MS v. BW Date:, 2012 BCPC 464

Citation: MS v. BW Date: 20121026 2012 BCPC 0464 File No: F15009 Registry: Port Coquitlam IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA IN THE MATTER OF THE FAMILY RELATIONS ACT , R.S.B.C. 1996 c. 128 BETWEEN: MS APPLICANT AND: BW RESPONDENT REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE DYER Counsel for the Applicant: D. Glass

Counsel for the Respondent: E. Duerr Place of Hearing: Port Coquitlam , B.C.

Date of Hearing: October 26, 2012 Date of Judgment: October 26, 2012 [ 1 ] The parties, whom I shall refer to as the mother and father, apply for various orders concerning their now three-year-old son, one C., who lives with his mother and her parents in Port Coquitlam and has done so since his birth. [ 2 ] The parties began cohabitation in June 2010 having dated while teenagers and separated in February 2011 when the father moved out. [ 3 ] After living with his sister for several months, he moved to Maple Ridge where he now resides in a two-bedroom apartment.

He lives alone but is now seeing a girlfriend in a relationship he describes as not serious but does involve some sleepovers, but not apparently while the father is exercising access to or with C. C. has at the trial date never met this girlfriend. [ 4 ] The mother is not now in a relationship and said she did not intend to become involved in one. Her focus is on her son, C. [ 5 ] The issues the parties seek to have resolved in this hearing are as follows: 1. Whether the father’s parenting time with his son should be increased to a 50/50 or week-on, week-off regime; 2.

Child support going forward and arrears of same from separation February 2011 to September 28, 2011 when an order on point was made and including both a table amount and a Guidelines 7 amount relating to child care costs; 3. Orders relating to parental travel with C. including relating to an application for a passport for C. and custody of same. [ 6 ] Various orders have been made in this matter, including importantly a consent order by Judge St.

Pierre following a family case conference on September 28 th , 2011 which provided that the parents would share joint custody and joint guardianship rights, the latter not being defined, and which required the father to pay to the mother $739.00 per month child support commencing October 1 st , 2011. C. was then living with his mother in excess of 60 percent of the time. [ 7 ] The order does not set out the income level Judge St. Pierre used in his calculation, but the current Guidelines require an annual income of some $79,000 to drive a $739.00 per month payment.

This is a form of backwards reasoning. [ 8 ] In addition, Judge St. Pierre ordered the father to pay the mother $180.00 a month under Guidelines 7 for her child care expenses then I believe $280.00 a month net of subsidy. They are now $180.00 a month net of subsidy. [ 9 ] Other orders were made by Judge St. Pierre, none of which in my view are relevant to the proceeding before me. [ 10 ] I have heard evidence from each parent as to their current living arrangements. [ 11 ] In the case of the mother, this included photos of her basement suite in her parents' home.

I am satisfied that both parents have very suitable accommodation for C. in the event that he stays with either and is in their care.

This in my view is a non-issue. [ 12 ] The mother’s immediate supports include her own mother and father, aged 46 and 49, who live above her, and to a lesser extent, an 18-year-old brother, slated to attend college somewhere this fall 2012, and two Polish grandmothers who apparently attend at her home for annual six-month stays and have a room in her home dedicated for their exclusive use when they visit. [ 13 ] I understand that these visits follow one another so that the mother’s home always has a Polish grandmother in residence so to speak more or less continually all year long.

I have no evidence of the ages or state of health of either Polish grandmother. There is however evidence they help both in picking up C. at his daycare and in providing some measure of afternoon care before the mother returns home from her work. [ 14 ] The father lives alone, but his support group includes his brother Frank and his partner, who live close by. His nephew is described to be a best friend of C. and when for example C. and his Uncle Frank and his son are at the father’s cabin on Sheridan Lake in the summer, the two little boys room together and play together.

The father’s sister lives in North Vancouver. She is now on maternity leave – at least that was the evidence at trial – and available to help with C. if called upon. To a lesser extent, the father’s parents can, on rare occasions, help out with C. They are apparently separated; the mother lives in Summerland and visits her son on occasion, and the father’s Dad lives in the Lower Mainland and seems to be at best available occasionally. [ 15 ] The mother testified that she was aware that the father’s sister had looked after C. while the father was away on, for example, a one week holiday in or about November 2011.

She expressed concern she was not notified about these care arrangements and only learned of his intended absence the day before he departed. She seemed to be angry that she was not earlier notified and generally was critical of the father that he did not notify her of the identity of C.’s caregivers. There is no evidence the mother notifies the father of her travel plans or the identity of C.’s caregivers when she is away. [ 16 ] At trial, she refused to admit when questioned on point that she did not always convey this information to him.

The mother was not critical of the father’s use of his sister as a caregiver for C. There is no evidence that the sister’s skills are lacking in any way as an infant care giver. She has at least one young child of her own and does not now work outside the home.

[ 17 ] The mother has been in his sister’s North Vancouver home either dropping C. off there or picking him up there when the father lived there for several months following their separation in February 2011. The mother said she did not feel comfortable speaking to members of the father’s family, but apparently does text some of them from time to time. She said she did not like his sister as she talked down to her. [ 18 ] On one occasion it seems the sister came by unannounced on a Sunday to the mother’s home following separation of the mother and father and wanted to see C.

The mother refused to allow this to occur, seemingly because the visit was not earlier more formally arranged and approved of. [ 19 ] My impression from all the evidence in this case is that this mother really insists on this approach to access for the most

part in the sense that the same must be somehow pre-arranged if it is to occur. For example, the father testified without any real challenge on point that following separation in February 2011 he felt he saw his son when it was acceptable to his mother. He described her approach as dictatorial. He would request access; if it was in essence convenient to her, it occurred. If it was not, he said it did not occur.

He gave some evidence of an argument occurring between the two parents because they could not agree on changing a pick-up time by some two to two-and-a-half hours. [ 20 ] This said, I expect the post-separation period was a stressful one for both of C.’s parents as they were making efforts to reconcile and seeing one another from time to time in this context. As well, I accept the mother’s evidence that from February 2011 to September 28th, 2011, the father really paid no child support.

Whatever financial help he may have provided was modest indeed and could not be equated in any of these months as a reasonable replacement for child support. [ 21 ] It is fair to say that later in time, for example in 2012, there has been some compromise on access by the mother compared to the immediate post-separation phase. For example, on the May 2012 long weekend the father requested and was given one extra day of access to C. – the Monday – that was not formally his under the above Judge St. Pierre order.

However, when he sought the additional Monday on the July Canada Day long weekend, this was not agreed to and the father had to leave an annual water ski weekend with his family at their Sheridan Lake cabin to return C. to his mother pursuant to the content of the order so he could apparently attend a birthday party for an infant also in attendance at his pre-school. [ 22 ] The father said that he and the mother were able to share some of the driving with respect to C.’s drop-offs and pick-ups, primarily at his residence on 224th Avenue in Maple Ridge, alternating this task on certain days I shall come to and he felt that the current arrangement was going fairly well. [ 23 ] The mother testified that he lives a 20 to 25 minute drive from her home in Port Coquitlam, at least for a 6:30 to 7:00 p.m. pick- up excursion.

The father estimated the drive to be 20 to 30 minutes in duration one way and guessed the distance was between 30 to 40 kilometres one way. I will assume it is approximately 35 kilometres one way in these reasons. The mother said she did not mind making this drive. [ 24 ] C. has no special needs but does have two medical conditions requiring attention on the part of his caregivers. He appears to suffer from eczema in the area of his private parts, rectum and buttocks. There is no medical evidence as to what causes this.

There is some suggestion in the evidence that C. may at some point have been allergic to Pampers diapers. I suspect their use was discontinued some time ago. [ 25 ] The mother wished the Court to have photographic evidence of C.’s condition and in May 2012 she took a series of photos of her son and the same were filed in Court at trial. To highlight the issue, a single 8-inch-by-11-inch photo taken on C.’s return from a weekend access visit with his father on August 12th, 2012 was also enlarged and filed as a separate exhibit on the second day of the hearing.

The Court was invited to review and did so the state of C.’s lower regions disclosed in these various photographs. [ 26 ] These photographs seemingly were intended to corroborate the mother’s evidence generally to the effect that usually on C.’s return from especially weekend overnight access visits with his father he had a chapped behind, if I could put it that way. She said mostly he did not have a diaper rash while in her care.

The father said C. had arrived on access visits more than once suffering from or with such a diaper rash. [ 27 ] One of the mother’s significant concerns about the father having more parenting time with his son relates to the above state of his bottom. She is critical of his efforts to potty train C. She says she has asked him to be involved in this exercise but he says, according to her, that he is more interested in playing with C. than spending time potty training him.

She says C. has a severe diaper rash, especially on his return from his father’s care because rather than potty training C., the Dad in her view plays with him leaving I think his dirty diaper on too long which causes a rash and has led to his eczema condition. [ 28 ] The point I think being attempted to be made is that the father responsible for the unhappy state of his son’s bottom and therefore lacks the necessary parenting skills to have more time with his son than he now has. [ 29 ] The father testified on this point. He understands that a dirty diaper will cause a sore bottom.

He said he checked it as necessary, namely, the diaper and state thereof when C. was with him. He was not asked how regularly he did so. He has a cream obtained from C.’s doctor that he applies to alleviate this soreness and condition. He candidly admitted that when C. was with him despite his best efforts to get C. to use his potty, C. seemed set against doing so at times and in essence, after a potty session was attempted, would nonetheless defecate in his diaper immediately thereafter.

This evidence went unchallenged. [ 30 ] In the result and without medical evidence, I do not find that C.’s eczema condition is solely due to the father’s neglect in either potty training or changing C’s diaper as regularly as might be required. [ 31 ] The father said that when C. was ill and in his care he would call the mother and I understood discuss his condition with her and no doubt share information as to what should be done. This is as things should be with two separated parents who care for and love a child as I find both these parents do.

[ 32 ] The various photos, none taken by the father, do not in my view really corroborate the mother’s suggestion or submission through counsel that the father is neglectful of proper toilet care and attention for his son. They were in my view unnecessary pieces of evidence in this case and I would not encourage the use of such evidence in future cases unless perhaps attached as a necessary exhibit to a relevant medical report filed in evidence. [ 33 ] C. since age 1 has had tubes installed in each ear, apparently to alleviate fluid build-up and associated pain therefrom.

One recently came out and may in future need to be reinstated. This ear condition can apparently lead to C. having more upper respiratory infections than other three-year-olds and he may require the use of antibiotics for same. [ 34 ] There is no medical evidence placed before me as to the cause of this condition and no evidence that either parent either does not know or cannot do what is required to care for a child with this condition.

There is no evidence that this condition requires any special type of care on their part for their son C. [ 35 ] The mother testified that generally she took C. to the doctor and had done so since birth. It seems on this family’s list of parental chores she took responsibility for this one and this responsibility has continued substantially to the date of the trial to be hers. I assume of late these visits would occur on a Saturday due to the mother’s own work

schedule which I shall come to. She testified that at times the father would take C. to the family doctor and meet her there when she had made the appointment. She later seemed to suggest the father did not take C. to the doctor. [ 36 ] There is no evidence the father was ever asked by the mother to (

a) make an appointment for C. at the family doctor and refused or neglected to do so, or (

b) attend at the family doctor for a visit involving C., or (

c) take C. to a doctor’s visit laid on for C. on one of his access weekends and refused. He said that indeed the mother did usually take C. to the family doctor and that once he offered to do so and she declined his offer. [ 37 ] In my view, nothing at all turns on this point.

There is no evidence that if asked to do so, the father could not either make an appointment for C. at the family doctor or take him to the doctor’s office, or ought to have taken C. to some doctor or hospital by reason of some emergent event involving C. while C. was in his care and that he either refused or neglected to do so or withheld material information about his medical condition while in his care from the mother. [ 38 ] I find he would be perfectly capable of assisting on C.’s medical attendances if by the parents’ own agreement his parental chore list or responsibilities were to be expanded to include this chore.

Thus far it seems to be one solely on the mother’s list. [ 39 ] I turn now to the parties’ work situation. [ 40 ] The mother works full-time for a restoration company in Surrey and has done so since January 2012. It is located a 40-minute drive from her home in Port Coquitlam. She is a project coordinator and administrative assistant and as such does accounting work among other types of work. She joined this company as it offered a good career opportunity for her. Her former job is located some five minutes drive from her home.

Now she leaves home about 7:30 a.m. in the morning after dropping C. at his daycare and works to 4:30 or 5:00 o’clock p.m. every weekday depending upon whether she takes a half hour or one hour lunch. In either case she would not return home until after 5:00 p.m. when I understood the daycare closes. [ 41 ] It seems she has a good relationship with her employer. She is now considering upgrading her education and taking certain university level courses and testified that her employer supports her doing so.

These courses will be taken during the day, not in evenings and her employer will pay her while she does them in the sense that her now $32,040 a year salary will be paid whether she is in her office doing office work for her employer or at school. [ 42 ] No evidence was given as to what courses she would take and when they would start or the course homework requirements, although my sense of her evidence is that, most likely they were to start this fall.

It would be rare indeed for a university level course in any discipline whatsoever not to require the student taking same to invest some material amount of time outside the classroom on reading assignments, possibly writing papers, and perhaps doing examination review. There is no evidence that such additional work could be done in office hours while the mother was being paid her full salary.

She has medical and related coverage through her employer and C. is covered under her plan. [ 43 ] The mother’s two financial statements show that in the year 2011 when she worked for the most part doing bookkeeping work for Tailwind Management earning $30,791 that she received a Child Tax Benefit of $3,418.35 and a B.C. Family Bonus amount of $48.18.

Her April 27th, 2012 financial statement discloses her $32,040 salary at her restoration company and a Child Tax Benefit of $1,200. [ 44 ] I turn to the father’s current employment situation. [ 45 ] On April 13th, 2012, he started work pursuant to a contract with a division of a large local construction company currently having some 28 significant commercial building contracts on the go. He receives a salary of $75,000 for this work. He is now a superintendent on one large New Westminster job, working both on-site and in his employer’s office also in New Westminster.

In fact, he works in both places. [ 46 ] While he used to do some night shifts, this is not now apparently an aspect of his job and he anticipates none going forward. His current contract ends, according to his evidence, on or about November 30th, 2012. There is a high degree of certainty his employment will continue and on or before November 30th next he will be made a superintendent of another large job. He will receive no bonus on this job, but there is a possibility he may on the next job to start sometime after November 30th, 2012. He says he works Monday to Friday.

His typical day is a start at 7:00 o’clock a.m. and he finishes at about 3:30 p.m. His office is a 15 to 20 minute drive from the mother’s home and C.’s daycare in Port Coquitlam and on the way home to Maple Ridge. He is usually home by 4:30 p.m. whether or not he picks up C. on the way at the daycare or at mother’s home. [ 47 ] He testified he has some flexibility in his current job stating variously that he could start a half an hour to one hour later in

which case the delay would be made up at the end of the day so he would leave at say 4:00 to 4:30 p.m. depending on his start time. He has discussed this

schedule with his employer who is okay with such a change being made as necessary. He too has medical coverage at work but no other benefits, for example a company car, and is actively taking steps to have C. placed on his insurance plan at work. [ 48 ] Formerly he worked with a company he and his Dad owned called BBW Construction. In 2011 he made $86,306 working there. He does not now do work for this company and receives no benefits from it save it may pay a monthly cell phone bill for him. He has no current plans to work for it. He is unsure his current employer would permit this.

I doubt they would. [ 49 ] He took his present job with the construction company primarily for the same reason as the mother took her new job, namely, to better his longer term employment prospects and security. He testified that he felt he could make more money in future in management rather than by using his tools. He is a journeyman carpenter by training. [ 50 ] I have mentioned that C. is now in full-time daycare five days a week from about 7:15 to 7:30 a.m. in terms of his start time and finishing between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m. when the daycare requires his pick-up.

The daycare is located within a very short distance of his mother’s home. He has been attending it since age 1. He is generally picked up by 4:00 o’clock p.m. by a grandmother, namely, one of the Polish grandmothers, when he sees his Dad at 4:00 p.m. for weekday visits, and by 5:00 p.m. by his mother, or if she is late getting home by a grandmother again, or even one of the two daycare providers will drop him at the mother’s home. This arrangement appears to be working well. [ 51 ] The mother makes his lunch the night before. The daycare provides his breakfast.

The mother is on email from the daycare and they can thereby report things to the mother in this way, for example, if some form of emergency arose there that required that he be removed. The father said thus far there have been no such emergencies. The father is apparently not on this email list, I suspect either because he is not a signatory to the daycare contract or because the mother has not authorized the daycare to put him on it. In my view, he has as much right to be on it as she does, subject always to the terms of the daycare provider’s contract.

If the daycare wants to alert both parents as to any problems, the same message in my view could readily and easily be sent to both of them by email. [ 52 ] C. is said to have some friends at the daycare. On average, the two workers there deal with some four to five children in total at any given time. [ 53 ] In 2011, the net cost was $280.00 and since October 1st of that year, the net cost has become $180.00 as I mentioned above. On September 28th, 2011, Judge St. Pierre ordered the father to pay $180.00 per month starting in October and that was a sum to be applied against this daycare cost.

This would not seem to in compliance with Guidelines 7(2) requiring a pro rata contribution to the net amount by both parents, having regard to their income levels. [ 54 ] On one occasion, the father sought to remove his son from this daycare and they refused to release him to the father apparently because he is not a signatory to the contract.

It is unclear to me whether the daycare understands or has been given a copy of the earlier Court order providing the parents with joint custody and joint guardianship rights. [ 55 ] The mother suggested that she generally drops C. at the daycare before leaving for work between 7:00 to 7:30 a.m. To do so, it would seem he would need to get up between 6:30 to 7:00 o’clock a.m. I do not believe I was given an exact hour for his daily awakening when he lived with the mother. [ 56 ] The father on the current access

schedule does not drop C. off at the daycare in the morning. He did say it takes him 20 to 30 minutes to get his son up and ready in the morning. The drive to the daycare is about 25 minutes. The father has no plan to change C.’s daycare if he gets more time with him. Hence, if he were required to do a morning drop-off thereat, assuming C. was with him overnight, C. would have to get up maybe say 20 minutes earlier than he now does when living with his mother.

The mother testified that she was now opposed to weekday overnight sleepovers by C. at his Dad’s solely because he would on occasion have to get up earlier than he now does. [ 57 ] On Mondays and Wednesdays, one of the mother’s grandmothers picks C. up at the daycare and readies him to be picked up by his father on his way home from work both days for an evening visit. Father drives his son home on Wednesdays and the mother now drives to Maple Ridge on Monday evenings to recover C. She said she left at about 6:35 p.m. and did not mind the drive out and back in the evening.

In the result, on weeknight access days C. always sleeps at his mother’s home as things now stand. [ 58 ] The father gave evidence as to the type of things he does and wants to do with his son. He said he tried to be as involved with him as he could and takes him swimming, plays sports with him, builds Lego, and plays with toys and also reads to him. He intends to put him in ice hockey when he is old enough. [ 59 ] There were no concerns voiced by the mother about the activities this father engaged in with C. She was critical of his communication skills however.

For example, she said he had not made it clear to her when he wanted to have holidays with C. in 2012. She is okay with him having a one week summer holiday with C. The father said because he had a new job he could not get a summer holiday in the year 2012. The mother said he would not tell her which of his two cell phones she should use to communicate with him.

He said he would answer both initially, but now proposes he use the BBW Construction number which the mother has. [ 60 ] There is no evidence she was unable to communicate some important message to him about anything because of his refusal to designate one of his two cell phone numbers only for all child related communications. [ 61 ] These parents can and do communicate by both email and text messages, seemingly their preferred mode of dealing with one another. Judge St. Pierre on November 24 th , 2011, ordered them to use a journal to communicate with each other.

At trial, the mother was critical of the father’s refusal or inability to cooperate with this methodology. He said in his view there was no need to use a journal. He felt the two parents could and perhaps should talk civilly with one another. One would hope so. [ 62 ] The current access

schedule settled upon by the parties is as follows.

[ 63 ] In week 1, the father sees his son for two weeknight access visits only on Monday and Wednesday evenings. These last from 4:00 p.m. to a 7:00 p.m. pick-up or drop-off as the case may be. C. is with his mother for the balance of the time. Assuming a 30 kilometre drive between the parents’ homes, C. is on the road so to speak for 120 kilometres for purposes of these two weeknight visits and spends about two hours in his parents’ cars by my calculation each week.

Neither parent expressed any concern on this issue. [ 64 ] In week 2, in addition to the two mid-week visits, C. has overnight weekend access with his Dad. He is picked up at his mother’s home by Dad at about 4:00 p.m., one of the grandmothers or a parent possibly having first got him from daycare, and returned to mother at 4:00 p.m. on Sunday. This Sunday pick-up or drop-off is alternated by the parents and the father said things were going fairly well in his view in this regard.

The driving distance in week 2 by my calculation is 180 kilometres and C. spends about three hours in the car. [ 65 ] Hence C.’s total driving time in the current regime is about five hours every two weeks and some 300 kilometres are covered. [ 66 ] This arrangement is not as ordered by the Court but a plan the parents themselves put in place. It relies in part on the help of one of the mother’s Polish grandmothers or her own mother possibly on the pick-ups done by the father at her home.

There is no evidence this assistance is given by either grandmother in any way under duress insofar as it is done to assist the father in exercising his access to his son and no indication that it will not continue in future. [ 67 ] The mother’s father works in Richmond and is home most days at 3:00 p.m. Her mother works four days on and three days off or perhaps four days on and four days off and is said to be home most days by 3:40 p.m. when working. Both these adults are available to assist with C. pending mother’s return home from her work.

However, that said I have little evidence of their actual involvement with C. after school. [ 68 ] The mother said she had offered the father extra time with his son, for example, further visits on Tuesday and Thursday evenings, with the father picking up C. at the daycare at 4:00 p.m. and a pick-up or drop-off at 7:00 p.m. at his place or hers. The parties would alternate this leg of driving. She said he did not agree to this scheme however did not say why.

She also said she was okay with extended access which she had never denied as long as they first had some sort of agreement as to the duration implicitly with proper notice having first been given.

The problem at least from the father’s perspective is that reaching an agreement with the mother has not always possible according to his evidence. [ 69 ] At trial, the mother offered the father two additional weekday access evenings, Tuesday and Thursday, so that his weekday access would be Dad picking C. up at daycare assumedly at 4:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. each weeknight with alternating drop-off and pick-ups at the end of each visit. This scheme would occur every week as I understood her proposal.

She would have the weekend in week 1 whereas his second weekend would continue. [ 70 ] In the result, the driving distance and time would increase each week by my calculation by some 120 kilometres from what it now is and two hours for a total driving distance in two weeks according to her proposal of something in the order of 600 kilometres. This was not a concern to the mother.

I observe her proposal is the same as if Dad had C. overnight, Monday to Thursday, and drove him to her home the next morning or indeed to daycare by 7:15 to 7:30 a.m. [ 71 ] There was evidence given by the parties at the hearing before me about historical difficulties in their agreeing on travel outside of Canada and the father’s refusal apparently to cooperate in the process of acquiring a passport for C. to permit such travel.

However, at the hearing it seems the father accepted the desire on the part of the mother to do so, for example, to travel to Poland where she has relatives and I think in fairness the mother also agreed that if she should be permitted to take or do such travel, so should the father, however on mutually agreed upon terms that would bind both parents in the same fashion. [ 72 ] I do not intend to deal with their evidence further.

The various orders I feel should be made based on the evidence on point will follow at the conclusion of these reasons. [ 73 ] Lastly, I turn to the matter of arrears of child support and the evidence relating to this issue. [ 74 ] I find the father did not pay child support to the mother following their separation in February 2011 until the order was made by Judge St. Pierre on September 28th, 2011 commencing October 1st, when he paid her $739.00 per month. Nor did he assist with child care expenses in the above period when C. resided with his mother in my understanding of the evidence.

I accept that he may have paid for some outings when he and the mother were apparently attempting to reconcile following separation and may have bought some groceries, but this is not the equivalent of monthly child support. [ 75 ] There was an issue as to whether the mother withdrew money from the parties’ Royal Bank of Canada joint account following separation without the father’s consent. He testified he then funded this account, depositing in essence some spending money into it each month. He did not believe she had access to these funds. The mother agreed she had made no deposit to this account.

She said the only money she took out was somehow to cover credit card fees incurred when the joint account was in overdraft. The bank somehow debited her personal account with these fees and she would reimburse herself from the joint account. She could not say how much in total. She did not know she had taken out as much as $2,480. [ 76 ] I found her evidence on point vague and difficult to follow. She presented no banking records to corroborate her position, for example, her own account records showing the alleged service charge debits for which she reimbursed herself.

This would have been the best evidence and would have been very helpful for me on this point. [ 77 ] The father said that between April 2011 and January 2012, some $2,480 was withdrawn from this account without his consent and filed Royal Bank of Canada records marked as Exhibit 5 showing various amounts being taken out, he said not by him and not with his consent. He said he asked the mother if she was accessing this account and she, contrary to her evidence at trial before me, denied doing so and denied having access to it and said she knew nothing about it.

When he went to the bank, they would not tell him who was making the withdrawals but did provide the records which were marked as Exhibit 5. He testified she was the only person who had access to this account which I understand he closed in the spring of this year.

[ 78 ] I find I prefer his evidence on point to hers and I accept she withdrew $2,480 from this joint account from funds that he deposited and which were his property without his consent or authority following their separation. I do not find they were used for the purpose she stated in her direct evidence. This is an amount that should in my view be taken into account when I assess the contribution that he earlier made for her living expenses or for child support for C. [ 79 ] The mother’s application for child support was first filed June 1st, 2011.

The law with respect to retroactive child support is well explained in D.B.S. v. S.R.G. , 2006 SCC 37 , a judgment of our Supreme Court of Canada, often referred to in all levels of trial court including for example in the Morgan decision, 2006 BCSC 1197 , where Judge Kelleher outlined the four factors discussed in D.B.S. at paras. 47 and 48 of his reasons as follows: [47] However, even if a parent has failed to meet his or her obligation to pay the amount of child support that fits his or her income, a retroactive award may not be appropriate.

In exercising its discretion to determine whether a retroactive award is appropriate in the circumstances, the court must consider the following four factors discussed at paras. 100 to 116 of D.B.S. :

(1) Is there a reasonable excuse for why support was not sought earlier?

(2) Was there any blameworthy conduct on the part of the payor parent?

(3) Is a retroactive award appropriate in light of the child's past and present circumstances?

(4) Will a retroactive award cause hardship to the payor parent or to his or her other children? [48] None of these factors standing alone is determinative. The court must take a holistic approach. That is, the court must consider all of the facts and determine whether a retroactive award is warranted in the particular case: D.B.S. at para. 99 .

Further, it is not the case that retroactive awards are reserved for only exceptional cases: "It cannot only be exceptional that children are returned the support they were rightly due" ( D.B.S. at para. 97 ). [ 80 ] This I think is not an exclusive or exhaustive list of the factors that the Court should consider in determining whether or not a retroactive child support award should be made but perhaps these factors are the more important ones. [ 81 ] Applying these various factors in an holistic way, there is in my view on the evidence before me no reasonable excuse offered by the father as to why child support was not paid following the parties’ separation on February 21st, 2011.

I am generally not of the view that there is any early blameworthy conduct proven on the father’s part post-separation, for example, demands for child support and his refusal to pay. [ 82 ] It seems the parties were making some efforts to reconcile after separation and perhaps this father felt the issue of his supporting his son financially could await the outcome of such initiatives. He filed a reply on July 7th, 2011. He then knew she was formally claiming child support but although agreeing to her claim or at least not opposing it, did not immediately commence appropriate payments.

There is no evidence as to why this was so. [ 83 ] His failure then to pay child support with no explanation from him borders on blameworthy conduct on his

part in my view. Certainly, there is law to suggest that where a parent does not pay the requisite amount of child support having regard to his income, that this in itself might be seen as blameworthy conduct. As well, I am aware that in D.B.S. , supra , this is a principle that is set out. [ 84 ] As to the third factor, this in my view is a neutral factor to some extent. There is no evidence C. suffered particularly in the period in issue. However, both parents were legally obliged to assist with his care and costs and the father did not.

Therefore, C. did not have the benefit of his Dad’s monetary contribution. [ 85 ] Lastly, I am not of the view that a retroactive award will cause hardship on the father. He earns $75,000 a year. He has a good job with excellent prospects I think of it continuing, with advancement and the possibility of a bonus on his next project. His May 25th, 2012 financial statement discloses a net worth of approximately $30,000. He was able to afford a one week warm weather holiday in November 2011 with his then girlfriend, I believe to Hawaii.

He can now and in future afford to pay a fair retroactive amount, really what he should have paid, had he complied with the Guidelines and what they mandated having regard to his income level following separation. [ 86 ] I find the mother is entitled to retroactive child support to commence following their separation on March 1st, 2011 for some seven months based on the father’s actual Guidelines income in 2011 being $86,306.25 earned while working for BBW Construction and as per his 2011 T4 slip appended to his May 25th, 2012 financial statement.

A monthly table amount at this rate of pay is some $821.00 and over seven months from March to and inclusive of September 2011, the retroactive table amount in total would be some $5,747. He will have a credit against this amount of some $2,480, as above. [ 87 ] In addition, I find that C. was enrolled in daycare from March 1st to September 30th, 2011 and that this cost was regularly paid by the mother at the subsidized or net rate of $280.00 a month or some $1,960 in total over seven months.

This is and was an appropriate Guidelines 7 expense. [ 88 ] I find that the mother’s Guidelines income in 2011 for purposes of Guidelines 7 was some $34,667 as per her financial statement sworn April 27th, 2012 and including the Child Tax Benefit and B.C. Family Bonus of $3,466.53 disclosed. [ 89 ] Accordingly, the parents’ proportionate share of his child care cost from March 1st to September 30th, 2011 was 71 percent for the father and 29 percent for the mother.

He ought to have contributed $199.00 per month times seven months or say, $1,393 to this historical cost and he did not. [ 90 ] In the result, the arrears of child support that now exist by my calculation are $3,267 for table amount requirements and $1,393 for Guidelines 7 amounts or some $4,660 by reason of the non-payment by the father of any child support for C. from March 1st to

September 30th, 2011. [91] These retroactive amounts are to be paid by the father to the mother at the rate of $200.00 per month, commencing on the 1stday of December, 2012 until paid in full.

He may make larger payments and more frequent payments as he sees fit. [92] I turn to the central issue in this case of whether the father’s time with his son should be extended from what it is now so that C.essentially resides with each parent 50 percent of the time. [93] In making this decision I must have regard to the factors in s. 24(1) of the Family Relations Act and I have considered all ofthem. [94] Counsel have provided me with the following cases and materials, all of which I have reviewed: 1. Young, (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3 2. An

article entitled The Importance of Fathers by Dr. Gary Kneier, PhD. 3. Pollard v. Metivier, (phonetic) an unreported Supreme Court of British Columbia decision, New Westminster Registry, datedMay 12th, 2010, a judgment of Ker J. 4. R.A.L. v. R.D.R., 2007 ABQB 79, a judgment of Martin J. This latter case was provided at the conclusion of the trial and is anauthority wherein Dr. Kneier’s above

article is referred to I think with approval by this Court at para. 212 of the lengthy reasons. TheR.A.L. decision is also referred to in three other cases provided by the father’s counsel, two in Alberta and one in Saskatchewan, none ofwhich are binding on me nor is the R.A.L. decision. 5. McMechan, 2005 MBCA 4, a judgment of the Manitoba Court of Appeal. 6. Brighton, [2000] B.C.J. No. 1328, a judgment of Paris J. 7. Hosseini v. Kazemi, 2011 BCSC 1130, a judgment of Harris J. 8. W.R.B. v.

A.G.T., 2009 BCSC 717, a judgment of Rogers J. [95] The Young, supra, decision deals in part with our highest Canadian Court’s views on the best interests of the child, a factorcertainly within s. 24 of the Family Relations Act. The headnote of this case dealing in part with relevant provisions of the FederalDivorce Act states in part as follows: Decisions are made according to the best interests of the child without the benefit of a presumption in favour of either parent.

The Actenvisages contact between the child and each of his or her parents as a worthy goal which should be in the best interests of the child.Maximum contact, however, is not an unbridled objective and must be curtailed wherever the welfare of the child requires it. [96] And later the following passage appears: Courts must attempt to balance such considerations as the age, physical and emotional constitution and psychology of both the child andhis or her parents and the particular milieu in which the child will live.

One of the most significant factors in many cases will be therelationship that the child entertains with his or her parents. Since custody and access decisions are pre-eminently exercises in discretion,the wide latitude under the best interests test permits courts to respond to the spectrum of factors which can both positively andnegatively affect a child. What may constitute stressful or damaging circumstances for one child may not necessarily have the sameeffect on another. [97] In the case at bar, Judge St.

Pierre made an interim without prejudice joint custody and joint guardianship order on September 28th, 2011. Neither party before me seeks to upset this order. This fact alone distinguishes the case at bar from Young, supra.

Nonetheless, the general observations of the Supreme Court of Canada on the matter of the best interests of the child must and do guideme on the application made by the father to change what the mother calls the status quo parenting plan. [98] In the Pollard, supra, case the father as in the case at bar sought to modify a joint custody and guardianship order so that histwo children, aged nine and seven-and-a-half would reside with each parent on an equal basis. Their homes were located five minutesapart from one another with the children’s school in between.

The order sought to be varied involved a bi-weekly parenting schedulewith the children for seven days out of 14 being the father and requiring six changeovers every two week cycle. A changeover being aparental pick-up or drop-off typically at the children’s school.

Father obtained a new job that required him to travel rather extensively,not something he could do and exercising any meaningful access to his two children on the basis of the existing order. [99] Ker J. was persuaded that the above order should be varied to a week-on, week-off arrangement, thereby reducing what wascalled the toing and froing, meaning the six changeovers and to facilitate the father’s work travel in his off-week. In coming to thisdecision this judge said this at para. 57 of the Court’s reasons: [57] While variation of the current

schedule no doubt will bring some changes, the children are at a flexible enough age andappropriately and significantly bonded to both parents that they will be able to adapt. Moreover, Dr. Pollard’s concerns about not seeingthe children for some seven days straight is in large part alleviated by Mr. Metivier’s suggestion that if Dr. Pollard wishes to see thechildren during the week and the children are with him she can if she wishes pick the children up at school on Monday, Wednesday, orFriday of the week they are not with her and spend a couple of hours with the children before their father picks them up.

Both partiesalso support the right of first refusal for the other to provide child care when the other is unable to do so doing their regular access time. [100] In the Brighton, supra, case the parents of a nine-year-old child were living in Lumby and Revelstoke, respectively. The child

had lived almost all his life in Revelstoke. Paris J. said this in paras. 16 and 17 of his reasons: [16] The circumstances in this case are difficult and I am concerned about the possible effect of my decision on the unsuccessful parent. However, it is axiomatic that the consideration that must guide the Court's deliberations in this kind of case is the best interests of the child.

Of course, the Court cannot predict the future with certainty so it must make the best judgment it can as to which course for the child appears to hold fewer risks. [17] The present situation in place based on the last agreement calls for the de facto custody of the child to alternate from year to year. Such an arrangement may be appropriate in some circumstances. However, in this case the parties do not live close to each other. The result would be that every year the child would be uprooted and his life disrupted in a major way.

I do not think that is in the child's best interests, even bearing in mind the desirability of having both parents involved in his life to the extent possible. [ 101 ] This judge declined to order a one year on and off rotation for the child in question and granted the father sole custody as he felt his situation was more stable than the mother’s.

This case can be distinguished on its facts from the case at bar. [ 102 ] In McMechan , supra , the issue on appeal was whether a trial judge in a situation where parents had joint custody of two children ought to have varied an interim order and changed the children’s school to one closer to the mother, she having moved away from their long-standing school catchment area.

The Manitoba Court of Appeal found it was an error to change the status quo requiring the children to move away from the only school they had ever attended, thereby disturbing the continuity of their schooling and counselling thereat. [ 103 ] This factual issue clearly does not arise in the case at bar. The father does not seek to switch the child’s school or daycare. His position at this hearing is not in my view driven by his convenience -- far from it.

I accept however that the focus must always remain in the case at bar on C.’s present and future best interests and not on the parents’ convenience. [ 104 ] In the W.R.B. , supra , decision Rogers J. stressed in para. 14 his view that stability and predictability were key elements in meeting the best interests of a five-year-old child. He refused to vary the parties’ earlier agreed on custody and access arrangement to a two-week-on, two-week-off

schedule to accommodate the father’s new work

schedule whereby although living in Kelowna as was the mother, his new job required him to work two weeks on in Alberta and travel to and from Alberta to do so and have two weeks off.

Judge Rogers’ reasons for making his order seemed to be based on the fluidity of the father’s work history and his concern that future changes might be requested with his next new job; in other words, a concern about the father’s stability and in the result that of the child. [ 105 ] It is not suggested in the case at bar that either parent before me is unstable in any way or that the increased time the father seeks with C. is to accommodate his own work schedule.

I do accept that stability and predictability are important considerations for a young child, but so too is his need to bond with and know each parent and have a strong relationship with each parent. [ 106 ] In Hosseini , supra , Harris J. dealt with two children aged eight and 13 and whether two parents sharing joint custody and guardianship rights over them should change their parenting arrangement from the Dad, who initially lived in Yaletown, Vancouver, but moved to within a few blocks of the mother’s home, having alternate weekend access and Tuesday night access to a 50/50 shared parenting regime.

The mother resided in West Vancouver. Harris J. (as he then was) rejected the father’s request but did add one additional overnight stay in each two-week cycle in accordance with the expressed views of the two children. He did so largely because the status quo was working well. The mother had more time to spend with the two children than did the father who worked as a vascular surgeon. He seemed to be concerned that in the father’s affidavit it was not made clear when the father alleged he had the time outside his professional practice to be an engaged parent.

He also found there were some difficulties in the parents communicating with respect to the children and that they had a tendency to argue with one another. He found the mother was better able to discharge all responsibilities concerning the two children including relating to schooling and extracurricular activities. As well, he said this in para. 23 of his reasons: [23] It is clear from the evidence and from earlier court decisions that the parents have had difficulty communicating with each other about the children. Indeed, the tendency of the parents to argue is a source of distress to the children.

I am concerned that to move too rapidly to an equal shared parenting regime would create friction and cause arguments between the parents about issues to do with the logistics of the children's lives. Creating an opportunity for further conflict would not be in the best interests of children. [ 107 ] It is not clear what work the mother did outside her home if any in the case I have just discussed. [ 108 ] In the case at bar there is a remarkable similarity in the work

schedule of each parent and on balance it seems the father typically leaves work somewhat sooner than does the mother and works closer to C.’s daycare than does the mother. [ 109 ] The considerations of an almost three-year-old child, C., in the case at bar are different than for an eight and 13-year-old child in Hosseini , supra . This case is of little assistance in my view to the case at bar for this reason alone. [ 110 ] I turn to a discussion of the significant issue of this case.

Should the status quo be changed from what it is now to allow the father increased time with his son? [ 111 ] In my view, the order made by Judge St. Pierre on September 28 th , 2011 while a consent order should be considered in the context in which it was made -- a family case conference. It is said to be insofar as the access that the father agreed to is less than what he sought in his earlier July 7 th , 2011 reply among other things, namely, any time or equal time, something he agreed to on a without prejudice basis.

I construe such orders to mean that while parties agree to them, they do not preclude a party seeking a different result at a future Court hearing as is occurring here. This flows from the important term "without prejudice" often used in this level of Court. [ 112 ] Neither party before me really argued that I need first to find a material change in the parties’ circumstances after September 28 th , 2011 in order to grant the relief the father seeks under s. 20 of the Family Relations Act .

I will therefore not consider this issue further save to state if one were needed, both parties have new jobs and somewhat different work schedules than they did on September

28 th , 2011 and this in my view would be a material change in their current circumstances as compared to what they were on the date of the Judge St. Pierre order. [ 113 ] It is not suggested that the father’s application for extended time with his son is brought for some ulterior motive, often because it can lead to a lower child support obligation. There is no evidence the father is not a good father. The mother admitted that he was. I find that both parents love C. and have only his best interests at heart. There is no evidence he is unable to care for his son.

I have dealt with the diaper rash issue above. [ 114 ] I am far from convinced that the difficulties these parents have had historically communicating with one another is any kind of major or even minor impediment to the father having further time with his son. This difficulty was not presented in the evidence I heard as any sort of deal breaker in a potential shared parenting regime.

These parents are not now stuck in any form of acrimonious regime and I think on balance are getting on reasonably well. [ 115 ] The mother’s concerns over C. having to get up earlier if he had overnight weekday stays with his father are really no impediment in my view to increased overnight parenting time. If C. needs to be awakened 20 to 30 minutes earlier a few days a week than presently occurs when he sleeps at his mother’s, the solution is obvious.

If he need not be driven from Maple Ridge to Port Coquitlam at 7:00 p.m. on a weekday itself, an approximately half hour trip, he can simply go to bed earlier than he would than when living with mother and the at most half hour of sleep lost in the morning by reason of an early rising is made up at least on Mondays and Wednesdays. [ 116 ] If C. had more weekday overnight visits with his father, the driving time and distances would not change on Monday to Thursday, at least compared to the mother’s proposal for the father’s increased access.

Instead of a trip to and from Dad’s house in Maple Ridge occurring between roughly 4:00 p.m. and 7:30 p.m. on weekdays it would be broken up with the leg out from Port Coquitlam to Maple Ridge at 4:00 p.m. and the leg back by Dad would occur around 7:00 o’clock a.m. the following morning. C. would be more rested as would Dad.

Such a plan is safer in my view than one which requires a no doubt tired parent who has worked all day to make this trip in the later afternoon in Dad’s case or between 6:30 and 7:30 p.m. in the case of the mother. [ 117 ] I am very much of the view that the current weekday visits are far from ideal as far as assisting C. and his father bond as one would want any child and parent to do. This is a very important consideration in my view with young children. They need quality time with each parent and shorter absences or times apart from each parent.

Clearly mothers and fathers bring different skills to bear with their children who benefit from being exposed to often different personalities. [ 118 ] If authority is needed for these views that I have expressed, one need only refer to the frequent addresses and written work of Dr.

Joan Kelly a well-known psychologist who regularly addresses both lawyers, for example, at Continuing Legal Education conferences in British Columbia, and judges including most recently judges of this Court on April 30 th , 2009 at this Court’s biannual meeting in Whistler, British Columbia. [ 119 ] Based on all the evidence I have heard, I find it would be in C.’s best interests that these parents share his care on an equal basis, and that there be a shared parenting regime, week-on and week-off. There should in my view be a ramping-up

schedule set in place so that very quickly the current status quo moves with certainty and in regular steps to an equal sharing arrangement on the following basis which I shall shortly outline. [ 120 ] The order of Judge St. Pierre is varied and the following joint parenting scheme will go into effect not later than Friday, November 30 th , 2012: 1. In week 1, Dad’s week, starting Sunday, December 2 nd , 2012, the mother will deliver C. to the father at 4:00 p.m. that day. 2.

C. will be with his father to the following Sunday, December 9 th , 2012 at 4:00 p.m. when the father will deliver him to the mother who will have C. for the entire week to Sunday, December 16 th at 4:00 p.m., Mom’s week, when he will be returned to the father and so on with the parenting time occurring week-on and week-off thereafter. 3. In Dad’s week, Dad will drop C. off on Monday, Tuesday, Thursday and Friday at his current daycare or the mother’s home as the parties may agree between 7:00 and 7:30 a.m. C. will continue to attend the same daycare.

There is much to be said for the drop-off being made at the mother’s home and not at the daycare. This would allow her to see her son in Dad’s week daily, albeit for a short period of time; it would be less disruptive of C.’s current schedule; it might also allow Dad to get to work a bit earlier and home earlier for the afternoon pick-up. 4. In Dad’s week on, the Dad will pick C. up on Monday, Tuesday, Thursday and Friday at the daycare or the mother’s home between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m. as the parties may agree. If they cannot agree, the pick-up will be at the daycare.

There is much to be said for the current Monday and Wednesday regime continuing only in the sense I mean whereby a Polish grandmother typically gets C. from the daycare and Dad retrieves C. from the mother’s home. This is surely best for C. 5. In Dad’s week on, C. will spend each Wednesday with his mother overnight. She or her designate will pick C. up from the daycare and return him thereto the next day, the Thursday, by 7:30 a.m. as is currently the situation on most days. 6. In Mom’s week on, Dad will have C. on Wednesday overnight with the pick-up and drop-offs as ordered above. 7.

There will be reasonable telephone access facilitated by each parent in Mom and Dad’s weeks on, meaning Mom can reasonably call C. at night to say hello when he is with Dad and Dad will have exactly similar telephone access rights when C. is with his mother. No more and no less. These calls will not exceed five minutes and will occur not more than once per evening. 8. This parenting

schedule will be interrupted with respect to: (

a) the Christmas holiday period commencing in the month of December 2012, (

b) for foreign travel, and (

c) for summer holidays commencing in 2013 as well as certain special days which I shall

come to. In my view, each parent subject to foreign travel should have a right to up to a two week holiday time with C. and a right to foreign travel not to exceed 30 continuous days however not both in a given year. In other words, in the event that there is foreign travel, for example, the mother travelling to Poland with C. for up to 30 days, she would not in addition have an exclusive holiday time with C. for two weeks. The same would be so for the father. 9. If the parties cannot agree on holiday time, they will set a family case conference before me and I will be seized of that issue. 10. If the parties cannot agree on what I have called a ramping-up

schedule by Friday, November 2nd, 2012, either may apply to me for directions and I will conduct a one-half hour mini-hearing at 9:00 o’clock in the morning and I will make a supplemental order as to what this ramping-up must be prior to November 30th, 2012. [ 121 ] I want to state that in coming to this decision I have considered the “toing and froing” involved.

Neither parent is averse to this; in fact the mother proposed an increase in same in her own proposal for increased access for the father given in Court under oath in her direct evidence. [ 122 ] The above orders amount to less weekday toing and froing than did the mother’s proposal for increased access in my view. C. is very young. I have no doubt he will not really notice the toing and froing.

There is no real evidence before me to suggest any downside involved in these exchanges exceeds the upside in C. having more quality time with his father and the father driving the Maple Ridge to Port Coquitlam leg to C.’s home or daycare in a rested state after a good night’s sleep as opposed to the mother doing this driving after working all day between 6:30 and 7:00 o’clock p.m. in the evening which was an implicit ingredient in her own plan for extended access. [ 123 ] I turn now to child support going forward. [ 124 ] I find the father’s current Guidelines income is $75,000.

I find the mother’s current Guidelines income is $32,040 as per her most recent financial statement. Guidelines 9 applies. I have considered all factors (

a) to (

c) therein based on the evidence I have received and as well the principles in the leading case on point, namely, Contino v. Leonello-Contino , 2005 SCC 63 . [ 125 ] In my view, a fair child support order going forward and to start on December 1 st , 2012 would be used achieving the straight set- off approach. On this basis, the father’s monthly child support payment on an income of $75,000 for one child would be $701.00 and the mother’s monthly child support payment on an income of $32,040 for one child would be $308.00.

The set-off amount will be $393.00 a month payable by the father to the mother on the 1 st day of December, 2012 and on the first day of each and every month thereafter while the shared parenting regime which I have ordered continues and while C. is a child as defined by the Family Relations Act . Judge St.

Pierre’s order is varied accordingly. [ 126 ] I further order that only agreed upon Guidelines 7 expenses are to be paid pro rateably by each parent starting on the 1 st of December, 2012, in which I have calculated to be the following percentages: Dad at 70 percent and Mom at 30 percent. [ 127 ] If the parties cannot agree upon what is a proper Guidelines 7 expense, either may apply to this Court for a decision however, I will not be seized of that application.

Clearly, child care costs that are incurred by the parents for this child, C., to be in daycare while they both work during the day would be an appropriate Guidelines 7 cost. [ 128 ] Accordingly, the father’s share of the current daycare cost will be $180.00 a month times .7 or $126.00 a month to be paid by him to the mother, along with the above table child support, starting of course on December 1 st , 2012. This assumes that the mother will be responsible for paying the full amount of the child care net costs to the current child care provider. The Judge St.

Pierre order of September 28 th , 2011 is varied accordingly. [ 129 ] I further order that from today until November 30 th , 2012, the father will continue to pay monthly child support but not as ordered by Judge St. Pierre on September 28 th , 2011 because he clearly used an income level as per these reasons of $79,000 as the father’s income and as well the father’s share of daycare as ordered as things now stand amounts to 100 percent of the net monthly cost.

Therefore, the father will pay for November $701.00 a month and $126.00 for his 70 percent share of the daycare only for this month, and the order of Judge St. Pierre is varied accordingly. This will be so regardless of the actual percentage time C. spends with each parent in the month of November during what I have called a ramping-up time. [ 130 ] I turn finally to further orders I feel are appropriate to deal with the parties’ general agreement on travel. Passport orders: 1. The father will execute the passport application relating to C. by October 31 st , 2012 and provide same to the mother. 2.

The mother will forthwith submit this application to the federal Passport Office together with the requisite fee. 3. The passport will be directed to the mother’s home address by the passport authority and these instructions will be given to it by the mother. 4. On receipt of C.’s passport, the mother will forthwith advise the father who will within 14 days reimburse the mother for one-half the application fee which she paid. 5. The passport will be held by the mother as a trustee of same subject always to the following orders: Travel Orders: 6.

Either party shall be at liberty to travel with C. for a holiday purpose outside British Columbia for a period of time not exceeding 30 days in one year. 7. The travelling party shall give the non-travelling party not less than

(a) 90 days’ notice of any intended holiday of 30 days duration (b) 60 days’ notice of one not exceeding 20 days (c) 30 days’ notice of a holiday not exceeding ten days in duration. These are minimum notice requirements. More would be helpful. 8. The shared parenting orders herein shall be interrupted by any holiday or foreign travel done by either parent with C. and at the conclusion of same shall continue in effect as if no holiday or foreign travel had occurred. 9.

The travelling parent shall provide the non-travelling parent with a complete itinerary relating to the holiday or vacation travel together with a telephone contact number at the travel destination. 10. The mother will provide C.’s passport to the father not less than seven days prior to the father’s departure on travel with C. and he will return this passport to the mother within 48 hours of his return from any travel. 11.

The non-travelling parent will execute a written travel consent in favour of the travelling parent to allow him or her to take C. outside Canada, however, only for a holiday travel purpose, and the consent will set out the travel dates and confirm that at the conclusion of the trip, the travelling parent will return C. to the Province of British Columbia. That is to be an express term in any consent. 12. The travelling parent shall return C. to the Province of British Columbia once the agreed upon travel is concluded. 13.

The non-travelling parent will not unreasonably withhold his or her consent to the travelling parent’s travels with C. [ 131 ] Finally, I make these further orders relating to the parents’ access with C. going forward and one relating to financial disclosure: 1. C. will spend all Father’s Days with his father and all Mother’s Days with his mother and the above shared parenting regime will be interrupted accordingly. 2. Commencing December 24 th , 2012, Christmas Eve and Christmas Day each year will vary with one parent having C. from 4:00 p.m. December 24th to 2:30 p.m.

December 25th when C. is to go to the other parent from 2:30 p.m. December 25th to 4:00 p.m. December 26 th and the shared parenting regime will be interrupted accordingly. I assume the parents can agree upon which parent gets Christmas Eve this year and if not they may apply to the Court for an order, I will not be seized of such an application. This arrangement is to alternate each year.

Hence if for example the mother were to have the period of time from Christmas Eve over the early part of Christmas Day with C. this year, the father would have that time in the year 2013 and so on. [ 132 ] Lastly, I make this disclosure order: commencing by May 15 th , in the year 2013 and in each year thereafter that either party is legally obligated to either pay or contribute to child support for C. and as long as C. is a child as defined by the Family Relations Act , each parent will provide to the other parent a complete copy of: 1.

His or her tax return for the most recent tax year as filed with Canada Revenue Agency and all attachments; and 2. Within ten days of his or her receipt of same, any and all copies of notices of assessment or re-assessment received by him or her from Canada Revenue Agency with respect to any tax return filed. (ORAL REASONS FOR JUDGMENT CONCLUDED)