a passport, licence, permit, benefit, privilege or other thing for the child; (

h) giving, refusing or withdrawing consent for the child, if consent is required; (

i) receiving and responding to any notice that a parent or guardian is entitled or required by law to receive; (

j) requesting and receiving from third parties health, education or other information respecting the child; (

k) subject to any applicable provincial legislation, (

i) starting, defending, compromising or settling any proceeding relating to the child, and (ii) identifying, advancing and protecting the child's legal and financial interests; (

l) exercising any other responsibilities reasonably necessary to nurture the child's development. [92] Section 40(1) of the FLA states only guardians have parental responsibilities and parenting time. [93] In Fawcett, Russell J. analyzed the role the guardian’s views play in the best interests of the child test: [25] I agree with the respondent’s counsel that s. 41 codifies a degree of deference to the guardian’s views on issues concerning thechild, so long as they are guided by the child’s best interests.

Thus, I find that s. 37 does not mean that the views of the guardian, as theyrelate to the enumerated parental responsibilities, are not relevant in considering what may constitute the best interests of the child. [28] Deference to the custodial parent’s views has also been recognized in case law: see Chapman v. Chapman, (BCSC), [1993] B.C.J. No. 316 (S.C.). While Chapman does precede the passage of the FLA, it has been cited for several of the principles itenunciates, including giving deference to the custodial parent: N.F. v. H.L.S., [1998] B.C.J. No. 1739, aff’d 1999 BCCA 398 . In T.F. v.

K.R.C., 2010 BCSC 1808 , the court in making its finding, said the following at para. 47, afterconsidering Chapman and N.F.: I am mindful of the principle that the court should generally accord considerable deference to the wishes of the custodial parent who ischarged with the child’s long term care. [94] Recently in D.D. v. A.C., 2017 BCPC 5, Judge G. W. Koturbash considered the application by a step-grandparent for scheduledcontact time with her three year old step-grandchild.

The father, who was the child’s lone surviving parent, was willing to facilitate somecontact, but opposed the application to the extent proposed by the applicant. Judge Koturbash noted a dichotomy in judicial approachesto resolving disputes regarding grandparent contact time: the parental autonomy approach and the pro-contact approach. JudgeKoturbash states, at paras. 17 and 18: [17] The former assumes that as long as the parent is a fit parent, one can assume that the parent is acting in the best interests of thechild and the courts should leave it to the parent(

s) to decide whether or not contact with the grandparent(

s) is a good idea for theirchild(ren). Indeed, we entrust fit parents all the time with making important decisions about health, education, religion and the moralupbringing of their children. Some would argue that choosing who the child should have contact with is precisely the type of decisionwe must allow parents to make.

While parents might not always make the right decision, it is not always the court’s job to second guessand usurp their parental role. [18] The second approach says that contact between grandchildren and grandparents is generally a good thing and in the best interestsof the child and should be encouraged. This approach recognizes that the parent’s power to decide whether the child will have arelationship with their grandparent(

s) is not absolute and unless there is a good reason to justify disallowing contact the court willintervene. [95] As Judge Koturbash’s comments in para. 23 of D.D. v. A.C., British Columbia, have adopted a hybrid approach to this issue: [23] The British Columbia decision, on the other hand, can best be characterized as more of a hybrid approach. It holds: a. There is no presumption that grandparent contact is in the best interests of the child;

b. The onus to establish grandparent contact time is in the best interests of the child is on the grandparent - not on the parent to establishotherwise; c. The courts should be reluctant to interfere with a custodial parent’s decision in this sort of matter and should only do so where it is inthe best interest of the child; and d. While judges must be vigilant to prevent parents from alleging fictitious or imagined conflicts as a reason to deny contact time, incases of ‘real conflict and hostility’ between the parent and grandparent, the child’s best interest will rarely be served by granting access. Best Interest of the child analysis [96]

Section 37 of the FLA directs me to consider “all of the child’s needs and circumstances” when determining P.A.K.’s bestinterests. Section 37(2)(a): P.A.K.’s health and emotional well-being [97] P.A.K. will be five years old on November 21, 2017. As the result of her living with R.L.H. between December 26, 2013 andApril 21, 2015, P.A.K. developed a special bond with her grandmother. Since that time, P.A.K. has had extended visits with R.L.H.,although these have diminished over time. [98] I accept that P.A.K. thoroughly enjoys her visits with R.L.H.

Unfortunately, these visits have spawned conflict between R.L.H.and T.R.P. As Judge Koturbash noted in D.D. v. A.C., conflict between a parent and grandparent can have a negative impact on a child’semotional well-being. [99] In L.J.G. v. N.B., 2017 BCSC 350 , Madam Justice Choi refused the foster parents’ application for contact with theirfoster child after the child had been returned to her mother’s care. Justice Choi’s primary concern was the extreme level of acrimony andmistrust which the court proceedings engendered.

Justice Choi found the ensuing bitterness had begun to stand in the way of the childhaving a happy and stable life. [100] In this case, R.L.H. and T.R.P.’s rancour has metastasized to the point of destroying their relationship. I am doubtful they canshield P.A.K. from their toxic relationship. Section 37(2)(b): P.A.K.’s views [101] P.A.K. is only four years old and her views have not been canvassed, nor is it appropriate to do so. I accept R.L.H.’s evidencethat P.A.K. loves being with her grandparents as set out in para. 14 of her September 26, 2017 affidavit in which she states: 14.

When P.A.K. visited from August 5 to August 12, 2017, she had a wonderful visit and is very comfortable at our home. She hasher own bedroom with her belongings, a cat and dog who she loves. She did not want to leave and when it was time to return toKamloops she was very emotional and cried that she wanted to stay longer. Section 37(2)(c): the nature and strength of the relationships between P.A.K. and significant persons in her life [102] P.A.K. has a significant relationship with her mother, T.R.P., and her little brother, B.L.S.

As P.A.K. resides with her family inR.P.’s home, I assume she likely has a significant relationship with her maternal grandfather as well. [103] I am satisfied that R.L.H. and T.C. are part of P.A.K.’s extended family with whom she enjoys a significant relationship. [104] There is no evidence to suggest R.L.H. would deliberately foment conflict between B.L.S. and P.A.K. Nevertheless, her desireto bestow special attention on P.A.K. alone may undermine P.A.K.’s relationship with her brother.

As Judge Jackson held at para. 50,“An obvious imbalance in contact time can in the long run only cause resentment and friction between the two children.” Section 37(2)(d): the history of the P.A.K.’s care [105] P.A.K. has been in her mother’s care for her entire life except for the period when MCFD placed her in R.L.H.’s care. AfterP.A.K. was returned to her mother’s care by Judge Struyk’s April 21, 2015 order, R.L.H. has had fairly consistent contact with P.A.K. [106] I note that P.A.K., her mother and brother reside with R.P. in Kamloops. I gather R.L.H.’s communication with R.P. is alsostrained.

It seems that P.A.K. is the only member of T.R.P.’s household with whom R.L.H. has a positive relationship. Section 37(2)(e): P.A.K.’s need for stability [107] P.A.K. has had a tumultuous start in life, having been removed from her mother’s care for an extended period when she wasonly a year old. Still, P.A.K. has been in her mother’s care most of her life. Although stability militates towards preserving R.L.H.’scontact with P.A.K., familial conflict is inherently destabilizing. P.A.K.’s visits with her grandmother are fraught with discord becauseR.L.H. refuses to give B.L.S. equal attention.

Section 37(2)(f): the ability to exercise parenting responsibilities [108] There is no question that R.L.H. properly cares for P.A.K. in a parent-like manner when P.A.K. visits. Nevertheless, as JudgeKoburtash points out in para. 46 of D.D. v. A.C., an important parental responsibility is to minimize conflict between the parent andgrandparent. It is not in child’s best interest to increase the level of conflict. [109] Over the past year, R.L.H.’s conflict with T.R.P. intensified as these proceedings progressed.

Given the content of the affidavitsfiled in this case, it is not surprising R.L.H. and T.R.P. are now alienated.

Section 37(2)(

g) and (h): family violence [ 110 ] Family violence is not a factor in this case. Section 37(2)(i): the ability to cooperate [ 111 ] R.L.H. and T.R.P.’s ability to cooperate is undermined by their level of mistrust and animosity. Conclusion [ 112 ] From the outset of these proceedings, R.L.H. has sought guardianship of and parenting responsibilities for P.A.K. When Judge Jackson refused her application for guardianship, R.L.H. sought and continues to seek contact time with P.A.K. which is more akin to parenting time than contact.

R.L.H. is P.A.K.’s grandparent, and as such is “ ordinarily entitled to contact at the time and for the duration and under the conditions the parent agrees too”: D.D. v. A.C . , at para. 56 . Generally when a court does order specified contact to a non- custodian, the time is quite limited: D.D. v. A.C. , at para. 56 , citing Parmar v. Parmar , [1997] BCJ No 2095 , para. 19 . [ 113 ] T.R.P. is of the view R.L.H. ought to be even-handed with her two grandchildren. This is not an arbitrary or wilful or unreasonable expectation.

I suspect most parents would be troubled by a grandparent who wanted to lavish attention on only one of the grandchildren. R.L.H. does not seem to contextualize P.A.K. within P.A.K.’s existing family unit. I do not know whether R.L.H. fails to appreciate the potential adverse impact of her decision to have a relationship only with P.A.K., or she simply doesn’t care.

Whatever the case, I am not prepared to order R.L.H. have contact with P.A.K. on the terms she seeks. [ 114 ] Since R.L.H. filed her originating application on January 11, 2016, this Court has tried to encourage R.L.H. to establish a loving relationship with both P.A.K. and B.L.S. Twenty-two months later, R.L.H. still has no desire to have contact with B.L.S. In my view an order requiring R.L.H. to spend time with B.L.S. as a prerequisite to having extended visits with P.A.K. is futile. [ 115 ] I am not prepared to second-guess T.R.P.’s decision that R.L.H. ought to treat P.A.K. and B.L.S. equitably.

R.L.H. wants scheduled contact time with only P.A.K. R.L.H. has not persuaded me that such an order will be in P.A.K.’s best interests. [ 116 ] I will make final my October 12, 2017, order that R.L.H. have contact with P.A.K. at dates and times agreed between the parties. [ 117 ] The requirement to obtain R.L.H.’s signature approving the form of this Order is dispensed with. “Judith Doulis” _________________________________ J. T. Doulis Provincial Court Judge