D.L.J. v. R.T.C. Date:, 2017 BCPC 188

Citation: D.L.J. v. R.T.C. Date: 20170531 2017 BCPC 188 File No: F3857 Registry: Western Communities IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA IN THE MATTER OF THE FAMILY LAW ACT , S.B.C. 2011 c. 25 BETWEEN: D.L.J. APPLICANT AND: R.T.C. RESPONDENT REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE J. P. MacCARTHY Counsel for the Applicant: J. Kahan

Place of Hearing: Colwood , B.C. Date of Hearing: May 31, 2017 Date of Judgment: May 31, 2017 INTRODUCTION [ 1 ] THE COURT: D.L.J. is before this court on an ex parte application. In that ex parte application, she is seeking a protection order against R.T.C.

The basis of the protection order is that D.L.J. (hereinafter referred to as the "Applicant") is fearful of escalating family violence being perpetrated upon her by R.T.C. (hereinafter referred to as the "Respondent"). [ 2 ] The first issue before this court is to determine whether or not it has jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions of s. 183 of the Family Law Act (the “ FLA ”) to make the protection order, and the second issue is to determine whether or not, on the basis of the evidence before the court, that it is appropriate that a protection order be granted.

EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT [ 3 ] I have before me two sources of evidence. The first source is by way of an affidavit sworn by the Applicant on May 30, 2017, and filed May 31, 2017. The second form of evidence is the viva voce evidence provided by the Applicant at today's hearing, with the assistance of legal counsel representing her. CIRCUMSTANCES [ 4 ] Based on the evidence before me, the personal circumstances are that the Applicant is a person presently on CPP disability payments and also receiving long-term disability payments.

She suffers from a number of medical conditions which are outlined in paragraph 17 of her affidavit. Among those medical conditions are significant problems with her spine and back, as well as heart conditions and an inflamed stomach lining and other gastrointestinal problems. She is on medication, including what I understand to be heavy narcotics and other drugs, including antidepressants which are essential for her due to her medical conditions. [ 5 ] She formerly worked as a sales representative for a building supply store on Vancouver Island. She is 53 years of age.

She resides in a residence [omitted for publication] on Sooke Lake Road, Sooke, British Columbia (hereinafter referred to as the "Residence"). [ 6 ] She and the Respondent met through an online dating website back in the spring of 2015. They eventually communicated through texting and then had a personal meeting.

The relationship continued to grow from that point on, such that by the summer of 2015, they had agreed that they would be entering into a permanent, long-term relationship which would be monogamous or exclusive in nature. [ 7 ] Following that advancement in the relationship, they then agreed that because of the financial circumstances in which the Respondent found himself, they would commence to reside with each other in the Residence. The cohabitation commenced towards the end of September 2015. [ 8 ] The Respondent is 50 years of age.

He is a construction worker; however, given an injury that he sustained arising out of a hit- and-run accident, he has not been able to work for a considerable period of time. He is reliant on social assistance. He has done some volunteer work involving construction for a volunteer non-profit agency, but primarily has not been making a substantial amount of income from any other sources other than from his social assistance payments.

THE RELATIONSHIP [ 9 ] The parties' relationship continued after the commencement of cohabitation in late September and early October 2015; however, by September 1, 2016, the relationship had come to a very difficult stage. The relationship ended in September 2016. That resulted in a disagreement about the Respondent moving out of the Residence, which was the property of the Applicant and her sisters. [ 10 ] According to the affidavit material before me, the Respondent demanded payment of monies to compensate him for work that he had performed in the Residence while residing there.

Accordingly, the parties entered into a mutual agreement to end the tenancy arrangement and that was signed on the 31st of August, 2016. It made provision for a payment to the Respondent by the Applicant. [ 11 ] I am given to understand that a formal tenancy agreement had been entered into between the Applicant and the Respondent at the request of the Respondent.

The Applicant was told by the Respondent that this was a requirement of the social assistance branch of government and by having that formal agreement in place; he was able to qualify for additional payments from social assistance. [ 12 ] Having received a payment of some $5,000 from the Applicant, the Respondent did leave the Residence and the personal relationship apparently had come to an end. However, in October 2016, the Applicant was hospitalized with various medical conditions.

The Respondent made contact with her while she was hospitalized and, in the words of the Applicant as set out in her affidavit, he "came back into my life": He offered to help take care of me at the trailer by doing the cleaning and helping with taking me for groceries, et cetera. He did not contribute any money for food, or pay rent.

Eventually, we started a relationship as boyfriend/girlfriend again and by Christmas he was living with me once more, sharing my bed. [ 13 ] Based on the evidence before me, it is clear that the relationship between the Applicant and the Respondent was revived and, according to the evidence provided by the Applicant, the relationship continued from that point on until March of 2017 by which time

the relationship had again come to an end. [ 14 ] The evidence before me indicates that due to the medical condition of the Applicant, intimacy was an issue that became a source of disagreement between the Applicant and the Respondent. The Applicant indicated that her medical condition made intimate relations difficult for her. The evidence indicates that the Respondent was unsympathetic to her medical issue and found that a lack of intimacy was an irritant to him. [ 15 ] The situation was such that the parties, essentially, from January of 2017, were living separate and apart under the same roof.

The Respondent refused to leave the Residence, indicating that, in his view, he had a tenancy agreement and rights as a tenant, and therefore refused to leave. There was no formal tenancy agreement entered into between the parties once they had resumed cohabitating in October 2016, and that from that point on, the arrangements, if any, are undocumented. [ 16 ] The evidence provided by the Applicant indicates that the last three months have been very challenging for the Applicant. She has been avoiding the Respondent during the days by spending time at friends' houses.

She deposes that when she is at home, she is concerned that there will be arguments started by the Respondent which do not appear to have any conclusion. She deposes that in the course of arguments and disagreements, he is extremely abusive to her verbally. In particular, she notes in paragraph 8 as follows: He has been yelling at me when we disagree. He will yell and call me names and I just try to walk away and he follows me. He calls me cunt, bitch, crazy bitch, hugger, crazy whore, et cetera.

He has been getting very angry with me, standing right in front of me, yelling, and has been spitting in my face because he is so angry. [ 17 ] She also deposes that he is approximately five foot eight inches tall and weighs about 180 pounds, and is very muscular. She is a much smaller person, both in terms of physical stature and weight, and she further deposes that this difference in physical size makes her afraid of him. [ 18 ] The situation that has precipitated the ex parte application arises from a series of events that started on Thursday, May 25, 2017.

On that particular date, the Applicant had left the Residence and the Respondent, who was at that time drinking with a friend. The Applicant was of the view that the Respondent had been drinking all day. When she returned home around 9 p.m., she was surprised to find him sleeping in her bed. The Applicant and the Respondent had not been sharing a bed since approximately Christmastime of 2016. Accordingly, she slept on the couch that night. [ 19 ] On the following Friday, May 26, 2017, she came home and observed that the Respondent was drunk.

She noted a significant amount of glasses and beer and alcohol, along with the indication that there had been amounts spilled in the Residence and also an indication that the Respondent had been ill from the alcohol consumption and had vomited on the front porch. [ 20 ] She avoided any contact with the Respondent and went straight to bed, with concerns that she did not want to confront or initiate anything with the Respondent and wanted to try to get to sleep before anything happened. [ 21 ] It was while she was asleep that she heard the bedroom door open.

She was just waking up and she could observe that the Respondent was naked and he was crawling up from the bottom of the bed. She deposes in her affidavit and in her evidence that she pretended to be asleep because she was afraid and terrified of him; she also could not believe that he was doing this to her given the fact that they had not shared any sexual intimacy for several months. [ 22 ] It was during the course of this advance that she became increasingly alarmed.

She deposes in paragraph 13 of her affidavit as follows: I was lying on my side, away from him, and he put one hand under my pillow where my head was and his other hand went around my arm and was held tightly against my chest. He pushed his genitals against my body and I just froze. I lay there stiff and didn't move. I still pretended to be asleep. I didn't know what to do. He eventually rolled onto his back and then got out of bed. [ 23 ] This situation was particularly distressing, again because the Respondent had not shared the Applicant's bed since early January 2017.

She goes on to depose, both in her affidavit as well as in her oral evidence, that this situation of unwanted sexual contact really scared and upset her. As a result, she left the Residence and stayed with her sister during the past weekend following that unwelcomed event. She has also enlisted the assistance of her two sisters, who have been providing her with a measure of protection by staying with her at the Residence.

However that situation is not a permanent arrangement nor can the Applicant expect that it will be a permanent arrangement to provide her with adequate protection. [ 24 ] The police apparently have been contacted with respect to these events. The police have, apparently, demonstrated some reluctance to get involved, notwithstanding the allegations of the unwanted sexual contact.

It appears, on the basis of the communications provided to the Applicant by police, that they consider the matter to be civil in nature and that they are not at this point, apparently, intervening in any direct fashion in order to have the Respondent leave the Residence. [ 25 ] As I understand it, the Respondent has communicated to the police authorities that he has tenancy rights within the Residence and is standing on those tenancy rights. Thus, he is refusing to leave the Residence.

There is some indication that he may be looking for replacement accommodation; however, there is a significant amount of uncertainty as to the timing of or any actual acquisition of that replacement residential setting for the Respondent. [ 26 ] The Respondent has not been paying any rent to the Applicant during any portions of the time that he has occupied the Residence.

In particular, he has not been making any financial contribution for the household expenses or payments in lieu of rent during that period of time, but has performed some minor repairs, the most recently being in the last short period of time. [ 27 ] The Applicant’s legal counsel informs me that, because of the shared kitchen and bathroom arrangement, no protection is afforded to the Applicant under the Residential Tenancy Act and that the only appropriate means of trying to gain possession of the Residence may be by way of an application to the Supreme Court of British Columbia.

[ 28 ] The evidence before me is that there are no shared assets between the Applicant and the Respondent. As I understand it, they keep separate financial arrangements, assets and bank accounts. The only assets that the Respondent apparently has include his clothing, some personal property, some hand tools, and two bikes. So far as the Applicant is aware, those remain at the present time in the Residence, but could be stored in an adjacent outbuilding in a secured manner if an order is made pursuant to this application. Relevant Provisions of the Family Law Act [ 29 ] The application is being brought pursuant to s. 183 of the Family Law Act (the “ FLA” ).

Section 183 provides as follows:

(1) An order under this

section (

a) may be made on application by a family member claiming to be an at-risk family member, by a person on behalf of an at-risk family member, or on the court's own initiative, and (

b) need not be made in conjunction with any other proceeding or claim for relief under this Act.

(2) A court may make an order against a family member for the protection of another family member if the court determines that (

a) family violence is likely to occur, and (

b) the other family member is an at-risk family member.

(3) An order under subsection (2) may include one or more of the following: (

a) a provision restraining the family member from (

i) directly or indirectly communicating with or contacting the at-risk family member or a specified person, (ii) attending at, nearing or entering a place regularly attended by the at-risk family member, including the residence, property, business, school or place of employment of the at-risk family member, even if the family member owns the place, or has a right to possess the place, (iii) following the at-risk family member, (iv) possessing a weapon, a firearm or a specified object, or (

v) possessing a licence, registration certificate, authorization or other document relating to a weapon or firearm; (

b) limits on the family member in communicating with or contacting the at-risk family member, including specifying the manner or means of communication or contact; (

c) directions to a police officer to (

i) remove the family member from the residence immediately or within a specified period of time, (ii) accompany the family member, the at-risk family member or a specified person to the residence as soon as practicable, or within a specified period of time, to supervise the removal of personal belongings, or (iii) seize from the family member anything referred to in paragraph (a)(iv) or (v); (

d) a provision requiring the family member to report to the court, or to a person named by the court, at the time and in the manner specified by the court; (

e) any terms or conditions the court considers necessary to (

i) protect the safety and security of the at-risk family member, or (ii) implement the order.

(4) Unless the court provides otherwise, an order under this

section expires one year after the date it is made. [ 30 ]

Section 184 of the FLA is headed and deals with “Whether to make a protection order.”

Section 184 reads as follows: 184

(1) In determining whether to make an order under this Part, the court must consider at least the following risk factors: (

a) any history of family violence by the family member against whom the order is to be made; (

b) whether any family violence is repetitive or escalating; (

c) whether any psychological or emotional abuse constitutes, or is evidence of, a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour directed at the at-risk family member; (

d) the current status of the relationship between the family member against whom the order is to be made and the at-risk family member, including any recent separation or intention to separate; (

e) any circumstance of the family member against whom the order is to be made that may increase the risk of family violence by that

family member, including substance abuse, employment or financial problems, mental health problems associated with a risk of violence,access to weapons, or a history of violence; (

f) the at-risk family member's perception of risks to his or her own safety and security; (

g) any circumstance that may increase the at-risk family member's vulnerability, including pregnancy, age, family circumstances,health or economic dependence. [31] Section 184(2) of the FLA sets out the court’s required considerations if family members are seeking protections orders againsteach other; subsection (3) provides that for the purposes of subsection (2), the person who initiates a particular incident of familyviolence is not necessarily the person against whom an order should be made; and subsection (4) permits the court to make a protectionorder regardless of whether any of six circumstances enumerated in ss. (

a) to (

f) inclusive exist. [32]

Section 186 of the FLA permits the court to make an order under this part of the FLA without notice. Subsection (2) providesthat if an order is made under this part without notice, the court, on application by the party against whom the order is made, may setaside the order or make an order under s. 187 to either change or terminate the order that has been made under s. 183. [33] In order to avail the provisions of s. 183 of the FLA, the Applicant must satisfy the court that she is a family member and thatthe Respondent is a family member. The term "family member" is defined under s. 1 of the FLA on the following terms: "family member", with respect to a person, means (

a) the person's spouse or former spouse, (

b) a person with whom the person is living, or has lived, in a marriage-like relationship, (

c) a parent or guardian of the person's child, (

d) a person who lives with, and is related to, (

i) the person, or (ii) a person referred to in any of paragraphs (

a) to (c), or (

e) the person's child, and includes a child who is living with, or whose parent or guardian is, a person referred to in any of paragraphs (

a) to (e); [34] The Applicant in this matter is relying upon the provisions of the definition of a “family member” found under s. 1(b); namely,that she is a person with whom she has lived in a marriage-like relationship with the Respondent. Case Authorities Relied Upon by the Applicant [35] The Applicant has provided the court for consideration the following case authorities. I note that I have read each of theseauthorities, or at least the relevant portions of these authorities, and have relied upon the guidance provided by them, notwithstanding thatI may not make a specific reference to all of the cases. [36] The authorities before the court are as follows:

(1) Weber v. Leclerc, [2015] B.C.J. No. 2586; 2015 BCCA 492 ;

(2) K.L.L. v. D.J., 2014 BCPC 85 ; [2014] B.C.J. 982;

(3) S.L.M.W. v. M.R.G.W., 2016 BCSC 272 ; and

(4) J.Z. v. L.H.C., 2015 BCSC 97 . Position of the Applicant [37] The Applicant in submissions indicates that the evidence satisfies the jurisdictional question and that an order may be made bythis court pursuant to s. 183 on the basis that the Applicant is a family member of the Respondent and that the evidence supports thebasis of that relationship, even if the relationship was of a relatively limited duration, especially following the Applicant’s return fromhospital [see: K.L.L. v.

D.J., supra, which held that no specific time requirement was required to determine whether a “marriage-likerelationship” existed.] [38] The Applicant also submits that the requirements for making a protection order, and in particular that the Applicant is an at-riskfamily member, are supported by the evidence. In terms of making that order, the Applicant submits that consideration of the variousrisk factors set out in s. 184 (1), clearly indicate that a protection order should be granted in this particular case.

Analysis The Existence of a Marriage-Like Relationship [39] With respect to whether or not the relationship is such that this court can determine that the Applicant is a family member withthe Respondent, I have had the opportunity of fully reading the decision in Weber v. Leclerc. That Court of Appeal decision was decided

in the context of a different form of application before the Court of Appeal. In particular, what was being considered by the Court ofAppeal is what is the nature of a “marriage-like relationship”, which is, of course, the basis of defining a family member under s. 1 of theFamily Law Act; namely, under ss.(b), a person with whom the person is living, or has lived, in a marriage-like relationship. [40] The decision in Weber v. Leclerc was considered by Justice Steeves in S.L.M.W. v. M.R.G.W. In the S.L.M.W. case, JusticeSteeves made particular mention and provided an excellent

summary of the analysis contained within Weber v. Leclerc. At paragraph 34of the S.L.M.W. case, Justice Steeves states as follows: A recent decision of the Court of Appeal has set out the approach to be taken when deciding whether there has been a marriage-likerelationship, beginning with the issue of the financial relationship between the parties (Weber v. Leclerc, 2015 BCCA 492): [21] With respect to the question of whether financial dependence or interdependence was a requirement of a marriage-like relationship,Frankel J.A., speaking for the Court [in Austin v.

Goerz, 2007 BCCA 586], said: [55] While financial dependence may at one time have been considered an essential aspect of a marital relationship this is no longer so. Today marriage is viewed as a partnership between equals and there is no principled reason why marital-equivalent relationships shouldbe viewed differently. [56] Mrs. Austin relies on Gostlin v. Kergin [(1986), (BC CA), 3 B.C.L.R. (2d) 264 (C.A.)] . . . and Takacs v. Gallo[(1998), (BC CA), 48 B.C.L.R. (3d) 265 (C.A.)] . . .

While the need to examine the financial relationship between theparties is discussed in both, in neither do I find support for the proposition that a marital-equivalent relationship cannot exist absent somelevel of financial dependence. [57] Apposite is the more recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in M. v. H., (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, whichconcerned that portion of the definition of "spouse" in the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.

F.3, conferring certain rights on either a manor woman who are not married to each other but who live together in a "conjugal relationship." In discussing the requirements ofconjugal (i.e., marriage-like) relationships, Cory J. indicated that while financial dependence is a factor it is but one of many to beconsidered: [59] Molodowich v. Penttinen (1980), (ON SC), 17 R.F.L. (2d) 376 (Ont. Dist. Ct.), sets out the generally acceptedcharacteristics of a conjugal relationship.

They include shared shelter, sexual and personal behaviour, services, social activities,economic support and children, as well as the societal perception of the couple. However, it was recognized that these elements may bepresent in varying degrees and not all are necessary for the relationship to be found to be conjugal. While it is true that there may not beany consensus as to the societal perception of same-sex couples, there is agreement that same-sex couples share many other "conjugal"characteristics.

In order to come within the definition, neither opposite-sex couples nor same-sex couples are required to fit precisely thetraditional marital model to demonstrate that the relationship is "conjugal". [Emphasis added by Frankel J.A.] [58] It is understandable that the presence or absence of any particular factor cannot be determinative of whether a relationship ismarriage-like. This is because equally there is no checklist of characteristics that will invariably be found in all marriages. In this regardI respectfully agree with the following from the judgment of Ryan-Froslie J. in Yakiwchuk v.

Oaks, 2003 SKQB 124: [10] Spousal relationships are many and varied. Individuals in spousal relationships, whether they are married or not, structure theirrelationships differently. In some relationships there is a complete blending of finances and property - in others, spouses keep theirproperty and finances totally separate and in still others one spouse may totally control those aspects of the relationship with the otherspouse having little or no knowledge or input. For some couples, sexual relations are very important - for others, that aspect may take aback seat to companionship.

Some spouses do not share the same bed. There may be a variety of reasons for this such as health orpersonal choice. Some people are affectionate and demonstrative. They show their feelings for their "spouse" by holding hands,touching and kissing in public. Other individuals are not demonstrative and do not engage in public displays of affection. Some"spouses" do everything together - others do nothing together. Some "spouses" vacation together and some spend their holidays apart. Some "spouses" have children - others do not.

It is this variation in the way human beings structure their relationships that make thedetermination of when a "spousal relationship" exists difficult to determine. With married couples, the relationship is easy to establish. The marriage ceremony is a public declaration of their commitment and intent. Relationships outside marriage are much more difficultto ascertain. Rarely is there any type of "public" declaration of intent. Often people begin cohabiting with little forethought or planning. Their motivation is often nothing more than wanting to "be together".

Some individuals have chosen to enter relationships outsidemarriage because they did not want the legal obligations imposed by that status. Some individuals have simply given no thought as tohow their relationship would operate. Often the date when the cohabitation actually began is blurred because people "ease into"situations, spending more and more time together.

Agreements between people verifying when their relationship began and how it willoperate often do not exist. [Emphasis added by Frankel J.A.] [22] Austin establishes that the question of whether a cohabiting couple are in a "marriage-like relationship" is a question of mixed factand law that requires a broad approach: [62] The chambers judge properly took a holistic approach in finding that Ms. Goerz and Mr. Austin "were in a committed, marriage-likerelationship for all purposes". She had regard to all aspects of their relationship, including that there was minimal sharing of expensesand no commingling of assets.

Based on the evidence it was open to the chambers judge to reach the conclusion she did and there is nobasis on which this Court can interfere: Housen v. Nikolaisen, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235, 2002 SCC 33 at para. 22. [23] The parties' intentions -- particularly the expectation that the relationship will be of lengthy, indeterminate duration -- may be ofimportance in determining whether a relationship is "marriage-like".

While the court will consider the evidence expressly describing theparties' intentions during the relationship, it will also test that evidence by considering whether the objective evidence is consonant with

those intentions. [24] The question of whether a relationship is "marriage-like" will also typically depend on more than just their intentions. Objective evidence of the parties' lifestyle and interactions will also provide direct guidance on the question of whether the relationship was "marriage-like". [ 41 ] Justice Steeves goes on at paragraph 35 of the S.L.M.W. decision to note as follows: 35 The decision in Weber is also significant because it questioned the previous view in Gostlin that financial support was a fundamental aspect of a marriage-like relationship.

In Weber the court said: [12] . . . it is difficult from this vantage point, some 30 years after Gostlin , to fully understand the reasoning expressed in the passage that I have quoted [from Gostlin ]. It is based on the idea that marriage is a relationship characterized by economic dependence or interdependence. Perhaps marriage was, or was perceived to be, such a relationship at that time.

Today, though economic dependence or interdependence exists in many marriages, it would be difficult to characterize such dependency as being an essential characteristic of marriage. [ 42 ] I have taken into account the various factors that are discussed in both Weber v. Leclerc and in S.L.M.W. v. M.R.G.W. The evidence before me that has been adduced by the Applicant supports the conclusion that the Applicant and the Respondent were, at two separate times in their overall relationship, in a marriage-like relationship.

That conclusion is also supported by the evidence of the Applicant that the couple had initially agreed and expressed the view that they wanted to enter into a long-term, monogamous and exclusive relationship back at the outset of the relationship.

That appears to have again been either implied or expressed by the resumption of the relationship and their cohabitation following the hospitalization of the Applicant. [ 43 ] I am also satisfied that the marriage-like relationship was made out on the basis of the testimony of the Applicant that both friends and acquaintances were provided with an indication from the Applicant and Respondent to those friends and acquaintances that this couple was in a marriage-like relationship. [ 44 ] Having come to that conclusion, I am therefore satisfied that this court does have jurisdiction under s. 183 in order to make a protection order.

Consideration of the Basis to Make the Protection Order [ 45 ] I must then turn to the issue of whether or not, in this case, the evidence does support the making of a protection order. [ 46 ] In that regard, I have considered all of the requirements of s. 184 and in particular ss. (1).

I am of the view that the evidence that I have before me on this ex parte application does support the requirement that there be family violence and that, in this case, the Applicant is an at-risk family member. [ 47 ] The family violence can be viewed through the lens of the verbal abuse that the Applicant has been subjected to at the hands of the Respondent. See , for example, Morgadinho v.

Morgadinho , 2014 BCSC 192 which held that the broad and inclusive definition of family violence recognizes that harm may extend beyond physical violence and it is the ability of threatening words to instil fear that creates the harm. Similarly, “derogatory language” is a form of family violence as noted in K.L.L. v.

D.J. (supra). [ 48 ] More importantly, and more concerning, is the evidence I have of the uninvited and non-consensual sexual touching that occurred most recently when the Respondent made his way into the Applicant's bed, apparently in a somewhat intoxicated state. [ 49 ] I am mindful that I, of course, only have the evidence of the Applicant before me on an ex parte application.

The Respondent may rebut that evidence, but on the basis of what is before me, I am concerned that there is some sort of significant escalation of the family violence, which started with the verbal abuse and has now escalated to the description of the unwanted sexual touching. [ 50 ] I am satisfied on the evidence before me that the verbal abuse meets the requirements of s. 184(1)(

c) and there is a pattern of psychological or emotional abuse being rendered upon the Applicant. This comes not only through the verbal abuse, but also by the position apparently adopted by the Respondent that he has some tenancy rights to the Residence, but to which he has made little in the way of financial contribution. It appears that the Respondent is attempting to take full advantage of some rather ill-defined tenancy rights, while at the same time not providing any rent or other significant services in lieu of rent.

It appears that the Respondent is taking full advantage of the situation in his refusal to leave the Residence while at the same time using his presence as a means of rendering emotional or psychological abuse upon the Applicant. [ 51 ] It is clear from the evidence that the Applicant is fearful of the continued presence of the Respondent in the Residence.

She has taken short-term steps in order to provide a measure of protection by enlisting the assistance of her family members. [ 52 ] Having regard to all of the factors under s. 184(1), and based on the evidence before me, I am of the view that the making of a protection order under s. 183 is most appropriate and warranted. However, I am mindful, as I have indicated throughout my reasons, that what I have before me is an ex parte application. Obviously, I do not have any contrary evidence from the Respondent.

Given that, I must make an allowance for the Respondent to seek to avail himself of the provisions of s. 187 of the Family Law Act in terms of either terminating or varying the terms of the protection order that I will be making. Form of Order [ 53 ] There will be a protection order granted pursuant to s. 183 of the Family Law Act . It will be for the duration of one year. The protection order will be in favour of the Applicant, D.L.J. It will be directed against R.T.C. [ 54 ] The provisions will be as follows, and for the convenience of our courts clerks, I will utilize the court’s pick list options under

the Family Law Act orders for protection orders. [ 55 ] Starting with Number B1: It will be under s. 183(3) (

a) of the Family Law Act , R.T.C. shall have no contact or communication, directly or indirectly, with D.L.J. [ 56 ] Number B3: Under s. 183(3)(

a) of the Family Law Act , R.T.C., shall not attend at or be found within 50 metres of the Residence or place of employment of D.L.J. [ 57 ] Number B10: Under s. 183(3)(c)(

i) of the Family Law Act , any peace officer, including any RCMP officer having jurisdiction in the Province of British Columbia, who is provided with a copy of this order, is directed to remove R.T.C. from the Residence located on Sooke Lake Road, Sooke, British Columbia. [ 58 ] Number B11: Under s. 183(c)(ii), any police officer, including any RCMP officer having jurisdiction in the Province of British Columbia, who is provided with a copy of this order, is directed to accompany R.T.C. to attend at the Residence located on Sooke Lake Road, Sooke, British Columbia, on one occasion to supervise the removal of his personal belongings. [ 59 ] I am going to make a specific direction pursuant to s. 183(3)(a), that R.T.C. shall not attend at, enter or be found to be within 50 metres of the Residence on Sooke Lake Road, Sooke, British Columbia, except as otherwise provided for in this protection order. [ 60 ] I am going to pause for a moment.

Are there any other conditions that are being sought with respect to the protection order other than, I am going to make a further provision for an application under s. 187 ? [ 61 ] MS. KAHAN: No, Your Honour, other than I would just like to confirm that the Sooke Lake Road location is actually located in Victoria -- [ 62 ] THE COURT: All right. That is the -- [ 63 ] MS. KAHAN: -- not in Sooke. [ 64 ] THE COURT: So is it the Victoria postal or is it the actual City of Victoria jurisdiction? Or is it the -- [ 65 ] MS.

KAHAN: I just know that the residential address is -- it says Victoria and they have told me that it is actually Victoria, so I am not sure as far as jurisdiction, but that is the postal address. [ 66 ] THE COURT: All right. So is it within the City of Victoria, or is it within the Capital Regional District, or is it within the District of Sooke? [ 67 ] D.L.J.: No, it's -- it's actually Langford. I'm still a little unclear on that because now Langford is now an official city so technically it should be Langford, B.C., not Victoria, B.C.

But -- [ 68 ] THE COURT: All right. [ 69 ] D.L.J.: -- my postal still says Victoria, B.C. [ 70 ] THE COURT: Yes. Well, okay, I am going to change the reference to Sooke, British Columbia, to Langford, British Columbia -- [ 71 ] D.L.J.: Okay. [ 72 ] THE COURT: -- throughout the terms of the order. [ 73 ] MS.

KAHAN: Thank you, Your Honour. [ 74 ] THE COURT: And then I am going to make a provision that R.T.C. may apply to shorten the term of this order, extend the term of the order, or otherwise change the order or to terminate the order pursuant to s. 187 of the Family Law Act , upon giving seven days' written notice to D.L.J. Anything further with respect to this? [ 75 ] MS. KAHAN: Nothing arising. [ 76 ] THE COURT: All right. I will direct that the registry prepare the form of this protection order. I also will direct that the registry arrange for the service of the protection order.

I am going to further direct that the protection order be accompanied by the Application to Obtain an Order, the Notice of Motion and the Affidavit in Support, all filed May 31, 2017. I will also direct that a certificate of service or affidavit of service be prepared and filed by the process server. [ 77 ] THE COURT: I am also going to direct that the registry order a copy of my reasons for judgment in this matter on an expedited basis. [REASONS FOR JUDGMENT CONCLUDED]