K.A.F. v. G.D.L.R. et al Date:, 2016 BCPC 217

Citation: K.A.F. v. G.D.L.R. et al Date: 20160713 2016 BCPC 0217 File No: F17103 Registry: Port Coquitlam IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA IN THE MATTER OF THE FAMILY LAW ACT , S.B.C. 2011 c. 25 and IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILD, FAMILY AND COMMUNITY SERVICE ACT, R.S.B.C. 1996 c. 46 BETWEEN: K.A.F. APPLICANT AND: G.D.L.R. RESPONDENT AND: THE DIRECTOR OF CHILD, FAMILY AND COMMUNITY SERVICE RESPONDENT REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE T.S. WOODS Counsel for the Applicant: M. Parsons

Counsel for the Respondent: R. Swartzberg Counsel for the Respondent Director of Child, Family and Community Service: D. Dunn Place of Hearing: Port Coquitlam , B.C. Dates of Hearing: March 10 and 30, and June 24, 2016 Date of Decision: July 13, 2016 INTRODUCTION [ 1 ] The Notice of Motion now before the court is the third in a succession in which the safety and well-being interests of now seven-year-old Child-S, and how those interests might be best served, have been raised with the court.

It is appropriate therefore that I introduce these Reasons for Judgment on the present motion by briefly reviewing the background of previous, related appearances in these proceedings. [ 2 ] On September 9, 2015, the Applicant K.A.F. appeared before me seeking an order, ex parte , to require that the time her then six-year-old daughter, Child-S, would spend thereafter with her father, G.D.L.R., be supervised. That motion was brought under very unusual circumstances.

K.A.F. had been directed by a social worker (Social Worker-S.B.)—exercising delegated powers conferred upon him by the Director of Child, Family and Community Service under ss. 92 and 29.1 of the Child, Family and Community Service Act , R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 46—to make the ex parte application based upon concerns that he (the social worker) had about Child-S’s safety when she was in the care of G.D.L.R.

Social Worker S.B. did not consider himself at liberty to specify the grounds for his concerns so K.A.F. came before the court on September 9th in a state of great agitation and emotional turmoil; she was able to say very little in support of her motion other than that she understood Child-S to be in some kind of peril and that the supervision order she was seeking needed to be made because a social worker considered it essential for Child-S’s protection.

I granted the ex parte application somewhat reluctantly (given the limited information offered in support of it) and made an interim order (the “September Interim Order”) that included, inter alia , a provision that Child-S’s time with G.D.L.R. be supervised by the Director. I did so in the full expectation that further information would be forthcoming from the Director which would bring into clearer focus the risks that Child-S was thought by child protection authorities to face if left unsupervised with G.D.L.R.

Indeed, para. 7 of the September Interim Order provided as follows: “Social Worker S.B. or his lawful designate is directed to attend at the court appearance now scheduled for September 15, 2015 at ten o'clock a.m. so that he or his lawful designate has an opportunity to provide such evidence as he has and is able at law to provide to supplement the skeletal evidence given by the Applicant, K.A.F, ("K.A.F."), in support of this ex parte application that K.A.F. has brought at Social Worker S.B.'s direction.” (See K.A.F. v.

G.D.L.R. , 2015 BCPC 322 at para. 13 ) [ 3 ] Despite that provision in the September Interim Order, no evidence “to supplement the skeletal evidence given by … K.A.F. … in support of [the] ex parte application that K.A.F. … brought at Social Worker S.B.’s direction [on September 9, 2015]” was provided to the court until the hearing, commencing on March 10, 2016, of the motion brought by G.D.L.R. that is now before me. [ 4 ] My transcribed Oral Reasons for Judgment regarding the above-described first appearance in these proceedings on September 9, 2015, are indexed at 2015 BCPC 322 . [ 5 ] Next, on November 9, 2015, I heard a motion brought by the Director seeking to have deleted the provision of the September Interim Order requiring that Child-S’s time with G.D.L.R. be supervised by the Director.

That motion was supported by G.D.L.R. and opposed by K.A.F. The arguments advanced in favour of that motion were two. First, counsel submitted that in purporting to impose a supervision requirement regarding Child-S’s time with G.D.L.R. upon the Director, I had acted without jurisdiction.

Second, counsel submitted—more on policy than on legal grounds—that the provision in the September Interim Order requiring the Director to supervise G.D.L.R.’s time with Child-S interfered with the ability of the Director to allocate its finite resources to needs in the ways it considers appropriate and should be cancelled for that reason. I did not see merit in either of the Director’s arguments.

Moreover, at no time— neither before the hearing on November 9, 2015, nor at it—was any affidavit or other evidence adduced (either by Social Worker-S-B. or anyone else) to supplement the scant information that was before me when, with some reluctance, I made the September Interim Order. [ 6 ] My Reasons for Judgment dismissing the Director’s motion, issued on November 26, 2015, are indexed at 2015 BCPC 331 . [ 7 ] Now, in the present Notice of Motion—filed on November 12, 2015, and heard on March 10, March 30 and June 24, 2016— G.D.L.R. seeks to have the September Interim Order (which was granted ex parte ) set aside, the effect of which would be to remove altogether the supervision requirement regarding his time with Child-S.

In the alternative, his counsel argues that if continuing supervision of G.D.L.R.’s time with Child-S is still considered necessary by the court, that supervision should be ordered to be provided by G.D.L.R.’s mother (“Mother-S.C.”) and not by the Director.

G.D.L.R. submits that the limitations as to time and location that the Director has imposed upon his supervised time with Child-S are unnecessarily restrictive and that those limitations are interfering with his ability to maintain and nurture his relationship with his daughter. [ 8 ] While the Director opposes both of the orders that G.D.L.R. seeks, the Director invites the court, by way of an oral cross- motion, to order that the supervisory responsibilities regarding G.D.L.R.’s time with Child-S (currently borne by the Director) transferred to a third party approved by K.A.F. and G.D.L.R. [ 9 ] It was not until the hearing of G.D.L.R.’s present motion that the court, finally, came to learn the source of Social Worker-S- B’s concerns—the concerns that led him to direct K.A.F. to appear before me as his proxy on September 9, 2015, seeking an ex parte order requiring that all of Child-S’s time with G.D.L.R. be supervised thenceforward.

I now know that those concerns were and are

rooted in allegedly inappropriate, physically abusive practices that G.D.L.R. is suspected of having employed when administering discipline to two children from another relationship—a five year old (“Child-J1”) and a seven year old (“Child-J2”). Those allegedly inappropriate, physically abusive discipline practices came to the attention of the Director shortly before September 9, 2015—the day of the ex parte application brought by K.A.F. as Social Worker-S-B.’s proxy. The allegations against G.D.L.R. in that regard are still under investigation. They are serious allegations—sufficiently so that they led to: (

a) the immediate removal of Child-J1 and Child-J2; (

b) the complete isolation of Child-J1 and Child-J2 from G.D.L.R. for a time; and (later); (

c) the imposition of a requirement that G.D.L.R.’s time with Child-J1 and Child-J2 be supervised by a professional supervision agency.

That professional supervision requirement was still in place as of the present hearing and the allegations of physically abusive discipline practices levelled against G.D.L.R. by the Director are to be the subject of a trial in a separate proceeding that, based on counsel’s submissions, I understand will likely proceed in October, 2016. [ 10 ] The evidence on G.D.L.R.’s motion to lift or modify the supervision requirements regarding his time with Child-S, and the Director’s oral cross-motion to relieve the Director of its supervisory responsibilities in that regard, took two days to be heard.

On a third day, previously filed written arguments were supplemented by oral closing submissions to the court. [ 11 ] G.D.L.R.’s motions—both to set aside the September Interim Order and (in the alternative) to vary it to specify Mother-S.C. as supervisor—are resolutely opposed by K.A.F., Child-S’s mother.

They are also opposed by the Director, inasmuch as the Director has standing concerns regarding Child-S’s safety should she be left in G.D.L.R.’s care without supervision, given what is alleged against him in relation to his treatment of Child-J1 and Child-J2. [ 12 ] The Director’s oral, cross-motion is not supported by either G.D.L.R. (who wishes that his time with Child-S be either wholly unsupervised or supervised by Mother-S.C.) or K.A.F. (who wishes the Director to continue performing the supervision). [ 13 ] G.D.L.R.’s involvement with the Director has been extensive.

I repeat for emphasis that the concerns that lead the Director to oppose his current motion—according to the testimony of the current social worker (“Social Worker-T.H.”)—are that, in the Director’s opinion, there is a “likelihood” that Child-S will come to “physical harm” as a result of G.D.L.R.’s use of “inappropriate discipline”: Trans. , March 10, 2016, pp. 82-83 and 94).

Significantly, as I have noted above and note again here for emphasis, the Director’s concerns about the risks that G.D.L.R. potentially poses to Child-J1 and Child-J2 are of such a magnitude that, to date since some time after their removal from the care of G.D.L.R. and his new common-law spouse (“N.F.”), the Director has required that G.D.L.R. and N.F.’s parenting time with those children be supervised professionally. [ 14 ] Matters here are further complicated by the fact that G.D.L.R. and N.F. have recently had another child (“Infant-B”). Infant-B, too, was removed from G.D.L.R.’s (and N.F.’

s) care. That removal occurred days after his birth. It, as well, was based on the concerns about G.D.L.R.’s disciplinary tactics with Child-J1 and Child-J2 that led to their removal—the same disciplinary tactics that, I now know, actuated the Director to appear before me on September 9, 2015, in the person of K.A.F. and obtain an order that requires G.D.L.R.’s contact with Child-S to be supervised.

I pause to say that the Director’s protection concerns about Infant-B appear now to have abated to some degree insofar as the baby has been returned to the care of G.D.L.R. and N.F. under the supervision of Mother-S.C.

That supervision is nevertheless required to be continuous except for two hours each day when G.D.L.R. and N.F. are permitted to be out in the community and in public with Infant-B without Mother-S.C. present to monitor their treatment of him. [ 15 ] While, as I have noted, the Director opposes G.D.L.R.’s motion seeking to set aside the September Interim Order and thereby lift all supervision requirements regarding his time with Child-S, or in the alternative vary them, the Director does cross-apply orally on instructions for an order that the September Interim Order be varied to remove the requirement that the Director provide that supervision.

In her written argument, counsel offered the Director’s rationale for such a variation in these terms: “[K.A.F.] acted protectively in making her application for the Ex Parte Order. If there is a further Order made with respect to [G.D.L.R.’s] contact with Child-S, there is no evidence before the Court that [K.A.F.] would not continue to act protectively without the Director’s involvement in the planning and supervision of the contact. It is the Director’s submission that if [G.D.L.R.] is given supervised contact with [Child-S] that it be done by a third party agreed to by the parents.

In the event that this Court finds that the contact should be supervised by a professional agency, that should be at the expense of [G.D.L.R.]. The Director submits that [G.D.L.R.’s] contact with [Child-S] should be either scheduled in the Order or as agreed upon between the parents.” (Director’s Written Submissions , May 27, 2016, at p. 4). A CORRECTION TO MISTAKEN TERMINOLOGY [ 16 ] In the decisions I have previously rendered in this matter (and, indeed, in the September Interim Order), I referred to G.D.L.R.’s time with Child-S as “parenting time”. That is a misnomer that requires to be corrected.

The misnomer stems from the fact that at the time of the rush hearing of K.A.F.’s initial ex parte motion on September 9, 2015, K.A.F. and G.D.L.R.’s file was in off-site storage and not accessible.

I was not aware then (and K.A.F., in her distress, did not think to mention) that on August 7, 2012, Judge Steinberg of this court had made an interim order declaring K.A.F. to be Child-S’s sole guardian. (While that order was indeed an interim order and was granted under the predecessor statute to the current Family Law Act , it nevertheless continues in force and as a result of it K.A.F. remains Child-S’s sole guardian: see L.A.M.G. v. C.S. , [2014] B.C.J. No. 2004 (Prov.

Ct.) at paras. 10-20 .) [ 17 ] It follows that the proper term to use when referring to G.D.L.R.’s time with Child-S in this proceeding is “contact”: see Family Law Act (ss. 59 ff. ).

[18] The fact that G.D.L.R. has had his guardian status removed by a previous court order has significance for the case at bar. Itcannot be gainsaid that a person, like G.D.L.R., who lacks the status of a guardian under the Family Law Act has substantially fewerrights and obligations regarding a child, like Child-S, than does a guardian like K.A.F. As section 40(1) provides, “only a guardian mayhave parenting responsibilities and parenting time with respect to a child”.

Thus, while G.D.L.R. doubtless continues, as Child-S’sbiological father, to be an important person in her life, his role and powers are markedly circumscribed by comparison to those of K.A.F.and the force with which he can assert his arguments in the present hearing is, correspondingly, somewhat diminished.

G.D.L.R.’s MOTION IS PREMATURE [19] I will say now that I have reached the conclusion that—having brought his motion seeking the elimination (or, alternatively,curtailment) of the supervision requirements imposed upon him by the September Interim Order with so much of the importantbackground still being dynamic and in flux—G.D.L.R. has acted prematurely. In the paragraphs that follow, I will first provide a briefoverview of what giving due consideration to the best interests of Child-S actually requires of me as the judge hearing G.D.L.R.’smotion.

Then I will outline the reasons why I have concluded that G.D.L.R.’s motion to set aside the September Interim Order, hisalternative motion to vary it, and the Director’s oral cross-motion to vary it in a different way, must all be dismissed. Lastly in theseReasons for Judgment I shall address the next steps that I consider to be appropriate in this litigation.

Best Interests Generally [20] In considering G.D.L.R.’s motion to lift the supervision requirement regarding his contact with Child-S altogether, or at leastvary or relax it in some way, I must respond in the manner that would best serve the best interests of Child-S. Those interests arestatutorily defined in this hybrid proceeding by s. 4 of the Child, Family and Community Service Act and s. 37 of the Family Law Act. [21] A child’s best interests are, of course, broadly conceived and multiply determined, as the governing legislation welldemonstrates.

They are concerned (of course) with matters of physical safety and well-being but they extend much farther and take inpsychological factors as well. And, when a court is called upon to assess what will serve a child’s best interests in the round, thatassessment must necessarily include, inter alia, a consideration of how any particular stipulation that may be imposed by a state actor(including a court) will affect the relationship that exists between the child and the important people in that child’s life. This is reflectedin, for example, subss. 4(1)(

c) and (

d) of the Child, Family and Community Service Act, respectively, which identify as relevant factorsin determining a child’s best interests “the importance of continuity in a child’s care” and “the quality of the relationship the child haswith a parent or other person and the effect of maintaining that relationship”. Recourse to similar considerations is mandated by subs.37(2)(

c) of the Family Law Act which provides that in determinations as to what will serve the best interests of a child under that statute,“the nature and strength of the relationships between the child and significant persons in the child’s life”, inter alia, “must beconsidered”. [22] Significantly for present purposes, subs. 37(2)(

j) of the Family Law Act mandates that when prescribing an arrangement that isaimed at serving a child’s best interests, courts must give due consideration to “any civil or criminal proceeding relevant to the child’ssafety, security or well-being”. Moreover, s. 68(2)(

b) of the Child, Family and Community Service Act renders admissible inproceedings under that statute “any oral or written statement or report the court considers relevant, including a transcript, exhibit orfinding in an earlier civil or criminal proceeding”.

These latter provisions demonstrate the intent of the Legislature that judges presidingover hearings and trials (like the present hearing) where the best interests of children are in play be properly attentive to otherproceedings which may be running in parallel, or may be otherwise external, to the proceedings that are before them but whichnevertheless involve evidence that has important potential implications for those hearings and trials.

Obviously, where evidence is beingheard in separate family law proceedings that are material to the interests being vindicated in each, all reasonable steps should be taken toensure that those proceedings do not unfold in silos. Duplicity or multiplicity of court processes touching on the same subject matterought to be avoided, chiefly so that the best interests of the children affected by them are properly, efficiently and comprehensively served: see, for example, Mirasty et al. v. Charles et al. (1984), (BC CA), 15 D.L.R. (4th) 481 (B.C.C.A.), Re: Superintendent of Family and Child Services v.

Stuart (1985), (BC CA), 18 D.L.R. (4th) 617 (B.C.C.A.), Auxi v.Menton (1994), (BC SC), 2 B.C.L.R. (3d) 307 (B.C.S.C.) and, more recently, Foulds v. Kelly, [2011] B.C.J. No.1816 (S.C.). Parallel Proceedings [23] As has been noted, there are two, Director-instigated proceedings currently on foot of which the court is aware and in whichG.D.L.R.’s parenting behaviour—in particular, his disciplinary practices—have come under close scrutiny. The present proceeding,under Port Coquitlam File No. 17103, is centrally occupied with potential threats to the safety and well-being of Child-S.

However, thesource of that concern is based in turn upon the allegations that G.D.L.R. used inappropriate, physically abusive methods to disciplineChild-J1 and Child-J2—allegations which are in the course of being addressed directly in Port Coquitlam File No. 17053. It is theexistence of those allegations regarding Child-J1 and Child-J2 that, as I have noted, prompted the Director to take steps to put measuresin place to protect Child-J1 and Child-J2 in File No. 17053 and to protect Child-S in File No. 17103.

Since the birth and subsequentremoval of Infant-B on January 20, 2016, additional steps have been taken by the Director to put measures in place to protect him (andfor the same reason), but in a subsidiary way under File No. 17053—the proceeding that is centrally concerned with Child-J1 and Child-J2. [24] As a result of the protective measures that have been put in place in File No. 17053 and File No. 17103, G.D.L.R., at present, isentitled to: (

a) no parenting time with Child-J1 or Child-J2 that is not professionally supervised; (

b) no contact with Child-S that is not professionally supervised; and (

c) only two hours per day of parenting time with Infant-B that is not supervised by Mother-S.C.

[ 25 ] The investigation into the very serious allegations that have been made against G.D.L.R. with respect to the way he has previously disciplined Child-J1 and Child-J2 began in early September, 2015 and it is still ongoing. That investigation is, without question, the touchstone investigation as regards all of the proceedings that are currently underway concerning G.D.L.R. and his future role in the lives of all of his children. Its outcome, as reflected in the ultimate disposition of the proceedings in File No. 17053, will directly affect future arrangements for Child-J1, Child-J2 and Infant-B.

Indirectly its outcome will affect future arrangements for Child- S. [ 26 ] If all unfolds in accordance with the expectations of Director’s counsel, in October of 2016, a judge of this court will hear evidence about the abusive discipline allegations against G.D.L.R. (and N.F.) in the context of a full trial in the touchstone file, File No. 17053. The evidence that supports those allegations and the evidence contra will be fully explored, legal arguments will be fully presented and considered, and dispositive factual findings and legal determinations will be made.

At the end of that trial, court orders governing G.D.L.R.’s future dealings with Child-J1, Child-J2 and Infant-B will be pronounced, and they will be pronounced against the background of a full survey of the applicable law together with the hearing judge’s findings of fact.

Those findings (I say again) will be made following a comprehensive, judicial assessment of the merits of the Director’s contention that G.D.L.R. used tactics when disciplining Child-J1 and Child-J2 that were seriously inappropriate, physically abusive and harmful to those children. [ 27 ] The supervision requirements that constrain G.D.L.R.’s contact with Child-S have their origins, as I have explained, in the allegations against him that are going to be considered and ruled upon approximately three months from now in the case centrally concerned with Child-J1 and Child-J2 and G.D.L.R.’s allegedly abusive discipline practices with those children—that is, File No. 17053.

The evidence before the court on the present motion in File No. 17103 represents only a fraction of what the hearing judge who presides over G.D.L.R.’s hearing in October will have before him or her. Surely it is evident to all that for the court to proceed to make even provisional determinations regarding those allegations for the purposes of the present motion now would be most unwise.

Such determinations could be nothing more than provisional because they would be made without the benefit of the full canvassing of all of the relevant evidence and law that must await the hearing in October of the other application in File No. 17053—the one centrally concerned with G.D.L.R.’s conduct toward Child-J1 and Child-J2.

The Specific Allegations Against G.D.L.R. [ 28 ] It is useful at this juncture to identify briefly what, prescisely, is alleged against G.D.L.R. in terms of his disciplinary dealings with Child-J1 and Child-J2—the allegations that have led, inter alia , to the Director imposing significant constraints and limitations upon his time with those children and with Child-S and Infant-B. (I will also identify more precisely some other features of the evidence that relate to those allegations and the effects that the alleged physical abuse may have had on Child-J1, Child-J2 and Child-S.) [ 29 ] The cautious approach I am taking with regard to G.D.L.R.’s present motion is driven in part by the serious nature of the allegations against him and their effects coupled with the forceful steps that the Director has taken, to date, in response to them.

I acknowledge straightaway that the evidence that I have before me in the present motion is incomplete and multifarious; assertions of serious wrongdoing were met by staunch denials and some of the assertions adverse to G.D.L.R. are attributed to persons who have an antipathy for him and whose interests diverge from his. Nevertheless, there is some evidence before me that will undoubtedly surface more fully before the judge who presides at the trial in File No. 17053 in October, to support in some degree, among others, the following contentions: (

a) G.D.L.R. has spanked Child J-1 and Child-J2; (

b) G.D.L.R. has struck Child-J1 with a belt whose colour and shape Child-1 can identify; (

c) Medical investigation of the bruising and multiple other markings on Child-J1’s body revealed the presence other healed injuries that are consistent with a history of inappropriate, physical discipline; (

d) Child-J1 reported to relatives and RCMP officers that the bruising that led to the investigation in September, 2015, resulted from being struck with a belt by G.D.L.R. and spanked across her buttocks by N.F. because she had either urinated in or vomited on her bed. Child-J1 also reported being given a cold shower afterward; (

e) Child-J2 reported to relatives and police in more vague disclosures that he heard screaming and smacking noises in relation to the alleged events recounted para. (

d) above, and that he himself had been subjected to similar disciplinary handling by G.D.L.R. and N.F.; (

f) Child-S overheard physical disciplinary measures being used by G.D.L.R. and N.F. with Child-J1 and Child-J2 which caused them (the children) to cry; (

g) Child-S is fearful of displeasing G.D.L.R. as she knows she will be hit/punished if she does displease him; (

h) Child-S would like her visits with G.D.L.R. to be longer than the one hour currently fixed for them, but she does not wish them to be increased in number to more than one per week; (

i) Child-S does not wish her visits with G.D.L.R. to be at his home but rather wishes them to occur in public places in the community; (

j) Child-S wishes a third party to be present during her visits with G.D.L.R.; and (

k) Child-S has volunteered to a social worker and to K.A.F. that she has her own safety concerns about G.D.L.R. and N.F. spending unsupervised time with Infant-B. [ 30 ] I think it only fair to also mention, here, that there is no evidence before me to say that the above-referenced reports to police of the possible use by G.D.L.R. (and N.F.) of physically abusive discipline methods with Child-J1 and Child-J2 have led to the laying of

any charges. Similarly, supervision reports (which have not been tendered in evidence by any party) are nevertheless said generally show that G.D.L.R.’s supervised contact sessions with Child-S (and his supervised parenting time sessions with Child-J1 and Child-J2) have, according to Child-S’s current social worker, Social Worker-T.H., “gone well”: Trans. , March 10, 2016, pp. 81-82. Disposition Regarding the Proposed Removal of Supervision Requirements from the September Interim Order Altogether [ 31 ] For all of the foregoing reasons, I consider that—given (

a) the seriousness of the allegations about G.D.L.R.’s disciplinary practices with Child-J1 and Child-J2, (

b) the existence of some evidence to support those allegations, and (

c) the inability of the court on the present motion to carry out a comprehensive assessment of all of the evidence that pertains to those allegations in the course of what, necessarily, has been a truncated hearing of a plea for interim relief—G.D.L.R.’s motion seeking to set aside the September Interim Order and thereby have the supervision requirements imposed by it removed altogether is premature. Accordingly, that motion must be and is hereby dismissed.

Disposition Regarding the Proposed Variation of the Supervision Requirements in the September Interim Order [ 32 ] I have listened to arguments advanced on different grounds and with different objectives by counsel for both G.D.L.R. and the Director in which each has urged the court (in G.D.L.R.’s case, in the alternative) to vary the supervision requirements imposed in the September Interim Order regarding G.D.L.R.’s contact with Child-S. Those arguments must also fall on grounds of prematurity and for the same reasons.

I do, however, wish to address G.D.L.R.’s alternative submissions, and the Director’s submissions, seeking variation of the supervision requirements of the September Interim Order separately so that my reasons for rejecting them are clear and transparent.

G.D.L.R.’s Variation Proposal [ 33 ] It will be recalled that G.D.L.R. submits that should the court be unwilling to remove supervision requirements regarding his contact with Child-S altogether, the court ought to consider, in the alternative, the possibility that that supervision be carried out, henceforward, by Mother-S.C. [ 34 ] Some support for that suggestion can perhaps be found in the Director’s decision to accept Mother-S.C. as the supervisor of G.D.L.R.’s parenting time with Infant-B.

That supervision is, nevertheless, required to be continuous except for two hours each day when G.D.L.R. (and/or N.F.) are permitted to be out in public places in the community with Infant-B without Mother-S.C., as supervisor, being present. [ 35 ] All of that said, I do not consider that in the absence of the full and comprehensive canvassing of the evidence and applicable law regarding the serious allegations against G.D.L.R. and his disciplinary practices with Child-J1 and Child-J2 that is forthcoming in File No. 17053, I can properly take the measure of the supervision requirements regarding G.D.L.R.’s contact with Child-S that are called for and then, even on an interim basis, conclude with sufficient confidence that Mother-S.C. is capable of fulfilling those requirements. [ 36 ] Of course, the potential involvement of one party’s parent (the subject child’s grandparent) as a possible supervisor of another party’s parenting time or contact with the subject child is often fraught.

Issues of trust and alignment with factions in family conflicts frequently conspire to rule out the suitability of such persons as supervisors of their grown children’s parenting time or contact. Without taking anything away from Mother-S.C., I am bound to acknowledge that these are legitimate sources of concern in the case before me.

Supervision of an adult’s parenting time or contact with a child who is considered to be at risk should be carried out by a person (or persons) in whom the parent who is not under suspicion, acting reasonably, has expressed a high degree of trust and confidence. [ 37 ] G.D.L.R.’s contact with Child-S is, by reason of express stipulations in the September Interim Order, currently being supervised by the Director.

The court can, I believe, fairly infer that the Director has put the supervision responsibilities regarding G.D.L.R. and Child-S in the hands of a person or persons whose skills and experience well match the unique needs of this individual case.

The unique needs of this individual case are best known by the Director whose finger, figuratively, is squarely on the pulse of what is evolving in the file that involves Child-S directly (File No. 17103) and the separate file (File No. 17053) whose subject matter, indirectly, is responsible for supervision requirements being imposed upon G.D.L.R.’s contact with Child-S in File No. 17103 in the first place. [ 38 ] While it was greeted with some scepticism by counsel for G.D.L.R. and the Director, I do see merit in the submission made on K.A.F.’s behalf that the demands and frustrations associated with parenting an infant are different from those associated with parenting a seven-year-old.

Even though, in the opinions of both G.D.L.R. and (apparently) the Director, Mother-S.C. may be adequately equipped to monitor the behaviour of G.D.L.R. (and N.F.) vis à vis Infant-B, it does not necessarily follow that she would have the abilities and wherewithal to meet the rather different supervision demands that come with an assignment to monitor G.D.L.R.’s time with Child-S.

K.A.F. certainly doesn’t think so and in other respects the Director has been prepared to show a considerable amount of deference to K.A.F. as a mother who is both keenly aware of what Child-S’s best interests require and who will champion those best interests assiduously. As counsel for the Director expressed it “… there is no evidence before the Court that [K.A.F.] would not continue to act protectively without the Director’s involvement in the planning and supervision of the contact” (Director’s Written Submissions , May 27, 2016, at p. 4).

For her part, K.A.F., “act[ing] protectively,” raises objection to Mother-S.C. being substituted for the Director as the supervisor of G.D.L.R.’s contact with Child-S and I believe her objection is sound. [ 39 ] I consider it telling in this regard that, in its wisdom, the Director has not to date seen fit to transfer supervisory functions with respect to G.D.L.R.’s parenting time with Child-J1 and Child-J2 away from a professional supervision agency and to Mother-S.C. (or, indeed, to anyone).

Those two children are much closer in age to Child-S than is Infant-B and I consider that the parenting challenges (and potential demands and sources of frustration) they bring with them would be much more comparable to what Child-S would pose for G.D.L.R. than would those presented by Infant-B.

That may explain why the Director has chosen a more relaxed stance as to who has the necessary skills to perform the supervisory role when G.D.L.R. and N.F. are interacting with Infant-B. [ 40 ] Added to the foregoing is the fact that there is some suggestion in the evidence that Mother-S.C. is sometimes willing to take a somewhat permissive approach to the supervision of her son’s parenting or contact with his children than what is called for in all the

circumstances. K.A.F. referred in her testimony, and in an exhibited e-mail, to an occasion in December, 2015, where Mother-S.C. sought to set up a Christmas gathering at which, among others, G.D.L.R., Child-J1, Child-J2 and Child-S would all be brought together at the same place without G.D.L.R.’s prescribed supervisors being present: see Trans ., March 30, 2016, pp. 27-28 and Exhibit 6.

That evidence, like all of the other evidence before me on this motion, will likely be fleshed out more fully on both sides at the October hearing of File No. 17053, but it does nevertheless give the court a further reason to hesitate to accede to G.D.L.R.’s submission that his contact with Child-S be supervised by his own mother (Mother-S.C.) over the objection of Child-S’s mother (K.A.F.). [ 41 ] In all the circumstances I am not persuaded that it would serve the best interests of Child-S for me to grant the variation that G.D.L.R. is seeking as an alternative to the removal of supervision requirements altogether.

That is, for the reasons I have given, I do not consider that it would be in Child-S’s best interests to have the supervisory functions currently being discharged by the Director with regard to G.D.L.R.’s contact with Child-S transferred to G.D.L.R.’s mother (Mother-S.C.). G.D.L.R.’s alternative motion in that regard is accordingly dismissed.

The Director’s Variation Proposal [ 42 ] As I have noted above, while the Director supports K.A.F. in opposing the removal of all requirements for supervision regarding G.D.L.R.’s contact with Child-S, the Director nevertheless seeks on instructions by oral cross-motion to have the court vary the September Interim Order to transfer control over the supervisory regime regarding Child-S away from the Director (where that control now reposes) and to a third party who is acceptable to both K.A.F. and G.D.L.R.

K.A.F. strongly opposes any such variation. [ 43 ] The case for variation of the supervision regime is put in this way by Director’s counsel in final argument on G.D.L.R.’s motion as follows: “[K.A.F.] acted protectively in making her application for the Ex Parte Order. If there is a further Order made with respect to [G.D.L.R.]’s contact with [Child-S], there is no evidence before the Court that [K.A.F.] would not continue to act protectively without the Director’s involvement in the planning and supervision of the contact.

It is the Director’s submission that if [G.D.L.R.] is given supervised contact with [Child-S] that it be done by a third party agreed to by the parents.

In the event that this Court finds that the contact should be supervised by a professional agency, that should be at the expense of [G.D.L.R.] … It is the Director’s submission that the Ex Parte Order should be varied to be between the parents and be in [Child-S]’s best interests based on the evidence available.” (Director’s Written Submissions, May 27, 2016, p. 4) [ 44 ] With all respect to counsel’s argument in favour of the variation the Director seeks (which I recognise is advanced on instructions), I struggle to see how relieving the Director of the responsibility for supervising G.D.L.R.’s contact with Child-S, and placing that responsibility in the hands of a third party acceptable to both K.A.F. and G.D.L.R., would ultimately redound to the best interests of Child-S.

How, in these circumstances, could K.A.F. be realistically expected to go about identifying a properly qualified, third party supervisor and a supervision arrangement that is tailored to the unique requirements of this case and then presenting the same to G.D.L.R. for his consideration? K.A.F. has, throughout, been left largely (and perhaps, necessarily) in the dark about why it was that —in early September of 2015, after years of having unsupervised contact with Child-S—G.D.L.R. should, thenceforward in the Director’s opinion, need to have that contact supervised.

Her being in the dark in that way is doubtless attributable in part to privacy concerns. As Social Worker-S.B. explained to K.A.F. when he directed her to apply for the ex parte Order requiring G.D.L.R.’s contact with Child-S be supervised in the first place, he was not at liberty to disclose information flowing from another investigation of G.D.L.R. arising in relation to protection concerns for other children (Child-J1 and Child-J2) who are the subject of a separate investigation and a separate file (File No. 17053). [ 45 ] That must, to some degree, remain the case for the foreseeable future.

The Director will continue to be constrained to some degree in what it can share with K.A.F. about what it continues to learn about G.D.L.R. and his past and present disciplinary practices with Child-J1 and Child-J2 as its investigation proceeds, and about what it learns from the professionally prepared reports it receives about how G.D.L.R. is performing during his supervised parenting time with those children.

This accruing information, along with other information, can and undoubtedly will be drawn upon by the Director when calibrating the supervision requirements for G.D.L.R./Child- S contact in the coming months if the Director remains responsible for that supervision.

K.A.F., by contrast, would not be able to call freely upon that information to guide her in configuring a suitably protective supervision regime and, to that extent, if the Director’s suggested variation were to be ordered, she (K.A.F.) would be left to make decisions about what kind of supervisors are needed, where the supervised contact should occur and for how often, how long and under what conditions, at least partially in the dark.

The arrangement the Director proposes would also require K.A.F. to try to persuade G.D.L.R. accept her suggestions as to who would supervise his contact with Child-S and in what manner in circumstances where G.D.L.R. remains adamant that a requirement for supervision of that contact has never been justified. The Director’s oral cross-motion proposes a plan that I do not consider is in any way workable. [ 46 ] In

summary, I cannot see how yielding to the Director’s submissions and substituting K.A.F. for the Director as the de facto arbiter of the supervision parameters in these circumstances would produce a variation to the September Interim Order that would better serve the interests of Child-S.

To the contrary, the Director’s recommended variation would in my view disengage the supervision regime from those (the Director and its delegates) who, by reason of the existing and accumulating knowledge they possess about G.D.L.R. (as a result mainly of their involvement File No. 17053) are best equipped and qualified to tailor the supervision regime for G.D.L.R. and Child-S to serve Child-S’s best interests in File No. 17103. [ 47 ] For all of those reasons I am not disposed to make the variation to the September Interim Order that the Director urges upon me.

That is, I am quite satisfied that to transfer effective control over the entire supervisory regime regarding G.D.L.R.’s contact Child-S away from the Director (where that control now reposes) to a third party acceptable to both K.A.F. and G.D.L.R.—with the details to be worked out by consensus between them—would be practically unworkable and inimical to Child-S’s best interests and would not favour those interests as the Director argues. The Director’s oral cross-motion in that regard is accordingly dismissed.

VARIATIONS TO THE SEPTEMBER INTERIM ORDER THAT CAN BE MADE [48] As I have previously acknowledged, it is necessary that the September Interim Order be varied to delete all erroneous referencesin paragraphs 1 and 2 to G.D.L.R.’s time with Child-S as “parenting time” and replace them with “contact”. [49] Inasmuch as Social Worker-S.B. is no longer responsible for Child-S’s file, it is also necessary to vary the September InterimOrder to delete all references in paragraphs 1 and 2 to Social Worker-S.B.’s name and replace them with “the Director”. [50] I further consider, given the evidence that G.D.L.R.’s supervised contact with Child-S is now limited to two hours per week,that it is appropriate that I add some language to paragraph 2 of the September Interim Order to make more explicit the statutoryconsiderations that the Director must bear in mind when configuring that supervised contact going forward.

Specifically, after the words“lawful designate” that come at the end of that paragraph, but before the semi-colon, I order the addition of the following language: “, having due regard to all relevant and material factors and considerations, including those factors and considerations that areenumerated in

section 4 of the Child, Family and Community Service Act and

section 7 of the Family Law Act, that must guide thedevelopment of a supervised contact regime that will serve the best interests of [Child-S]” [51] I am fully aware that requiring the Director to continue supervising G.D.L.R.’s contact with Child-S comes at a cost to theDirector. But nothing less, in my view, would suffice to serve this vulnerable child’s best interests in these unusual circumstances.

Some sense of the seriousness of the risk which the Director has, to date, sought to manage through the supervision order it obtained onSeptember 9, 2015 (through K.A.F. as its proxy) can be gained from noting that that supervision has, from the beginning, been carriedout by a professional supervision agency.

This, too, goes to the issue of cost. [52] I do not doubt that the claims upon the Director’s budget and resources associated with professional supervision constitute onelegitimate consideration among many others that must be weighed when the Director settles upon what regime will best meet Child-S’sneeds in the coming months. But the primary factors and considerations that should guide the Director in fashioning the supervisionregime that will best serve the interests of Child-S are those set out in

section 4 of the Child, Family and Community Service Act andsection 7 of the Family Law Act. Among those factors and considerations are ones which I singled out previously, and which I single outfor mention again now, namely: (a) “the importance of continuity in a child’s care” and “the quality of the relationship the child has with a parent or other person andthe effect of maintaining that relationship”, per subss. 4(1)(

c) and (

d) of the Child, Family and Community Service Act, respectively;and (b) “the nature and strength of the relationships between the child and significant persons in the child’s life”, per subs. 37(2)(

c) of theFamily Law Act. [53] In the present circumstances—in which Child-S has herself expressed a wish to have weekly visits that are longer than twohours with G.D.L.R. (albeit supervised ones in the community and not at his home)—I invite the Director to give further consideration towhether the contact arrangement between G.D.L.R. and Child-S that is currently limited to only one, two-hour supervised session eachweek properly reflects all of the considerations that I have referred to above.

CONSOLIDATION OF THE RELATED PROCEEDINGS [54] I have referred above to File No. 17053—the file centrally occupied with getting to the truth of the allegations that G.D.L.R. hasemployed inappropriate, physically abusive tactics when disciplining Child-J1 and Child-J2—as the “touchstone” file. It is theallegations arising out of that file that have spilled over and affected G.D.L.R.’s contact with Child-S in the matter now before me, FileNo. 17103.

It is anomalous indeed, in my view, that by bringing the motion now before me in File No. 17103, G.D.L.R. has precipitateda hearing that, prematurely, invites the court to make orders on an incomplete record when the question of whether G.D.L.R. truly didemploy inappropriate, physically abusive tactics when disciplining Child-J1 and Child-J2 will be confronted squarely andcomprehensively and run to ground in October, approximately three months from now.

To use a perhaps homely metaphor, I do notconsider that the tail that is File No. 17103 should be permitted to wag the dog that is File No. 17053 in that way. [55] Here, both files converge on common factual allegations, but one of the files (File No. 17053) has primacy. I am not preparedto try to accomplish on an incomplete foundation in Child-S’s case that which the court hearing Child-J1 and Child-J2’s case will be in aposition to deal with on a complete one. [56] Recall that s. 37(2)(

j) of the Family Law Act requires that when seeking to fashion an arrangement that is aimed at serving achild’s best interests, courts must give proper consideration to “any civil or criminal proceeding relevant to the child’s safety, security orwell-being”. What is soon to unfold in File No. 17053 will unfold in what is manifestly a “civil … proceeding relevant to [Child-S’s]safety, security or well-being”. Indeed, the disposition of file 17053 will almost fully inform the disposition of File 17103.

Plainly, thepresent situation cries out for an order that the two proceedings be consolidated so that duplicity of court processes can be avoided and sothat the best interests of Child-S in the matter before me can be properly, efficiently and comprehensively evaluated in one, combinedproceeding. [57] The following quotation from S.H. v. L.-A.H., [1997] B.C.J.

No. 897 (S.C.) is apposite: “Proceedings under the Family Relations Act dealing with custody of children and proceedings under the Family and Child Services Act,1980 (B.C.) c.11 (now replaced by the Child, Family Community Services Act) can be heard together in the Provincial Court.

Theevidence in one proceeding may be very important in determining the issues under the other proceeding. ‘The safety and well-being ofthe child, the best interests of the child, the claims of the parents and the competing claims of the Superintendent "(in our case theDirector)" and third parties may all be relevant to deciding what order ought to be made’... p. 485 re: Mirasty et al and Charles et al (BC CA), 1984, 15 DLR (4th) 481 (BCCA).

Hearing the matters together ‘...provides a broader and more flexible basis fordeciding what order or orders ought to be made in the several proceedings before it’. (p. 486 re: Mirasty).”

[ 58 ] While not on all fours with the case before me, S.H. v. L.-A.H. nevertheless gives expression to a general policy that is clearly applicable here—a policy that urges the aggregation together of related proceedings concerned with a child’s best interests so that the prospects of a just outcome flowing from one comprehensive assessment of the relevant evidence and applicable law can be maximised. [ 59 ]

Section 194.1 of the Family Law Act provides as follows: “ 194.1 If a proceeding under this Act and a proceeding under this Act or another Act are started in the same court, the court, on application or on the court’s own initiative, may consolidate the proceedings.” [ 60 ] In my respectful opinion, the jurisdiction conferred by ss, 37(2)(

j) and 194.1 of the Family Law Act was intended to be exercised in precisely these kinds of circumstances. The addition of File No. 17103 by consolidation to File No. 17053 (which is on its way to hearing in October) will not greatly enlarge the scope of File No. 17053 in terms of its hearing. File 17053 is the “touchstone” proceeding after all; File 17103 was borne of it and the outcome of File 17103 cannot be other than intimately linked to the ultimate disposition of File No. 17053. Further duplication of court processes can be avoided and many efficiencies can be gained if the two matters are consolidated. [ 61 ] For all of the foregoing reasons, I exercise my discretion under ss. 37(2)(

j) and 194.1 of the Family Law Act to order that File No. 17103 be consolidated with File No. 17053. [ 62 ] I invite counsel in the now consolidated proceeding to

schedule a Pretrial Conference in the very near future to address any scheduling or other issues that may arise as a result of the consolidation, all with a view to ensuring that the combined proceeding does go forward to hearing in October, 2016, on the dates already scheduled for File 17053, or as soon thereafter as possible.

SUMMARY AND DISPOSITION [ 63 ] To conclude, I summarise the outcome of the hearing of G.D.L.R.’s motion and the Director’s oral cross-motion, as addressed in these Reasons for Judgment, as follows: (

a) Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the September Interim Order are varied to read as follows (with the appropriate substitutions of actual names and other identifying information): “1.

Until further order of the court, all contact to be exercised henceforward by the respondent [G.D.L.R., identifying information ] with [Child-S, identifying information ] shall be supervised by the Director of Child and Family Development or its lawful designate; 2. [G.D.L.R.]’s supervised contact with [Child-S] shall occur at such times, for such durations and on such terms as the Director or its lawful designate directs, having due regard to all relevant and material factors and considerations, including those factors and considerations that are enumerated in

section 4 of the Child, Family and Community Service Act and

section 7 of the Family Law Act , that must guide the development of a supervised contact regime that will serve the best interests of [Child-S];” (

b) G.D.L.R.’s motion to set aside the September Interim Order and thereby have the provisions contained in it that require his contact with Child-S to be supervised cancelled, is dismissed; (

c) G.D.L.R.’s alternative motion to have the provisions contained in the September Interim Order specifying that supervision of his contact with Child-S be carried out by the Director or the Director’s lawful designate varied to specify that that supervisory responsibility be transferred to [Mother-S.C., identifying information ], is dismissed; (

d) The Director’s oral cross-motion to have the provisions contained in the September Interim Order specifying that supervision of G.D.L.R.’s contact with Child-S be carried out by the Director or the Director’s lawful designate varied to specify that that supervisory responsibility be transferred to a third party as agreed between K.A.F. and G.D.L.R., is dismissed; and (

e) The within proceeding, Port Coquitlam Family File No. 17103, is consolidated with Port Coquitlam Family File No. 17053. [ 64 ] Orders accordingly. __________________________ Thomas S. Woods, P.C.J.