S.H. v. R.G. Date:, 2013 BCPC 114

Citation: S.H. v. R.G. Date: 20130430 2013 BCPC 0114 File No: F34673 Registry: Surrey IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA IN THE MATTER OF THE FAMILY LAW ACT , S.B.C. 2011 c. 25 BETWEEN: S.T.H. APPLICANT AND: R.M.G. RESPONDENT REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE R. HAMILTON Counsel for the Applicant: Sonia Hayer Counsel for the Respondent: Jeanette Cohen Place of Hearing: Surrey , B.C.

Dates of Hearing: April 2, 3, 4, 5 and 15, 2013 Date of Judgment: April 30, 2013 INTRODUCTION [ 1 ] S.T.H. (S.H.) and R.M.G. (R.G.) are the parents of two children: T.R.H. (T.), born [d.o.b.] and A.M.H. (A.), born [d.o.b.]. T. is four years old and A. is one year old. [ 2 ] Both children reside with S.H., his current partner – C.D. – and her three children from a different relationship. [ 3 ] S.H. and R.G. were together in a relationship from late 2000 until April, 2012 when they separated. S.H. left the relationship and went to live with C.D. and her three children. S.H. took T. with him when he left R.G.

A. remained with R.G. [ 4 ] S.H. commenced this action under the former Family Relations Act R.S.B.C. 1996 c. 128 (the “ F.R.A. ”) on April 13, 2012 seeking orders for custody, guardianship, access and maintenance with respect to the children.

R.G. filed her Reply on April 20, 2012 and included a counterclaim seeking orders for joint custody, joint guardianship, access and maintenance with respect to the children. [ 5 ] S.H. attended a Family Case Conference on June 26, 2012 and in the absence of R.G., Judge Dickey made orders that the parties share joint custody and joint guardianship of A., that T.’s primary residence would be with S.H., that each parent have access with the child in the other parent’s care, and ordered the parties to attend another Family Case Conference. [ 6 ] Two days later, on June 28, 2012, the parties appeared in court to make some minor changes to the access terms set out in Judge Dickey’s order. [ 7 ] T. remained living with S.H. and A. remained living with R.G. until the early morning hours of December 11, 2012 when a social worker with the Ministry of Children and Family Development ( the “Ministry”) removed A. from R.G.’s care pursuant to

section 30 of the Child, Family, and Community Service Act , R.S.B.C. 1996 c. 46 (the “ C.F.C.S.A.” ). [ 8 ] Since her removal, A. has resided with S.H. and C.D. [ 9 ] While the parties filed their court applications pursuant to the F.R.A. , that Act was repealed effective March 18, 2013 so this matter proceeded before me pursuant to the newly enacted Family Law Act , S.B.C. 2011 c. 25 ( the “ F.L.A. ”). [ 10 ] In this action, S.H. seeks orders that he have sole guardianship of both children thus giving him sole responsibility for all of the parenting responsibilities for the children set out in

section 41 of the F.L.A. If S.H. is successful in his guardianship application, then R.G. would not be permitted parenting time with the children; rather, she would only be entitled to contact with the children. S.H. seeks an order that R.G.’s contact be limited to six hours per week, preferably on Saturdays and that her contact be supervised. Currently R.G. has contact with the children two days each week for three hours each visit.

Her contact with the children is supervised by a professional supervision agency paid for by the Ministry. [ 11 ] R.G. seeks orders for joint guardianship and shared parenting responsibilities. She seeks parenting time with both children. In her closing argument at this hearing, counsel for R.G. stated that her client is not opposed to further supervision of her contact with the children, but only until such time as R.G.’s social worker with the Ministry feels supervision is no longer necessary.

Once her social worker no longer requires R.G.’s contact with the children to be supervised, R.G. wants unsupervised parenting time with the children. R.G. does not oppose T. continuing to reside with S.H., but she would like A. returned to her care eventually. BACKGROUND [ 12 ] Most of the background to this case is not in dispute between these parties.

a) S.H. [ 13 ] S.H. is [age] old. He works for a union setting up large venues for concerts or trade shows. He met C.D. through work as they both work in the same industry. [ 14 ] He lives in Maple Ridge with C.D. and the five children. [ 15 ] S.H. and R.G. commenced their relationship in late 2000 and they were together for twelve years. According to S.H. their relationship involved fairly heavy drug use, including heroin. The couple fought regularly and the relationship was explosive at times.

S.H. testified that neither party was happy in the relationship but they remained together for their children. [ 16 ] T. was born drug addicted on [d.o.b.]. S.H. testified that prior to T.’s birth R.G. entered the FIR program at Children’s Hospital which program supports families in recovery but struggling with drug addiction. R.G. resided at the FIR Program alone until T. was born. After T. was born S.H. was able to join R.G. and he moved into the FIR Program at Children’s Hospital.

While they were in the FIR Program, S.H. and R.G. developed a safety plan for T.’s care should they relapse back into their drug use. The safety plan involved having S.H.’s sister, N.F., care for T. while these parents addressed their drug addiction. [ 17 ] In March, 2010 S.H. and R.G. were firmly entrenched back in their drug use so T. went to live with N.F. This plan was supported by the family’s social worker with the Ministry. [ 18 ] While T. was with N.F., both parents attended and successfully completed a drug treatment program.

R.G. struggled at first in her program but she eventually successfully completed the program.

[ 19 ] The hard work of these parents paid off and in approximately November, 2010 a plan was established to return T. to his parents’ care. T. returned and remained with his parents until S.H. took T. when the parties separated in April, 2012. [ 20 ] There is no evidence before me that S.H. or R.G. have used drugs, other than methadone, since 2010 following the completion of their drug treatment programs. [ 21 ] R.G. gave birth to A. on [d.o.b.]. A. was not born drug addicted like her brother. [ 22 ] In late 2011, S.H. met C.D. through work and they became friends.

As their friendship developed, S.H. was spending more and more time with C.D. [ 23 ] S.H. and R.G. separated over the Easter weekend in April, 2012. S.H. had spent a couple of nights away from home in the company of C.D. When S.H. returned home R.G. confronted him and they started to argue. Each party gave me a slightly different account of this argument, but nothing turns on those differences. I am satisfied that there was a physical component to their argument. [ 24 ] S.H. packed up T. to take him when he left the home. Of concern in S.H.’s mind was R.G.’s difficulty coping with T.’s behaviour.

Indeed, R.G. did not dispute that she struggled with T.’s behaviour. She conceded that on one occasion she became so frustrated with T. that she spanked him too hard. The incident was reported to the Ministry and R.G. admitted to her social worker that she had spanked T. too hard. [ 25 ] S.H. left A. with R.G. because A. was only about three and a half months old at the time of their separation. S.H. felt that it was important for A.’s sake to remain with R.G. [ 26 ] When S.H. left R.G., he took T. to S.H.’s mother’s home and then S.H. went to C.D.’s home.

I was not told a specific date when T. moved in with his father in C.D.’s home, but I gather it was not too long after the separation. [ 27 ] The parties struggled with access arrangements for each to see the child in the other’s care following their separation. As I indicated earlier, Judge Dickey made access orders on June 26, 2012 which orders were slightly modified two days later. The access orders gave specified access to A. for S.H., but only gave reasonable access to T. for R.G. provided the access was agreed upon by S.H.

Unfortunately for T., S.H. insisted that R.G.’s access with T. be supervised which made it difficult for T. to have contact with his mother. [ 28 ] With the assistance of a Ministry social worker the parties reached an agreement during the summer of 2012 that R.G. would have a weekly visit with T. at a local park where S.H. could loosely supervise the contact. These visits were not ideal because C.D. attended the park along with her three children and the children all wanted to play together thus detracting from T.’s time with R.G. [ 29 ] Following that summer, there was no set access

schedule in place for R.G. and T. The parties attended an access hearing pursuant to the F.R.A. in October, 2012 but that hearing did not conclude. The hearing was set to continue in March, 2013, but as I have indicated earlier, on December 11, 2012, A. was removed from R.G.’s care by a child protection social worker, so the access hearing pursuant to the F.R.A. did not proceed in March, 2013. [ 30 ] Since December 11, 2012 both children have resided with S.H. and R.G.’s access to the children has been supervised as arranged by Darcy Bannister, the social worker with the Ministry assigned to this family to address the child protection concerns that led to A.’s removal.

b) R.G. [ 31 ] R.G. is [age] old. She lives alone. [ 32 ] Historically she was employed as a dog groomer for five years but has not worked in that field since about 1995. [ 33 ] R.G. was diagnosed with Hepatitis C in 2000. She receives a disability pension from the government due to her Hepatitis C diagnosis. [ 34 ] R.G. has a strained relationship with her mother and sister.

She does not speak to her sister, and I was left with the impression that relationship has been strained for a long time. [ 35 ] With respect to her mother, R.G. did not provide me with any detail as to the current status of their relationship. Some of the documentation entered into evidence in this hearing refers to R.G. having been the victim of sexual abuse at the hands of one of her mother’s partners and that R.G. did not feel supported by her mother growing up and in the aftermath of the sexual abuse.

I understand that since the separation of R.G. and S.H., R.G.’s mother has, at times, been assisting R.G. and at other times they have not been speaking. [ 36 ] Following the separation between R.G. and S.H., R.G. began working with Shawn McNabb a Registered Clinical Counsellor employed by Project Parent. In his reports, Mr. McNabb talks of his attempts to work with R.G. around her relationship with her mother.

It appears that this work was not very fruitful and very little progress was made to assist R.G. in mending her relationships with her immediate family. [ 37 ] As I indicated earlier, R.G. described a somewhat different altercation with S.H. over the Easter weekend leading to their separation. Regardless of those differences, it is a fact that this couple separated and shortly thereafter this action began. [ 38 ] Not long after the parties separated, R.G. began dating P.L. R.G. had known P.L. from an earlier time in her life. Sometime in May or June, 2012 R.G. testified that she moved into P.L.’s home.

She stated that at one point she was living in the top floor of the home with P.L. and then eventually moved into a basement suite in the home with A. At some point during the summer P.L. moved out of the top floor of this home, and, I think, he moved into the basement suite with R.G.

[ 39 ] The difficulty I have in drawing any firm conclusions about the living arrangements and the relationship between R.G. and P.L. is that R.G. testified quite confidently in her evidence in chief that she ended her relationship with P.L. after the last weekend in June, 2012. However, in cross-examination it was evident that she was wrong regarding that date. I am satisfied that she maintained her relationship with P.L. through July and possibly into August, 2012.

I mention this because R.G.’s recollection of dates and the chronology as to how events unfolded is not great, so I must be cautious before reaching any conclusions as to factual events based upon R.G.’s testimony alone without any corroboration. [ 40 ] R.G.’s relationship with P.L. was clearly a mistake. P.L. is a violent man. He bragged about having shot a police officer and he said he spent two years in jail for that crime. He was violent in the relationship with R.G. [ 41 ] As I have indicated, I am not sure when R.G. ended her relationship with P.L.

Prior to the end of her relationship with P.L., social workers with the Ministry from White Rock visited with R.G. to advise her of P.L.’s violent past and that she and A. were at risk of being harmed if she maintained her relationship with him. [ 42 ] R.G. testified that following her meeting with the White Rock social workers she decided to terminate her relationship with P.L. [ 43 ] At some point in August, 2012 R.G. was residing away from her basement suite while some renovations were being carried out in her home.

One night she received a call from her neighbour who advised that he could hear music coming from her basement suite and the neighbour was wondering if R.G. knew what was happening. R.G. did not know why anyone would be in her basement suite at that time of night, so she decided to pack up A. and she went back to her basement suite with her friend, B., and A. to investigate this potential intruder. [ 44 ] The frailties of such a decision are obvious. Why would R.G. think it was a good idea to go and confront an intruder in her basement suite rather than call the police to check the home?

But of even greater concern is why would R.G. think it was a good idea to take A. with her when confronting this unknown intruder? A. was only eight months old at the time. [ 45 ] As it turns out the intruder was P.L. and R.G. asked him to leave the home but he refused. R.G. called the police and at some point P.L. tampered with a part of R.G.’s car engine and then he smashed one of her car windows. I was not told if P.L. was charged with anything arising out of this incident. I was not told if he was arrested by the police that evening.

But I mention this incident as one example of P.L.’s violent behaviour and to highlight what I would describe as questionable judgment by R.G. when it comes to her safety and A.’s safety. [ 46 ] While she was not in a relationship with P.L. through the fall of 2012, it is clear that R.G. and P.L. were having some limited contact. On November 29, 2012 social worker Bannister met with R.G. and confronted her about information Ms. Bannister had heard that R.G. and P.L. had been seen together in the community. Ms.

Bannister emphasized the safety risk to R.G. and A. if P.L. was present. [ 47 ] In what could fairly be described as a lapse in judgment given P.L.’s history, on November 30, 2012, R.G. decided to go to P.L.’s Alcoholic’s Anonymous meeting to confront P.L. and tell him to stay away from her. The confrontation ended poorly. [ 48 ] Following the Alcoholics Anonymous meeting, P.L. came by R.G.’s home. He was intoxicated and threatened to smash a window in the home. R.G. let P.L. into her home rather than call the police.

P.L. assaulted R.G. in her home with A. present, but likely asleep. [ 49 ] R.G. did not tell social worker Bannister about this assault. However, given her concerns about the contact between R.G. and P.L. and the safety concerns for A., Ms. Bannister prepared paperwork to apply in court for an order authorizing the Ministry to supervise R.G.’s care of A. to ensure that R.G. was keeping P.L. out of her life and maintaining a safe home for A. [ 50 ] R.G. had an appointment with Ms.

Bannister for December 11, 2012 to review the application for the supervision order. [ 51 ] Late in the evening of December 10 and into the early hours of December 11, 2012, P.L. came to R.G.’s home and there was another violent assault. Again, P.L. gained access to the home, although on this occasion R.G. did not let him in the home. A. was asleep at the time. During the physical altercation, R.G. grabbed a knife or a pair of scissors and stabbed P.L. Their altercation carried on outside of R.G.’s home.

At some point R.G. discovered that P.L. took her car keys so she chased after P.L. to retrieve her keys. [ 52 ] While all of this altercation was occurring outside of the home, A. was inside the home asleep, but alone. [ 53 ] While chasing P.L., R.G. could hear police cars approaching. A police car stopped and she was placed in the police car and not allowed to return home for A. R.G. asked that a police officer go and retrieve A. but that did not happen. The police contacted an after hours social worker with the Ministry who attended R.G.’s home and removed A. and transported her to a foster home.

Later that day Ms. Bannister transferred A. to S.H.’s care where she remains today. [ 54 ] Following A.’s removal, R.G. arranged for housing at the Ishtar Transition Home. She wanted A. returned to her care at the Transition Home, but social worker Bannister was not prepared to do that until such time as R.G. took some counselling to help her recognize why she made such poor decisions when it came to her own safety and A.’s safety. [ 55 ] R.G. had been working with Mr.

McNabb at Project Parent for over six months at the time of A.’s removal and it was apparent she needed more assistance from that program in light of her decision to leave A. in the home alone on December 11, 2012 and chase P.L. to try and retrieve her car keys. I was not provided with an updated report from Mr. McNabb. The most recent report tendered into evidence in this hearing was the six-month report dated November 8, 2012. I am told that R.G. has continued her work with Mr.

McNabb at Project Parent up to the present time; however, I have no current information as to her progress towards her goals in that program.

c) T.H.

[ 56 ] As I indicated earlier, T. is four years old and he was born drug addicted. Apparently R.G. did not know she was pregnant for the first four months of her pregnancy and she was using drugs during that time. [ 57 ] I was not given any medical records for T. He is awaiting a comprehensive behavioural assessment from Sunnyhill Hospital to help his parents understand his challenging behaviour. [ 58 ] According to S.H., R.G., and C.D., T. is a very challenging child to parent. He has extreme outbursts of anger and has been prone to hitting others, including other children, during these outbursts.

S.H. arranged for the paperwork to get T. on the waiting list for the Sunnyhill behavioural assessment, but it is not clear when that assessment will be done. According to C.D., T.’s behaviour has settled somewhat while he has been living at her home. He is developing some coping skills and he has a story about a turtle that he can read to calm him down when he feels an angry outburst approaching. [ 59 ] T. sees Dr. Bamber who is a specialist who treats children with Attention Deficit Disorder and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder.

I was not told that T. has been diagnosed with either of those disorders. [ 60 ] T. is enrolled to start Kindergarten at [name] School in September, 2013. He is currently enrolled in pre-school at [name] Pre- School which is owned and operated by N.F., S.H.’s sister. [ 61 ] S.H. and C.D. have been in touch with [name] School staff as they anticipate that T. will need a care aide to assist with his troubling behaviour when he starts school in September, 2013. [ 62 ] According to S.H. and C.D., T. gets along well with C.D.’s three children, P. age 11, D. age 8, and M. age 7.

C.D. testified that her son D. has some significant behavioural problems that are similar in some ways to T.’s behavioural problems. D. either has gone through, or is about to go through, the Sunnyhill behavioural assessment that S.H. has sought for T. C.D.’s oldest child, P. has severe dyslexia but no other health problems. C.D.’s daughter, M. has no health or behavioural problems.

d) A.H. [ 63 ] A. is sixteen months old. She was diagnosed with Hepatitis C when she was about six months old. Her Hepatitis C does not presently manifest itself in any health problems for A. She has no other health problems or behavioural problems. [ 64 ] At the end of June and into July, 2012 A. had a very bad diaper rash. She was living with R.G. at the time and was visiting with S.H. During an access visit at the end of June, 2012, S.H. and C.D. saw A.’s rash. C.D. took photographs of A.’s diaper rash and those photographs were tendered into evidence.

No medical records were produced from any doctor’s appointments A. was taken to for treatment of this diaper rash. [ 65 ] While I am not medically trained, I am of the view that A.’s diaper rash as depicted in the photographs is severe. I do not know how it could be described otherwise.

She has a sizable area around her genitals and anus of raw exposed flesh that is bright red and it appears that it would be very painful. [ 66 ] When R.G. dropped A. off for her visit with S.H. she says that she informed S.H. that A. had a diaper rash, but she did not give S.H. any cream or ointment, or anything that she was using to treat the rash. R.G. testified that she had taken A. to see a doctor at a supportive housing program in Surrey called Maxine Wright for treatment of the diaper rash.

However, in cross-examination R.G. conceded that she actually saw a nurse and not a doctor when she went to Maxine Wright. [ 67 ] While I am not sure that taking A. to see a nurse rather than a doctor for treatment of such a severe rash should be considered a parenting failure, the failure in my view was delivering A. to S.H. without any cream or ointment so that he could treat the rash while A. was in his care. [ 68 ] When S.H. saw A.’s rash he took her to see the family doctor who prescribed an ointment to treat the rash and when S.H. returned A. to R.G. he gave R.G. the prescription ointment for A.’s rash. [ 69 ] There was considerable time at the hearing before me devoted to evidence about the course of the healing of A.’s diaper rash.

According to S.H. each time he had A. he and C.D. were careful to treat the rash and it was improving by the time they took A. back to R.G. They testified that when they got A. back for their next visit the rash had become worse again. [ 70 ] According to R.G. she said that she treated the rash as directed and applied the ointments and used cloth diapers as she was told. She gave the impression that she should not be blamed for the time it took for the rash to heal. [ 71 ] Social worker Bannister was asked about A.’s diaper rash.

She said she observed the rash and she felt that it was not a sign that A. was being mistreated or neglected while in R.G.’s care. The difficulty I have is I was not told when Ms. Bannister saw A.’s diaper rash. There clearly were times over the month or so that it took to clear up this rash that the rash appeared to be improving. If Ms. Bannister saw A.’s rash during one of those occasions when it was starting to clear up, then I would accept her view that the rash did not appear to be so bad as to raise a concern for the care A. was receiving in R.G.’s care.

However, what I do not understand is how it is that A.’s rash got to the point as depicted in the first photograph. A rash of that severity does not just appear overnight. Accordingly, I am of the view that A.’s diaper rash as depicted in the photographs tendered as Exhibit 1 in this hearing is some evidence that she was being neglected while in R.G.’s care.

e) Involvement of the Ministry [ 72 ] I have already reviewed the Ministry’s involvement with R.G. before A.’s removal and to a lesser extent the Ministry’s involvement with R.G. after A.’s removal. [ 73 ] At the Presentation Hearing following A.’s removal, social worker Bannister obtained an interim supervision order allowing her

to supervise S.H.’s care of A. mainly for the purpose of ensuring that R.G.’s access with A. was supervised. [ 74 ] At the commencement of the Protection Hearing, social worker Bannister sought a three month temporary supervision order. That application has not been heard because the parties are awaiting the outcome of this hearing before deciding whether to proceed with that application. [ 75 ] If S.H. obtains an order for sole guardianship of T. and A. then I am told that Ms.

Bannister will withdraw her application for the three month temporary supervision order and leave it to S.H. to ensure the ongoing safety of the children while they are with R.G. [ 76 ] Lastly, I am told that on May 7, 2013 Ms. Bannister is having a comprehensive meeting with all of the various individuals who have been involved with counselling, assisting, and supporting R.G. to discuss R.G.’s progress towards addressing the identified child protection concerns and the need for continued supervision of her contact with the children.

CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES [ 77 ] As I have discussed above, S.H. lives with C.D. and the five children. It is clear to me that S.H. relies quite heavily on C.D. to assist in caring for T. and A. C.D. appears to be responsible for making medical and dental appointments for T. and A. S.H. does not have a valid driver’s licence, so C.D. does all the driving to get T. and A. to their appointments and to their access visits. [ 78 ] S.H. has never, in fact, parented T. and A. on his own. He parented the children with R.G. until they separated, and then he dropped T. off with his mother while he went to live with C.D.

I am not sure when, but I suspect it was not long after the separation that T. joined S.H. in C.D.’s home. [ 79 ] S.H.’s relationship with C.D. is one year old. There is no guarantee that the relationship will last, although there is nothing in the evidence before me that suggests S.H. and C.D. are experiencing any difficulties in their relationship. To the contrary, the past six months since A.’s removal from R.G. has likely been a trying time for S.H. and C.D.

But they appear committed to raising the five children in their home despite the obvious attendant stresses that will bring to any relationship. [ 80 ] R.G. is alone. She is not in a relationship right now. Her last relationship was a mistake and it led to A.’s removal from her care. She has no immediate family that she can turn to for support when she experiences difficulties either in her personal life or her parenting life. She too has never parented T. and A. on her own.

While she parented A. on her own between April and December, 2012, she did so with some difficulties. [ 81 ] I have already discussed A.’s diaper rash in June and July, 2012. As well, R.G. began and then maintained a relationship with P.L. who she knew was a violent individual.

She exposed A. to the risk of P.L.’s violence by maintaining that relationship, and she took A. with her when she went to investigate the report of an intruder in her home one night in August only to find it was P.L. who then tampered with her car and smashed her car window. [ 82 ] But despite all the parenting shortcomings I have discussed in these reasons, R.G. should be commended for the work she has done to address the child protection concerns and parenting deficits identified by Ms. Bannister. [ 83 ] R.G. has participated in Project Parent for close to twelve months.

While I do not have any reports on her progress beyond November, 2012, the fact that she has maintained her enrolment in that program demonstrates a commitment to improving her skills as a parent and to working with her counsellor to look at ways of improving her life. [ 84 ] R.G. has secured housing for herself in Langley. Her landlord lives upstairs in her home and the house has an alarm system [ 85 ] R.G. has been seeing an alcohol and drug counsellor since March, 2010 when T. went to live with N.F. [ 86 ] R.G. began personal counselling while she was living at the Ishtar Transition Home in February, 2013.

She is on a wait list for a counselling program called Stopping the Violence and she testified that following this hearing she is enrolled to start a program called Healthy Boundaries. [ 87 ] So, while she is living alone and does not have close family to whom she can turn for help, she is actively engaged in programs in the community to better herself as an individual and as a parent. She is making connections with supportive people in the community. [ 88 ] R.G. sees T. and A. for three hours on Tuesdays and A. for an additional three hours on Fridays.

T. does not see his mother on Fridays as he is in pre-school on Fridays. The visits are supervised by a professional agency called Circle of Friends which is paid for by the Ministry. THE LAW [ 89 ] As I indicated at the outset of these reasons, the law governing the parenting of children changed in British Columbia on March 18, 2013. The new statute affects the applications before me. [ 90 ] Pursuant to

section 251 of the F.L.A. the order of Judge Dickey made on June 26, 2012 granting S.H. and R.G. joint custody and joint guardianship of A. now means that both S.H. and R.G. are guardians of A. and they have parenting responsibilities and parenting time with A. as provided for in the F.L.A . [ 91 ]

Section 39 of the F.L.A. defines under what circumstances a parent is a guardian of their child. Pursuant to

section 39 of the F.L.A. both S.H. and R.G. are presumptively T.’s guardians. Since Judge Dickey’s order did not address custody or guardianship of T. but only his primary residence, the transitional provision in

section 251 of the F.L.A. does not apply. [ 92 ] Accordingly I conclude that S.H. and R.G. are both guardians of T. pursuant to

section 39 of the F.L.A. and A. pursuant to

section 251 of the F.L.A. As such both are entitled to exercise parenting responsibilities and have parenting time with both children rather

than just contact with the children.

Section 40 of the F.L.A. says: Parenting arrangements 40

(1) Only a guardian may have parental responsibilities and parenting time with respect to a child.

(2) Unless an agreement or order allocates parental responsibilities differently, each child's guardian may exercise all parental responsibilities with respect to the child in consultation with the child's other guardians, unless consultation would be unreasonable or inappropriate in the circumstances.

(3) Parental responsibilities may be allocated under an agreement or order such that they may be exercised by (

a) one or more guardians only, or (

b) each guardian acting separately or all guardians acting together.

(4) In the making of parenting arrangements, no particular arrangement is presumed to be in the best interests of the child and without limiting that, the following must not be presumed: (

a) that parental responsibilities should be allocated equally among guardians; (

b) that parenting time should be shared equally among guardians; (

c) that decisions among guardians should be made separately or together. [ 93 ] Pursuant to section 40(2) of the F.L.A. each of S.H. and R.G. may exercise all the parental responsibilities set out in

section 41 of the F.L.A. unless I conclude that consultation between these two parents would be unreasonable or inappropriate in all of the circumstances. [ 94 ] Pursuant to section 40(3) I may order that the parenting responsibilities be divided between S.H. and R.G. in whatever manner I determine is in the children’s best interests (

section 37 of the F.L.A. ). [ 95 ] What is clear from my review of these sections of the F.L.A. is that in circumstances where parents lived together after the birth of their child and then separated, there is no need for the parents to apply for guardianship because they are statutorily deemed to be the child’s guardian. In fact, there is no

section in the F.L.A. that allows a statutorily presumptive guardian to apply for an order for guardianship. I conclude that is so because the Legislature wanted to discourage parents from fighting over words in court (such as custody and guardianship) and rather focus litigation on sorting out duties and responsibilities for the children. [ 96 ] So, in this case both S.H. and R.G. are the guardians of T. and A. [ 97 ] R.G. seeks to preserve her status as a guardian of both children, and S.H. seeks an order that R.G. be declared not a guardian of the children. As I have just pointed out there is no

section in the F.L.A. by which S.H. can apply for an order of sole guardianship of the children, although that is what he would like me order. The only way S.H. can become the sole guardian of T. and A. is if I order that R.G. is not their guardian. [ 98 ] I have considered

section 51 of the F.L.A. which on its face seems to contemplate authority for the court to order that a person is a guardian of a child.

Section 51 states: Orders respecting guardianship 51

(1) On application, a court may (

a) appoint a person as a child's guardian, or

(

b) except in the case of a director who is a child's guardian under the Adoption Act or the Child, Family and Community Service Act , terminate a person's guardianship of a child.

(2) An applicant under subsection (1)(

a) of this

section must provide evidence to the court, in accordance with the Supreme Court Family Rules or the Provincial Court (Family) Rules, respecting the best interests of the child as described in

section 37 [best interests of child] of this Act. (3) Subsection (2) of this

section applies regardless of whether there is consent to the application under

section 219 [persons may consent to order being made] .

(4) If a child is 12 years of age or older, a court must not appoint a person other than a parent as the child's guardian without the child's written approval, unless satisfied that the appointment is in the best interests of the child.

(5) A person who has custody of a child under

section 54.01(5) or 54.1 of the Child, Family and Community Service Act is deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to be a guardian appointed under subsection (1) of this section. [ 99 ] I am of the view that the application contemplated by section 51(1) of the F.L.A. to appoint a person as a child’s guardian is an application by a person who is not presumptively a guardian under

section 39 of the F.L.A. I say that because otherwise

section 39 of the F.L.A. would be meaningless. It would mean that despite being a statutorily presumptive guardian, a parent could nonetheless apply to be appointed a guardian. But that application would be unnecessary and I do not believe the Legislature enacted a statute that provided for applications that are not necessary. [ 100 ] I believe that

section 51 of the F.L.A. , as it applies to parents, is reserved for those parents who separated before the birth of the child, or who never lived together with the other parent and the child, and therefore are not presumptive guardians under

section 39 of the F.L.A. Accordingly, I conclude that section 51(1) of the F.L.A. is not available to a

section 39 presumptive guardian who wishes to apply for sole guardianship of a child. [ 101 ] However, I am of the view that section 51(1) (

b) of the F.L.A. authorizes a court to terminate a person’s guardianship of a child. It says so very clearly. [ 102 ] So, should a parent wish to have sole guardianship of a child in circumstances where both parents are statutorily presumptive guardians, then the route to that outcome, in my view, is for one guardian to apply to terminate the other parent’s guardianship pursuant to section 51(1) (

b) if the F.L.A . [ 103 ] Unfortunately the F.L.A. does not set out what a court is to consider when deciding whether or not to terminate a statutorily presumptive guardian’s status as a guardian, other than the overarching consideration of the child’s best interests set out in

section 37 of the F.L.A . [ 104 ] The only other sections of the F.L.A. that I should mention at this point are sections 215 and 218 of the F.L.A.

Section 215 authorizes a court to change, suspend or terminate a court order.

Section 218 authorizes a court to include in an order any terms or conditions the court considers appropriate. DISCUSSION [ 105 ] In light of the provisions of the F.L.A. that I have set out above, I have come to the following conclusions regarding the applications before me. [ 106 ] While not set out in the Application filed by S.H. because that application was filed before the F.L.A. came into effect, his application for sole guardianship of the children is really an application pursuant to section 51(1) (

b) for an order terminating R.G.’s guardianship of T., and an application pursuant to

section 215 for an order terminating Judge Dickey’s order granting R.G. joint guardianship of A. If both of those orders are made, then the effect would be that S.H. would be the only guardian of both children. For the reasons I have stated above, there is no

section of the F.L.A. authorizing me to make an order that S.H. has sole guardianship of the children. [ 107 ] While R.G.’s application is for joint guardianship of both children, there is no

section in the F.L.A. that permits such an application since she is a statutorily presumptive guardian of T., and she already has an order for guardianship of A. I believe that the appropriate way to deal with R.G.’s applications is to treat them as applications to preserve what she already has, guardianship of both of her children. [ 108 ] In resolving these applications I am to consider the best interests of T. and A. as that concept is defined in

section 37 of the F.L.A.

Section 37 states: Best interests of child

(1) In making an agreement or order under this Part respecting guardianship, parenting arrangements or contact with a child, the parties and the court must consider the best interests of the child only.

(2) To determine what is in the best interests of a child, all of the child's needs and circumstances must be considered, including the following: (

a) the child's health and emotional well-being; (

b) the child's views, unless it would be inappropriate to consider them; (

c) the nature and strength of the relationships between the child and significant persons in the child's life; (

d) the history of the child's care; (

e) the child's need for stability, given the child's age and stage of development; (

f) the ability of each person who is a guardian or seeks guardianship of the child, or who has or seeks parental responsibilities, parenting time or contact with the child, to exercise his or her responsibilities; (

g) the impact of any family violence on the child's safety, security or well-being, whether the family violence is directed toward the child or another family member; (

h) whether the actions of a person responsible for family violence indicate that the person may be impaired in his or her ability to care for the child and meet the child's needs; (

i) the appropriateness of an arrangement that would require the child's guardians to cooperate on issues affecting the child, including whether requiring cooperation would increase any risks to the safety, security or well-being of the child or other family members; (

j) any civil or criminal proceeding relevant to the child's safety, security or well-being.

(3) An agreement or order is not in the best interests of a child unless it protects, to the greatest extent possible, the child's physical, psychological and emotional safety, security and well-being.

(4) In making an order under this Part, a court may consider a person's conduct only if it substantially affects a factor set out in subsection (2), and only to the extent that it affects that factor. [ 109 ] Section 37(1) of the F.L.A. makes it clear that I am only to consider the best interests of T. and A. in resolving these competing applications. [ 110 ] Accordingly I propose to review the relevant factors set out in section 37(2) of the F.L.A. below.

a) The health and emotional well-being of T. and A.; [ 111 ] There is nothing regarding the health and emotional well-being of A. that would impact these applications. A. has Hepatitis C but that disease is not affecting A.’s day to day life right now. She has regular doctor appointments to monitor her health but there is nothing about A.’s health that weighs in favour of either S.H. or R.G. [ 112 ] T.’s behavioural problems have been an issue for R.G. in the past. She acknowledged that she had difficulty coping with T.’s

challenging behaviours to the point where she spanked him too hard. The Ministry became involved and R.G. was referred to Project Parent for assistance. She has continued her involvement with Project Parent for almost one year, although I do not have any information as to her progress in that program beyond November, 2012. [ 113 ] S.H. has not struggled with T.’s behaviour in the same way that R.G. has. S.H. has been proactive in getting T. on the waiting list for a comprehensive behavioural assessment at Sunnyhill Hospital.

In her evidence, R.G. conceded that while she and S.H. were together she allowed S.H. to take care of all of T.’s medical appointments or other appointments dealing with T.’s behavioural challenges. [ 114 ] I conclude that S.H. is better able to cope with T.’s behavioural issues as demonstrated by S.H. over the years both when he and R.G. were together and since their separation.

b) T.’s and A.’s views, unless it would be inappropriate to consider them; [ 115 ] Given the ages of the children I am of the view it would be inappropriate to consider their views on these applications. Moreover, there is no evidence before me as to what their views are concerning their present living arrangements.

c) The nature and strength of the relationships between T. and A. and significant persons in their lives; [ 116 ] There is no evidence before me that T. and A. have a stronger or weaker relationship with either of their parents. I have been told, and I accept, that T. and A. are closely bonded with each other and with both of their parents. I have also been told, and I accept, that T. and A. have a close and significant relationship with C.D. and her three children. [ 117 ] Both T. and A. attend their Aunt’s daycare and T. attends her pre-school.

I have been told, and I accept, that both children have a close and significant relationship with their Aunt. [ 118 ] I am of the view that this factor is neutral as between S.H. and R.G. on the applications before me.

d) The history of T.’s and A.'s care; [ 119 ] I am of the view that this factor weighs in favour of S.H. There is no evidence before me that could form the basis of any criticism of S.H.’s care for his children. He was unreasonable, in my view, in limiting R.G.’s contact with T. following their separation in April, 2012 although he felt he had good reason to insist on R.G.’s visits being supervised.

But aside from his rather strict views on the need for R.G.’s visits to be supervised, there really is no evidence that would support a criticism of his care for his children. [ 120 ] I have already reviewed above some obvious criticisms of R.G.’s care for her children. I will not repeat those here. R.G., on the whole, has provided good care for her children, but there have been times when she had serious lapses in judgment that placed the safety and well-being of her children at risk.

As evidence of the good care she was able to provide her children, S.H. had no reservation leaving the children in R.G.’s care when he went to work during their relationship together. As well, when S.H. decided to separate from R.G. he left A. in her care. A. was a very vulnerable child at that point and S.H. nonetheless felt that it was better for A. to leave her with R.G. than to take her with him when he left. [ 121 ] Having said that, R.G.’s care of A., as I have pointed out above, raised some very serious concerns.

One issue that I have not touched upon is the blood test A. had to determine if she had Hepatitis C. In about March, 2012 R.G. took A. for a blood test to determine if she had Hepatitis C. Following that test R.G. did nothing to determine the results of the blood test. She did not give the doctor a phone number to report the results, nor did she call the doctor back to find out the results.

R.G. was informed of the blood test results, and the positive diagnosis of Hepatitis C, from her mother who received the news from A.’s family doctor. [ 122 ] R.G.’s failure to follow up with the blood test results for A. is concerning. This was not just a minor blood test. The diagnosis of Hepatitis C presents a significant health concern for A. as she grows older and the results of that test ought to have been obviously important to both her parents. [ 123 ] So, for those reasons, I conclude that this factor weighs in S.H.’s favour.

e) T.’s and A.’s need for stability, given their ages and stages of development; [ 124 ] Both of these children need stability given their young ages and given T.’s behavioural problems. [ 125 ] S.H. has done a good job with the significant contribution from C.D. in providing a stable life and daily routine for both children. While I pointed out earlier that this relationship between S.H. and C.D. is still in its early stages, it appears to be a committed relationship.

C.D. has taken on a significant parental role in the lives of T. and A. and the children are benefiting from her involvement. [ 126 ] Both S.H. and C.D. appear to have secure jobs working in the same industry. Neither works full time so that one or both is available for the children each day. There is a fairly strict daily routine in S.H.’s home which is understandable given that he and C.D. have five children to care for.

[ 127 ] I am of the view that S.H. and C.D. are providing a stable living environment for both children. [ 128 ] R.G. has struggled with stability in her life since the separation. Her living arrangements were quite unstable from April until December, 2012. R.G. then obtained housing at the Ishtar Transition Home and from there moved into her current home.

I believe that if R.G. is able to maintain her current home, she will have taken a significant step in stabilizing herself and by extension her ability to provide a stable living environment for her children. [ 129 ] A.’s removal on December 11, 2012 was an obviously destabilizing event. R.G. has been working hard with counsellors and other professionals to better herself so that she can provide a more stable life for both herself and her children. [ 130 ] In the end, I am of the view that as matters currently stand S.H. is able to provide more stability for T. and A. than R.G.

f) The ability of S.H. and R.G. seeking guardianship of T. and A., or seeking parental responsibilities, parenting time or contact with T. and A., to exercise their responsibilities; [ 131 ] I have no concerns regarding S.H. ability to exercise his parenting responsibilities or to discharge his guardianship responsibilities over T. and A. while he has the assistance of C.D. I have pointed out earlier that S.H. has never had to care for T. and A. on his own. Having said that, there is no evidence before me that would call into question S.H.’s capacity to discharge his duties as T.’s and A.’s guardian or to fulfil his parental responsibilities as set out in

section 41 of the F.L.A . [ 132 ] For the reasons I have already stated, I have some reservations about R.G.’s ability to fulfil her parental responsibilities as T.’s and A.’s guardian. She has exercised poor judgment at times and has not followed through on some important aspects of her children’s lives. [ 133 ] Despite that, R.G. has demonstrated a level of commitment to improving herself as an individual and a parent that cannot be overlooked.

While I am not aware of how she is doing in the various programs she is connected to, there is no evidence she has relapsed into drug use and she continues to participate in the Project Parent program. Only time will tell if she has been able to improve herself and move beyond whatever factors in her life led her to make some bad decisions that put herself and A. in harm’s way. [ 134 ] On all of the evidence, I am prepared to say that R.G. lacks the capacity to exercise some parental responsibilities listed in

section 41 of the F.L.A. , but does not lack the capacity to exercise other of those parental responsibilities.

g) The impact of any family violence on T.’s or A.’s safety, security or well-being, whether the family violence is directed toward T. and A. or another family member; [ 135 ] There is no evidence of family violence in the relationship between S.H. and R.G. R.G. admits that she was unable to cope with T.’s behavioural challenges and that led her to spank T. inappropriately. [ 136 ] I am of the view that R.G. has learned from her mistake. I am also of the view that T.’s behaviour has improved and that he is not as prone to acting out violently as he did in the past.

I do not consider the historical spanking incident to be a significant factor in this case. [ 137 ] However, what cannot be overlooked is R.G.’s relationship with P.L. which was clearly violent. It is clear that R.G. did not have the ability to keep herself and A. safe from P.L. and that ultimately led to A.’s removal. [ 138 ] R.G. testified that she entered the Ishtar Transition Home within days of the last assault by P.L. in December, 2012. There is no evidence that R.G. has had any contact with P.L. since that date.

While we are now four months beyond the last assault, and while R.G. is getting professional help to assist her in making safe decisions for herself and her children, I have not been given any current information on positive changes or what better understanding R.G. has as to why she would place her own safety and the safety of young A. at risk in a domestically violent relationship.

While I accept that R.G. has made a clean break from her violent relationship with P.L., I am of the view that there remains some risk that R.G. will exercise poor judgment when it comes to her safety and the safety of her children in any future relationships. That risk, however, is one that can be reduced through the further professional help and counselling that R.G. states she plans to pursue.

h) Whether the actions of a person responsible for family violence indicate that the person may be impaired in his or her ability to care for T. and A. and meet their needs; [ 139 ] I have already concluded that R.G.’s spanking of T. is not a significant factor in my decision in this case. There is no additional evidence that either R.G. or S.H. were responsible for family violence. Accordingly I find that neither parent is impaired in their ability to care for the children or meet their needs due to family violence.

i) The appropriateness of an arrangement that would require S.H. and R.G. to cooperate on issues affecting T. and A., including whether requiring cooperation would increase any risks to the safety, security or well-being of T. and A. or other family members;

[ 140 ] There has never been a safety risk associated with communication between S.H. and R.G. While S.H. complained that there was poor communication with R.G., both he and C.D. said that they had no difficulty keeping R.G. informed of important details concerning T. and A.

As well, neither S.H. nor C.D. objected to the suggestion that R.G. might attend the children’s dentist and doctor appointments so that she could hear directly from the specialists as to her children’s health. [ 141 ] While I was left with the impression that S.H. and C.D. were not that happy with the prospect that R.G. might insert herself into an aspect of the children’s lives where she has not been to this point, there was no evidence to suggest that, should she elect to do so, there was any risk to the safety, security, or well-being of the children.

j) Any civil or criminal proceeding relevant to T.’s and A.’s safety, security or well-being. [ 142 ] The outstanding child protection case under the C.F.C.S.A. is the only relevant proceeding under this factor.

I have been told that a decision whether to pursue that case is awaiting my decision in this case. [ 143 ] Whether or not social worker Bannister proceeds with her application for a three month temporary supervision order under the C.F.C.S.A. will depend on how I decide the applications in this case. [ 144 ] Regardless of what I decide, the orders made in the proceedings under the C.F.C.S.A. will prevail over the orders I make under the F.L.A. ( Re: Christie, and Dereniuk v. Christie , Unreported, Vancouver Registry No. 4063 & 3722, February 23, 1993, B.C. Prov.

Ct.) [ 145 ] P.L. was charged with a number of different criminal offences arising out of the assaults he committed against R.G. on November 30 and December 11, 2012. Those criminal charges have been resolved and are not relevant to what I must decide on the applications before me in this case. I am of that view because I am satisfied that P.L. is no longer a part of R.G.’s life and he poses no further risk to her safety or the safety of the children. GUARDIANSHIP [ 146 ] If R.G. was still involved in the violent relationship with P.L. my decision would likely be different.

R.G. showed, at times, grossly impaired judgment respecting her own safety and the safety of A. while she was in that relationship. [ 147 ] But R.G. has made appropriate decisions since December 11, 2012 for her own safety. She has shown a commitment to herself and improving her parenting that needs to be recognized. [ 148 ] Given the statutory presumption of guardianship over T. that R.G. enjoys, along with the order of guardianship that she has with A., I am not satisfied that S.H. has established that this is one of the rare cases where guardianship should be terminated.

I say one of the rare cases, because I am of the view that in enacting the F.L.A. the Legislature decided to put birth parents who have raised children together before separation on a more equal footing than they have been in the past under the F.R.A . [ 149 ] I am further of the view that in enacting the F.L.A. , the Legislature:

a) Established a presumption of guardianship; and

b) Did not include an operative

section allowing a presumptive guardian to apply for sole guardianship. [ 150 ] Accordingly, to obtain sole guardianship in those circumstances the presumptive guardian must apply to cancel the other presumptive guardian’s guardianship status. I am of the view that the Legislature intended that such applications to cancel a presumptive guardian’s guardianship status would occur only in very rare and the clearest of cases where cancelling guardianship was clearly in the child’s best interests.

I do not consider this case to be one of those rare and clearest of cases such that it is in T.’s and A.’s best interests to cancel R.G.’s guardianship over them. [ 151 ] Accordingly for all of the foregoing reasons I confirm that S.H. and R.G. continue to be the guardians of T. and A. PARENTING RESPONSIBILITIES [ 152 ] Pursuant to section 40(3) of the F.L.A. , I apportion the parenting responsibilities between S.H. and R.G. as follows. [ 153 ] S.H. alone will have sole responsibility for the parenting responsibilities set out in subsections 41(1)(a),(b), and (c).

I reach that conclusion because I am not satisfied that R.G. has, in fact, benefited from all of the courses and programs she is taking or plans on taking such that her tendency to lapse into bad judgment when it comes to her own safety and the safety of her children has been sufficiently ameliorated that she can be trusted with the parental responsibilities set out in those subsections. [ 154 ] S.H. and R.G. will share equally in the parenting responsibilities set out in subsections 41(1)(d), (e), (g), (j), (k), and (l). S.H. and R.G. will share the parenting responsibilities set out in subsections 41(1)(

f) and (

h) subject to the following qualifications. With respect to subsection 41(1)(

f) if the parties are unable to reach an agreement with respect to a decision under this subsection, S.H. will have the final say and R.G. may seek a review of that decision in court pursuant to

section 49 of the F.L.A. With respect to section 41(1) (

h) if R.G. neglects or refuses to provide her response on an issue respecting her consent for T. or A. within 48 hours of a written request

by S.H., then S.H. alone may give, refuse, or withdraw consent for T. and A. PARENTING TIME [ 155 ] S.H. wants R.G.’s parenting time with T. and A. to continue to be supervised. R.G.’s counsel in her closing submissions did not object to continued supervision until such time as the Ministry no longer required supervision. I am not satisfied that supervision is necessary any longer to ensure the children’s safety. The two safety concerns expressed by S.H. and Ms. Bannister were R.G.’s inability to cope with T.’s behaviour that led her to spank T. inappropriately, and the presence of P.L.

I am satisfied that neither of those issues presents a sufficient safety concern to warrant supervised access. [ 156 ] However, I am satisfied that R.G. could benefit from having some of her access in a more controlled setting where there are others available as a resource to her should she need some assistance with her children. I do not view this as a safety issue but more as a learning issue. [ 157 ] N.F. has graciously offered to assist in supervising R.G.’s visits with the children at her daycare.

Again, I view N.F.’s offer to assist to be a benefit to T., A., and R.G. because they will have access to a licenced daycare operator to assist with questions around how to deal with the children’s behaviour. [ 158 ] So, I order that R.G. will have the following parenting time with T. and A.: (

i) Tuesdays for three hours with the parenting time to be exercised at the [name of daycare] Daycare or the nearby Family Center with N.F. present. The hours are to be set in consultation with N.F. It may be that the parenting time would work better in the afternoon rather than the morning so that R.G. could have the children at the nearby Family Centre rather than at the daycare where there will be other children present. (ii) Fridays for three hours with A. alone. T. is in pre-school so he is not available for these visits. If, or when, T. is out of pre-school he is to be included in these visits.

The Friday visits will occur at the [name of daycare] Daycare in the presence of N.F. The terms for the Tuesday visits will apply to the Friday visits. (iii) Commencing Saturday May 11, 2013 R.G. will have a four-hour visit with T. and A. unsupervised. R.G. will be responsible for picking up the children at the start of the visit and S.H. will be responsible for picking up the children at the end of the visit. After four consecutive Saturday visits R.G.’s visits will increase to six hours each Saturday.

I have deliberately chosen May 11, 2013 as the date for the start of these visits to accommodate the scheduled May 7, 2013 meeting with social worker Bannister to review R.G.’s progress towards her goals. (iv) In the event that Ms. Bannister is not prepared to cancel her requirement for R.G.’s time with the children to be supervised, then these orders for parenting time will be suspended until such time as the orders under the C.F.C.S.A. have expired. ANCILLIARY ORDERS [ 159 ] Pursuant to

section 218 of the F.L.A. I make the following orders: (

i) Neither parent shall drive the children in a vehicle unless they possess a valid British Columbia driver’s licence. (ii) Neither parent will allow the children to reside with or have any contact with P.L. born [d.o.b.]. (iii) Neither parent will reside with any new person and introduce the children to that new person without giving the other parent 14 days notice of their intention to do so.

The parent giving notice must provide the other parent with the full name and date of birth of the new person and must provide the other parent with an opportunity for a face to face meeting with the new person. (iv) If either parent misses their parenting time with the children, that parenting time will be made up within 30 days of the missed parenting time. (

v) Neither parent will consume non-prescription illegal drugs or alcohol 24 hours prior to, or during, their parenting time with the children. (vi) The parties will appear before me for a two hour parenting time review hearing during August, 2013. I anticipate that some changes will have to be made to the parenting time orders I have made in this decision given that T. will be starting kindergarten in September, 2013.

CONCLUSION [ 160 ] For the reasons set out above, I confirm that S.H. and R.G. are the guardians of T. and A. and therefore, I dismiss S.H.’s application to cancel R.G.’s guardianship of T. pursuant to section 51(1)(

b) of the F.L.A. and I dismiss S.H.’s application pursuant to

section 215 of the F.L.A. to cancel Judge Dickey’s order that R.G. shares joint guardianship of A. with S.H. [ 161 ] The parties will share the parenting responsibilities for T. and A. pursuant to

section 41 of the F.L.A. as set out in paragraphs 151 and 152 above. [ 162 ] R.G. will have parenting time with T. and A. as set out in paragraph 156 above. [ 163 ] I will make the ancillary orders set out in paragraph 157 above. [ 164 ] The parties are to appear before me in July or August, 2013 for a review of the parenting time and to make adjustments to account for T. starting school in September, 2013. [ 165 ] I will remain seized of any applications in this case until December, 2013. _________________________________ The Honourable Judge R.N. Hamilton Provincial Court of British Columbia